|
Post by welshofficer on Jul 11, 2015 23:15:40 GMT -6
QC, I think I agree, too many gaps to plug with available force. Although I might mischievously send a small battalion to show themselves on Battle Ridge, to ensure the escapees swing north down the valley... The problem of course, if GAC holes up and uses the 25th for recon, is that the battle probably takes place further down the valley on the 26th. WO The Na's had been moving north, that would be where more water and graze would have been. Tom,
Not that it matters, if movement is tracked and factored in whilst the regiment holes up on the 25th.
Heading towards the mouth of the LBH is just fine for Terry.
WO
|
|
Deleted
Deleted Member
Posts: 0
|
Post by Deleted on Jul 12, 2015 4:25:37 GMT -6
I think our modern FA is a little better than that. The gunners wet their fingers and stick them up into the wind before they say fire. Very sophisticated process. We do that at launch sites too. Except hubby, He marches to a different drummer. Have Weather Station, will travel.not surprising he marches to a different drum. I dread to think what he must go through on a daily basis.
|
|
Deleted
Deleted Member
Posts: 0
|
Post by Deleted on Jul 12, 2015 4:26:45 GMT -6
Even if there was serious, trained, military reconnaissance was Custer the type of commander who would take their information under consideration? He doesn't seem to have listened well to feedback from others. Another stupid leading question.
|
|
|
Post by welshofficer on Jul 12, 2015 5:08:40 GMT -6
I don't like the idea of even a smallish battalion over on the eastern area. You can't communicate with them, and while there is advantage to what you say Justin, I think the majority will follow the watercourse as Tom indicates. The risk in that case is not justified by potential reward. If he (Custer) had a larger force then yes, with part on Battle Ridge, displayed boldly, and yet another force, larger than the first on Battle Ridge extension in the event some opportunity unforeseen presents itself. QC,
It would certainly be a challenge picking an officer to trust with that task, and I wouldn't want Benteen moved from GAC.
WO
|
|
|
Post by edavids on Sept 11, 2015 7:46:36 GMT -6
So what if this thread is 2 months old. It's still a good one.
IMHO - Custer's biggest mistake (of many) was committing Reno's small force to attack a village of unknown size and location then failing to provide support. To me this has always been where the battle went from difficult to destruction. I've always wanted to get opinions on a few aspects of this part of the battle and here is as good a place as any. I've read the arguments for "why" Reno should have stayed in the timber, primarily on the other board; occasionally on this one. My question is not "should he" but "could he".
Reason provided by those who believe Reno should have stayed are in quotes (albeit paraphrased), with my thoughts afterward. Feel free to critique!
* "Reno could have held the timber for hours; Benteen and DeRudio said so" - Both also used the qualifier of having sufficient ammunition. I believe the answer is in simple arithmetic - 124 rounds per trooper. Even at a slow firing rate of 2 rounds per minute, that is a max of 62 minutes firing time. Depending on which time estimate one chooses to believe for the duration of the valley fight - skirmish to timber to skedaddle - Reno had no more than 30 minutes before his ammo ran out, probably less. As I believe Fred so aptly stated "then what?".
* "Reno should have set up a defensive perimeter on the bench area of the timber" - I have not yet been to LBH but one of the counters to this argument is that Reno had an insufficient number men available in order to set up a defensible perimeter covering the entire timber area. I'll keep quiet and ask folks who have been there to comment.
"Reno's support was only 15 minutes away." - What evidence is there that this would have been clear to Reno? He had received no communication from Custer once attack commenced (hat waving does not count) and he had no idea where Benteen was. With all the firing, dust, smoke, screaming & confusion, I doubt he could have detected anything but warriors and would have been aware that his ammo supply was getting eaten up quickly.
"Benteen could have joined him in the timber" - This one I really don't understand. Benteen had 2 routes that I know of available to him: 1) He could ride across 2.5 miles of open prairie with his 115 man force and HOPE 500-900 warriors would part like the Red Sea and allow him to team up with Reno; 2) He could follow Custer's route up the bluffs (time consuming), ride down the steep bluffs that Reno eventually ascended, cross a fast flowing river and climb a 6-10 foot bank on the far side, then have to deal with the same 500-900 warriors who, of course, would scatter at the sight of cavalry (insert sarcasm). I suppose the hills farther West of Reno's position might have been feasible but again, time consuming and those same 500-900 warriors to get through once to the timber area. Again, this leaves us with "then what". 250 men could certainly cover more of the timber perimeter but each of Benteen's men adds a rifle, pistol and 124 more rounds of ammo. Does he add another hour to the fray? Remember - Benteen stated after his 5-6 hours of holding the timber that "we would all be dead by morning".
