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Post by AZ Ranger on Feb 18, 2015 8:43:34 GMT -6
Off to ISE and will return Sunday
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Post by quincannon on Feb 18, 2015 9:23:49 GMT -6
Montrose: Special Forces Branch Insignia is the former insignia of the U S Army Indian Scouts, canceled in the 1930's,resurected by the 1st Special Service Force, canceled again, and again resurrected by U S Army Special Forces unofficially in the 1960's and officially sometime in he early 1970's (I believe)
Scarface: You have failed with the above posts to meet my high standard of excellence in all things. Training, as an individual, collectively (in units), technically (as in mule train management), and in leadership (leaders are made not born, and the making is a continuous process) is not everything, but nearly so. I cannot eat meat today it being Ash Wednesday, but I will make and exception in biting into your butt, and sort it out with God later.
Mike: Yes, there could have been much batter outcomes, despite Indian numbers. Numbers are meaningless. It is what is done with numbers that have meaning. A well organized, trained, and led, 7th Cavalry could have won, and should have at least scored an incomplete victory by standards of that campaign. Planning and leadership failures are largely to blame, and a McKenzie or Merritt, to name only two I believe could have pulled it off.
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Post by tubman13 on Feb 18, 2015 9:35:53 GMT -6
Off to ISE and will return Sunday Hope the truck holds up this time!
Regards, Tom
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Post by tubman13 on Feb 18, 2015 9:38:49 GMT -6
Montrose: Special Forces Branch Insignia is the former insignia of the U S Army Indian Scouts, canceled in the 1930's,resurected by the 1st Special Service Force, canceled again, and again resurrected by U S Army Special Forces unofficially in the 1960's and officially sometime in he early 1970's (I believe) Scarface: You have failed with the above posts to meet my high standard of excellence in all things. Training, as an individual, collectively (in units), technically (as in mule train management), and in leadership (leaders are made not born, and the making is a continuous process) is not everything, but nearly so. I cannot eat meat today it being Ash Wednesday, but I will make and exception in biting into your butt, and sort it out with God later. Mike: Yes, there could have been much batter outcomes, despite Indian numbers. Numbers are meaningless. It is what is done with numbers that have meaning. A well organized, trained, and led, 7th Cavalry could have won, and should have at least scored an incomplete victory by standards of that campaign. Planning and leadership failures are largely to blame, and a McKenzie or Merritt, to name only two I believe could have pulled it off. Sometimes, ones eyes are bigger than their stomach, don't bite off more than you are willing to chew.
Regards, Tom
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Post by welshofficer on Feb 18, 2015 14:16:05 GMT -6
We know the training shortcomings, and that it wasn't limited to the 7th cavalry.
But that alone does not primarily explain the debacle on 25 June 1876.
As Steve puts it, GAC fed the hostiles a few companies at a time. First Reno, then Keogh, finally Yates.
WO
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Post by welshofficer on Feb 18, 2015 14:32:56 GMT -6
The firing lines in the valley were immediately rendered pointless when - let's see, got to have the correct jargon.....- the flanks were turned and/or enfiladed, making the line rather stupid near immediately. They seemed to collapse pretty quick back into the timber. So......worked? At what? Preventing Indians from standing tall in front of the line at a range the term "aiming" might have meaning? Well, maybe. There was a lot of firing and not much indication from the tribes they hit a lot. (Or vice versa) So, in that firing lines were established in the valley, fine, but how successful were they? There were not real firing lines on Reno Hill, although Godfrey led a line covering the retreat from Weir, threatening to shoot any man who ran, and they didn't seem to slow the Sioux advance a ton, but arguably. If the Sioux were into it, they could easily have enfiladed THAT line as well, but too tired and laden with new carbines and ammo, perhaps. Did they hit anyone? At the appearance of these lines did the Sioux gasp and hit the deck, crawling and quivering back to their lodges? The water runs' covering fire were not real firing lines unless we're describing clumps of guys firing in different directions a line. Their skill in the saddle, which sucked in aggregate, and their inability to fight in the saddle were all the product of institutional non-training. I have no idea why Custer kept dividing and don't think he did after heading north on the east side. Think they got fouled up in or near MTC distant from the river and were driven to where they died. I feel momentum and not proactive decision making was the fueling issue thereinafter. ??
