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Post by montrose on Sept 1, 2012 19:23:04 GMT -6
This is the 3411 rock drill. {Be honest with me, how many of you knew I was heading here from day one?}
Blue situation. Reno Bn has been launched as advance guard for a regimental attack across Ford A. LTC Custer decided to change this plan, by having the main body shift to the left.
He assumed the village was between Ford A and Ford B. His move to right would put him behind the village when he reached Ford B. He had no possible way to know about Ford B, except total trust in his Crow guides.
He was gambling. There are arguments that he did not trust his Indian guides. He bet the farm on their advice. His actions are lunacy if their was no ford beyond the bluffs.
Okay, he gets to 3411 and sees his assumptions on Indian locations and actions are wrong. Village is not upstream of Ford B, instead the ford ois center of mass of the village.
Ohhhh, and he failed to tell Reno, Benteen and McDougall of his move to the right.
So at 3411, the Indians are not where you thought they were, and not running away as expected. Your subordinates do not know where you are, or what you intend.
Clock is running.
Now what?
(Since we have been discussing C2, this is a fragmentary order situation. (FRAGO). This is a process where you adjust your plan. I can explain further iffolks need advice.)
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Post by quincannon on Sept 1, 2012 20:23:49 GMT -6
The only thing that makes any sense (to me) is fight the battle you have. You already lost the battle you want. Consolidate the regiment by the fastest practical means. Designate a regimental rally point. There are several good possabilities but whichever it is, it should be an easily recognizable place. Send officer or senior NCO messengers to the divergent elements of the regiment with exact knowledge of your intent. Execute.
Based upon everything I have seen that you have written since I have known you, I had a pretty good idea. You never made a secret of how you feel that this and turning onto the bluff in the first place were the two most critical decision points of the day.
Just found out that a new kit of the Royal Navy's Duke Class Frigates have been issued in 1/350 scale which considering my old eyes will be a blessing. One of those is HMS Montrose. You may very well be famous yet Will.
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Post by lew on Sept 1, 2012 20:57:29 GMT -6
I send one company back towards Reno to be in position to cover his retreat. By messenger I inform Reno to fall back across the river to a defensive position. He will take charge of the wounded and pack train coming up. I send Lt. Cooke to Benteen ordering him forward to my position as soon as possible. I will try and stay hidden from the Indian camp, waiting the arrival of Benteen. If the enemy follows Reno across the river, I'll turn back to attack them. At this point I await the arrival of Benteen before advancing on the camp.
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Post by quincannon on Sept 1, 2012 21:05:37 GMT -6
If I recall correctly when Custer or someone looking a lot like him was seen at 3411, Reno was very early on in his fight. Correct me here if I am wrong. It's important.
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Post by benteen on Sept 1, 2012 22:24:33 GMT -6
I send one company back towards Reno to be in position to cover his retreat. By messenger I inform Reno to fall back across the river to a defensive position. He will take charge of the wounded and pack train coming up. I send Lt. Cooke to Benteen ordering him forward to my position as soon as possible. I will try and stay hidden from the Indian camp, waiting the arrival of Benteen. If the enemy follows Reno across the river, I'll turn back to attack them. At this point I await the arrival of Benteen before advancing on the camp. Larry, With do respect, your plan looks like a sound military operation, but in my opinion, it doesnt take in the reality of the situation. Reno isnt in a skirmish with a few warriors, he is being enveloped by hundreds maybe a thousand warriors with more coming. Sending one company of about forty men, thirty with horse holders is not going to give Reno much covering fire. These warriors are mixed in with Renos men, pulling them off horses, your troops are just as likley to shoot a soldier as an Indian. These warriors will roll over this company the same way they did companies I,L,and C. Larry I dont know what Custers plan was but its fair to assume he felt the Indians would run, that Reno would hit the village, and that he would support him with a flank attack. Well, what happened. Reno was stopped cold hundreds of yards from the village, the Indians werent running, and he couldnt cross at Ford B to support him with a flank attack. It is all over. There should be no further thoughts of victory or attacking the village. My only thought now should be of saving my men, my Regiment. Iattack with my whole battalion to support Reno. It should make the warriors hesitate, and pull back out of the timber. Now with 210 men I can give Reno a chance to collect his wounded and provide a military retrograde up the hill. (I fully understand that caring about his men was not one of Custers strong suits) but it is mine. Certainly I agree with you about sending a message to Benteen to get here fortwith. Be Well Dan
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Post by quincannon on Sept 1, 2012 23:10:31 GMT -6
Dan: How do you envision the Yates and Keogh squadrons getting to where they need to be with a start point somewhere around 3411. I am going to pull out the maps tomorrow afternoon, but if they go back the way they came to Ford A and then follow Reno's trail into the vallley that route seems quite long and time consuming to me, but I just don't have the milage or time required off the top of my head.
