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Post by fred on Apr 6, 2011 9:19:03 GMT -6
Regarding Martini, I'm not sure he was on Custer's tail all the time. Totally agree. Martini exaggerated his own importance, especially as the years wore on and he realized the direction and importance these events had become. Again... totally agree. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by corbin on Apr 6, 2011 9:37:55 GMT -6
bc
For the record bc, you are no dummy, far from it. You are someone I look up to and admire greatly and the lot of us could take example from.
All one can do is take what they say and either believe it or not, pick and choose as some like to do. I prefer to take what they say and examine it without negativity, prejudice or bias. Martini told the court that he was within a few paces of Custer all the way. I have no reason to doubt his testimony, he was after all Chief Trumpter and a courier. What was his rightful place and who is to say that where he said he was, or he wasn't?
I see we have somewhat the same sense of humor, oh well, more's the pity if they can't get the gist of things.
Benteen-Goldin Letters by Carroll, pg 59, Jan. 15, 1933: Goldin: “…I remained with the column under Gen. Custer until we reached a point possibly a mile down stream from the point where we knew Reno was already engaged with the upper end of the huge village. In the meantime Gen. Custer had left this column and ridden to a point out of our sight, but which evidently overlooked the scene of Reno’s engagement. I state this because we later learned that men in Reno’s command saw and recognized him on the bluffs. In the mean time the rest of his command had continued down the stream but hidden from the Indians by a high ridge paralleling the course of the high bluffs above the river. When about a mile below Reno’s position we slowed down to a walk and it was at this point that Custer rejoined us and a few moments later I was given a message to deliver to Major Reno. What this message contained I do not know, but my orders were to get it to Reno at once, remain with him until the two columns affected a junction when I was to report to Lt. Cooke. On my trip back I saw no Indians nor could I see a place to descend to the river and cross to reach Reno’s little squadron fighting in the bottoms apparently against heavy odds. While making the descent of the bluffs and fording the river a number of bullets whistled entirely too close for comfort about my ears, whether aimed at me, or whether they were shots fired high by the Indians I do not know. I do know I was a might uncomfortable for a few moments. I reached Reno just about the time his Indian allies on the extreme left of his slender line broke and ran… I delivered my message, Reno glanced at it, asked where I left Custer and what he was doing, folded his message put it in his notebook and turned to watch the movement of the left of his line, which seemed to be forced back into the timber… It was only a few moments after this that the retreat was ordered.”
Wild
No longer the case once he sat atop 3,411.
That's the point!!! AND BEFORE? What were his orders predicated upon prior to that time? The Big Village that he didn't see and in immediate due course reported the same to Benteen?
The above exchange would suggest that whether one big village lay ahead or a string of smaller ones Reno was expected to attack the lot?
And if Custer didn't believe his scouts and guides that the villages were all gathered together in one big one? And still believed that they were all strung out up and down the LBH as they were at the Washita? Would this not explain Reno's orders? Would this not also explain why he went on downstream, perhaps to discover and attack another village and in the process block any attempt (thus supporting Reno) by those who were fleeing Reno's attack from gathering? Could this have been a better attempt to bag the lot of them as he understood it? He missed the opportunity at the Washita, he wasn't about to make that same mistake twice, was he?
Montrose, acquire a copy of The Benteen-Goldin Letters. Good stuff in there and Carroll did an excellent job in editing it.
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Post by benteen on Apr 6, 2011 10:29:37 GMT -6
Gentlemen,
Historians and the folks in this and other forums believe that whatever Custer's plan was (If he had any) or thoughts were predicated on the fact that the Indians would scatter. That Custer remembered from the Washita that there may be other camps is a reasonable assumption and one I agree with. However there was another lesson to be learned from that battle. That was that the Indians Did Not always scatter. Here at the LBH there were far more warriors than there were at the Washita. Unless I'm missing something ( certainly nothing new) which is obvious to every one else, Why did he have no doubt that the Indians would scatter
Be Well Dan
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Post by wild on Apr 6, 2011 11:10:23 GMT -6
Corbin OK lads can we agree on what Custer thought his objective was? Was it a big village? Was it a string of villages? Was it one village of a string of villages? You see his objective would have determined his advance formation and orders to Reno.
