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Post by welshofficer on Jul 10, 2015 5:41:35 GMT -6
The big mistake was bringing the main body of the regiment too far forward on the 24th.
It's then just cascading on the 25th, once loss of surprise is feared after bringing the entire regiment within touching distance: - Premature hurried attack without recon/intel - Detaching an entire battalion (Benteen) to recon sweep the left - Failing to support Reno's insufficient battalion in the valley and without warning ascending the eastern bluffs - Failing to spot (from 3411) Reno's left flank vulnerability to even a modest screen and to backtrack in support - Failing to ford a river in time (or at all) to relieve the building pressure on Reno after rashly continuing northwards - Failing to backtrack from Ford B before that space becomes occupied by counter-attacking hostiles - Failing to finally defensively deploy his 5 right wing companies in a combat resilient concentration or vacate northwards/eastwards before annihilation.
WO
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 10, 2015 7:42:38 GMT -6
Good point. If for simple math we have 600 soldiers with 100 rounds that would be 60,000 rounds. If there was only 24,000 with the pack train that would be an addition 40 rounds per trooper. Easy to do. But you would have to hold your horses with the ammunition. Regards Steve AZ,
But it is certainly a trade-off to avoid having that cumbersome pack train in tactical tow, when all it short-term provides is ammunition?
WO
I think there is a good chance that due to the lack of recon up the Rosebud the pack train was moved forward. The same routes used to engage Crook could get to the pack train if left behind. My choice would be to leave it near the divide if the other areas were cleared. I am really curious on how much was known about other routes such as SFRC. AZ Ranger
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 10, 2015 9:26:51 GMT -6
AZ,
But it is certainly a trade-off to avoid having that cumbersome pack train in tactical tow, when all it short-term provides is ammunition?
WO
I think there is a good chance that due to the lack of recon up the Rosebud the pack train was moved forward. The same routes used to engage Crook could get to the pack train if left behind. My choice would be to leave it near the divide if the other areas were cleared. I am really curious on how much was known about other routes such as SFRC. AZ Ranger AZ,
We know the route the 2nd cavalry patrol took in the spring. I suspect the answer is very little about SFRC and others, beyond maybe the vague memories of a number of guides/scouts. Take the ascent of the eastern bluffs. Don't go up there unless Bouyer knows exactly where he can bring you down....
WO
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Post by quincannon on Jul 10, 2015 9:55:41 GMT -6
Seemingly off topic but possibly relevant later on.
Does anyone have any background information on the right of way for modern US87/Int90, and the railroad? Specifically was there a ford located where the highway and railroad cross the river south of the battlefield, which would be west of Ford A?
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Post by tubman13 on Jul 10, 2015 10:07:36 GMT -6
Chuck, Steve and I were there the day after I sent that picture, but not down on the river. There is a fairly sharp bend right there and the bend appears to be deep, moving west all private land. Far enough from the road that seeing would not be easy to see. There are a number of breaks in the cottonwoods that could indicate low banks.
On another topic, we did not mention we could see tour buses at Reno Hill from the divide, easily.
Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Jul 10, 2015 10:26:18 GMT -6
Thanks Tom. You probably know what I am getting at here. Highways and railroads usually follow the easiest route if they can. I know there was an old stage road that followed that route in the 19th century. You probably were not looking but could those railroad and highway bridges be seen from the divide, as well as the tour busses?
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Post by tubman13 on Jul 10, 2015 10:38:52 GMT -6
Thanks Tom. You probably know what I am getting at here. Highways and railroads usually follow the easiest route if they can. I know there was an old stage road that followed that route in the 19th century. You probably were not looking but could those railroad and highway bridges be seen from the divide, as well as the tour busses? The hill in the picture was visible, which would mean that traffic on the interstate, at that location would be visible. I took no notice of the bridges. If you are in fact going up there next year, Steve and I will be there from the 23rd. You can certainly take the side trips that we did. Steve and I might even be able to round up MR. Pretty Top for his dissertation on the battle very different perspective. Ok, Steve, just kidding!
Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Jul 10, 2015 10:58:23 GMT -6
I am still planning my trip with Jack. It will probably be in mid spring, but between Joan, Jack, and I we have a boat load of commitments between April and Election Day.
Let me study the maps some more.
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Post by crzhrs on Jul 10, 2015 11:44:58 GMT -6
That's the point that I was trying to make - that all of this "The Indians always ran" nonsense is just that, nonsense and a red herring. Custer's response was that he wasn't much worried about the size of the Indian camp only that striking it before it scattered was his overriding concern. -Donovan "A Terrible Glory: Custer and the Little Bighorn" Another issue was the lay out and position of the Indians village. The site was selected for defensive purposes, running along the LBH river with the river acting as a buffer. In addition on the other side of the river were high hills and rough terrain down to the river. The Indian camp was on a level plain with a tremendous field of vision enabling them to see approaching danger from any direction. The Indians were far superior in selection positions that benefited them and giving them an opportunity to counter any attack or time to escape. At the LBH they were able to do both.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 10, 2015 13:26:20 GMT -6
OK I'll bite. Was that Donovan's opinion that you take as gospel, or was it Donovan reporting the opinion of some contemporary source, that claims that Custer told him that this was his overriding concern. The short answer is , probably the first and Donovan does not know B from a bull's butt what Custer's overriding concern was, and assumed what it was. I don't mind being corrected in this, but I want to see a source.
