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Post by tubman13 on Feb 17, 2015 18:57:03 GMT -6
An opinion here, if you will, there were 4 what I would consider well trained companies in this regiment. The quality companies were Benteen's MacDougal's, French's and probably Yates's in that order. Montrose is probably right about all of those other regiments being better. In the case of the 7th the companies pretty much were running themselves.
Most regiments/units, then as now reflect their commanders/managements style and intensity. Montrose has certainly worked with more sophisticated teams than I did. Teams today are cross trained and there is redundancy, a luxury our Army did not have or seem to take in account in the 19 century. However having said that the 7th was the worst of a mediocre bunch.
Having said the above recon, planning, and communication were what did George in on 2 June 1876. In that order. Execution kind of sucked as well.
Regards, Tom
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Post by Mike Powell on Feb 17, 2015 19:27:58 GMT -6
In the rank of predetermining factors, I rate the number of capable opponents as premier. I do not believe any improvement in training, whether of mules, enlisted men, NCO's or officers could have overcome the numeric superiority, especially given Custer's execution of whatever exact plan he had in mind. I believe there is some number of such of the opponents that day that he, Custer, with his command as it was could have overcome. That is obvious as a general statement. What the number is, I do not know. But I'd be curious if those on the board believe, holding all other things equal, that Custer could have survived half the number of NDNs, proceeding as he did?
Alternatively, taking the "what if" on another tack, is there a peer of Custer's that had he somehow come in the place of Custer, and again holding all else equal, would have been able to engage the village and survive, along with a greater remnant of the 7th than did occur?
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Post by Dark Cloud on Feb 17, 2015 19:38:57 GMT -6
The firing lines in the valley were immediately rendered pointless when - let's see, got to have the correct jargon.....- the flanks were turned and/or enfiladed, making the line rather stupid near immediately. They seemed to collapse pretty quick back into the timber. So......worked? At what? Preventing Indians from standing tall in front of the line at a range the term "aiming" might have meaning? Well, maybe. There was a lot of firing and not much indication from the tribes they hit a lot. (Or vice versa) So, in that firing lines were established in the valley, fine, but how successful were they?
There were not real firing lines on Reno Hill, although Godfrey led a line covering the retreat from Weir, threatening to shoot any man who ran, and they didn't seem to slow the Sioux advance a ton, but arguably. If the Sioux were into it, they could easily have enfiladed THAT line as well, but too tired and laden with new carbines and ammo, perhaps. Did they hit anyone? At the appearance of these lines did the Sioux gasp and hit the deck, crawling and quivering back to their lodges?
The water runs' covering fire were not real firing lines unless we're describing clumps of guys firing in different directions a line.
Their skill in the saddle, which sucked in aggregate, and their inability to fight in the saddle were all the product of institutional non-training. I have no idea why Custer kept dividing and don't think he did after heading north on the east side. Think they got fouled up in or near MTC distant from the river and were driven to where they died. I feel momentum and not proactive decision making was the fueling issue thereinafter.
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Post by Deleted on Feb 17, 2015 19:48:00 GMT -6
The firing lines in the valley were immediately rendered pointless when - let's see, got to have the correct jargon.....- the flanks were turned and/or enfiladed, making the line rather stupid near immediately. They seemed to collapse pretty quick back into the timber. So......worked? At what? Preventing Indians from standing tall in front of the line at a range the term "aiming" might have meaning? Well, maybe. There was a lot of firing and not much indication from the tribes they hit a lot. (Or vice versa) So, in that firing lines were established in the valley, fine, but how successful were they? There were not real firing lines on Reno Hill, although Godfrey led a line covering the retreat from Weir, threatening to shoot any man who ran, and they didn't seem to slow the Sioux advance a ton, but arguably. If the Sioux were into it, they could easily have enfiladed THAT line as well, but too tired and laden with new carbines and ammo, perhaps. Did they hit anyone? At the appearance of these lines did the Sioux gasp and hit the deck, crawling and quivering back to their lodges? The water runs' covering fire were not real firing lines unless we're describing clumps of guys firing in different directions a line. Their skill in the saddle, which sucked in aggregate, and their inability to fight in the saddle were all the product of institutional non-training. I have no idea why Custer kept dividing and don't think he did after heading north on the east side. Think they got fouled up in or near MTC distant from the river and were driven to where they died. I feel momentum and not proactive decision making was the fueling issue thereinafter. So lack of institutional training was not a leading factor in their demise. I think we, forgive me if I'm wrong, are pretty much in agreement. The theory of GAC or family member being wounded early in the engagement is an interesting one. I'll have to give that some thought.