And if Custer didn't believe his scouts and guides that the villages were all gathered together in one big one? And still believed that they were all strung out up and down the LBH as they were at the Washita? Would this not explain Reno's orders? Would this not also explain why he went on downstream, perhaps to discover and attack another village and in the process block any attempt (thus supporting Reno) by those who were fleeing Reno's attack from gathering? Could this have been a better attempt to bag the lot of them as he understood it? He missed the opportunity at the Washita, he wasn't about to make that same mistake twice, was he?
The above is a military impossibility.Time, distances,terrain opposing strenghts would not allow for this. [Fred does nice I just do robust but no disrespect ment.]
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Post by corbin on Apr 6, 2011 11:18:16 GMT -6
The above is a military impossibility.Time, distances,terrain opposing strenghts would not allow for this.
This according to what you know? Or... What Custer did or didn't know?
Likewise no disrespect intended at all, in fact I enjoy most if not all your comments. It's just that we tend to reflect upon what we think we know. I think we all tend to forget, even myself, what appears to be, as you put it "impossible", was possible given what was or wasn't known at that time.
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Reddirt
Full Member
Life is But a Dream...
Posts: 208
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Post by Reddirt on Apr 6, 2011 14:08:06 GMT -6
Custer probably learned a valuable lesson from his experience at the Battle of the Washita; know the disposition of your opponent prior to committing your troops.
From Weir's Point (or Sharpshooter Ridge if you are so inclined) Custer observed a village of such great magnitude that he must have immediately realized was the result of the culmination of all the Indian "signs" previously discovered by his scouts laying before him.
This assessment was enforced by the lack of a currier from Benteen acknowledging additional camps and/or an attempt by the village to escape. If either case had occurred, Custer must have been confident that a messenger would have been sent by Benteen advising him so.
Under these conditions, "Big Village" may have meant: "We have the entire encampment before us."
The call to "Hurry" may be interpreted as a realization that the formidable size of the village called for Benteen's additional troops to make haste and support Custer's command to facilitate the capture of such a huge camp.
One may then, logically, surmise that the call for "packs" essentially referred to the ammunition packs and the combat troops with those packs to "come quick". All other, non-essential, packs to be cut loose if necessary.
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Post by wild on Apr 6, 2011 15:55:26 GMT -6
Fred
I do believe Custer was after the non-combatants,
Let's consider this in detail. Custer must first abandon Reno.Treachery? He needs time but the Indians own the time. Finding a suitably located ford introduces chance to the expedition. The expedition will involve a journey of up to 4 miles along the front of the enemy. The expedition will be under enemy surveillance all the way. Success will depend on Reno entertaining sufficient numbers to allow for an unopposed crossing if a ford is found. The evacuees will also have to play their part by fleeing North. I count 6 "ifs" there and each one has to favour Custer.What's that a 1 in 32 chance of success? and that's just to get him into position. Add to all that Custer has no insurance,nobody riding shotgun for him. Nor does his message to Benteen fit such a project. I just don't know Fred perhaps I just lack the cavalier spirit.
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Post by corbin on Apr 6, 2011 17:25:07 GMT -6
Corbin OK lads can we agree on what Custer thought his objective was? Was it a big village? Was it a string of villages? Was it one village of a string of villages? You see his objective would have determined his advance formation and orders to Reno.
And a whole lot more most people don't think about. Note... To all intents and purposes the first and the 3rd are the same.
The logistics for each of these would be significantly different in approach and intent, ie how and when such support would be expected.
1) Does anyone really think that if Custer had known the existence of the Big Village anytime prior to the lone tepee, that he would have sent Benteen off? And - That the Pack Train would have been allowed to lag so far behind?
2) If the villages were all strung up and down the stream, as at the Washita, again, does dispatching Benteen and/or Reno to deal with one of them make any sense?
The logistical support for each type of operation would have been significantly different.
