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Post by fred on Apr 5, 2011 14:40:45 GMT -6
BC,
At this point, you know as much as I do. They did send me an e-mail a couple of weeks ago telling me they were toning down some of my flippant prose. They also questioned several entries which rather surprised me, only because they seem even more serious and professional than I had given them credit for. So I think this is going to be a very good effort, certainly by McFarland. As soon as I know more I shall let you know.
Nothing at all yet on Book II.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Apr 5, 2011 14:50:04 GMT -6
This may have been his initial belief but the reaction to Reno's attack and what he saw for himself could not have been taken for scattering. No, you are quite right. In my opinion what Custer saw from the heights above Reno's valley fight (read, "3,411") was exactly what he would have expected given Gerard's report that the Indians were coming out to confront Reno. I believe Custer would expect the scattering to occur farther north as the women, children, and elderly were accompanied out of the standing village by a number of warriors. Completely agree. There was a time-- not too long ago... only months-- when I believed Custer had no idea Reno had retreated. This timing work I have done however, no matter how I tweak it, tells me otherwise; but it also tells me Custer had no idea of the depth of the Reno debacle. Yes, I don't see much of a "cunning plan," more of just finding another crossing point where he could get below the Indians he was afraid of losing. To me, that is the most simple plan of all and that always seems to work in military situations like this, situations that are so helter-skelter. Best wishes, Fred. PS-- Hey, "wild," I hope you are doing well. The last "pint" I lifted was to you. FCW
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Post by corbin on Apr 5, 2011 17:02:48 GMT -6
Fred,
I'm not sure how solid an opinion can be, the intelligence of such, is another question. I have observed many people who claim experience, but seem to lack the proficiency to express themselves intelligently enough to secure the confidence of others. That such experience be touted, lacking intelligence, insight and foresight puts them in peril of foot-n-mouth disease I fear. Not you, nor for that matter anyone here that I am aware of, but it occurs with regular circumstantial frequency to those so associated and seems to spread as rampantly as the plague, and kills as many prolific with its lethal insanity.
It is my hope that disagreement here be not held in contempt, for me, it is what makes a discussion board enjoyable. I most certainly have no set in stone theories, and would hope others be open to the ideas I put forth based upon the evidence and no other. Rest assured that hot air is just that, without evidence its nothing to give one a heart attack about and should be ignored.
bc
I have a wry sense of humor not all people understand. I usually try it early on just to elicit a response, if none is forthcoming, I know how I stand in trying it again. I see you didn't miss it, good for you. I may try again, don't know, but I think it best to let others know my style before I try it again. I usually don't point to the punch lines, nor try to push things like that too far.
What little I've seen of Fred's work tells me that his books should do very well and should be a valuable resource for researchers and others alike. Not sure if I'll have the moolah to buy it right away, but hope to in the not to distant future.
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Post by corbin on Apr 5, 2011 18:34:19 GMT -6
Wild does ask some very good questions. But all of this presupposes what Custer knew or observed and that requires a lot more than what is known. The statements of Martin, Kanipe, Goldin and others who survived to tell their tales don't enlighten us much in that regard. Martin's statements give the impression that the village was virtually empty of warriors, yet he was close enough at that time to see children and dogs to tell what they were. I would suggest that this distance was within a mile of that village, as anything over that range would surely be suspect of true identity confirmation. I know Fred's 3411 seems to fit the bill, and for Wild, Weir Peak, and I'm not saying that they don't. It's just that from personal experience atop skyscrapers, and like structures, one in particular was 750 feet (250 yards) high, and the largest free standing structure in the world at the time. And from that distance it was most difficult to determine what anything was on the ground below, even the cars looked like ants and the people barely discernible, so I'm not so sure about anything over a mile away and would suggest that Martin's distance at that time was most likely closer than we would suspect.