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Post by montrose on Feb 17, 2015 20:04:28 GMT -6
6. Use of Indians. The 7th Cav seems particularly inept in the use of Indian auxiliaries. There are 3 functions of these forces: Guide, Scout, Fight. Guides are familiar with the area of operation and provide local knowledge. Scouts are self explanatory, they may not have been in the area before. And finally, they have combat power and can be used in battle. The 7th left FAL with 4 Sioux and a large Ree force. The Sioux were, I believe, guides. The Ree were for scouting. The Crow came later from COL Gibbon's command.
The 7th poorly integrated Indian assets. First, they had an interpreter problem. The interpreters should be in the hip pocket of the chief of scouts. If the regimental commander wants to talk through an interpreter the Scout Commander should be there. Working through interpreters is an art and a science and my former school has spent over $10M developing better methods.
The Rees were aggressive and wanted to fight. They were hampered by the coward Gerard. By his own accounts, Gerard stayed far from the advance, and spent the campaign deep in the rear. AT the lone tepee Custer and the main body reached this area before Gerard. GAC was made that the Rees had not followed his orders to move ahead. They hadn't obeyed the order, since Gerard, per usual, was not at his appointed place of duty. Varnum ended up trying to fulfill scouting duties with himself and an orderly because he had no means to communicate with his own scouts.
The problem is that many Indian auxiliaries did their best to fight alongside the 7th. Yet the 7th had now worked out procedures for command, control, procedures, TTP/SOP . This should have been worked out and rehearsed prior to battle. I appears that LTC Custer did not understand Indian combat power, and just wanted the Indians to go away when the enemy is found. This is foolish. Look at Crook's use of Indians vice Custers.
(Sidebar: Anyone remember where Special Forces branch insignia comes from?)
I do not have a good picture of the utility of the 4 Sioux and Dorman. They do not appear to have served any useful role. I wonder if it was an interpreter problem, or failure of US leadership. May be worth a separate thread. GAC retained Bouyer and the Crows to stay with him at the lone tepee, and not Dorman and the Sioux. Of course, it could be that Bouyer was not just an interpreter but one of the best guides and scouts of his era.
The use of auxiliaries involves integration training so you know how to fight together. Crook was infamous for this, so were Mackenzie and even Miles.
Steve is our most experienced poster with respect to conducting operations with folks from many different entities. Local, state, federal, even folks in same outfit who have never worked together before. Any insights here?
One of the mantras of Special Operations: If you are doing something for the first time in combat, you are a failure at training and readiness.
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Post by montrose on Feb 17, 2015 20:19:13 GMT -6
Tom,
The mission of SF is to work through, with and by indigenous forces. The vast majority of my career involves training 3rd world militaries, as part of a country battle focused analysis mission plan
My explanation here may be hard to follow. What we do s look at a countries army, and the tasks they need to do. Then we train them to do those tasks. Many countries want sexy training on tings they will never do.
My personal experience is that every 3rd world country needs training on troop leading procedures and how to lead a patrol. Hell, I know a few units in the US Army who need the same.
My point is I am not looking at the 7th with the lens of what the 75th Regiment would do. I am comparing them to African forces I have personally trained and evaluated, both government and non government.
I have some funny stories that will detract from main thread. When things get quiet, ask me to explain my experience with counter poaching in Zimbabwe and Botswana. TLDR: State had asked the NPS to sort out a solution, they actually wanted unarmed rangers, but eventually were convinced to train units with pistols and WW2 carbines. The bad guys were 100% equipped with Aks, plus RPGs and machineguns. ANd this is the same NPS who claims they can not ackowledge the dozens of false markers at LBH because the inaccuracy is itself historical fact that must be acknowledged.
Sigh, my one functional eye is sore tonight, will post later.
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Post by Colt45 on Feb 17, 2015 20:23:51 GMT -6
I have a very hard time seeing what, if any, role training or lack there of played in the defeat. No amount of training can overcome a poorly communicated plan and flawed strategy. If you take each phase of the battle in isolation, the failures and or successes are directly attributable to an officer's decision. Poor decisions took training out of the equation. It's up the senior officers to put the command in a position to be successful. Training has everything to do with success or failure. Under stress, an individual resorts to his training, so if he is well-trained, that training kicks in automatically. Conversely, if there is no training, or very poor training, then you cannot expect soldiers to perform well, regardless of whether or not the officers in charge are communicating or executing a plan well or poorly. If the 7th had been well and recently trained, when things got sticky they might not have broken and ran, and might have been able to act cohesively, perhaps even surviving in some numbers. As it was, the training was poor and the leadership bad. Recipe for certain disaster. If they were very well trained, both in individual skills and in battalion level skills, they might have survived, some of them, in spite of the bad planning, lack of recon, and poor decision-making. Good leadership helped keep the Reno and Benteen battalions alive through the evening of the 25th and all through the 26th, even though the training level was poor. A unit can generally survive if either training is very good, or leadership is very good. You can't survive if both are bad.