Same for Larry going back to Ford A with one company. Time is the factor as it always is.
All this is why I requested information as to what phase Reno was in when Custer arrived at 3411, at the exercise start point.
More soldiers in that valley will permit a more orderly withdrawl, if that is what is decided. If they get there soon enough, it just might put in check any flanking maneuver around Reno's left toward Ford A.
I think we all will find that this is a much more complicated problem than the first RD. More in the way of historical events have taken place and the options become much fewer.
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Post by fred on Sept 2, 2012 1:35:41 GMT -6
If I recall correctly when Custer or someone looking a lot like him was seen at 3411, Reno was very early on in his fight. Correct me here if I am wrong. You are not wrong. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Sept 2, 2012 1:55:45 GMT -6
Some of this is duped (I took it from two of my documents and haven't bothered to proof it), but it sould help...
The divide to the morass is about 7½ miles. • It is ¾ mile from the morass to the eastern “lone tepee” [Gray]. Darling figured 1.4 to 2.4 miles from morass to the “lone tepee.” Smalley says 1 mile. • The divide to the divide halt was about ¼ mile (440 yards); divide halt to the mouth of No – Name Creek (at Ash or Reno Creek), approximately 6.7 miles (this is the creek Benteen moved down when he finished his scout). • From the divide crossing to the confluence of No – Name Creek and Reno Creek is 6.9 miles. • From No – Name Creek to the LBH is about 5 to 5.4 miles. [See below.] • Therefore the distance from No – Name Creek to the morass was only about ¼ mile (440 yards). • From the morass to the real lone tepee/Gerard’s Knoll is 3.05 miles. • South Fork is about 1 mile below No – Name Creek and at Reno Creek about 4 miles above the LBH. o My figures are 1.05 miles between where No – Name joins Reno Creek and where South Fork joins Reno Creek.
• South Fork to Ford A is 4.32 miles. • South Fork to Gerard’s Knoll is 2.62 miles. • Gerard’s Knoll to Middle Knoll is 1.1 miles. • Middle Knoll to Cooke’s Knoll is 0.38 miles (670 yards). • The western side of Middle Knoll to Last Stand Hill is approximately 5.71 miles. • Distances from the Custer – Reno separation point: o Reno’s route to the Ford A crossing was 1.62 miles. o From the Ford A crossing to open LBH valley is approximately ½ mile. o From the separation point to where I believe Cooke met Custer was approximately 1 mile. o From the Cooke – Custer meeting to where I believe Custer may have watered, 335 yards (2/10 of a mile). o From the watering point to the peak on the bluffs, 670 yards (.38 of a mile). (This would have been the first “high point” on the bluffs along the river north of Reno Creek valley.) o From the peak on the bluffs to “3,411,” 1½ miles.
• The divide crossing to Ford A is 11.81 miles along Reno Creek, almost straight-line except for one or two sharp bends in the valley. • Divide crossing—map reference, Thompson Creek NW, block 28, along trail and between large 4,400' elevation and a smaller rise to its south. • Morass—map reference, Lodge Grass NE, block 16 (northern half), just west of the confluence of No-Name Creek and Reno Creek.
Ford A ↔ 1.7 miles ↔ Gerard’s Knoll/“lone tepee” (in the “flats”) ↔ 2.3 miles ↔ South Fork ↔ 1 mile ↔ No – Name Creek ↔ 6.9 miles ↔ divide crossing. Total distance: 11.9 miles.