To answer your question Wild about how many Custer expected Reno to meet. The number if I remember correctly was 1800 warriors. I believe that is what Custer told Girard on the evening of the 24th. But we tend to look through the lens of what we know and not what Custer knew or believed. Did he believe that it was ONE Big Village? Or, was he expecting Indian encampments aligned like they were along the Washita? If it was ONE big village then most certainly Custer expected him to take on most if not all of them. By appearances, at this time of the discussion, it appears that he believed that they were all strung out like they were at the Washita, and if that was the case, then your 300 estimate may been what he was thinking and wouldn't have been ludicrous at all. This could explain Goldin and the supposed message he said he carried, although, still to this day, even with this in mind, his statements are dismissed as far fetched, even though by appearances, Custer would have been trying to correct that deficit once he had discovered or was told of the Big Village. I think most of this assumes what Custer observed from the heights. I'm not sure he observed anything other than perhaps that the villages weren't spread out, as at the Washita, but was one big village according to the lodge circles. And that was enough for him to send off his messengers, and he did. As concerns those messages, he like any commander worth his salt, knew he needed both men and ammo, and, he requested both. Because the dynamic he was, as Girard put it, "laboring under" had changed. And he changed his plans according to what it would take to assault One Big Village as opposed to hitting piece meal villages strung up and down the LBH valley.
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Post by corbin on Apr 5, 2011 18:35:27 GMT -6
Wild does ask some very good questions. But all of this presupposes what Custer knew or observed and that requires a lot more than what is known. The statements of Martin, Kanipe, Goldin and others who survived to tell their tales don't enlighten us much in that regard. Martin's statements give the impression that the village was virtually empty of warriors, yet he was close enough at that time to see children and dogs to tell what they were. I would suggest that this distance was within a mile of that village, as anything over that range would surely be suspect of true identity confirmation. I know Fred's 3411 seems to fit the bill, and for Wild, Weir Peak, and I'm not saying that they don't. It's just that from personal experience atop skyscrapers, and like structures, one in particular was 750 feet (250 yards) high, and the tallest free standing structure (of its kind) in the world at the time. And from that distance it was most difficult to determine what anything was on the ground below, even the cars looked like ants and the people barely discernible, so I'm not so sure about anything over a mile away and would suggest that Martin's distance at that time was most likely closer than we would suspect.
To answer your question Wild about how many Custer expected Reno to meet. The number if I remember correctly was 1800 warriors. I believe that is what Custer told Girard on the evening of the 24th. But we tend to look through the lens of what we know and not what Custer knew or believed. Did he believe that it was ONE Big Village? Or, was he expecting Indian encampments aligned like they were along the Washita? If it was ONE big village then most certainly Custer expected him to take on most if not all of them. By appearances, at this time of the discussion, it appears that he believed that they were all strung out like they were at the Washita, and if that was the case, then your 300 estimate may been what he was thinking and wouldn't have been ludicrous at all. This could explain Goldin and the supposed message he said he carried, although, still to this day, even with this in mind, his statements are dismissed as far fetched, even though by appearances, Custer would have been trying to correct that deficit once he had discovered or was told of the Big Village. I think most of this assumes what Custer observed from the heights. I'm not sure he observed anything other than perhaps that the villages weren't spread out, as at the Washita, but was one big village according to the lodge circles. And that was enough for him to send off his messengers, and he did. As concerns those messages, he like any commander worth his salt, knew he needed both men and ammo, and, he requested both. Because the dynamic he was, as Girard put it, "laboring under" had changed. And he changed his plans according to what it would take to assault One Big Village as opposed to hitting piece meal villages strung up and down the LBH valley.
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Post by fred on Apr 6, 2011 6:01:11 GMT -6
Ah-h-h!, Corbin, you have started the old juices flowing again. Maybe we can suck DC, montrose, wild, BC, and Steve into this thing and have some good chatter.
Give me a little time and I will eat your breakfast for you; nice to see another cool, savvy head enter the fray.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by corbin on Apr 6, 2011 6:21:37 GMT -6
Fred, Like Goldin, Martin & Kanipe, its all in how the story was told, sometimes its pure gold, isn't it? Wash away all that dirt and what's left are small glitters. The question is, is there enough, and, is it worth it?
