|
|
Post by quincannon on Sept 8, 2012 8:03:09 GMT -6
CHECK FIRE----------HAPPY BIRTHDAY MONTROSE------------RESUME FIRE
|
|
|
|
Post by montrose on Sept 8, 2012 8:33:39 GMT -6
Going back to Jag's movement to LCN ridge. He explained that the size of Wolf Tooth band was unknown.
The issue is once you crest LCN, you can see other side, and the WT band is is significant.
So now time has been consumed, troops moved further away from enemy main body, and there are no timeouts. So what do you do next?
I see the 3411 options as follow:
1. Realize battle is in the valley. Countermarch to Ford A, pick up Benteen en route, and fight in the valley.
Option 1A. Try to go directly from 3411 to valley fight, but this has so many problems, I do not regard this as a viable act.
2. Move immediately to Ford B area, cross and attack the Indians on Reno from the rear.
3. Move to Ford B and attack and seize the village circles there. Seizing a central position will disrupt Indians efforts to concentrate and respond. Goal is chaos, and creating an OODA loop advantage, to the point where Indian decision making is paralyzed.
4. Move past Ford B to get past the downstream end of the total village complex. A move like this requires stealth. Keep main body on far side of ridge crests, so they can not be seen from the village.
Note the actual COA chosen by GAC is not listed. It makes no tactical sense.I believe it was a series of compromise decisions that in their whole guarentee failure, with no, zero, nada, hope of achieving anything tactically relevant.
|
|
|
|
Post by benteen on Sept 8, 2012 9:28:24 GMT -6
Colonel,
You dont believe that going to his direct support in the timber is an option?
Didnt know it was your birthday. Happy Birthday Colonel hope this year and all the rest find you in better health and less pain. You have had more than your share of bumps.
Be Well
Dan
|
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Sept 8, 2012 9:47:20 GMT -6
Dan: You do not have to go to the timber to render direct support to Reno. A decision to fight in the valley will provide that support.
As stated in Reply #55 I reject course of action 1A for the same reasons Will does.
I also reject Courses of action 2, 3 and 4 as I stated in Reply 55 but I will here offer my reasoning
Course of Action 2: Exposure of your own flanks and rear with a high probability that this force will be cut off and not be able to aid Reno.
Course of Action 3: Rejected for the same reason as CA2 above. Any reduction in OODA loop will be offset by the overall disadvantages. They can recover faster than you can disrupt. You are locked in a relatively small area. They are not.
Course of Action 4: A movement to the far downstream extent of the villages further seperates you from the rest of the regiment. Stealth cannot be achieved as long as Wolf Tooth and his band have seen you. They might not fight you but they will certainly follow and harrass you and give warning to others. There are still a lot of warriors in that village. When you attack that downstream end it most probably will have the same overall effect as Reno's attack. indecisive at best, catistrophic at worst.
|
|
|
|
Post by benteen on Sept 8, 2012 10:53:53 GMT -6
Dan: You do not have to go to the timber to render direct support to Reno.. . Colonel....I certainly dont want to seem argumentative, we both feel it is time to save the command. You state that I dont have to go to the timber and render direct support, I agree and Colonel Montrose has listed other courses of action. My question is sir, why cant I go directly to Renos position in the timber. I have tried a flank attack that failed, Reno is getting his a** handed to him why cant I go directly to him, for the reasons I listed in reply #37. I have no problem being shown that it is a bad tactical decision, I guess it is just sticking in my craw that that is what I would do. Be Well Dan |
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Sept 8, 2012 11:07:46 GMT -6
Dan: Going into the valley in support of Reno does not necessarily mean that you have to become joined at the hip with him. You may add your presence in the valley thereby taking pressure off of him and allowing him to withdraw, supporting that withdrawl by fire and maneuver.
It is only if you believe that where Reno is presently located, be it timber or still on a skirmish line, is where you wish to fight, that would necessitate you physically joining him. If you do that and the pack trains and Benteen have not yet joined you, your command is still split, and you are then in the same situation Reno finds himself in. The bag is bigger, but your still in the bag. Pack trains in the attack is not the best use of resources I think.
Sidebar: I recieved a letter yesterday from the young lady I used to teach in Sunday School. She is a P I halfway through boot camp, and doing quite well. Her father presently commands USS Freedom LCS1 out of San Diego.
|
|
|
|
Post by Yan Taylor on Sept 8, 2012 11:09:46 GMT -6
If I had to pick one off Montrose’s list (many happy returns William and many more to come), I would plumb for option #2, if option #2 gets thwarted by the warriors defending the crossing I would try option #1.