Reno Creek has been known also as Benteen Creek, Ash Creek, Trail Creek [Lakota], Little Wolf Creek, Medicine Dance Creek—or Great Medicine Dance Creek—and Sundance Creek. It appears the Sioux also called it Spring Creek.
• Ford A is about 4 to 4½ miles from the eastern “lone tepee.” • Ford A is about 1.7 miles from the real “lone, burning tepee.” • The Indian village was approximately 3 miles from Ford A. o Reno dismounted to form his skirmish line about 2½ miles from Ford A. o His command fought dismounted for about 30 minutes. o It took about 15 – 20 minutes for retreat to river and bluffs. • Ford A to “Gerard’s Knoll,” located in “the flats,” is approximately 1.7 miles.
North Fork (or Custer Creek) to Reno Hill: 1.3 to 1.5 miles. North Fork is about 2 miles from “3,411” based on an easier route, not quite straight line.
Reno Hill to Ford B, crossing the LBH and going through the valley and the Indian villages is about over 3.3 miles by horseback. If the Indians crossed the LBH going towards Reno Hill, then reversed themselves and rode to MTC, the distance would be a little over 3 miles. • Weir Peak is 1¼ miles (2,200 yards) along the bluffs from Reno Hill. • Varnum’s sighting of E Company—map reference, Crow Agency, block 34 (lower half of the block), just south of the south end of the 3,400' – marked elevation (Sharpshooter Ridge).
Weir Peak “rises rather steeply about a mile and a quarter from Reno Hill. The point is in effect a group of three promontories that resemble a sort of an ‘L’ on its side. There are two points along the river’s bluffs, west of the present road and parallel with the river. The other peak lies east of the road and presents a round ‘sugarloaf’ appearance. At the time of the battle, the eastern and western projections were connected by gradual sloping sides that have since been graded down for the present road bed” [Liddic, Vanishing Victory, p. 131]. • The distance traveled by the three Crows from Weir Peaks along the bluffs to the so-called Boyer’s Bluff above Ford B was 1.3 miles (2,275 yards). • The Sioux called Weir Point/Peaks, Black Butte.
Cedar Coulee— • The head of Cedar Coulee is approximately 9/10 of a mile (1,600 yards) from the center of the Reno Hill complex. • This “bend” is about ½ mile (880 yards) from the head of the coulee. • Cedar Coulee is about 1 1/8 miles (2,000 yards) from its head to its emptying into MTC. • From the top of Cedar Coulee to the top of Luce Ridge, following a probable route is 2.6 miles. This would be made up of a 1 – mile trip down MTC and .48 mile (850 yards) up the slopes to Luce added to the 1 1/8 miles of Cedar Coulee. • From where Cedar Coulee meets MTC, it is approximately 9/10 of a mile (1,600 yards) to the beginning of the slopes leading to Luce Ridge. • The bottom of Cedar Coulee is approximately 1.4 miles (2,450 – 2,500 yards) from the top of Luce Ridge. • Cedar Coulee was also known as South Coulee.
Fords— • Ford A to Ford B is 4.3 miles, not straight line. • From Reno’s retreat crossing ford around the river loops and through the village to Ford B, it is about 3.4 miles. It is another 2.48 miles to Ford D, a total of 5.88 miles from the retreat crossing to Ford D, not straight line. • Ford B to the Deep Ravine crossing is 1.43 miles (2,500 yards), not straight line. • Ford B to Ford D is 2.48 miles (4,375 yards), not straight line.
We refer to the deep, dry streambed that led Custer to Ford B as Medicine Tail Coulee, but the Indians never called it that. It was also called Muddy Creek and referred to frequently as “the watering place” during the RCOI. The Sioux and Cheyenne had several names for it: • Muskrat Creek (referred to by Standing Bear [M]). • Dry Creek (Soldier Wolf [C]). • Water Rat Creek (Fears Nothing [O]).
• Luce Ridge is approximately 6/10 mile from the bluffs above Ford B.
