Determining Outcomes

[Beth]

I will admit that as a person who pretty much grew up as a flatlander, then moving to a place with mountains I quickly learned that traveling in mountains took some getting used to. In Iowa or most other places in the midwest, if the map says it's 30 miles from city A to City B, you pretty much know its going to take you 30 minutes go get there and your odometer is going to be 30 miles higher--and you know exactly how much gas it will take your car to make the triip.

In the mountains, it may be 30 miles as the crow flies, but it will never be 30 miles on the odemeter and the rate you travel will depend on the number of switchbacks, climbs and descents you have to do. Your fuel milage will be different because your car works harder getting you from A to B. Also the road bed you travel will never be the most direct way to get there but it will be the one that probably takes the least amount of work because it is based on old trails that have been used for ages.

[Deleted]

Feb 18, 2015 16:57:08 GMT -6 Beth said:

Okay so Custer was intended to be the main combat element, but a pincer will only pinch when there are two parts meeting, otherwise it's just basically a poke(I'm sure that there must be a military word for it). Since Terry/Gibbon where not in place to be the second half of the pincer, it would appear Custer was attempting to make his regiment into a pincer and failed.

If Custer had concentrated in the valley south of the village and acted as a poke, do you think the natives would have attacked or run? Or would Custer had to have dismounted to fight or would he have had the advantage of surprise and been able to ride though the village?

Was one of the factors that led the Indians to attack Reno instead of running was Reno's small numbers? They never attack Custer as a whole, just bits and pieces that Custer left spread all over the field.

Beth

I believe he would have had to dismount and fight on foot. Wasn't there a 10ft wide drainage feature that stopped Reno's charge? He would have had the numbers though to stand his ground.

The Indians would have come out and fought him while the non-combatants would have headed north.

[welshofficer]

SF,

11 companies coming northwards down the valley towards the hostiles gives GAC options.

Particularly if Terry/Gibbon/Brisbin are within reasonable proximity north of the village.

The numbers become marginal once the 7th attacks alone, from south and north.

Nearly half the regiment getting butchered on the eastern bluffs, travelling to a northern attack point, just adds insult to injury.

WO

[tubman13]

Montrose, loved your most recent post. So Custer elects to approach/attack up the valley, sends NA scouts to disperse as much of the herd as possible. Assuming at some point a skirmish line would have to be thrown out, it would be with much better coverage and concentrated fire power. I see the NA's fighting fiercely at first, while attempting to extricate their families from an area of danger, then fighting a rear guard action as long as pressure is continually applied. If NA pressure is to great, with the entire regiment, an orderly retreat is doable. Your thoughts?

Regards,
Tom

[mac]

montrose
Please go on. I am keen to see where you are going.
Cheers

[quincannon]

Had Custer entered the valley and assaulted the southern end of the village(s) with the entire regiment the action would have been conducted as a combined mounted-dismounted assault, consistent with the dragoon doctrine and methodology adopted by the U S Army in 1776 and continues today. It is very easy to understand.

Advance as far forward as possible mounted, and when resistance builds against you dismount a part of your force while covering the dismounts with your elements that remain mounted. That way each part of your force compliments the capability of their opposite number. It is very much like the tank-Infantry team of today. Same stuff-different horse.

[shaw]

I'm with QC and Tom on this Montrose. At first I thought, "that's not a Custer maneuver", but actually it is. Charging in is just his type of tactic. But he can't know to do this without scouting ahead. Therein lies the rub. Instead Custer scouts as he goes along. It slows down the whole right wing thrust, gives the NA's time to repulse Reno and then deal with the Custer battalion. What amazes me is that once Custer's NA scouts told him that the village was big ( up at the Crows Nest ) that he didn't scout to get a fix on how large the village was.

So if he did and attacks from the south with perhaps the scouts to drive off some of the herd, then the village draws off to the north and runs into Terry-Gibbon...

Then?

This is not the direction the NA's would prefer...

[shaw]

Apologies, didn't mean to get off topic, but the possibilities are interesting.