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Post by Deleted on Feb 17, 2015 20:42:45 GMT -6
I have a very hard time seeing what, if any, role training or lack there of played in the defeat. No amount of training can overcome a poorly communicated plan and flawed strategy. If you take each phase of the battle in isolation, the failures and or successes are directly attributable to an officer's decision. Poor decisions took training out of the equation. It's up the senior officers to put the command in a position to be successful. Training has everything to do with success or failure. Under stress, an individual resorts to his training, so if he is well-trained, that training kicks in automatically. Conversely, if there is no training, or very poor training, then you cannot expect soldiers to perform well, regardless of whether or not the officers in charge are communicating or executing a plan well or poorly. If the 7th had been well and recently trained, when things got sticky they might not have broken and ran, and might have been able to act cohesively, perhaps even surviving in some numbers. As it was, the training was poor and the leadership bad. Recipe for certain disaster. If they were very well trained, both in individual skills and in battalion level skills, they might have survived, some of them, in spite of the bad planning, lack of recon, and poor decision-making. Good leadership helped keep the Reno and Benteen battalions alive through the evening of the 25th and all through the 26th, even though the training level was poor. A unit can generally survive if either training is very good, or leadership is very good. You can't survive if both are bad. The deaths occurred primarily during two phases, the Reno retreat and the GAC battlefield. Can you explain how better training would have changed the result of either? In my mind they could have been the best drilled/trained and practiced soldiers of the period but the result would have been exactly the same. They were put in a position to fail. Keogh's command was left in an untenable position. Maybe with better training they may have taken a few more NAs with them and maybe lasted a little longer but they were all going to die regardless. Same can said for GAC and his HQ/Company. Poor leadership decisions guaranteed victory for the NA.
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Post by Beth on Feb 17, 2015 21:00:52 GMT -6
I may be wrong but Custer strikes me as a person who didn't adapt as well to new ideas or weapons. He didn't know and understand how to handle the mules, he didn't know and understand his Indian forces. He didn't use his scouts to their advantage. I am sure there are plenty more examples.
Was Custer endemic of the US Army at the time? People who were still trying to use the lessons from the CW to try to fight the next war.
Beth
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Post by AZ Ranger on Feb 17, 2015 22:21:43 GMT -6
Steve is our most experienced poster with respect to conducting operations with folks from many different entities. Local, state, federal, even folks in same outfit who have never worked together before. Any insights here?
Glad you asked. In the last few years we have recognized that though individuals may have skills such as use of firearms and know their agency procedures we had not idea what each other would do when the first shot came in our direction. There is a group of trainers From ALERRT (http://alerrt.org/) that came to Northern Arizona. We formed in teams with officers that work in same area but from different agencies. Our team had two Game and Fish, one Forest Service Officer and two Coconino county deputies. These were the guys that we worked with in the same area but never trained together, We leaned to communicate with hand signals and applied group tactics that everyone knew what they were suppose to do. Previously we might show up to a radio call and no one would take charge and the others may help or hinder.
So the individuals may have been trained to agency standards but it was within their agency and with other officers that as soon as they leave there they weren't going to be working with them. They could be stationed 100 miles or more apart. The ALERRT training has the actual officers that work a particular area regardless of agency train together. So the officers that actually respond from various agencies in a particular location can now function together.
It was a disaster waiting to happen before even though the individuals may the necessary skillsets such as firearms training we were hardly better than the bad guys when it came to organization and tactics.
Even when working within your own agency when you work with someone new you have reservations going into conflicts. I tell the new guys that I am the best back up they can have. I can't run fast so no sense in running and I can shoot well and know I will if I recognize the threat.
Certainly agencies have their special forces such as SWAT, entry teams, precision rifle shooters but they are teams and show up together.
Steve
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Post by AZ Ranger on Feb 17, 2015 22:41:03 GMT -6
I think training allows for more options and helps in making the best available decision. And maybe my thinking of training is not exactly the right term. Training is not just the individual and I would apply it to leaders.
Of course they died on Custer battlefield but were the best decision made that got them to the place where they died.
Custer fed the 7th to the Indians a few companies at a time.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Feb 17, 2015 22:49:12 GMT -6
"So lack of institutional training was not a leading factor in their demise."