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Post by wild on Apr 6, 2011 7:06:58 GMT -6
Hi Corbin Welcome
So we have Custer in motion with his half regiment advancing to attack the enemy. His objective is one large village or one village of a number of villages strung out along the LBH. Without going into detail it is just not feasable for Custer to advance on one village of a number of villages with half a regiment. The balance of probablity would suggest that Custer was moving to attack one large village.It was party time on the LBH,a social gathering ,meeting cousins and old friends.
Because the dynamic he was, as Girard put it, "laboring under" had changed. What had changed was his assumption that he could hit the village with 8 troops. Now he found that the village was vast,he had a major obstacle between him and it,the terrain split him from Reno and he had committed his forces prematurely. At this point I think he was a dead man walking.
Hi Fred Many thanks for the liquid salute.Greatly appreaciated.
I believe Custer would expect the scattering to occur farther north as the women, children, and elderly were accompanied out of the standing village by a number of warriors. I'm not sure if you are suggesting that Custer intended going after the "noncombatants "but I'll just use above as an excuse to make one or two points. The village is 2 to 3 miles long.If the women and children start to evacuate the village they will do so over the lenght of the Village.In other words the troops will be going after scattered evacuees not a nice concentrated body of humanity. To round up the scattered means the regiment will fragment and lose all combat efficienty The job will be difficult enough but it must be acomplished in the midst of hundreds of undefeated warriors. The 7th was as all military units are a delivery system.Overload a system and it will break.
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Post by fred on Apr 6, 2011 7:11:00 GMT -6
Corbin— Let me address each of your points by breaking them down, as below. My methodology is what I call the “Dark Cloud Philosophy,” a technique of paying attention to what was said, with more emphasis on earlier narratives than later, especially when they tend to contradict or add additional “color” to what was said previously. By sticking to the anecdotal work, then adding the more empirical data, i. e., measurable distances, reasonable speeds; and finally, using what I have termed, “military exigencies,” I think we can arrive at reasonable conclusions that if not fully exculpating nonsense, can at least explain said nonsense. … all of this presupposes what Custer knew or observed and that requires a lot more than what is known. From my perspective Custer “knew” very little, but observed the initial stages of Reno’s fight in the valley. He probably did not see the actual dismounting of Reno’s command, but I believe Custer watched the action for some five to eight minutes—why longer?—enough to see the skirmish line advance and Indians—primarily on foot—pulling back. We must also factor in the burgeoning smoke—increasing as the battle wore on—and the extreme dust, not only rising casually from a bare prairie floor, but being deliberately stoked by Indians wishing to hide movement. As far as numbers were concerned, Custer believed 800 warriors, with a possibility of as many as 1,500, neither number seeming to cause much trembling. LT Godfrey admitted that they misread the signs totally along the Rosebud causing them to believe there were far fewer Indians than even that 1,500 number. As for what Custer “saw” as he moved along the bluffs or watched from 3,411, we can use the following, excerpted from my so – called Book II: Lieutenant Hare—in the advance—recalled seeing, “forty or fifty [hostiles] between us and the Little Big Horn. They evidently discovered us, because they disappeared at once.” Private Davern was riding near Hare and Davern estimated twenty – to – forty. As would be expected, distance and Indian strength estimates vary, but not by that much considering the movement of men from position to position and the constant movement and arrival of Indians. It seems the initial Indian force was not very great, maybe around fifty or so (Gerard, Doc Porter, Lieutenant Hare). This grew exponentially as moments went by: Culbertson, two hundred to two hundred fifty; Wallace, two to three hundred; Hare, four to five hundred rising from the coulee; Porter, “a great many downriver”; Moylan, four hundred; Reno, five to six hundred; Ryan, five hundred; all fairly consistent, especially considering the circumstances. So my question here would be, Why would Custer—sitting atop the bluffs, seeing some or most of this—expect or “know” anything different? In my mind, the only question remaining for George Custer would be, Is this all of them? My guess would be that he would factor in a few more as he suspected the village was in the process of bolting, ergo, precipitating his move north. I discount totally Goldin’s story of a message to Reno. It bears no semblance to reality and even if it did, it arrived too late entirely to be of any import. Furthermore, with what we know of Reno’s own movements, I find it extremely hard to believe Goldin could have sought him out and delivered anything. To me, Kanipe was something of