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Post by Yan Taylor on Feb 19, 2015 13:23:29 GMT -6
That’s exactly what I was trying to get across Montrose, they must have got wind of Reno because of the reports received before he even made contact, he was told that they are coming back up the valley, so given the amount of armed Indians contained in this village and what was at stake, then even if the regiment attacked as a whole they would encounter resistance, as they did with Reno the Indians would try and screen the village with dust clouds hoping that it would discourage any thrust by the cavalry into a target they couldn’t see and if that failed then its game on.
Ian.
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Deleted
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Post by Deleted on Feb 19, 2015 13:43:35 GMT -6
Yan, Here is the null hypothesis of the "Indians always Run" theory. If the Indians make a stand, fight them. Is that not what every US commander for 50 years wanted to happen? At LBH, consider what would happen if the Indians did run. They would have to abandon the villages. This means hundreds of tons of supplies. If the Indians ran, they would have starved to death that winter. The first to die would be the children, then the elderly, then the women. How can you live in a culture that emphasizes men as warriors, where you sacrifice all you value for self preservation? We keep looking at LBH only through the GAC lens. The 7th cavalry had caught the Indians napping, to borrow a phrase from Martini. So put on an Indian hat. What are their options, what can they do? Run away, not bloody likely. I don't disagree with the overall summary. However, while warrior status was highly regarded, women and children were held in higher regard within the tribal structure. The reason the NAs were at LBH was precisely for self preservation. Going into a reservation meant the end of their culture and would kill their spirit. Given the option, the NAs would much preferred to have moved on without conflict thus eliminating any risk to the women and children.
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shaw
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Post by shaw on Feb 19, 2015 18:08:43 GMT -6
The NA's weren't running. They weren't running at Rosebud the week before. Ask Crook.
Also the NA's at LBH were swelled by Indians coming off the reservation to join the meet and greet at Greasy Grass. Many of them planned to head back after the summer. Included was Red Cloud's son Jack. This was the army's problem. They underestimated the size of the NA's they were going to face.
From wiki...
Number of Indian warriors
1876 Army Campaign against the Sioux As the Army moved into the field on its expedition, it was operating with incorrect assumptions as to the number of Indians it would encounter. The Army's assumptions were based on inaccurate information provided by the Indian Agents that no more than 800 hostiles were in the area. The Indian Agents based the 800 number on the number of Lakota led by Sitting Bull and other leaders off the reservation in protest of US Government policies. This was a correct estimate until several weeks before the battle, when the "reservation Indians" joined Sitting Bull's ranks for the summer buffalo hunt. However, the agents did not take into account the many thousands of "reservation Indians" who had "unofficially" left the reservation to join their "uncooperative non-reservation cousins led by Sitting Bull". The latter were those groups who had indicated that they were not going to cooperate with the US Government and live on reservation lands. Thus, Custer unknowingly faced thousands of Indians, in addition to the 800 non-reservation "hostiles". All Army plans were based on the incorrect numbers. While after the battle, Custer was severely criticized for not having accepted reinforcements and for dividing his forces, it must be understood that he had accepted the same official Government estimates of hostiles in the area which Terry and Gibbon also accepted. Historian James Donovan states that when Custer asked interpreter Fred Gerard for his opinion on the size of the opposition, he estimated the force at between 1,500 to 2,500 warriors.[14]
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Post by Deleted on Feb 19, 2015 18:19:50 GMT -6
The NA's weren't running. They weren't running at Rosebud the week before. Ask Crook. Also the NA's at LBH were swelled by Indians coming off the reservation to join the meet and greet at Greasy Grass. Many of them planned to head back after the summer. Included was Red Cloud's son Jack. This was the army's problem. They underestimated the size of the NA's they were going to face. From wiki... Number of Indian warriors 1876 Army Campaign against the Sioux As the Army moved into the field on its expedition, it was operating with incorrect assumptions as to the number of Indians it would encounter. The Army's assumptions were based on inaccurate information provided by the Indian Agents that no more than 800 hostiles were in the area. The Indian Agents based the 800 number on the number of Lakota led by Sitting Bull and other leaders off the reservation in protest of US Government policies. This was a correct estimate until several weeks before the battle, when the "reservation Indians" joined Sitting Bull's ranks for the summer buffalo hunt. However, the agents did not take into account the many thousands of "reservation Indians" who had "unofficially" left the reservation to join their "uncooperative non-reservation cousins led by Sitting Bull". The latter were those groups who had indicated that they were not going to cooperate with the US Government and live on reservation lands. Thus, Custer unknowingly faced thousands of Indians, in addition to the 800 non-reservation "hostiles". All Army plans were based on the incorrect numbers. While after the battle, Custer was severely criticized for not having accepted reinforcements and for dividing his forces, it must be understood that he had accepted the same official Government estimates of hostiles in the area which Terry and Gibbon also accepted. Historian James Donovan states that when Custer asked interpreter Fred Gerard for his opinion on the size of the opposition, he estimated the force at between 1,500 to 2,500 warriors.[14] Different circumstances could have led to the thinking about whether NAs would run or fight. Although GAC knew nothing about the Crook engagement, the NAs didn't flee because they were looking for a fight and their village was not being attacked or in immediate danger. Same at Fetterman. Washita they backed down when the women and children were captured. Giving the option, I don't think NAs would not have fought a battle in their village and risked the woman and children. At LBH, they had no choice but to fight, GAC brought the fight to them, plus numerical advantage would have bolstered confidence. I can understand GAC believing they would flee when his command was seen early in the morning.