The site of the Indian village was selected for the proximity of shade and water, plus a decent grazing area for the stock. They were collocated in close proximity for mutual security. It is a horrible place to defend. The only reason it looks easy to the casual observer having some knowledge of the battle is that an accident of nature provided the Indians with interior lines to counter Custer's scheme of maneuver.
I think if you will ask Tom or AZ who just completed a visit to the spot not 10 days ago, they will tell you that there is a hill that will mask any approach from the south and allow you to get to within a very few hundred meters of the south end of that village without much chance of detection or if you so desired put you in a position to destroy or run off the pony herd, before any possible response can be undertaken.
Next time you set up a defensive position, against a competent enemy I would suggest that you do not have a river and bluff to your back.
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Post by mac on Jul 11, 2015 4:54:45 GMT -6
OK I'll bite. Was that Donovan's opinion that you take as gospel, or was it Donovan reporting the opinion of some contemporary source, that claims that Custer told him that this was his overriding concern. The short answer is , probably the first and Donovan does not know B from a bull's butt what Custer's overriding concern was, and assumed what it was. I don't mind being corrected in this, but I want to see a source. The site of the Indian village was selected for the proximity of shade and water, plus a decent grazing area for the stock. They were collocated in close proximity for mutual security. It is a horrible place to defend. The only reason it looks easy to the casual observer having some knowledge of the battle is that an accident of nature provided the Indians with interior lines to counter Custer's scheme of maneuver. I think if you will ask Tom or AZ who just completed a visit to the spot not 10 days ago, they will tell you that there is a hill that will mask any approach from the south and allow you to get to within a very few hundred meters of the south end of that village without much chance of detection or if you so desired put you in a position to destroy or run off the pony herd, before any possible response can be undertaken. Next time you set up a defensive position, against a competent enemy I would suggest that you do not have a river and bluff to your back. This is why I do not understand why Custer did not attack from a more westerly approach. He was told at the Crows Nest that there was a large pony herd to that side of the village. Cheers
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Post by quincannon on Jul 11, 2015 8:20:52 GMT -6
In this particular case Mac, you just might then assume that Custer did not constitute a competent enemy.
Coming in from the west or southwest would negate any need for any sort of envelopment, the terrain could accomplish the same thing any envelopment could.
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 11, 2015 14:05:36 GMT -6
OK I'll bite. Was that Donovan's opinion that you take as gospel, or was it Donovan reporting the opinion of some contemporary source, that claims that Custer told him that this was his overriding concern. The short answer is , probably the first and Donovan does not know B from a bull's butt what Custer's overriding concern was, and assumed what it was. I don't mind being corrected in this, but I want to see a source. The site of the Indian village was selected for the proximity of shade and water, plus a decent grazing area for the stock. They were collocated in close proximity for mutual security. It is a horrible place to defend. The only reason it looks easy to the casual observer having some knowledge of the battle is that an accident of nature provided the Indians with interior lines to counter Custer's scheme of maneuver. I think if you will ask Tom or AZ who just completed a visit to the spot not 10 days ago, they will tell you that there is a hill that will mask any approach from the south and allow you to get to within a very few hundred meters of the south end of that village without much chance of detection or if you so desired put you in a position to destroy or run off the pony herd, before any possible response can be undertaken. Next time you set up a defensive position, against a competent enemy I would suggest that you do not have a river and bluff to your back. This is why I do not understand why Custer did not attack from a more westerly approach. He was told at the Crows Nest that there was a large pony herd to that side of the village. Cheers Mac.
It would also place the river behind the hostiles, with river crossing pinch points.
Northwards flight down the valley leads straight into Terry/Gibbon/Brisbin.
WO
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Post by quincannon on Jul 11, 2015 14:23:36 GMT -6
Custer had the combat power to give the Indians a very bad day had he attacked from the west, on either a southwest to northeast axis, or a west to east axis.
Tom has recently told us what could be seen from the Crows nest, which actually surprised me. He did not say if he was aided by field glasses or not. Perhaps he will comment.
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 11, 2015 15:01:19 GMT -6
Custer had the combat power to give the Indians a very bad day had he attacked from the west, on either a southwest to northeast axis, or a west to east axis. Tom has recently told us what could be seen from the Crows nest, which actually surprised me. He did not say if he was aided by field glasses or not. Perhaps he will comment. QC,
How would you deploy the 7th for that sort of attack...?
How would you plug those river crossings to force any flight northwards toward the Terry reception committee....?
WO
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