a fraud. I do not believe he was sent back with any message and his commentary is valuable—again, to me—only as a color analyst in a baseball game would be. “We galloped”; “The grass was green; the dirt, brown.” Martini overblows his own importance and if you pay attention to his stories over the years, the older Martini got, the closer he got to the penultimate or even ultimate action. At the RCOI in January – February 1879, he said he was given the note near the head of a ravine or coulee. The only “head” of a coulee in Martini’s entire life was Cedar’s, not Medicine Tail, not Deep. At the RCOI he described it perfectly and beautifully and when coupled with the testimony of Carlo DeRudio, it linked up almost to the yard at a rise in the bluffs shown as “3,411” on the USGS topographical map. Weir Peaks was specifically denied as the place Custer was seen. Weir Peaks also makes no sense from a military standpoint, especially considering the urgency involved in trying to stop a stampede. The diversion from the rest of his command to Weir would be too long entirely and over some rather difficult terrain. In addition, there were Indians on the east bank of the river and on the bluffs… not many, but enough to make such a journey utterly foolhardy. Furthermore, if one maps out DeRudio’s travels, it would have been almost impossible for him to have seen Custer et cie on Weir, through the trees and over his shoulder. As for “sleeping dogs…” see below. First of all, why would Martini be with Custer? Custer had several orderlies that day, all of whom spoke far better English than Martini (thus, a note, as opposed to a verbal order). Why would George Custer go to the edge of the bluffs to see what was happening and take Martini? My answer… he didn’t. He took his brother Tom, his titular A – d – C and his adjutant, just as DeRudio partially said. Wouldn’t you? I certainly would! The distance DeRudio claimed was 1,000 yards (a little more than ½ mile). I do not believe that. I believe it was closer to 1,400 yards (.8 miles), especially since I have spent an inordinate amount of my life in trying to map this man’s movements through the timber. And while either of those distances may seem excessive, it must be remembered that these figures were seen atop a high bluff with nothing but clear, blue sky behind them. (The Northern Cheyenne warrior, Young Two Moons, described June 25, as a hot, clear day with “no wind.”) Having been there and experimenting with distances all the way to the red fort, DeRudio’s testimony is plausible and believable. From 3,411, it is difficult to see far downstream, especially with the rising dust. Again, Young Two Moons: “There was a great dust from fighting, but no storm after the battle.” (More basis for Custer to do what he did, go where he went, see what he needed to see. A recon!) Martini was not that close to Custer or to the edge of the bluffs to see very much and what he did see from there was the small Spotted Tail Agency village located on the east side of the river, in the flats below Weir Peaks. And with all the hazurai going on in the prairie side of the LBH, why would there be any warriors in that village? All one might expect to see would be women, children, and dogs, running hither and yon. Then with the language situation as it was, it would be understandable that Martini would have misinterpreted or misunderstood what Custer said. And Kanipe was already gone, so no one else could tell us anything George Custer said. And remember my friend, you heard it here first. As far as I know no one else has ever brought that up as an explanation for Martini’s “observance.” Part of Custer’s errors that day included beliefs garnered over the years and the “lessons” he took away from previous actions. It is my belief that Custer sent Benteen where he did with precisely that idea in mind: multiple camps spread out along the valley. The Washita. Absolutely correct!… as stated above. No longer the case once he sat atop 3,411. The only things Custer did not gather from that view were, (1) the full length of the village downstream, and (2) the village density. In my opinion, it was the density that killed him. That was the thing he missed. Too many @#$%^ Indians!I agree with you. I would not argue this point at all. I believe “men” was the emphasis, but “ammo” is fine, as well. You are quite right about the dynamic and if “we have got them!” was spoken, it was precisely because of this understanding. The only remaining question would be, Where can I cross to corral the lot? Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Apr 6, 2011 7:21:47 GMT -6
Wild,
I do not disagree with you here, at least not in general terms. The village was about 1 1/2 miles long, not two or three, and Custer could see that from the bluff above Ford B. What else he could see is problematic, but whatever it was, he moved north to try to get around it. Thus-- in my opinion-- his move to find another fording place, i. e., Ford D. What he found there was the gathering place for these so-called refugees and according to Indian "lore" this was as far as they got and I would suspect that the military-- George Custer included-- "knew" that the scattering would go only so far before it stopped, allowing the male members of the families to catch up... is that a reasonable assumption?
