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Post by montrose on Feb 17, 2015 6:50:50 GMT -6
1. Purpose. Discuss factors that determined the outcome of LBH. The intent is to explore the theory that the outcome of LBH was predetermined, that no training, leadership of decisions could have changed what happened. A secondary intent is to look at the theory that any other regiment in the Army would have an identical outcome as the 7th.
2. The scattering. The critical cause of the 7th's failure was scattering the regiment into numerous small penny packets. Any other unit would have assembled the regiment before the attack. This was standard procedure at the time, and we see it in the other battles of the campaign. Fred, how long would it take to form an assembly area this side of Ford A, until Benteen and McDougall close up? Also, the other officers are complicit. When you are given bad orders, you say something. The only officer I know who objected to the scattering was Benteen. Reno did send 2 messengers to Custer for support, but he kept attacking while waiting for support that never arrived.
3. The mule train. The mule train was a fiasco that contributed to LBH failure. The mules were used to pull wagons until days before the battle. Then animals and soldiers tried to sort out packing for the first time. Meanwhile, the rest of the Army had a rule of thumb that it took a year to train a pack mule. If you are going to go with a clown circus train, then you have to adjust. Outrunning the trains shows a lack of ability and skill in regimental leadership.
By the way, when mechanized units went to the M1 Abrams and Bradley, what was the slowest element in any mech unit? The M548 ammunition carrier, which is a variant of the M113. In maneuvers I have seen the ammo carriers fall 30 miles behind their units. Fuel trucks were also an issue, until they bought better trucks. Tanks that are bingo on ammo are very expensive paper weights.
4. Company and above training and operations. The 7th operated poorly whenever 2 companies had to work together unless one person was present: Frederick Benteen. Benteen's performance at LBH demonstrates that competent leadership matters. In the northern sector, 5 companies died 5 widely scattered deaths, none within supporting range of any other. The fact that we can identify company clusters proves that the failure was not a soldier or sergeant issue. It was incompetence in the company commanders and regimental commander.
5. Training. I think we need to look at what training means. It is not only whatever training Private Snuffy received, in an Army with no initial entry training or minimum training standards. For individuals we look at individual soldier, NCO and officer training. But you also want to look at collective training. The challenge here is that there were no permanent units except company and regiment. I believe that collctive training was a 7th Cav weakness, that we do not see in the other regiments in the Army. 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 9th, 10th Cav, etc. Look at COL Gibbon's performance in the 1876 campaign, compared to Custer's. Both are under same Dept commander.
I am still thinking about formats, analytical tools, and approaches, open to suggestions on how to develop tis discussion.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Feb 17, 2015 8:15:08 GMT -6
Will
I think 4 and 5 hold my interest the most and you have put together what I thought rather than stated regarding training.
The mule train was anticipated since they brought along packs and it was not a new idea that it took training of the mules to get them to function as a pack train. That to me is at a Custer level and above to make sure that happened regardless of where he was at.
Looking forward to this discussion.
Regards
Steve
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Post by Yan Taylor on Feb 17, 2015 8:39:47 GMT -6
Could one of the problems be that a lot of these companies and officers for that matter, had been split from each other for around 18 months prior to the campaign? I don’t really know how much this would affect their performance on the day but would it have some effect assembling a regiment after so long? I would assume that all of the officers and most of the NCOs would know each other.
Training: now if the regiment was split up and was serving in the various forts and installations around the southern USA, would the training regime be down to who was in charge of that particular company? And if some of these companies were down to only two Lieutenants would they place the onus on the shoulders of the 1st Sergeant to keep the men in shape, so see how we have given the officers a hard time concerning their performance, then I think it would only be fair if the 1st Sergeants should be scrutinised over how much training they gave their company, apparently 1st Sgt Ryan of M Company left some good accounts over how his company went about their daily business, did any others do the same?
The Mule Train does seem like it was thrown together in an ad-hock fashion with the addition of company personnel going from the normal six to in some cases to around 10 or eleven. But would Custer have just taken this as par for the course and just got on with the job? Again problems like this would have arose in any campaign in any era, at the end of the day you work with what you have got and get on with it, but if they had better trained mules could the train keep pace with the main column? If so then they wouldn’t need a company of cavalry to provide security.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Feb 17, 2015 9:10:55 GMT -6
I believe the organizational structure itself must be looked at. I think we can all agree that it was flawed, but so were the rest of the cavalry regiments. So, is the structure part of the reason? Did other units modify their internal structure to make up for known shortfalls? If so, why were these local modifications not applied to the 7th Cavalry? If an structure modifications were applied by Custer, were they correct, or were they too flawed?