This completely leaves out the pack train. Without the extra ammo the whole enterprise would be useless. 3.5 miles per hour tops and it would be interesting to see how 175 mules would fare with 500-900 warriors riding and whooping around them, protected by Benteen's 115 and McDougall's entourage of a similar number had Benteen followed his statement that he would not have gone in without the pack train.
To borrow from Robert E. Lee - the whole enterprise would have been rendered "impracticable". I do not believe Reno had much choice about retrograding which does not excuse the chaotic dash for safety that was the result. He did save 3/4 of his force which is a plus, but now rendered useless for many minutes till Benteen arrived.
One last thought and maybe this is a flight of fancy - I'm stumped like most everyone else what might have worked better on the retrograde to keep it from becoming a Buffalo Run. What do you think of a "column of 2's", pistols drawn, come out of the timber firing and then there is the element of "hope for the best". Maybe the warriors back off even more than they intially did and hesitate to attack an armed and firing column permitting more troopers to survive. This, of course, presumes that amid the chaos and Bloody Knife's brains that this could have been organized quickly and that the troopers had at least the skills to ride fast and shoot a pistol. BIG IF! Again - this could be a fantasy and I'll gladly accept any broadsides on this one.
Best,
David
|
|
|
Post by Colt45 on Sept 11, 2015 8:18:44 GMT -6
David, Your math about how long Reno could have held out is dead on. There simply wasn't any way he could have held the timber. At the time of the breakout, he was almost surrounded, so a breakout was the only viable option. A breakout is a desperation move, aimed at removing one's unit from being surrounded. It is never a neat, orderly affair. Reno could have done a better job getting the word out to his battalion that they were leaving, thus avoiding abandoning some of his troops, who had to join up later that evening, but a breakout is going to involve taking casualties, which they obviously did.
Trying to go out in a column of 2's wouldn't work. The idea of a breakout is to "attack" the surrounding force in a hopefully weak spot with everyone all at once, so as to effect the greatest number of troops escaping. You want to break containment and break contact with the enemy as quickly as you can. It's kind of like a jailbreak, where everyone runs at the same time.
Great post on your part. Good, thoughtful analysis of the timber situation.
|
|
|
Post by edavids on Sept 11, 2015 8:44:06 GMT -6
David, Your math about how long Reno could have held out is dead on. There simply wasn't any way he could have held the timber. At the time of the breakout, he was almost surrounded, so a breakout was the only viable option. A breakout is a desperation move, aimed at removing one's unit from being surrounded. It is never a neat, orderly affair. Reno could have done a better job getting the word out to his battalion that they were leaving, thus avoiding abandoning some of his troops, who had to join up later that evening, but a breakout is going to involve taking casualties, which they obviously did. Trying to go out in a column of 2's wouldn't work. The idea of a breakout is to "attack" the surrounding force in a hopefully weak spot with everyone all at once, so as to effect the greatest number of troops escaping. You want to break containment and break contact with the enemy as quickly as you can. It's kind of like a jailbreak, where everyone runs at the same time. Great post on your part. Good, thoughtful analysis of the timber situation. Thank you Carl
|
|
|
Post by edavids on Sept 11, 2015 8:54:10 GMT -6
Sorry-Colt. Your knowledge and willingness to share is appreciated.
|
|
|
Post by montrose on Sept 11, 2015 9:34:47 GMT -6
The valley fight was lost when the main body failed to support the advance guard. This was LTC Custer's decision, and yet the other board is decicated to the false theory that this was Reno's responsibility.
Reno followed the plan. Custer did not.
Reno's major decision failure was moving so far from Ford A with no support. In his defense he had sent 2 messengers to Custer. In addition, Cooke, Keogh, Varnum and Gerard had also sent back reports. Instead of supporting his own main effort, he went off to explore empty badlands east of the river.
