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Post by AZ Ranger on Apr 4, 2011 6:28:42 GMT -6
Off to Phx second week of LE watercraft school
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Post by Dark Cloud on Apr 4, 2011 9:03:33 GMT -6
Lord. Every time you putter off and announce it, it's a permission slip for the doofae to return and post for the duration of your absence. It's so much better when they deservedly quiver and show restraint before people who know of what they post.
So if by tax day it's been proven that Reno and Benteen, by galloping their steeds effortlessly for two hours around the Sioux camp, could have created an impenetrable cloud from which an elite group of Bevo Boys would have emerged to capture Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull to elicit info as to their fortification and firearm protocols so their flanks could be, er, turned, we know who to blame, fellah.
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Post by fred on Apr 4, 2011 9:51:22 GMT -6
I agree.
Send me an e-mail when you return so I'll know it's safe to look at the other boards again. I would rather not tax my blood pressure medicine. And Dark Cloud... stay close, will you.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by corbin on Apr 4, 2011 10:31:51 GMT -6
See... Dark Cloud was right. ;D
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tel
New Member
Posts: 19
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Post by tel on Apr 4, 2011 22:51:43 GMT -6
tel The problem with Martin's version is which do you want to use. There are at least three and details change. That is quite characteristic of memory over time. As a side note I believe you stated you were a Marine Corps officer. Were you a enlisted man before becoming an officer? My nephew is currently an enlisted man and just got out of training in Florida at the Naval Intelligence school. He intends to do one enlistment than apply to be an officer. He graduated from Long Beach State University in southern CA. Regards Steve Andrews I was drafted right out of college, went through basic, one tour (promoted to corporal and then sergeant) and then went through OCS, served two more tours and was fast tracked up through the ranks. I pissed off some lifers but the same thing happened to my father in WWII. Drafted, less than a year later he was a first lieutenant and finished the war as a Major. Offered the rank of Colonel if agreed to sign up during Korea but he declined. Left the corps in 1976 and went into private industry. By the way, I agree that Martin's story morphed over time. So we can never be too sure.
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tel
New Member
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Post by tel on Apr 4, 2011 23:04:33 GMT -6
Once again we figure out a way to yank an even more specific event out of an already specific event. It is rather neat and I enjoy your back – and – forth. There are a few things however, that should be considered before one arrives at any conclusions regarding this note business. First of all, we have all been under the impression about rising dust and Custer being able to figure out who was where and when before he headed into the “tunnel.” I also believed that for a long time, but after doing all the work I have done on my time – line, I now doubt seriously the dust issue when it comes to Benteen and the packs. I am convinced Custer was at 3,411 when Benteen turned onto Reno Creek from No – Name Creek. No – Name was narrow and unused and I would think dust was not an issue, not during a trot—why would Benteen either walk or gallop down it?—so nothing would be seen until some movement on Reno Creek. The morass was Benteen’s first stop and at any sort of speed it would have taken him only about four minutes to reach it, hardly enough to send dust plumes billowing into the atmosphere. His command would have closed up fairly rapidly so there would have been a minimum of dust raised… and besides, that dust would have been at far away as six or seven miles; Benteen had a meager force of only 117 men; and there were high intervening bluffs separating Reno Creek at that point from the northern hills. In addition, there were intermediate hills, viz, Benteen Hill and Reno Hill, separating the two commands. Of course there are those who would argue that Custer sat atop Sharpshooters’ Ridge, but those people are arguing without any evidence and refuse to take their heads out of the sand. My work tells me Custer sat at 3,411 for less than ten minutes—why more?—and would have reached the head of Cedar Coulee in only about four minutes from 3,411. Cooke was with him and Custer would have instructed Cooke as they rode toward the command, to send back a messenger to look for and speed up, Benteen. The dichotomy contained within the note was not because of pressure or worry—Reno was doing rather well at the time and was in no serious trouble—and Custer’s troops had not fired a single shot yet. So why the packs? Why the emphasis? I have always believed—and still do—that it was because George Custer wanted those extra men. How many packs contained ammo? If memory serves me right, the command carried 25,000 extra carbine rounds. At 1,000 per case and two cases per mule, that would equate to 13 mules. If Custer was in such a sweat for ammo, why didn’t Cooke simply write, “Bring the ammo mules” or “Cut out the ammo mules”? It would have been a lot easier—as Benteen had ordered Hare to do on Reno Hill—to push ahead 13 mules than it would be to herd 175 at any speed. Cooke was a top – flight officer and adjutant and I doubt he would have made a mistake of that nature if Custer had specifically told him the ammo. Besides, the Indians were in the valley, not in the hills, and if they were going anywhere it was down valley, away from the pack train. The only other answer is that Custer wanted those additional troops, plus McDougall’s command, together, 121 men, plus the extras on DS, maybe as many as 137. You add those numbers together—210 + 117 + 137 = 464—and you have a pretty decent attack force. You sequester the packs in the hills… and the question arises, Who cares? If Custer loses that battle, what does anyone care about the packs? This was also—to me—another way of bringing all his forces together and doing it as quickly as possible. I think Custer feared a chase, his worst nightmare, because that would lead to scattering. By the time he was at 3,411, he could be reasonably assured he had found the village and that everything was downstream, nothing upstream. That would culminate Benteen’s mission. Again, however, I believe that note was written not under duress, but under anticipation.