Why, knowing the pack train was a millstone around the neck, did Custer not take appropriate steps to mitigate the problem, unrelated to the training of the mules, and train?
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Post by tubman13 on Feb 17, 2015 9:23:03 GMT -6
Could one of the problems be that a lot of these companies and officers for that matter, had been split from each other for around 18 months prior to the campaign? I don’t really know how much this would affect their performance on the day but would it have some effect assembling a regiment after so long? I would assume that all of the officers and most of the NCOs would know each other. Training: now if the regiment was split up and was serving in the various forts and installations around the southern USA, would the training regime be down to who was in charge of that particular company? And if some of these companies were down to only two Lieutenants would they place the onus on the shoulders of the 1st Sergeant to keep the men in shape, so see how we have given the officers a hard time concerning their performance, then I think it would only be fair if the 1st Sergeants should be scrutinised over how much training they gave their company, apparently 1st Sgt Ryan of M Company left some good accounts over how his company went about their daily business, did any others do the same? The Mule Train does seem like it was thrown together in an ad-hock fashion with the addition of company personnel going from the normal six to in some cases to around 10 or eleven. But would Custer have just taken this as par for the course and just got on with the job? Again problems like this would have arose in any campaign in any era, at the end of the day you work with what you have got and get on with it, but if they had better trained mules could the train keep pace with the main column? If so then they wouldn’t need a company of cavalry to provide security. Ian. Ian, to your 1st point, I think Keogh and I CO went from reconstruction duty in the south, to boundary survey duty and were among the last to receive their new weapons. I don't mind being corrected here, as the info is on a recall basis.
Training neglected through much of 75&76.
Mule train a cluster puck. for you hockey fans.
Regards, Tom
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Post by AZ Ranger on Feb 17, 2015 10:23:44 GMT -6
I believe the organizational structure itself must be looked at. I think we can all agree that it was flawed, but so were the rest of the cavalry regiments. So, is the structure part of the reason? Did other units modify their internal structure to make up for known shortfalls? If so, why were these local modifications not applied to the 7th Cavalry? If an structure modifications were applied by Custer, were they correct, or were they too flawed? Why, knowing the pack train was a millstone around the neck, did Custer not take appropriate steps to mitigate the problem, unrelated to the training of the mules, and train? I agree and I think we share plan where the pack train could have been left at the divide. At least there would be not bring pacs Steve
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shaw
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Post by shaw on Feb 17, 2015 16:15:19 GMT -6
I don't disagree with much of what is written so far, but to me organization aside, the lack of advanced scouting was a key component in the failure of the 7th to complete its mission. 6 Crows and 39 Arikara's. Custer doesn't really effectively use them after the divide and in fact releases the scouts that went with his battalion before engaging the enemy. I got the number from wiki by the way.
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Post by tubman13 on Feb 17, 2015 16:59:54 GMT -6
I don't disagree with much of what is written so far, but to me organization aside, the lack of advanced scouting was a key component in the failure of the 7th to complete its mission. 6 Crows and 39 Arikara's. Custer doesn't really effectively use them after the divide and in fact releases the scouts that went with his battalion before engaging the enemy. I got the number from wiki by the way. Amen.
regards. Tom
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Deleted
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Post by Deleted on Feb 17, 2015 17:33:13 GMT -6
I have a very hard time seeing what, if any, role training or lack there of played in the defeat. No amount of training can overcome a poorly communicated plan and flawed strategy.
If you take each phase of the battle in isolation, the failures and or successes are directly attributable to an officer's decision.
Poor decisions took training out of the equation. It's up the senior officers to put the command in a position to be successful.
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Post by tubman13 on Feb 17, 2015 18:08:41 GMT -6
I have a very hard time seeing what, if any, role training or lack there of played in the defeat. No amount of training can overcome a poorly communicated plan and flawed strategy. If you take each phase of the battle in isolation, the failures and or successes are directly attributable to an officer's decision. Poor decisions took training out of the equation. It's up the senior officers to put the command in a position to be successful. Here's one you should like, Reno was in command of the regiment throughout the Fall and Winter and virtually no training was done.
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Post by welshofficer on Feb 17, 2015 18:12:26 GMT -6
Montrose,
Poor recon of enemy and terrain. It all flows from those omissions.
