|
Post by montrose on Sept 5, 2012 10:56:49 GMT -6
JAG lays out a hypothesis that the L/C/N ridge movement was, at least in part, an overreaction to the Wolf Tooth band.
This does have explanatory value, I have wondered about this move. Itwould appear to be smarter to keep this force in the couless, out of sight of the village.
Going to this ridge in no way, shape or form is related to the movement to Ford B.I have seen posters suggest that LCN was used to provide a base of fire for the Ford B action. It is too far away.
Respectfully,
William
|
|
jag
Full Member
Caption: IRAQI PHOTO'S -- (arrow to gun port) LOOK HERE -- SMILE -- WAIT FOR -- FLASH
Posts: 245
|
Post by jag on Sept 5, 2012 11:33:37 GMT -6
JAG lays out a hypothesis that the L/C/N ridge movement was, at least in part, an overreaction to the Wolf Tooth band. This does have explanatory value, I have wondered about this move. Itwould appear to be smarter to keep this force in the couless, out of sight of the village. Going to this ridge in no way, shape or form is related to the movement to Ford B.I have seen posters suggest that LCN was used to provide a base of fire for the Ford B action. It is too far away. Respectfully, William William, I don't think it was as much as an overreaction as it was an intent. Had Custer followed Reno in as it has been suggested he should have done, the possibility existed that those Indians on the bluffs should have waylaid the Pack train, as there was nothing between them and that train once his departure had opened a free and clear route to them. His move downstream, I believe was an attempt to 1) round them all up and most importantly and of immediate necessity 2) protect the pack train as no other unit was then available to do so. I think he had planned on going that way all along. I believe his route downstream was governed at the time by those Indians and what their possible intent could have done had he not positioned his unit between them and that pack train, which I firmly believe he did. For to have gone directly up and over the bluffs could have seriously impaired - of immediate concern, 1) his own operations and 2) what a massive attack upon that pack train by them getting there first would have done... Both of these reasons and the concerns that mitigated their thought were tied one to the other and highly dependent upon how he reacted to their presence. He knew what a long haul he had ahead of him and expressed the same while watering. Naturally their safe conveyance there would be highly dependent upon what route he took downstream and the fatigue factor and toll it would make upon the horse of great concern. The route I have specified also accomplished that goal. Up and over the bluffs just wasn't an option at the time he had the luxury of choosing.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Sept 5, 2012 11:42:02 GMT -6
Jag: I won't speak to Custer's intent, but Wolf Tooth going after the packs, which you have as a possability, I think is a stretch. The pack train was guarded by a force equal to WT's band. In addition the detail men and the packers were there. There is a possability they could have interfered, but considering WT's numbers and the pack train total numbers I don't think it would have led to much save delay, maybe.
|
|
jag
Full Member
Caption: IRAQI PHOTO'S -- (arrow to gun port) LOOK HERE -- SMILE -- WAIT FOR -- FLASH
Posts: 245
|
Post by jag on Sept 5, 2012 12:13:06 GMT -6
Jag: I won't speak to Custer's intent, but Wolf Tooth going after the packs, which you have as a possability, I think is a stretch. The pack train was guarded by a force equal to WT's band. In addition the detail men and the packers were there. There is a possability they could have interfered, but considering WT's numbers and the pack train total numbers I don't think it would have led to much save delay, maybe. This is not what Custer knew or for that matter didn't know. I've never heard of any early scouting reports to him from the valley of Med T. or Deep C. prior to 1) the Crows who went to see the village and 2) the 6 man scout team sent ahead of Custer's advance downstream. I don't believe he had the luxury of knowing what was there, at that time, and wouldn't have had the same spin on it as you have.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Sept 5, 2012 12:18:12 GMT -6
Where is the spin in saying that I don't think any attack by Wolf Tooth's band on the pack train would have been of great concern. No spin at all. Just an opinion, in that the pack train was well protected from the size force Wolf Tooth could muster. Therefore it is my opinion, now you may start the spin running, that whatever the motivation was for mixing it up with Toothy, that reason was not concern over the pack train. There maybe a thousand others and it is not my concern what they were, this reason though I believe to be far fetched.
|
|
|
Post by wild on Sept 6, 2012 1:14:12 GMT -6
Fred My apologies. Most cavalier of me to attach your name without checking re Ford D I missread of your reply 46 on the Weir Point thread.