Best wishes, Fred.Fred, not too simplify what you stated, but in a way this is Napoleonic. March divided and then unite your forces for attack. In other words concentrate available forces. I am not questioning. Just clarifying (even though I think he wanted ammo and men but what's the difference). He was staring down at the village and perhaps realized that he would need more men. But to me it would have made sense then to hold position and not increase the distance between his command and reinforcements. But then we could also say that Custer assumed that Benteen was coming and that McDougall was on his way too. So he moved ahead. What he didn't know was that they were not coming. Simplistic, I know but might this cover your theory?
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Post by fred on Apr 5, 2011 6:56:05 GMT -6
tel,
I agree with you... completely. And simplifying things is almost always the way to go.
It is my opinion-- as Benteen said-- that Custer had no real plan and was winging it as he went along. I think things gelled for him, but he was reacting more than he was acting.
Custer had a legitimate reason to send Benteen to the left... I think he remembered what he was confronted with at the Washita and "scattering Indians" was always primary in his mind.
I also think he meant to support Reno directly-- as he said he was going to-- but Gerard's message about Indians coming up the valley made him re-act rather than confront the situation head-on.
I also believe that he didn't wait because he was worried about the Indians scattering. Again, that was the over-riding fear of the entire campaign. So what do you do about that? Well, you try to head them off all the while bringing up your reinforcements. It was a gamble that Custer lost, primarily because Reno interjected himself between Custer and Benteen, stopping Benteen's progress north.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Apr 5, 2011 7:00:46 GMT -6
corbin,
What's your point? Or are you just another "pretty" face, throwing up pithy commentary? Why waste your time?
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by corbin on Apr 5, 2011 7:58:26 GMT -6
No, no, no and double know. I wasn't referring to Dark Cloud's last post, although albeit my fault for not stating it differently, my apologies. I was of course referring to the topic of this thread and the general discussion thereof.
For clarification...
RED are quotes from Fred: The material following Dark Clouds name are quotes from him.
There are a few things however, that should be considered before one arrives at any conclusions regarding this note business. First of all, we have all been under the impression about rising dust and Custer being able to figure out who was where and when before he headed into the “tunnel.” I also believed that for a long time, but after doing all the work I have done on my time – line, I now doubt seriously the dust issue when it comes to Benteen and the packs.
I am convinced Custer was at 3,411 when Benteen turned onto Reno Creek from No – Name Creek. No – Name was narrow and unused and I would think dust was not an issue, not during a trot—why would Benteen either walk or gallop down it?—so nothing would be seen until some movement on Reno Creek. The morass was Benteen’s first stop and at any sort of speed it would have taken him only about four minutes to reach it, hardly enough to send dust plumes billowing into the atmosphere. His command would have closed up fairly rapidly so there would have been a minimum of dust raised… and besides, that dust would have been at far away as six or seven miles; Benteen had a meager force of only 117 men; and there were high intervening bluffs separating Reno Creek at that point from the northern hills. In addition, there were intermediate hills, viz, Benteen Hill and Reno Hill, separating the two commands.
Of course there are those who would argue that Custer sat atop Sharpshooters’ Ridge, but those people are arguing without any evidence and refuse to take their heads out of the sand. My work tells me Custer sat at 3,411 for less than ten minutes—why more?—and would have reached the head of Cedar Coulee in only about four minutes from 3,411. Cooke was with him and Custer would have instructed Cooke as they rode toward the command, to send back a messenger to look for and speed up, Benteen.
Dark Cloud,
Again: look at the near desert that was the LBH battleground in the early photos for years. That was due to the mass herds of game and ponies that kept it nubbed down. It bore no resemblance to the lush field today.
The air was fuzzy with dust with thousands of men and animals moving even before the smoke, and these blase assumptions of glances to the morass or to LSH from Weir Point and seeing anything are rather dubious, as are flensing distinctions by dust cloud as if the units beneath dyed them for identification and they weren't covered by nearer ones.
And again (again), you cannot logically just ignore known events that would explain detritus and artifact exclusively in order to substitute a theory...
My work tells me Custer sat at 3,411 for less than ten minutes—why more?—and would have reached the head of Cedar Coulee in only about four minutes from 3,411. Cooke was with him and Custer would have instructed Cooke as they rode toward the command, to send back a messenger to look for and speed up, Benteen.