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Post by fred on Apr 6, 2011 18:39:35 GMT -6
Wild, my Boy! Custer must first abandon Reno. Treachery? No. Military exigency. And Custer's dual belief that, (a) Reno can fend for himself, and (b) the ultimate mission is in front of Custer, which-- fortuitously-- will aid Reno. I tend to agree with you, though I am unclear of your precise meaning here; but... Custer would hardly know this as I believe he felt he was in full control and still on the offensive. I believe Custer felt confident of success up to some moment in time while he was atop Cemetery Ridge. Certainly an element in almost all military operations and something fully acceptable to George Custer's personality. Read, contempt. Read, contempt. No longer an important element in Custer's thinking, though he did take the low ground once past Calhoun Hill. I believe he felt no one was watching any longer except a few warriors on his tail-- not enough to worry about and easily handled by Keogh's force. Too much dust in the valley; too much panic, too much disorganization. A classic case of underestimating one's foe... ergo, contempt. ... which they did. Again, I do not disagree; but was any of that going through his mind? He had supreme confidence in his own abilities and those of his regiment. You add to that his contempt for his foe, his belief in his previous experiences, and the fluidity of the situation, and you have the element present at the LBH. Remember too, the military's strength is in its organization. The power in a military lies not with its individual, but with its group. A good military is defined by its cohesiveness, its discipline, and its firepower. Instead of 1 + 1 = 2; in a good army, 1 + 1 = 4. Custer's biggest problem was that the Indians had enough men-- a classic case of underestimating size-- to equal 10. In addition, these Indians were going nowhere-- a classic case of not knowing your enemy. The man felt he was in full control... almost to the end. Even Martini's comment, "We've got 'em, boys!" tells us a lot. Sure it does; Custer sees "size" and knows he will need more men-- and maybe more ammo, though I tend to doubt he was figuring ammo, simply because it's tough loading a carbine on the chase. Thus the wait on Cemetery Ridge. I see no problem with the note business, or with calling up Benteen. Not you, my boy, not you! Just from our personal communications I know that. Again, Wild, remember something. Try to look at this thing in the simplest terms. Don't complicate it. It was fast, furious, mobile, sharp; plenty of movement; tons of confusion. This whole affair was a lot more simple than we always seem to make it out to be. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Apr 6, 2011 18:42:38 GMT -6
Here we go with the dupes again.
Diane, this is the message I receive whenever I put together a long post: "This page took too long to generate and has been stopped. A log of this error has been reported to ProBoards Support."
I then click on the "back" arrow and the white page comes on with whatever I wrote. I hit post again and it takes, but there is always a duplicate. I will now delete the second one.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by corbin on Apr 6, 2011 20:01:22 GMT -6
yup, same here. I replied to your post Fred, but it doesn't show up again on the quick view link at the bottom. It is however posted on the thread.... weird.... corrected it... wrong thread anyway....
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Post by wild on Apr 7, 2011 6:03:16 GMT -6
Hi Fred
To get Custer North bound you have supplied him with bags of contempt,supreme confidence ,an exigency and an assumption.
The introduction of contempt and confidence into the equation permits our hero to attempt almost anything. An exigency will negate his obligation to Reno and an assumption will ease his conscience. So Custer is on the offensive,has no military limitations,his objective is no more than a stone's throw away and you have him heading Northwards to chase women and children? I don't think we can have a gung ho Custer chasing women and children? It just does not sound right Fred. And the organisation and cohesion you speak of will be dissipated in rounding up the women and children.And for this tactic to work he must be prepared to shoot them. Can you just imagine Terry arriving to be met by "a victorious" Custer up to his eyes in dead women and children?
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Post by wild on Apr 7, 2011 6:08:49 GMT -6
Corbin
And a whole lot more most people don't think about. Note... To all intents and purposes the first and the 3rd are the sameOh they are very different my friend.
I must try the other board and see if I can get an answer re what Custer thought he was facing.
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Post by corbin on Apr 7, 2011 6:22:11 GMT -6
Oh they are very different my friend.
Ya think? Custer didn't seem to think so, did he? Big Village was used by him to describe just that - what you are describing in #3.
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Post by fred on Apr 7, 2011 7:34:54 GMT -6
Wild,
No one-- least of all, me-- has suggested a "round-up" of women, children, and old folk. There is considerable evidence that not all warriors fought Reno and not all warriors fought Custer. Common sense tells me they didn't sit in their tepees playing Indian cribbage. Destruction of families, along with these additional warriors, looms as a prime objective to me. That threat-- reaching warriors fighting Reno-- could easily break the back of the resistance.
As for Terry, do you honestly believe Terry, stumbling upon a victorious Custer, could care? Women and children were not killed in other village raids?
To me, that is a perfectly plausible and legitimate objective.
Best wishes, Fred.
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