Ford B to the top of Calhoun Hill is about 1.1 miles. • Ford B has also been referred to as Minneconjoux Ford. • Almost ½ mile (880 – 900 yards) wide at its mouth. • Ford B to Nye – Cartwright Ridge is .86 mile (1,500 yards), but up slopes to the ridgeline. • Ford B to Custer’s Bluff is 2/10 of a mile (350 yards). • For Indians crossing at Ford B, then riding up Deep Coulee to hide their horses, the distance could have been as little as 650 to 670 yards. From there along an infiltration route, they would have had to move ¾ of a mile (1,340 yards) to reach a point in Calhoun Coulee. It would then be some 4/10 of a mile (670 yards) to the top of Calhoun Hill. o In a test on a high school track, ¼ – mile was completed in crouching, jumping – up, running, and dodging fashion in 5 to 6 minutes. The experiment added as much as 1/8 – mile to the distance because of the way we crouched and ran in various diagonals. This would mean that an infiltrating Indian, under optimal conditions, could move at a rate of 2½ MPH to 3 MPH or as much as 3¾ MPH to 4½ MPH. o For the Indians to close to within 100 yards of Calhoun Hill – Battle Ridge via Calhoun Coulee using infiltration tactics from as far out as 670 yards, it would take 5 minutes – 8 minutes to move the 570 yards (.324 miles).
• From the North branch of Medicine Tail Coulee across the ridges and into the coulee that empties into Deep Coulee near Henryville, Indians would have traveled some 1.14 miles (2,000 yards).
Nye – Cartwright Ridge to Calhoun Hill is .86 miles (1,500 yards), down a ravine and straight across the Deep Coulee flats. • Custer’s Bluff to Nye – Cartwright Ridge is 2/3 of a mile (1,175 yards). • Luce Ridge to Nye – Cartwright Ridge is ¼ mile (440 yards).
Custer Ridge (also called Battle Ridge)— • Runs roughly parallel to and about 1 mile from the LBH, and is about 6/10 – 7/10 of a mile (1,050 – 1,225 yards) long. • The C Company charge off Battle Ridge into Calhoun Coulee may have gone for as long as 650 yards (.37 miles). • From the middle of the presumed dismount area in Calhoun Coulee to the lower part of Finley – Finckle Ridge is approximately ¼ – mile (425 yards). • From Battle Ridge, east, to Crazy Horse Ridge, is approximately 1/3 of a mile (600 yards).
Calhoun Hill is approximately 1,000 yards (.57 miles) from the top of Greasy Grass Ridge. • If the C Company men dismounted and then ran by foot from a point 650 yards deep in Calhoun Coulee to Finley – Finckle Ridge, then up onto Calhoun Hill, across into the Keogh Sector, and then onto Custer/Last Stand Hill, the distance from that point would have been approximately 9/10 to 1.15 miles (1,585 – 2,025 yards). • If C Company men reached Finley – Finckle Ridge, they would have had to go 4/10 – mile or 670 yards to reach Calhoun Hill.
Calhoun Ridge is also called Finley Ridge or Finley – Finckle Ridge.
Custer Hill (also known as Last Stand Hill) is about 2/3 mile from Calhoun Hill— • Custer Hill to Reno areas: about 4 3/8 miles (all straight – line distances). • COL Nelson A. Miles visited the battlefield in 1878 and measured distances and times from point to point: o Reno Hill to Custer Hill measured at 4 miles. o Miles took cavalry horses between the 2 points and found the distance could be covered in 58 minutes at a walk and 15 minutes at a variable trot and gallop. • Custer Hill is about to 3 miles from Weir Peak. • On 22Aug1878, CPT J. S. Payne measured the distance from Custer Hill to Reno Hill. The straight – line distance was 4 miles, 160 yards. • Calhoun Hill to Ford D is approximately 2.33 miles via the Keogh Sector, then down the coulee north of Cemetery Ridge.
The distance from Ford D to Cemetery Ridge using the route Custer probably followed is 1¼ to 1½ miles.
Gerard’s Knoll— • Gerard’s Knoll to Middle Knoll is 1.1 miles. • Gerard’s Knoll to the Ford A crossing is 1.7 miles.
Lone tepee— • From the divide halt to the lone tepee is 9¾ to 10 miles. • From the lone tepee to Ford A is approximately 1.7 miles.