WO
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Post by Beth on Feb 18, 2015 14:40:35 GMT -6
"So lack of institutional training was not a leading factor in their demise." Um, no. Their lack of adequate training was totally a leading factor. It limited the orders that could be given, and the options were absurdly few in the cold light of reflection. If you're Reno or Benteen or Custer, you KNEW there was attack and chase, or.......what? Many of the same terms used then are still used, but I contend they mean and imply different things. Again: what training could actually be done regardless of the officer in charge? What ammo? What money? Train horses all day, more feed needed among other things. Why waste it for mere Indians, Mr. Secretary.......They'll run, like they always do. I completely agree that the options available to a cavalry officer were "absurdly few" but was that down to a lack of training or the fundamental short comings of a cavalry unit in 1876? What training from the manuals of the time could have made a difference? I agree that they were terribly under trained with respects to mounted fighting, shooting practice, re-loading etc but even if above proficient in each of these disciplines, would the outcome have been any different? What discisions would GAC have made differently if his troops were better shots or could reload mounted? Would this have led him to keep his command together, probably not. Would he have recon'd more, I don't think so. Every decision he made appears to be based on a belief that the Indians would flee. Were any Cavalry unit at the time taught to fight and reload while mounted? Beth
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Post by welshofficer on Feb 18, 2015 14:43:23 GMT -6
Beth,
When it comes to deficient "training", I would focus more on the guide/scouting function of the strike force rather than the training of the actual troopers. Plenty of poorly trained cavalry regiments avoided that sort of defeat in detail debacle.
WO
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Post by tubman13 on Feb 18, 2015 14:56:58 GMT -6
WO, rudimentary mistakes were made at the top. No amount of proficiency or training of EM's would have saved the day. Training was certainly a huge issue with the 7th, but the fatal deficiency came from the very top.
Regards, Tom
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Post by Beth on Feb 18, 2015 15:14:55 GMT -6
Beth, When it comes to deficient "training", I would focus more on the guide/scouting function of the strike force rather than the training of the actual troopers. Plenty of poorly trained cavalry regiments avoided that sort of defeat in detail debacle. WO Can you possibly explain more what you mean? Show one view the 7th cavalry as a strike force? I could see where it would have been more sucessful for a cavalry to be used to scout out the area, locate the Indians then bring up the Infantry and others to fight the Indians all together. I believe that pretty much was the plan of the campaign on paper. However they used the 7th to do the scouting with the 'best Indian fighter" in charge so they had to expect Custer to attack if he found Indians. Or am I totally off the wall confused? I've been really under the weather for the last week or so and I know it's effecting my thinking which is extremely frustrating. Beth
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Post by tubman13 on Feb 18, 2015 15:33:06 GMT -6
Beth, When it comes to deficient "training", I would focus more on the guide/scouting function of the strike force rather than the training of the actual troopers. Plenty of poorly trained cavalry regiments avoided that sort of defeat in detail debacle. WO Can you possibly explain more what you mean? Show one view the 7th cavalry as a strike force? I could see where it would have been more sucessful for a cavalry to be used to scout out the area, locate the Indians then bring up the Infantry and others to fight the Indians all together. I believe that pretty much was the plan of the campaign on paper. However they used the 7th to do the scouting with the 'best Indian fighter" in charge so they had to expect Custer to attack if he found Indians. Or am I totally off the wall confused? I've been really under the weather for the last week or so and I know it's effecting my thinking which is extremely frustrating. Beth I know that you asked WO, but I am going to butt in. The 7th would have been an excellent strike force if used properly, as a whole. This is especially true knowing the positioning of Terry/Gibbon. If NA's run which way are going to initially going to head? If they fight, they fight better than 600 troops concentrated at the south end of their village. I could continue, but there are others better equipped to give you a scenario where the 7th wins or fights to a costly draw for both sides.
Regards, Tom
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Post by Beth on Feb 18, 2015 15:56:57 GMT -6
Can you possibly explain more what you mean? Show one view the 7th cavalry as a strike force? I could see where it would have been more sucessful for a cavalry to be used to scout out the area, locate the Indians then bring up the Infantry and others to fight the Indians all together. I believe that pretty much was the plan of the campaign on paper. However they used the 7th to do the scouting with the 'best Indian fighter" in charge so they had to expect Custer to attack if he found Indians. Or am I totally off the wall confused? I've been really under the weather for the last week or so and I know it's effecting my thinking which is extremely frustrating. Beth I know that you asked WO, but I am going to butt in. The 7th would have been an excellent strike force if used properly, as a whole. This is especially true knowing the positioning of Terry/Gibbon. If NA's run which way are going to initially going to head? If they fight, they fight better than 600 troops concentrated at the south end of their village. I could continue, but there are others better equipped to give you a scenario where the 7th wins or fights to a costly draw for both sides.