Ian.
|
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Sept 8, 2012 11:16:16 GMT -6
Ian: I think you do have to pick. Will has outlined all the options available save sitting on you butt and doing nothing.
|
|
|
|
Post by wild on Sept 8, 2012 11:35:32 GMT -6
3. Move to Ford B and attack and seize the village circles there. Seizing a central position will disrupt Indians efforts to concentrate and respond. Goal is chaos, and creating an OODA loop advantage, to the point where Indian decision making is paralyzed
The description here is better than my offering in proposing this scenario.
Interesting that it is arrivied at by a complex route and puts only 5 companies in a central position.It is possible to have placed all 12 companies in the centre of the village.
Armies are delivery systems.The purpose being to deliver more ordnance on the enemy at a time and place where it hurts most.
I have placed the full potential of a cavalry regiment on the door step of the enemy by the simplist most direct route over the best terrain.
If the front door is open-------
|
|
|
|
Post by montrose on Sept 8, 2012 14:33:04 GMT -6
QC and Wild,
Actually, you both have a point.
Option 5. Maintain observation of valley fight from vicinity 3411. Park Yates/Keough out of view of enemy. Dispatch patrol to LCN.
Send messengers to Benteen and McDougall Bns.
You have a window to wait while supporting BNs close, to decide how you will use your 4 Bns (2 with you, 2 coming).
A critical decision is whether to:
a) send Benteen to valley, while you use your Bns to go north (multiple small forces better suited to even fight, or numerical superiority)
b) Combine with Benteen,and bring regiment into valley to fighting the valley (Mass, unity of effort)
c) Take Benteen with you, and all go north
Disposition of trains more complicated, I will address this later
|
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Sept 8, 2012 19:44:23 GMT -6
Will: Mass and unity of effort is the only chance you have of making this particular sow's ear into something that resembles a silk purse. Compounding the error you have already made is not the answer.
If you bring Benteen to you, that still leaves Reno in a bad way. Even your force combined with Benteen will not be able to strike a timely blow I think. In addition you are going on a wish and a proimise if you go north. You probably know that there are ford(s) there. What you don't know is if those fords are defended, the nature of the fords themselves, and most importantly, once you commit yourself to that course of action there is no going back. You can't get a combined Custer/Benteen force to Ford B or D, find out you can do no good, and then get back to be any help to Reno.
This battle must be fought by a combined force in the valley, en mass or you might as well have stayed home.
|
|
|
|
Post by wild on Sept 9, 2012 5:36:28 GMT -6
Consider--
This is a single unit action.
Not only that. the unit in question is not a stand alone unit.
It is a line unit normally acting in support or being supported.
Why all blue commanders try to replicate ortodox battlefield tactics is puzzling.
This action is a commando raid using a mobile column for a swift strike.
Also in such an action the unit is expendable.
This is why the unit should focus it's entire strenght on a single target ;to wit the centre of the village
|
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Sept 9, 2012 8:18:56 GMT -6
Richard: What is the overall objective of a raid? Is that type of objective consistent with the operational maneuves leading up to this confrontation? Is a raid type action consistent with the strategic objective of the campaign?
|
|
|
|
Post by benteen on Sept 9, 2012 14:41:33 GMT -6
Sidebar: I recieved a letter yesterday from the young lady I used to teach in Sunday School. She is a P I halfway through boot camp, and doing quite well. Her father presently commands USS Freedom LCS1 out of San Diego. Colonel...I believe you mentioned this young lady a while back. She was either thinking of joining the military or was heading for boot camp. Nice to see shes doing fine. Got to make you feel good. Best wishes to her. Tell her thanks for joining up to keep my sorry butt safe Be Well Dan |
|
|
|
Post by wild on Sept 10, 2012 0:51:02 GMT -6
Colonel
Is a raid type action consistent with the strategic objective of the campaign?
The objective of the campaign is the destruction of Indian society and it's removal from the land.
We have heard mention of superior societies;literate societies as opposied to the illiterate societies.The real difference is the ability of the surerior society to produce expendable humans to wit soldiers.
The Indian warrior is not expendable,he is a vital integral part of his society.
It was possible to achieve all the goals of the campaign by bringing on a battle of such armageddon proportions that the resultant shock and awe,to coin a phrase,to the Indian would result in the collaspe of his society and the hearding of the remanants onto reservations.
The arrival of a cavalry regiment unannounced into the heart of the greatest concentration of Indians the plains had seen in yonks,the total absence of any early warning system and failure of the warriors to protect his women and children would have had a devasting effect on his morale
The tactics pursued by blue commanders,I think,are greatly influenced by the Custer result.It seems that avoidence of such a result is uppermost in blue minds resulting in over cautiousness.
|
|