Custer had a reputation of heading to the sound of a fight. In this case, he headed in the opposite direction.
|
|
|
Post by custermania on Aug 24, 2021 14:32:51 GMT -6
The night March that was forced. Those guys went into battle exhausted imo.
|
|
|
Post by custermania on Aug 24, 2021 14:40:11 GMT -6
I don’t know how you could say attacking on 25 wasn’t mistake. Guys exhausted no sleep where they have to have total awareness. Horses dropping out because they exhausted not to mention 95 degrees. Imo the night March is what got him plus splitting up the troops. He shouldn’t of raced first he knew Terry wasn’t. You don’t attack something that big and not know what it’s about. quote author="@deleted" source="/post/111652/thread" timestamp="1436316375"] My idea/opinion was the continual dispersing of his companies as crossed the Little Big Horn river. He scattered and strewed his men into smaller and smaller groups preventing mutual support for the units. Regards Dave There's a surprise. Dave restates QCs line of garbage. Again, still waiting for your first original opinion. I won't hold my breath.[/quote]
|
|
|
Post by custermania on Aug 24, 2021 14:40:28 GMT -6
I don’t know how you could say attacking on 25 wasn’t mistake. Guys exhausted no sleep where they have to have total awareness. Horses dropping out because they exhausted not to mention 95 degrees. Imo the night March is what got him plus splitting up the troops. He shouldn’t of raced first he knew Terry wasn’t. You don’t attack something that big and not know what it’s about. quote author="@deleted" source="/post/111652/thread" timestamp="1436316375"] My idea/opinion was the continual dispersing of his companies as crossed the Little Big Horn river. He scattered and strewed his men into smaller and smaller groups preventing mutual support for the units. Regards Dave There's a surprise. Dave restates QCs line of garbage. Again, still waiting for your first original opinion. I won't hold my breath.[/quote]
|
|
|
Post by custermania on Aug 24, 2021 15:51:07 GMT -6
Custer knew who sitting Bull and crazy horse was going in. He should of known that not everyone is created equal in battle. Custer himself did things others couldn’t. Crazy Horse was very similar but opposite of Custer. Crazy Horse personality was completely different than Custer and it’s hard to argue that. My point is Custer should of known the village would attack like Hornets. That’s what this reminds me off. The Indians were like 5,000 Hornets protecting the nest. The Soldiers didn’t have each other back mostly imo because of Fear. NA fought for each other and families. Beth, The Indians did what circumstances dictated to them on each occasion. Mostly one would expect small irregular concentrations to disperse. But the options were much greater when concentrated and the numbers favourable, either offensively (Fetterman) or defensively (Gratton). GAC's dispositions were imprudent on 25 June 1876, even if the hostile strength had been at the lower end of the Indian agents' estimates. And of course, by attacking on the 25th, GAC was attacking blind and without his own independent corroboration/verification of hostile strength if he was not trusting his Crow scouts. WO
|
|
|
Post by noggy on Aug 27, 2021 1:30:22 GMT -6
I don’t know how you could say attacking on 25 wasn’t mistake. You could argue it was the right decision because 1. The odds of being discovered during the 25th, being so close to the village, were very low. I don't now the area in which the 7th was camping in during the morning of the 25th, but I doubt it was well suited for a defensive fight. The NAs would have attacked them; they did after all not hesitate going all the way down South to mess up Crook's plans. Soldiers being right at their back door would not be acceptable. 2. Most historians and military experts think the attack on the 25th would have succeeded, at some level, had GAC led a firm attack with the majority of the 7th, and not just sending 3 companies on their own (without even knowing they were on their own!). So sure, you can argue the point. All the best, Noggy
|
|
|
Post by coverup on Sept 3, 2021 16:11:10 GMT -6
How about listing the biggest mistakes or errors in judgement that resulted in the debacle at the LBH? Here are my two top ones: Custer sends Benteen off to his "scout" with no guides or medical personal. What was his intent? To keep Benteen out of any credit for Custer's victory or SOP to gather info? My top mistake is not notifying Benteen when there is an attack order given. Custer sends two messengers to Benteen telling him if he finds nothing to keep going. Yet at the most critical and crucial time of the operation he doesn't send any message to Benteen telling him Indians are on the run and a attack order has been issued. He had several options in notifying Benteen: The Indians are on the run, stay alert. Indians are on the run and we need your support ASAP. Don't worry I have everything in hand and all you need to do is mop up any fleeing Indians. Yet he does nothing to let Benteen know that a battle is about to began! What are you opinions on Custer's mistakes at the LBH?
|
|