[Yan Taylor]

Maybe he could have done with this manual;

A. REINFORCED BATTALION ACTING ALONE.
Reconnaissance. When acting alone the battalion uses its reconnaissance platoon to reconnoitre 3 to 7 miles ahead of the advance guard and 1 to 2 miles on each side, depending on the road net. Squads are sent to reconnoitre ahead and to the flanks. The vehicles work in pairs. Any resistance met is immediately reported to the battalion commander. The reconnaissance platoon seeks to determine the strength, composition, disposition, and flanks of the enemy, and makes reports immediately to the battalion commander by the best means available.

(2) Advance guard. The advance guard of a reinforced infantry battalion acting alone frequently' consists of a rifle company reinforced with a platoon of tanks, engineers, and one or more assault guns and mortars.
(a) The company (support) commander usually rides near the tail of the advance party. The battalion commander may march with the support commander.
(b) The advance guard attacks boldly and attempts to overcome hostile resistance. If enemy resistance is too strong, it uncovers enemy defensive positions, including flanks. While doing this it serves as a covering force for the development of the main body and later as an element of the base of fire.
(c) Flank guards. Flank guards are sent out 2 to 5 miles, depending on the road net, to protect the flanks of the battalion. Prior information of the route may indicate the necessity for attaching engineers.
Flank guards for a battalion usually consist of rifle platoon, with attached supporting weapons. A reinforced rifle company may be used as a flank guard for a combat command.
(d) Flank guards protect the battalion from ground observation and surprise attack from the flanks. Points from which the enemy may observe the march of the column are reconnoitred. Movement is usually by bounds. Key positions, the holding of which will protect the main body, are occupied. A flank guard may split into two or more elements and use the leapfrog method of advance.

(4) Rear guard. When the battalion is advancing, the rear guard usually consists of a rifle platoon with an assault gun attached. The rear guard follows the main body 5 to 10 minutes. When the enemy attacks from the rear, the rear guard fights a delaying action withdrawing a portion of its force under cover of the fire of the remainder, occupying positions that afford long range fields of fire and at the same time good routes of withdrawal.

Sorry as Shaw said about going off topic.
Ian.

[fred]

Shaw,

A very interesting post... and one I agree with in your general thoughts.

Feb 19, 2015 9:18:47 GMT -6 shaw said:

At first I thought, "that's not a Custer maneuver", but actually it is. Charging in is just his type of tactic. But he can't know to do this without scouting ahead. Therein lies the rub. Instead Custer scouts as he goes along.

This is precisely what he did.

It slows down the whole right wing thrust, gives the NA's time to repulse Reno and then deal with the Custer battalion.

The only caveat I might throw in here is that, generally speaking, there were enough Indians without those fighting Reno to do away with the split-up Custer battalions. The largest contribution of valley fighters to battle Custer were those following Crazy Horse, and I believe, other than the chase, Horse saw very little of the valley fight.

What amazes me is that once Custer's NA scouts told him that the village was big ( up at the Crows Nest ) that he didn't scout to get a fix on how large the village was.

I agree... at least try. I assume, therefore, the only reason he did not send a bunch of scouts farther ahead-- and immediately!-- is two-fold. First of all, he did not plan an immediate attack; and second, when he changed his mind he was too worried about scattering and that's why he moved rapidly down Reno Creek, probably obviating the need for scouts... who had some difficulty keeping up anyway.

So if he did and attacks from the south with perhaps the scouts to drive off some of the herd, then the village draws off to the north and runs into Terry-Gibbon.... This is not the direction the NA's would prefer...

Exactly.

Good post.


Best wishes,
Fred.

[tubman13]

The NA's had three options including east, following the trail that eventually became a two lane that goes through the Cheyenne Reservation. Not bad in that is the general direction of the Sioux reservations. If they opt for north Terry/Gibbon. This works. If they opt for west or northwest get a currier through to Terry and inform of change of plans. Custer then assembles enough companies on the best horses and harries the NA's progress. In fact he should do that no matter what option the NA's choose. He might also send a currier towards Crook and tell him of events, remember he has no idea that Crook is out of the game.