First of all, no company went farther than D. We have accounts backing that up. D, with Edgerly leading, actually went beyond the Weir complex and Tom Weir called them back to the loaf. Archaeology proves the presence of troops in that area I though the D you refered to was Ford D and your ref re archaeology etc etc. Very sloppy of me mea culpa. Best Wishes
|
|
jag
Full Member
Caption: IRAQI PHOTO'S -- (arrow to gun port) LOOK HERE -- SMILE -- WAIT FOR -- FLASH
Posts: 245
|
Post by jag on Sept 6, 2012 8:14:58 GMT -6
Where is the spin in saying that I don't think any attack by Wolf Tooth's band on the pack train would have been of great concern. No spin at all. Just an opinion, in that the pack train was well protected from the size force Wolf Tooth could muster. Therefore it is my opinion, now you may start the spin running, that whatever the motivation was for mixing it up with Toothy, that reason was not concern over the pack train. There maybe a thousand others and it is not my concern what they were, this reason though I believe to be far fetched. Q, Its a game. In this game, I thought I was the commander of my own regiment. I didn't realize that we'd have a Rip Van Winkle expert on each and every nit pick to quarrel with about that commanders decisions. You asked me a question and I answered it. Just because I choose a scenario where it doesn't agree with long held beliefs about where the Real Custer had to have gone, just had to have done because it satiates a mind or man, doesn't mean mine hasn't any value, or for that matter, historical context. I assure you it does. And although Will's original post indicated a starting point for rock2, I pm'd him and asked him if I had a different perspective as a commander, particularly on the subject of 3411, whether or not I could explore a different route. His reply was that I could and he then accordingly made a post accomodating my request. While there would be, and rightly should be those who share your belief about what should, could or even has to be, I most vehemently and respectfully disagree. I have explored enough of this battle from the perspective of an investigator trying to solve a crime. This starting with the crime that has to be committed in order for any investigation be launched, otherwise it is, in my most humble opinion an excercise in utter futility. THe crime lay upon the ground where the massacre of Custer's men fell. That is where my investigation started. That is where the evidence was gathered to work back to find the culprit or culprits who commmitted that crime. In that investigation there was no attempt to assign someone a title other than suspect, and all were in my own mind, innocent until I could provide proof positive evidence of any guilt, this to include those who massacred them as the cause of it has never been fully satisfactory to all. To most properly find that cause or fault I then began my investigation, like any good csi, at the scene of the crime and worked my way back. Not the other way around as has been the case every since the unsatisfactory results and men lay upon that ground. And the repetitive nature of each comes to the same conclusion with little or no evidence to support their findings to the satisfaction of all. Now, I would have sent Reno off, just like Custer did, and for the same reasons. I would have gone down that right bank, just as I indicated in my beginning post and for those same reasons that I indicated, but evidently didn't get my point across. There is no evidence to suggest Custer sent anyone downstream on the left bank prior to Reno's departure. The only one's being the Crows going to take a look at the village. That was their only stated goal. There was no mention of them either ordered or otherwise for them to go take a look into the valley of Med. T. The only others were those recon group of 6 men detached in advance of his own move. It is therefore incumbent upon everyone to think upon their own good accord on this. Because without intel on what was there, which Custer didn't have, besides those 40 to 50 of Wolf Tooth's band, he had no way of knowing whether there were no other warriors in that valley or 100, 200, 500, 1000 etc. warriors there either waiting to ambush him had he gone that way and WT's band the bait, or, just waiting for him to take his men hot on the heels of Reno, thus leaving that door wide open for them to attack the pack train. This isn't just belief Q, these are the facts until you can provide that Custer sent someone into the Valley of Med. T. ere long in advance of his own move there. And then produce the spin to make it so.
|
|
|
Post by Yan Taylor on Sept 6, 2012 8:34:26 GMT -6
I think the pack train contained B Company (42), about 90+ trooper packers and about 6 civilians, so all in all it had about 140 men in total. When Custer started his move down MTC, the detail from F Company was sent forward (Grey said they went up the bluffs), I am not sure what rout this detailed took, they may have gone straight ahead or moved up either flank, I would have sent out two Details, one from E and one from F to act as flank guards, if the command did move down MTC they could be ambushed from either flank.