Custer – Reno separation in the flats— • Reno’s route to the Ford A crossing was 1.62 miles. • From the separation point to where Lieutenant Cooke met Custer was approximately one mile. • From the Cooke – Custer meeting to where I believe Custer may have watered, 335 yards (2/10 of a mile). • From the watering point to the peak on the bluffs, 670 yards (.38 of a mile). (This would have been the first “high point” on the bluffs along the river north of Reno Creek valley.) • From the peak on the bluffs to 3,411 is 1½ miles.
“Middle Knoll”— • Middle Knoll to Cooke’s Knoll is 0.38 miles (670 yards). • The western side of Middle Knoll to Last Stand Hill is approximately 5.71 miles.
“Cooke’s Knoll”— • Middle Knoll to Cooke’s Knoll is 0.38 miles (670 yards).
North Fork— • North Fork (or Custer Creek) to Reno Hill: 1.3 to 1.5 miles. • North Fork is about two miles from 3,411 based on an easier route, not quite straight line.
Ford A— • Ford A crossing point approximately 102 miles from mouth of Rosebud. • Ford A is about 4 to 4½ miles from the eastern lone tepee. • Ford A is about 1.7 miles from the real lone, burning tepee. • From the Ford A crossing to the open Little Big Horn valley is approximately ½ mile. • The Indian village was approximately three miles from Ford A. • Reno dismounted to form his skirmish line about 2½ miles from Ford A. • Ford A to Gerard’s Knoll, located in the flats, is approximately 1.7 miles. • Ford A to Ford B is 4.3 miles, not straight line.
Reno Hill— (also referred to as the Reno – Benteen Hill complex) • Reno Hill to Ford B, crossing the Little Big Horn River and going through the valley and the Indian villages is about over 3.3 miles by horseback. If the Indians crossed the Little Big Horn going towards Reno Hill, then reversed themselves and rode to Medicine Tail Coulee, the distance would be a little over three miles. • Weir Peak is 1¼ miles (2,200 yards) along the bluffs from Reno Hill. 3,411— • North Fork is about two miles from 3,411 based on an easier route, not quite straight line. • 3,411 is approximately 250 yards (.14 mile) from the summit of Sharpshooters’ Ridge (to its rear). • 3,411 is approximately 600 yards (.33 mile) from the head of Cedar Coulee. • 3,411 is 1,260 yards (.71 mile) from the southern peak of Weir Point.
Sharpshooters’ Ridge— • Map reference, Crow Agency, block 34 (lower half of the block), just south of the south end of the 3,400' – marked elevation (Sharpshooter Ridge).
Weir Point/Peaks— • Weir Peak is 1¼ miles (2,200 yards) along the bluffs from Reno Hill. • From 3,411 to the southern peak of Weir Point is 1,260 yards (.71 mile). • Weir Peak is 2 1/3 miles—straight line—from Calhoun Hill. • Weir Peak “rises rather steeply about a mile and a quarter from Reno Hill. The point is in effect a group of three promontories that resemble a sort of an ‘L’ on its side. There are two points along the river’s bluffs, west of the present road and parallel with the river. The other peak lies east of the road and presents a round ‘sugarloaf’ appearance. At the time of the battle, the eastern and western projections were connected by gradual sloping sides that have since been graded down for the present road bed.” • The distance traveled by the three Crows from Weir Peaks along the bluffs to the so-called Boyer’s Bluff above Ford B was 1.3 miles (2,275 yards).
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by brenda56 on Sept 2, 2012 5:13:19 GMT -6
"Fight the battle you have................" as stated by Quincannon seems to be the more sensible basis for what could have happened for the companies north of Deep Coulee. Isn't that what Reno and Benteen did in their area, and rather successfully too ?
But maybe Custer north of Deep Coulee, unbeknown to him of course, relinquished that decision. He didn't delegate that power to anyone but rather consigned the possibility to a non existent status. Assuming Custer felt the day was still his, as indicated by his move north of Calhoun, a level of responsibility and a limited room for action was placed heavily on the shoulders of Keogh. (It would appear Keogh was in a holding position probably for Benteen followed by a unit move northwards).