Regards, Tom
Thanks Tom. I need to know what everyone means by a strike force before I know how they could be used properly. I think what you are saying is that if Custer had sent the main part of the body of his forces down towards the village instead of just Reno with perhaps smaller groups on the bench and bluff--bench perhaps to scatter the horses and bluff perhaps just..? He could have effectively moved the Indians towards Terry/Gibbon. But that would have required that Terry and Gibbon be in the right place at the right time. To do would have envolved a reset clear back to the Bisby camp so Custer could send Herendeen down Tullock Creek so Terry could get in position. Beth
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Post by welshofficer on Feb 18, 2015 16:07:46 GMT -6
Beth,
(1) Disabuse yourself of any notion that GAC's 7th was a "scouting force". It was the strongest combat element, on paper, of Terry's pincer movement against the hostiles. It had the mobility to get south of the hostiles, unlike the other mixed infantry/cavalry column of Gibbon.
(2) It had its own scouting auxiliaries. Ask QC and Montrose how well they think the scouting aspect functioned.....?
(3) 11/12 companies, even platoon sized companies, concentrated in the valley to the south of the village should have been a sufficient force to withstand any counter-attack from the hostiles.
(4) The final "scouting", both of the enemy and the terrain was woeful. A hurried attack, after fear of discovery. That's why 8 of the 12 companies were still doing "recon" after battle had been joined.
WO
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Post by Beth on Feb 18, 2015 16:57:08 GMT -6
Okay so Custer was intended to be the main combat element, but a pincer will only pinch when there are two parts meeting, otherwise it's just basically a poke(I'm sure that there must be a military word for it). Since Terry/Gibbon where not in place to be the second half of the pincer, it would appear Custer was attempting to make his regiment into a pincer and failed.
If Custer had concentrated in the valley south of the village and acted as a poke, do you think the natives would have attacked or run? Or would Custer had to have dismounted to fight or would he have had the advantage of surprise and been able to ride though the village?
Was one of the factors that led the Indians to attack Reno instead of running was Reno's small numbers? They never attack Custer as a whole, just bits and pieces that Custer left spread all over the field.
Beth
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Post by montrose on Feb 18, 2015 18:22:21 GMT -6
1. Purpose. Discuss maneuver with respect to combat power.
2. Background. Beth, Tom, Welsh, Steve have been discussing the impact of maneuver on combat.
3. Discussion.
a. Tactics, Technique, Procedure (TTP). maneuver requires an understanding of time and space. The intent is to mass combat power at a particular space at a specific point in time. There is a military term called coup d'oeil to represent what this means. Term means blink of an eye. I reference my past posts on book Blink. It means a rapid understanding of terrain, and its impact on time and space. On these boards, many posters look at a map and measure the flat line distance between points A and B, regardless of all those brown lines on a map called contour lines.
The other board has no conception that flying over difficult terrain is very different than covering it on the ground. I challenge anyone on these boards to race me on a 5 mile course of my choosing. I am 80% disabled, and only have partial use of the left side of my body. Of course, I will pick a path for myself of flat terrain. For you, I will pick a path that has you crossing the Grand Canyon, or the Himalayas, or an active volcano.
b. Long distance maneuver. Steve has a few hundred posts discussing how animals handle long movements. I have zero experience with animals in this, I have extensive experience in motorized, mechanized, and dismounted operations. Let me start with dismount, since it covers both terrain and physical factors. This means maneuver with a pack of a minimum of 65 pounds, not counting water, LBE, weapon. I have conducted such movements from A team to division. (82nd).
Map analysis is useless. What you must understand is the harder the terrain, the more it wears you down. There are 2 reasons. First, for long distance movement, the best method is a steady pace. The accordion effect, where you stop and start, is very trying. Second, complicated terrain, where you constantly mike micro adjustments due to vegetation, slopes, etc, also wears you down.
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