Um, no. Their lack of adequate training was totally a leading factor. It limited the orders that could be given, and the options were absurdly few in the cold light of reflection. If you're Reno or Benteen or Custer, you KNEW there was attack and chase, or.......what? Many of the same terms used then are still used, but I contend they mean and imply different things. Again: what training could actually be done regardless of the officer in charge? What ammo? What money? Train horses all day, more feed needed among other things. Why waste it for mere Indians, Mr. Secretary.......They'll run, like they always do.
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Post by tubman13 on Feb 18, 2015 4:59:22 GMT -6
Training has everything to do with success or failure. Under stress, an individual resorts to his training, so if he is well-trained, that training kicks in automatically. Conversely, if there is no training, or very poor training, then you cannot expect soldiers to perform well, regardless of whether or not the officers in charge are communicating or executing a plan well or poorly. If the 7th had been well and recently trained, when things got sticky they might not have broken and ran, and might have been able to act cohesively, perhaps even surviving in some numbers. As it was, the training was poor and the leadership bad. Recipe for certain disaster. If they were very well trained, both in individual skills and in battalion level skills, they might have survived, some of them, in spite of the bad planning, lack of recon, and poor decision-making. Good leadership helped keep the Reno and Benteen battalions alive through the evening of the 25th and all through the 26th, even though the training level was poor. A unit can generally survive if either training is very good, or leadership is very good. You can't survive if both are bad. The deaths occurred primarily during two phases, the Reno retreat and the GAC battlefield. Can you explain how better training would have changed the result of either? In my mind they could have been the best drilled/trained and practiced soldiers of the period but the result would have been exactly the same. They were put in a position to fail. Keogh's command was left in an untenable position. Maybe with better training they may have taken a few more NAs with them and maybe lasted a little longer but they were all going to die regardless. Same can said for GAC and his HQ/Company. Poor leadership decisions guaranteed victory for the NA. Scarface, Colts last 7 word sentence answers your question which follow his sentence. Deaths on the Custer portion of the battlefield came from both issues. In the valley portion, the same commander who set Custer to fail, set Reno up to fail. Reno's retreat/charge was another commander(Reno) salvaging what he could of a bad situation he was put in.
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Post by Deleted on Feb 18, 2015 6:28:31 GMT -6
"So lack of institutional training was not a leading factor in their demise." Um, no. Their lack of adequate training was totally a leading factor. It limited the orders that could be given, and the options were absurdly few in the cold light of reflection. If you're Reno or Benteen or Custer, you KNEW there was attack and chase, or.......what? Many of the same terms used then are still used, but I contend they mean and imply different things. Again: what training could actually be done regardless of the officer in charge? What ammo? What money? Train horses all day, more feed needed among other things. Why waste it for mere Indians, Mr. Secretary.......They'll run, like they always do. I completely agree that the options available to a cavalry officer were "absurdly few" but was that down to a lack of training or the fundamental short comings of a cavalry unit in 1876? What training from the manuals of the time could have made a difference? I agree that they were terribly under trained with respects to mounted fighting, shooting practice, re-loading etc but even if above proficient in each of these disciplines, would the outcome have been any different? What discisions would GAC have made differently if his troops were better shots or could reload mounted? Would this have led him to keep his command together, probably not. Would he have recon'd more, I don't think so. Every decision he made appears to be based on a belief that the Indians would flee.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Feb 18, 2015 7:03:12 GMT -6
I think you could benefit by reading Sgt Ryan's assessment of trooper battle readiness in Ten Years with Custer. Ryan believe the basic soldier was different. They lacked desire to become proficient. The saber was only a dead weight because they could not use it. In my agency they would be let go for failure to respond to training. There was no need to take the sabers and that limits the ability to defend ones self when the revolver is empty.
Indians my not have closed to Reno's troopers close enough to yank the soldier off their horse if the soldier was proficient with a saber. They had no way of defending themselves when the revolver emptied. They could not use both hand to fight while mounted because they did not know how to ride with an independent seat. They had to hold on. One private state he dropped his revolver while trying to maintain himself in the saddle.
All of these events would be visible to the officers and it should effect decision making don't you think?
If your plan is that a whole bunch of mounted soldiers are going to scare the Indians and they might run or fight at a distance but not close to within close quarter distances than it wouldn't matter what the troopers level of battle readiness. When that didn't happen and the Indians were circling and closing in your assessment of those particular troopers ability to fight at close quarters should be considered when making the best available decision of what to do.
As far as training what part of cavalry doesn't suggest that they might be fighting from horseback and that the ability to maintain an independent seat which means you can stay in the saddle without having to hold on freeing both hands to fight. It goes even further at speed not experienced before tunnel vision sets in and the focus is narrow and ahead. They might not see an Indian riding right next to them or slightly behind them.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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