Ian.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Sept 6, 2012 9:24:24 GMT -6
Jag: Your correct. It is a game so let me rephrase. I would not be concerned about Wolf Tooth's band having any effect on my logistics. I think they are well protected, and the total numbers present with the train are only riveled by the five companies I have under my direct control.
|
|
|
Post by wild on Sept 6, 2012 9:24:56 GMT -6
thus leaving that door wide open for them to attack the pack train. I never understood this door wide open thing. The bag train was a mile long and we are in Montana which is the size of China.If the Indians wanted to take the bags they just swung arround in a arc and came in from the rear or just waited till the escort passed. The bags were not worth the escort .
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Sept 6, 2012 9:44:20 GMT -6
It seems judging by response most feel that this is a much more difficult decision making process than the original rock drill.
I stated in broad terms what I thought needed to be done given the situation Will presented to us (See Reply #1). I find myself at 3411. I see the size and extent of the village and horse herd. I cannot make out all the details of the village from this vantage point, but can come up with a rough estimation of size, therefore a rough estimate of warrior and total population. The size of the horse herd confirms my observations. I realize that the village extends further downstream than I had heretofore believed, and it seems that the various bands have grouped themselves much closer together than their normal habits.
Based upon the above I see Reno engaged, with a steady build-up of warriors to his front. I see his left flank exposed, and make the assumption that the hostiles will soon find that flank and exploit it. Reno is either in deep trouble or soon will be.
Let me make this perfectly clear. I will not abandon my soldiers (PERIOD) in that valley under any circumstances, nor will I risk the men of my immediate command in some sort of futile gesture to relieve pressure on Reno. I will not take them to Reno's aid by the most direct route because that route is very problematic for both trafficability and tactical reasons. Therefore, I will message both Benteen and the packs to make all possible speed to the river and across, (Ford A). I will message Reno informing him of my intentions and giving him a warning order to prepare to break contact. All messages will be via officer messengers fully informed of my intent. I will retrace my steps off the bluffs and into the valley, cross at Ford A (Reno's crossing point) and I will assist him in breaking contact. I will assemble the regiment at a rally point on the village side of the river, stabilize the situation and if the opportunity presents itself launch another attack as soon as practicable.
Under no circumstances would I consider moving north toward Weir or Ford B, or any place else in that direction. It is a fool's errand and will meet with some version of the historical outcome. It may be very tempting considering that no opposition save perhaps Wolf Tooth and his band are currently in view, but I would not think it would take a stroke of Alexander like genius to figure out they soon will be.
If I lose this battle and save my regiment that is enough for today. I will regroup, reorganize, consolidate, and prepare for further action.
In doing all of what is described above, I must first realize that I made a grave error, for which I am completely responsible as the commander. Rather than try to hide or make up for this error by some reckless action I will do what I now feel best to remedy my error, save my regiment, and prepare to fight another day. If I lost the battle, tough s**t. I will not be the first or last to make a critical mistake. I firmly believe the mark of a good commander is realize his mistakes, take corrective action, and if neccessary take the consequences, all the consequences.
