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Post by crzhrs on Jul 7, 2015 12:29:00 GMT -6
How about listing the biggest mistakes or errors in judgement that resulted in the debacle at the LBH?
Here are my two top ones:
Custer sends Benteen off to his "scout" with no guides or medical personal. What was his intent? To keep Benteen out of any credit for Custer's victory or SOP to gather info?
My top mistake is not notifying Benteen when there is an attack order given. Custer sends two messengers to Benteen telling him if he finds nothing to keep going. Yet at the most critical and crucial time of the operation he doesn't send any message to Benteen telling him Indians are on the run and a attack order has been issued. He had several options in notifying Benteen: The Indians are on the run, stay alert. Indians are on the run and we need your support ASAP. Don't worry I have everything in hand and all you need to do is mop up any fleeing Indians. Yet he does nothing to let Benteen know that a battle is about to began!
What are you opinions on Custer's mistakes at the LBH?
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Post by quincannon on Jul 7, 2015 13:18:28 GMT -6
Sending Benteen off was not in and of itself a mistake. It was only a symptom of a larger disease, that being the willingness to disperse combat power on the eve of battle.
That willingness to disperse combat power was the mistake.
Had he or anyone else been sent off with specific orders as to how far to go and what to do, and where it was intended for him to rejoin, and when, then it would have only been the ending scene of the first act of the play. Where and when to rejoin being the operative phrase.
Custer apologists and cavalry minded nitwits would counter any argument you might make Horse, saying that this was just the normal way of doing business in the sainted cavalry, a viewpoint I disagree with, BUT, saying that was so for just a moment, and saying it had been done a thousand times before does not excuse the fact that no specific orders were given, no objective (in either terrain or purpose) was assigned, and no control measures established, makes the internals of the act a mistake, regardless of other surrounding circumstance of purity of Custer's intent.
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Post by dave on Jul 7, 2015 13:30:52 GMT -6
My idea/opinion was the continual dispersing of his companies as crossed the Little Big Horn river. He scattered and strewed his men into smaller and smaller groups preventing mutual support for the units. Regards Dave
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Post by Colt45 on Jul 7, 2015 14:15:04 GMT -6
Actually, his biggest mistake was getting out of bed on the 25th. Seriously though, the biggest mistake was in deciding to attack on the 25th without proper recon or preparation. He should have laid up on the 25th and had scouts out all over the place getting the info he needed for an attack on the 26th.
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Post by tubman13 on Jul 7, 2015 14:28:43 GMT -6
How about listing the biggest mistakes or errors in judgement that resulted in the debacle at the LBH? Here are my two top ones: Custer sends Benteen off to his "scout" with no guides or medical personal. What was his intent? To keep Benteen out of any credit for Custer's victory or SOP to gather info? My top mistake is not notifying Benteen when there is an attack order given. Custer sends two messengers to Benteen telling him if he finds nothing to keep going. Yet at the most critical and crucial time of the operation he doesn't send any message to Benteen telling him Indians are on the run and a attack order has been issued. He had several options in notifying Benteen: The Indians are on the run, stay alert. Indians are on the run and we need your support ASAP. Don't worry I have everything in hand and all you need to do is mop up any fleeing Indians. Yet he does nothing to let Benteen know that a battle is about to began! What are you opinions on Custer's mistakes at the LBH? Horse, Good to hear from you. You have listed a primary.It has its roots in others. There were numerous others, both of omission and commission. Those mistakes started prior to the Benteen scout and continued until the very end. I don't think he cared one way or the other about Benteen getting any credit, Custer had a way with the press and chain of command. The propaganda machine, which continued on after his death knew how to take credit and shed blame. "Reno was a drunk." "Custer did not go AWOL in 1867, it was an affair of the heart." It all stuck then and much now.
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Post by tubman13 on Jul 7, 2015 14:32:40 GMT -6
My idea/opinion was the continual dispersing of his companies as crossed the Little Big Horn river. He scattered and strewed his men into smaller and smaller groups preventing mutual support for the units. Regards Dave Dave, it is very difficult for you to eat an elephant in one sitting. However, if I allow you to bring your friends and serve it up one plate at a time I will probably run out.
Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Jul 7, 2015 15:18:18 GMT -6
I sort of agree with your first, getting out of bed, Colt. Some days are peanuts. Some days only shells. 25 June was a shell day.
We have tossed this subject around as long as I have been on this board, and all of us have an idea of what we think individually is the greatest mistake.
Primary among them, primary meaning first (in time) in this instance, has to be inadequate to non-existent reconnaissance. What we must ask ourselves I think is in spite of the lack of reconnaissance could this battle be won, or at least could it have had an outcome more favorable than the historical outcome? If we conclude that it could have, then what were the decisions and the decision points that led away from a favorable outcome. The why will probably escape us in this exercise, as it has escaped everyone else, a universally agreed why that is.
My personal feeling is that the battle was winnable up to the split to the bluffs. After that it need not have been the disaster that it became, but it was no longer winnable.
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Post by Beth on Jul 7, 2015 16:35:44 GMT -6
My list.