So you could say the fluidity of the battle, as created by Custer, had transferred critical command decision from one location to another, from one person to another. And no one knew that, least of all Custer and probably not Keogh. Now I believe all of the commanders were competent however the interpretation of their actions not so. The much maligned Reno's actions allowed his men to fight another day. That sounds good to me. And in hindsight too Benteen and his men were survivors and fighters as well.
Now saying Reno and Benteen survived doesn't mean to say Custer and Keogh should have survived but it's a thought which occurs to most. So as I questioned before whose decision was going to be the one which at a time of crisis was going to have the most impact. Was it Custer waiting atop the Cemetery area or Keogh sitting in the middle of the overall battle ? Now Keogh being a competent officer, as pointed out to me before, was in command of the first location to fail. It may not have failed completely but lost it's "functionality". His area seems to have been awash with a flood of Indians hell bent on his destruction. Now I may be wrong but was Keogh in a position to determine that life could be and was about to become intolerable ? Did he have the opportunity to make a "Reno" decision before the situation became impossible ? Far far be it for me, or anyone else, to question Keogh's actions but could there be a simple explanation as to why the men on Calhoun could not extract themselves from a precarious situation ?
The bottomline is Custer, Reno and Benteen are scrutinised in detail, often to their detriment, but Keogh usually slips under the radar.
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Post by wild on Sept 2, 2012 5:26:33 GMT -6
He was gambling. There are arguments that he did not trust his Indian guides. He bet the farm on their advice. His actions are lunacy if their was no ford beyond the bluffs The river was fordable along it's entire lenght through this sector. It was the difficulty of the entry and emerging that was the consideration So his actions are not lunacy as they are based on an acceptable risk of difficulty not impossibilty.
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Post by quincannon on Sept 2, 2012 8:34:55 GMT -6
Richard: That was a statement of Will's opinion, and that opinion was based upon his study of both Custer and the battle,
Fordable: Richard have you ever moved a body of men across a river? I have in a tactical situation. I can tell you that wading across a river slows you down. In the end it has little to do with the depth of the water. Shallow is the only consideration there. It has much more to do with access, and the manner that access alows you to secure both banks and THEN get across. So knowing the little I do about that river and the terrain on both sides of it I believe Montrose is entirely correct in the statement he made, entirely correct. If you wish to participate focus on the problem. The problem is making a decision on what to do given the situation presented. Don't quibble with the verbage setting up the exercise, it's Will's exercise. Present your solution.
Brenda: In this exercise it is a discusssion of critical decision, the decision at 3411. I am sure Rock Drill 3 or 5 or 100 will discuss the actions on Battle Ridge.
Thanks Fred. Very helpful
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jag
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Post by jag on Sept 2, 2012 9:43:08 GMT -6
Richard: That was a statement of Will's opinion, and that opinion was based upon his study of both Custer and the battle, Fordable: Richard have you ever moved a body of men across a river? I have in a tactical situation. I can tell you that wading across a river slows you down. In the end it has little to do with the depth of the water. Shallow is the only consideration there. It has much more to do with access, and the manner that access alows you to secure both banks and THEN get across. So knowing the little I do about that river and the terrain on both sides of it I believe Montrose is entirely correct in the statement he made, entirely correct. If you wish to participate focus on the problem. The problem is making a decision on what to do given the situation presented. Don't quibble with the verbage setting up the exercise, it's Will's exercise. Present your solution. Brenda: In this exercise it is a discusssion of critical decision, the decision at 3411. I am sure Rock Drill 3 or 5 or 100 will discuss the actions on Battle Ridge. Thanks Fred. Very helpful I think we can all respect opinion. But we all have problems with those opinions that seem to defy the reality of the situation. For example: Will stated, "Ohhhh, and he failed to tell Reno, Benteen and McDougall of his move to the right. So at 3411, the Indians are not where you thought they were, and not running away as expected. Your subordinates do not know where you are, or what you intend." The problem I have with that is Custer seemed to telegraph that intention by his very presence on the top of the mountain where everyone of his subordinate could, should and had to have seen him. I mean really, if he's up there with 250 men stirring up the dust while riding at a gallop all the way, stopping and waving his hand off after scratching his butt, they had to have been retarded not to have taken notice of it in light of the position they all were in... They all knew they were about to attack some Indians somewhere near, could that cloud of dust, those 250 possibly have been Indians? Really now, if every Tom, Dick and Harry and their dog places Custer and his men atop those bluffs doing what they want him to do, wasn't it enough to be somewhere other than he had stated to his subs and a handy way to have done it? Good grief, was he waving a cordial wave, like saying hi there to the Indians, see ya soon and we'll have a smoke from the pipe and have a pow wow? Or was he possibly pointing a direction or possibly signalling somehow an intent to do other than what he had given his subs? Sorry Will, there are other opinions, this is my stupid a$$ed opinion and I like it.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Sept 2, 2012 10:03:16 GMT -6
Montrose,
I'm confused on a few points.