The NA's stay and fight, give Custer more than he wants. He simply retreats across Ford A to terrain he is familiar with and hunkers down to await Terry/Gibbon. He uses river as buffer. In my book a very simple game.

Back to reality, he $crewed the pooch by not sending recon from C.N..

Regards,
Tom

[montrose]

Let's look at GAC's jump from captain to general.

In the early ACW the US cavalry was dominated by the slavery folks. The problem was bad organizational design, Chuck's bread and butter. The US forces were scattered in small penny packets all over the Army, with elements in various infantry corps, divisions, even brigades. Hooker reorganized the cavalry, an issue often neglected because of his combat performance. He massed the cavalry in a corps, and reequipped them with breech loading repeaters. The problem was that the senior leaders of the cavalry were too intimidated by their previous poor performance against the traitors.

What the cavalry needed was inspirational leaders. GAC was a charismatic leader, great on aggression. Notso hotso with tactics or sound judgment. I believe he had a career long weakness on understanding any situation that he could not personally observe.

Example. GAC ordered Benteen to scout the left flank of Reno Creek, when he believed there was an Indian village where the south fork joins the main stream. Steve has ridden this route, and anyone looking at a map knows this is nasty terrain. Custer later decided he wanted to enter the bad lands east of the river, rather than the far more traversable river valley. He then decided he wanted Benteen and the trains to follow him on the bad lands. He just did not understand how his orders would effect his subordinate units.

We have several thousand posts about the topic "Benteen's dawdling". This is based on the belief that moving through badlands is the exact same thing as moving through a parade ground. It is not just a question of a timeline. (When can you get there). It is also a question of combat power, if you exhaust your units getting to the fight, how badly degraded is their combat power. I fell asleep under fire,..twice.

If the pack train fell apart following a valley, how would that improve in the bad lands? If you just wore out all the horses in the Benteen battalion, in the nasty area off Reno Creek, why would you think they can travel faster in further bad terrain?

Custer's decision to go through the badlands meant that the follow forces would arrive slowly, and exhausted, unfit for combat.

A commander has to consider the impact of his orders on his subordinates. Is there anyone here with military or law enforcement experience not familiar with "hurry up and wait" Or ESAD? Custer's rapid advancement meant that he didn't learn what every other officer in the Army did learn.

Custer was most effective when under the control of senior officers, who could cover for his myriad tactical and judgmental errors. His worst performances was as an independent commander.

Washita was his best performance against the Indians. He was micromanaged in that campaign by the Department, Division, and Army commander.

[Yan Taylor]

I would have thought that if the full Regiment did attack en-masse straight up the valley, that the Indians would still have tried to block them, they were already moving out to meet Reno as he got close so I would expect the same to happen no matter how large the force, around 600 cavalry against double or triple the amount of Indians would still be one hell of a clash, but I think they would of screened and defended rather than attack, and if the cavalry were to move round a hit the place in a sweep from the west, they would still have enough warriors or any armed males to counter this threat, the whole thing could become a huge “Mexican Stand Off” with the civilians scattering either north or northeast and any resistance gradually moving back to the river.

Ian.

[Yan Taylor]

Imagine if Benteen had to drag a pack train down Cedar coulee, Custer would have known how difficult this would be since he had just made the same journey, so would this have been a concern to Custer that Benteen could be struggling over rugged terrain and through enemy territory with a full mule train?

Ian.

[montrose]

Yan,

Here is the null hypothesis of the "Indians always Run" theory.

If the Indians make a stand, fight them. Is that not what every US commander for 50 years wanted to happen?

At LBH, consider what would happen if the Indians did run. They would have to abandon the villages. This means hundreds of tons of supplies. If the Indians ran, they would have starved to death that winter. The first to die would be the children, then the elderly, then the women. How can you live in a culture that emphasizes men as warriors, where you sacrifice all you value for self preservation?

We keep looking at LBH only through the GAC lens.

The 7th cavalry had caught the Indians napping, to borrow a phrase from Martini. So put on an Indian hat. What are their options, what can they do?

Run away, not bloody likely.