1. Attacking on the 25th without proper recon, with men and horses exhausted and without an apparent battle plan. 2. Splitting up into too many smaller units 3. Not communicating with Reno or Benteen 4. Underestimating his opponents--in size, in fighting ability and their intent. 5. No apparent situational awareness during the battle.
Beth
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Post by quincannon on Jul 7, 2015 17:19:56 GMT -6
And of those numbers 2, 3, and 5 are always fatal
If you changed number 1 to fighting instead of attacking (assuming then he was attacked) tired, no plan, no recon, would not even be talked about, so while the things you list n number 1 are important to an attack they are not all that important to a fight. I am going to eventually get to something here. Be patient it will be posts and answer driven.
Number 4: I don't thing there has ever been a commander, since there were commanders who did not do these things, every day all day long. It is one of those things we all talk about guarding against but no one does.
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Post by Beth on Jul 7, 2015 18:07:47 GMT -6
And of those numbers 2, 3, and 5 are always fatal If you changed number 1 to fighting instead of attacking (assuming then he was attacked) tired, no plan, no recon, would not even be talked about, so while the things you list n number 1 are important to an attack they are not all that important to a fight. I am going to eventually get to something here. Be patient it will be posts and answer driven. Number 4: I don't thing there has ever been a commander, since there were commanders who did not do these things, every day all day long. It is one of those things we all talk about guarding against but no one does. I am the poster girl woman for patience. On number 4, I had more in mind that he had an estimate from some government agency that there were X number of warriors with the hostiles and Y number of hostiles (As in any NA not currently on reservation land) Custer saw signs that should have made him question if the number might have been wrong. Custer had been told by several sources that it was a large village, some even said it was the largest they had ever seen. I understand that statements like 'there are not enough Indians in the world to defeat the 7th' are more about bravado than fact but Custer seemed to ignore or just not understand the evidence that was before his eyes. Question about general warfare and commanders--would or should a commander take into effect that he is facing an enemy that has their back up against the wall and are fighting for what they feel is a desperate fight for survival? Is that something Custer would have or should have known or is it a too modern way of thinking? Beth
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Post by Deleted on Jul 7, 2015 18:44:28 GMT -6
My list. 1. Attacking on the 25th without proper recon, with men and horses exhausted and without an apparent battle plan. 2. Splitting up into too many smaller units 3. Not communicating with Reno or Benteen 4. Underestimating his opponents--in size, in fighting ability and their intent. 5. No apparent situational awareness during the battle. Beth Attacking on the 25th was not a mistake. He did communicate with Reno and Benteen. He did not underestimate the number of warriors. He noted 1,500. Situational awareness?? Based on what?? Stop regurgitating the nonsense of others. His mistake was separating. Compounded by over-estimating the ability and courage of Reno and Benteen. Everything else is spin.
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Post by Deleted on Jul 7, 2015 18:46:15 GMT -6
My idea/opinion was the continual dispersing of his companies as crossed the Little Big Horn river. He scattered and strewed his men into smaller and smaller groups preventing mutual support for the units. Regards Dave There's a surprise. Dave restates QCs line of garbage. Again, still waiting for your first original opinion. I won't hold my breath.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 7, 2015 18:54:58 GMT -6
Beth: Custer spent all of his time following and did a half assed to non-existent job of finding out what they were doing.
He should have had reconnaissance out far enough and wide enough to pick up that trail to and from the Rosebud that the Indians used to go to and from Crook. Fred tells me that, unlike my previous belief neither Custer nor Terry knew that Crook had been in such close proximity. Well had Custer's reconnaissance cut that trail if would be a pretty good indicator that nine hundred to a thousand warriors were not down on the Rosebud playing beach blanket bingo.
No commander goes into battle with complete knowledge of the enemies intention - NEVER.
Intelligence received is not always intelligent.
For intelligence to be actionable it must first be believed. At the Bulge Dickson's commander did not believe him and First Army (specifically VIII Corps) got stomped. Koch's commander believed him, and was prepared for the German attack contingency should it arise.
All commanders use feel good crapola to get their team's game face on. It is pretty easy when your team is the Green Bay Packers. It is a might more suspect when you are coaching Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs.
If a commander does not take into consideration and proceed as if the enemy is fighting a desperate battle for survival each and every time he faces them then that commander is a goddamned fool.
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 7, 2015 19:22:07 GMT -6
Forget the 25th, as calamitous as it was. That was consequence, not cause. Death spiral downwards.
GAC's biggest mistake (I assume the equine logistical debacle had its roots when he was in Washington) was moving the body of the 7th too far forward on the 24th.
Hold back with the regiment, throw the scouts/guides out further ahead. Particularly those 6 Crows.
WO
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Post by quincannon on Jul 7, 2015 20:32:04 GMT -6
I am not sure if scouts and guides, and by that I mean non-military hirelings, would have been enough. Anything is better than nothing, but I think this time the information "required" transcends anything that the scouts and guides employed could provide.
This job called for serious, trained, military reconnaissance. I am not sure that capability was present.
Holding back though is a given, and for a number of reasons, for it is in holding back awaiting what your scouts can provide, that gives you more options, sometimes many more, before you commit yourself to one course of action.
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