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Post by Beth on Feb 19, 2015 18:35:59 GMT -6
The NA's weren't running. They weren't running at Rosebud the week before. Ask Crook. Also the NA's at LBH were swelled by Indians coming off the reservation to join the meet and greet at Greasy Grass. Many of them planned to head back after the summer. Included was Red Cloud's son Jack. This was the army's problem. They underestimated the size of the NA's they were going to face. From wiki... Number of Indian warriors 1876 Army Campaign against the Sioux As the Army moved into the field on its expedition, it was operating with incorrect assumptions as to the number of Indians it would encounter. The Army's assumptions were based on inaccurate information provided by the Indian Agents that no more than 800 hostiles were in the area. The Indian Agents based the 800 number on the number of Lakota led by Sitting Bull and other leaders off the reservation in protest of US Government policies. This was a correct estimate until several weeks before the battle, when the "reservation Indians" joined Sitting Bull's ranks for the summer buffalo hunt. However, the agents did not take into account the many thousands of "reservation Indians" who had "unofficially" left the reservation to join their "uncooperative non-reservation cousins led by Sitting Bull". The latter were those groups who had indicated that they were not going to cooperate with the US Government and live on reservation lands. Thus, Custer unknowingly faced thousands of Indians, in addition to the 800 non-reservation "hostiles". All Army plans were based on the incorrect numbers. While after the battle, Custer was severely criticized for not having accepted reinforcements and for dividing his forces, it must be understood that he had accepted the same official Government estimates of hostiles in the area which Terry and Gibbon also accepted. Historian James Donovan states that when Custer asked interpreter Fred Gerard for his opinion on the size of the opposition, he estimated the force at between 1,500 to 2,500 warriors.[14] Different circumstances could have led to the thinking about whether NAs would run or fight. Although GAC knew nothing about the Crook engagement, the NAs didn't flee because they were looking for a fight and their village was not being attacked or in immediate danger. Same at Fetterman. Washita they backed down when the women and children were captured. Giving the option, I don't think NAs would not have fought a battle in their village and risked the woman and children. At LBH, they had no choice but to fight, GAC brought the fight to them, plus numerical advantage would have bolstered confidence. I can understand GAC believing they would flee when his command was seen early in the morning. Yes, Custer brought the fight to them, but it means that the NA had the home court advantage. They had the numbers, battlefield, local knowledge and were rested. Custer entered the court blind to the terrian, size of his quarry, inferior numbers and had no knowledge if there were any other villages in the area who might come to the support of those he was attacking. Custer had exhausted troops, split up his forces and had moved beyond his supplies. His opening move upon arriving was to split his forces yet again, not a great start.
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Post by mac on Feb 19, 2015 19:02:06 GMT -6
Agreed Beth. Add to this that when he arrives he knows there is a pony herd out to the left which if disrupted would have a huge impact on the enemy. Instead he goes right into ground that will only further exhaust his men and horses. Cheers
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shaw
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Post by shaw on Feb 19, 2015 23:00:58 GMT -6
Beth, Mac
Agreed! When you drive or walk the battlefield you have to scratch your head on why Custer didn't attack from the west. By this I mean pincher in from that side versus the bluffs on the east. Even if he still had Reno come in from the south. The ground to the west is alternately flat and rolling cavalry friendly country. That's why the village was there and that's why the horse herd was on the bench lands near the village. There are some low bluffs further west, but they wouldn't have impacted the room Custer needed to maneuver. He however, chose the south and east. He chose poorly.
Of course he didn't effectively scout the village ahead of time. I've beat that horse to death.
If he'd realized the village's configuration he could have come in from the south and west, captured or dispersed the pony herd ( more likely the latter ).
Regardless, I think the NA's were in a fighting mood. Rosebud tells us that whether Custer knew about it or not. The NA's "knew" about it. Remember Sitting Bull's sun dance where he saw soldiers falling into the village.
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Post by welshofficer on Feb 20, 2015 8:40:15 GMT -6
The problem with an attack from the west is potential hostile flight to the east.
WO
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shaw
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Post by shaw on Feb 20, 2015 8:46:19 GMT -6
The problem with an attack from the west is potential hostile flight to the east. WO Not easy if your pony herd has been scattered.
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Post by welshofficer on Feb 20, 2015 9:11:00 GMT -6
Not easy for many if the pony herd was predominantly scattered, but the badlands to the east (and leading back to Sioux lands) would have been left unguarded. And a northerly escape route down TC with Terry having crossed the badlands from TC to the BH valley.
WO
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