The dichotomy contained within the note was not because of pressure or worry—Reno was doing rather well at the time and was in no serious trouble—and Custer’s troops had not fired a single shot yet. So why the packs? Why the emphasis? I have always believed—and still do—that it was because George Custer wanted those extra men.
Dark Cloud,
It's little more than a Yee-Haw, here's the village, come join the fun and make sure the fiasco that is our train makes it to where we can use it at need.
Keep it simple, conducive to the Custer known to history and to the abilities of the 7th as known to its officers. Unless the officers were idiots, they did not postulate that Reno's men, 25% holding horses, were enough with single shot carbines to stem thousands heading in any direction, including directly at them. They'd have to hit something with regularity to concern their targets. That wasn't happening and wouldn't. Officers knew what sufficient training was, and the 7th didn't have it.
They did not think the Indians would stand, much less turn on them in bulk, and they had no alternative to regress to at need.
------
I direct your attention to Cooke's directions to Martini at the RCOI. That's a pretty illustrative statement of how Regimental Command viewed the situation and the possible adjusted situation that Martini and Benteen might find when they got up, and it doesn't support any of the more asinine Custerphile theories whatever.
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There's no evidence at all soldiers rode along the LBH down river to below LSH from MTCF. We know Sioux and Cheyenne in soldier garb and on soldier mounts did around the field and way north, and that sequential firing lines by Custer uphill to the north and east failed in desired effect.
We know that those hiding by the river who somehow heard Custer's firing miles away with huge bluffs between somehow did not hear Weir's and Godfrey's, which was much closer and later. We only know that they could NOT have been confused in time and conflated events as they told it later, because that would bleed drama from the tale.
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Post by corbin on Apr 5, 2011 8:09:37 GMT -6
posted a reply... BUT, it doesn't show up on the quick view, I guess you'll just have to click on the subject thread to see it, it's still there, don't know why it doesn't show up on the quick view link at the bottom...
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Post by fred on Apr 5, 2011 8:24:57 GMT -6
No, no, no and double know. I wasn't referring to Dark Cloud's last post, although albeit my fault for not stating it differently, my apologies. I was of course referring to the topic of this thread and the general discussion thereof. corbin, And I am sorry, too. Mis-read your intentions, so I apologize. Some how we seem to attract a lot of jerks. Nice to see an intelligent poster. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by corbin on Apr 5, 2011 9:08:06 GMT -6
Not quite sure where I belong in all of this as far a intent, intelligence and-or jerk concerns. Thanks for the compliment, I think, however - careful not go to far with those, it tends to give one a larger head than the brain can fit and the expansion thereof tends to give a inflated opinion of oneself, far beyond its capability to fathom. ((Ye gods that's all I'd need.)) And of those opines I fear I need not share for fear of offending the gods and goddesses.
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Post by fred on Apr 5, 2011 9:55:07 GMT -6
corbin,
I have never believed in holding back on compliments. Life is too short and there are too many insecure people out there. A compliment, where and when deserved, diminishes nothing and only serves to help others. Stay on these boards and I guarantee you your head won't swell too much.
As for myself, I always welcome solid opinions, especially if they are intelligent, based on experience, or supported by "facts" or solid circumstantial evidence, as most things are with the LBH. It is the "theory" based on hot air and bogus or questionable testimony that drives me crazy... and I believe drives Dark Cloud crazy. This is the problem he and I both have with the other message board and quite frankly I now find it a waste of time to bother posting over there.
Anyway, I have been busy as hell and have not read your post (the one in red); I hope to respond soon. And please... you are no jerk; that wasn't meant for you.
And welcome here.
Very best wishes, Fred.
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Post by wild on Apr 5, 2011 10:54:33 GMT -6
Hi Fred I also believe that he didn't wait because he was worried about the Indians scattering. This may have been his initial belief but the reaction to Reno's attack and what he saw for himself could not have been taken for scattering. Now if Custer takes himself off Northwards without an attempt to cross at MTCF it is tantamount to the abandonment of Reno. I am thinking that Custer is tactically defeated and his excursion Northwards owes more to Mr McCawber than to any cunning plan he was hatching.
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Post by bc on Apr 5, 2011 13:22:12 GMT -6
Hello Corbin. Just a note to let you know that the comedy around here kinda died out when Gordie died. Maybe you can revive it as there are still a few comedic lurkers around. My little bit of dry wise cracks don't go very far anymore but maybe you can kick start it. By the way, first rule around here (bc general order #1) is to buy Fred's book from McFarland Publishing. The link is below. My receipt from last year gave an April 12 ship date but who knows except I'm watching the mail. I would think that the author will get the first box or two shipment for his perusal before the public sees them. Maybe Fred will give us a headups when he gets his. www.mcfarlandpub.com/book-2.php?id=978-0-7864-6289-6bc
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