|
|
|
Post by benteen on Sept 6, 2012 12:45:46 GMT -6
It seems judging by response most feel that this is a much more difficult decision making process than the original rock drill. I stated in broad terms what I thought needed to be done given the situation Will presented to us (See Reply #1). I find myself at 3411. I see the size and extent of the village and horse herd. I cannot make out all the details of the village from this vantage point, but can come up with a rough estimation of size, therefore a rough estimate of warrior and total population. The size of the horse herd confirms my observations. I realize that the village extends further downstream than I had heretofore believed, and it seems that the various bands have grouped themselves much closer together than their normal habits. Based upon the above I see Reno engaged, with a steady build-up of warriors to his front. I see his left flank exposed, and make the assumption that the hostiles will soon find that flank and exploit it. Reno is either in deep trouble or soon will be. Let me make this perfectly clear. I will not abandon my soldiers (PERIOD) in that valley under any circumstances, nor will I risk the men of my immediate command in some sort of futile gesture to relieve pressure on Reno. I will not take them to Reno's aid by the most direct route because that route is very problematic for both trafficability and tactical reasons. Therefore, I will message both Benteen and the packs to make all possible speed to the river and across, (Ford A). I will message Reno informing him of my intentions and giving him a warning order to prepare to break contact. All messages will be via officer messengers fully informed of my intent. I will retrace my steps off the bluffs and into the valley, cross at Ford A (Reno's crossing point) and I will assist him in breaking contact. I will assemble the regiment at a rally point on the village side of the river, stabilize the situation and if the opportunity presents itself launch another attack as soon as practicable. Under no circumstances would I consider moving north toward Weir or Ford B, or any place else in that direction. It is a fool's errand and will meet with some version of the historical outcome. It may be very tempting considering that no opposition save perhaps Wolf Tooth and his band are currently in view, but I would not think it would take a stroke of Alexander like genius to figure out they soon will be. If I lose this battle and save my regiment that is enough for today. I will regroup, reorganize, consolidate, and prepare for further action. In doing all of what is described above, I must first realize that I made a grave error, for which I am completely responsible as the commander. Rather than try to hide or make up for this error by some reckless action I will do what I now feel best to remedy my error, save my regiment, and prepare to fight another day. If I lost the battle, tough s**t. I will not be the first or last to make a critical mistake. I firmly believe the mark of a good commander is realize his mistakes, take corrective action, and if neccessary take the consequences, all the consequences. Colonel, I made a plan in my reply #37 and thought that you or Colonel Montrose (Judge) would critique it. When you didnt I just assumed I went off the reservation again as to the rules and accepted it, no big deal. But your post , other than you wouldnt go to Ford B, looks almost the same. With the theme being it is time to save my command and fight another day. Just for my own knowledge are we basically on the same page or am I missing something. Be Well Dan
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Sept 6, 2012 13:09:41 GMT -6
Dan: Same chapter, same verse, same line, with the exception you noted. It is nothing more than making the best of a bad situation. In addition it is owning up to responsibility for a unforced error. I think more than anything the line in my post about trying to hide or make up for an error by reckless action sums up what I think happened historically. It was either that or a monumental error in judgment. Men own up to their mistakes. It is a craven coward that trys to bluster and bull s**ts his way out of a mess
|
|
|
Post by bc on Sept 6, 2012 20:25:50 GMT -6
thus leaving that door wide open for them to attack the pack train.I never understood this door wide open thing. The bag train was a mile long and we are in Montana which is the size of China.If the Indians wanted to take the bags they just swung arround in a arc and came in from the rear or just waited till the escort passed. The bags were not worth the escort . I'd concur. With the NA method of fighting, they would have come around and ran off most of the mules with little trouble. They have been doing it to wagon trains for years. Any troops had better concentrate on the ammo packs and try to save them. They wouldn't be able to save them all with half a regiment. Custer lost most of their horses and he was fighting the NAs at the time. bc
|
|
|
Post by bc on Sept 6, 2012 20:29:50 GMT -6
Reminder, eyes shot this week, can barely see. I have received numerous PMs since star of rock drill. What concerns me, is folks who I have never seen post in general chat. If you have not, orrarely, post in general chat: Give it a shot, Not sure if Shan still reads these baords, he only posts every year or so, but has great insight. I started this thread to bring more people into the discussion. If you read this forum, and have not said anything in last week, just say hi. I can start a new thread to figure out why folks who read this forum, do not talk.It is a discussion forum, at the end of the day. If I don't agree with you, it is not personal, unless your last name is Markland. Hi Will.
Sorry I"ve been too busy lately to even try to do the heavy thinking required to put something together for your rock drills.
Good luck with your health and I hope all goes well.
I changed the font to size 8 by clicking on the button with the A and up/down arrow. It comes up as size 2 which I changed to 8. Then typed between the brackets.
bc (a Markland disciple)
|
|