That really was a matter for the CO in the field. The Wild West was not littered with LBH scale debacles.
WO
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Deleted
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Post by Deleted on Feb 17, 2015 18:24:01 GMT -6
I have a very hard time seeing what, if any, role training or lack there of played in the defeat. No amount of training can overcome a poorly communicated plan and flawed strategy. If you take each phase of the battle in isolation, the failures and or successes are directly attributable to an officer's decision. Poor decisions took training out of the equation. It's up the senior officers to put the command in a position to be successful. Here's one you should like, Reno was in command of the regiment throughout the Fall and Winter and virtually no training was done. Wasn't he in command up until May of 76? Custer had been relieved of command, arrested, for a period of time I believe. Confirms what a poor officer Reno was.
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Post by tubman13 on Feb 17, 2015 18:27:36 GMT -6
Here's one you should like, Reno was in command of the regiment throughout the Fall and Winter and virtually no training was done. Wasn't he in command up until May of 76? Custer had been relieved of command, arrested, for a period of time I believe. Confirms what a poor officer Reno was. I put the ball in your court!
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Post by Dark Cloud on Feb 17, 2015 18:34:33 GMT -6
Scarface,
No, that's exactly wrong. The level of training and its success limits or expands an officer's options. The supposed 'poor' decision making by officers did not have oodles of options. The 7th as a unit could not fight on horseback. If the enemy did not run, they had to go to ground or be slaughtered in the saddle. Or both, as it happened.
Atop this, whoever was in charge of the training - by which I thought I'd been lectured was actually practice, and not training given they all knew how to ride and shoot, right? Right? - had to deal with the weather and budget and what ammo there was to train/practice with. What was available? You'd have to know that before you lambast Reno or Terry or Custer for not training the guys, wouldn't you?
And really, how valid was this firing line training with the carbine anyway? Arranged in lines with officers and horseholders standing behind them taking aim at individuals who, if visible at all, are in speedy motion: the very thing the soldiers were never trained to do given issues hitting close, static targets as it was. Firing in a volley has zippo effect on such chaos, anyway. Especially when nothing aimed at is hit or, if some are hit, at such distance from each other it has small effect, if any. Hunters so train, they have to. The 7th? If you catch the Indians in a surround, sure, the training pays off. But for the vast majority of Indian fights?
They couldn't keep saddle at speed, they couldn't fight or even reload the pistol while riding. The 7th was dead absent total panic and running by the enemy. The village was too big to get panic driven in the short amount of time the 7th needed them to. They HAD to stand and fight, and that was it. Nobody's first choice.
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Deleted
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Post by Deleted on Feb 17, 2015 18:49:01 GMT -6
Scarface, No, that's exactly wrong. The level of training and its success limits or expands an officer's options. The supposed 'poor' decision making by officers did not have oodles of options. The 7th as a unit could not fight on horseback. If the enemy did not run, they had to go to ground or be slaughtered in the saddle. Or both, as it happened. Atop this, whoever was in charge of the training - by which I thought I'd been lectured was actually practice, and not training given they all knew how to ride and shoot, right? Right? - had to deal with the weather and budget and what ammo there was to train/practice with. What was available? You'd have to know that before you lambast Reno or Terry or Custer for not training the guys, wouldn't you? And really, how valid was this firing line training with the carbine anyway? Arranged in lines with officers and horseholders standing behind them taking aim at individuals who, if visible at all, are in speedy motion: the very thing the soldiers were never trained to do given issues hitting close, static targets as it was. Firing in a volley has zippo effect on such chaos, anyway. Especially when nothing aimed at is hit or, if some are hit, at such distance from each other it has small effect, if any. Hunters so train, they have to. The 7th? If you catch the Indians in a surround, sure, the training pays off. But for the vast majority of Indian fights? They couldn't keep saddle at speed, they couldn't fight or even reload the pistol while riding. The 7th was dead absent total panic and running by the enemy. The village was too big to get panic driven in the short amount of time the 7th needed them to. They HAD to stand and fight, and that was it. Nobody's first choice. "Exactly wrong"...I will have to remember that one :-) My point is the soldiers never had a chance to show whether training was a factor. Dividing, and dividing, and dividing again, reduced the command to practically useless. This compounded the recon mistakes. Leadship mistakes that doomed them before training was even a factor. Skirmish lines seemed to work pretty well in the valley and during the defense of Reno Hill. Agree with you on 7th Cav being useless unless facing panicked and fleeing village.
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