What is the point of this advance guard task of Reno's? If there was a regimental attack planned, why alert the enemy before the regiment is remotely together, and why insert force forward that can neither continue without help nor defend itself successfully alone? At no time would Custer think 130 men with Reno could defeat a large camp.
"LTC Custer decided to change this plan, by having the main body shift to the left." Again I'm confused. Left of what? In any case, if Custer's five are the main body, I don't understand this.
I think these discussions would benefit using compass directions and not ping-pong between left-right and compass headings or, worse, sorta-kinda compass headings where 'north' means down river.
I don't think Custer trusted the native scouts so much as Boyeur, who'd been in this exact spot within the year, I think. Why would Custer assume the village was limited between Ford A and Ford B?
It's not clear to me that much was clear from 3411 with lodges and activity increasing hidden by dust and smoke from thousands of ponies and campfires. Weir Pt., now visibly situated where his best view would be obtained, becomes a goal, if not for him, the scouts.
But, as you say, clock ticking, Reno in danger, you've done bad, George, you idiot, now fix it.
First, do no MORE damage and make decisions based upon accurate info (a thought for your lecture series - what a concept): get to Weir and see how big this mofo is and what is happening. No visible warriors beyond those with Reno, civvies moving (it sorta looks like) get the troopers to cheer and head north and we can hit the village from B - which he has only the dimmest location for in mind - and get the train protected and nearby and Benteen here.
That makes sense. WCS, if the odds are too heavy, retreat, meet Benteen, assist Reno evac, something, something, it'll work. Maybe if the camp is running, we'll hit down the ford Boyeur says is there and can make a crossing and engage to assist Reno, Benteen will know what to do when he gets here. Move, and keep the civvies moving and the enemy confused and panicked. Best of a bad situation.
Suspect he was hit in the MTC Weir Pt. area, and totally new tasks were inserted to get him to safety. The career of the guys who let Custer's corpse fall to the Sioux was over, if not Leavenworth. I think this because no officer would willingly take mounted soldiers across such striated ground to Battle Ridge for no precise, immediate purpose, and I don't believe splitting already insufficient forces makes much sense.
I realize I don't get this rock drill like everyone else, so I'm going to color in the corner.
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Post by wild on Sept 2, 2012 14:20:45 GMT -6
Colonel Reno got across at a point that was not a recognisable ford. I believe that there were dozens of fordable points along the river. It was high Summer and that river took the scenic route;snacking I think is the term so no white water. Any photos I'v seen show no more than a foot or two of water, Where's AZ when you need him? Do you think that it was only by ford B that the Indians countered Custer?
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Post by quincannon on Sept 2, 2012 14:39:50 GMT -6
Richard: I don't dispute the depth of the water. A fording place, any fording place is only as good to you in a military sense as access and egress, along with bottom conditions, and you ability to control those points during the act of crossing. As an example, it is obvious that retreat ford or crossing was fordable water. The banks on both sides though were problamatic. Let us continue and say that the Blue commander accesses the situation at 3411 and decided to cross the river to support Reno in the exact spot Reno used going the other way. That would mean he had to decend the bluff in a less than desireable place, cross at point where there were banks that would slow his crossing, and then reform on the other side before he could do anything. All this in the face of possible hostile action. Could it be done? Probably. Is it the best way to do it? That is the question. A river crossing is a tough proposition. Crossing a river under fire, even tougher. You don't necessarily look for ease. You look for practicability.
AZ did something recently on fords and bottom conditions, but I don't know where I saw it.
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