The rest of what you say is also valid and forms the template for Custer's errors.
I do believe Custer was after the non-combatants, but only to prevent any massive escape, thereby shattering the objective of the entire campaign. As to what he intended to do with them... well, one guess is as good as another, but I would not have wanted to be in the midst of those Indians had Custer re-united his command and crossed at Ford D. Christmas and its attendant presents were too far away!
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by bc on Apr 6, 2011 7:42:52 GMT -6
BC, At this point, you know as much as I do. They did send me an e-mail a couple of weeks ago telling me they were toning down some of my flippant prose. They also questioned several entries which rather surprised me, only because they seem even more serious and professional than I had given them credit for. So I think this is going to be a very good effort, certainly by McFarland. As soon as I know more I shall let you know. Nothing at all yet on Book II. Best wishes, Fred. You flippant? Where would that come from? Sounds like they are still in the editing stage. To meet an April 12 delivery date, they would have to had it sitting at the print shop a couple weeks ago. Guess I'll fold my tent out by the mailbox and move back in the house. Maybe get a shower after I move back in. bc
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Post by bc on Apr 6, 2011 8:07:39 GMT -6
Few points and questions.
Regarding Martini, I'm not sure he was on Custer's tail all the time. I think some of the things he related about the village came from listening to conversations between the officers and not necessarily what he saw. Martini was probably stationed with HQ staff most of the time. Custer's guidon bearer would more likely be on his tail than anyone.
Corbin, for us dummies, what was Goldin's message and how do you see it fitting in? Could you explain that further? I've never understood the Goldin connection. Thanks.
By the way Corbin, I like to joke around a lot. I used to take an obvious joke, ala Johnny Carson, and reverse the punchline with part of the setup leaving the rest for an intelligent person to figure out the joke. Kinda like Steven Wright as I didn't want to do a Carson monologue with easy jokes. Problem is that someone listening has to be on the same wavelength and think through a joke to get it and for most people it just went over there heads. Not everyone responds to my wry, dry, and monotone voice/writings.
bc
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Post by montrose on Apr 6, 2011 8:40:20 GMT -6
Goldin was sent out after Reno's two messengers arrived. This was before Custer turned right. The message in effect said keep going. Reno never saw it, as Goldin never delivered it. Goldin ended up horseless, hiding in the bushes above Reno's crossing.
The written message disappeared, likely still on his horse.
Since the VOCO message made no mention of Custer leaving Reno, The message was sent before Custer turned off. Thus, it would have reinforced Reno's belief that he was still the regiment advance guard.
Goldin could not remember what the exact message was, nor what was on the written order. Martini did better than that, and he didn't speak English. Goldin was a bad judgment call on Cooke's part. Better qualified runners were available.
Cooke also screwed up by not sending a runner to Reno informing him that the regiment main body was moving right, and that Reno was no longer the regiment advance, but an independent attack. This is not Custer's fault, Custer can't do everything.
Cooke was the adjutant, and should have been covering Custer's back with respect to routine staff work.
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Post by fred on Apr 6, 2011 9:06:04 GMT -6
Corbin,
Take it from me; I spent a couple of days with BC... he is a great guy, smarter than he lets on... or maybe I should say, more knowledgeable. Sharp as a tack!
Britt,
I do not even have the "edited" copy yet; when I get that, I have to re-index as well as read through the entire manuscript, comparing it to what I have here. I'll still keep you posted, however.
Montrose,
If I am not mistaken, Goldin claimed to have been sent back after the watering, but before they reached Reno Hill. So sayeth Herr Goldin!! I believe also that he was a regimental clerk, part-time or otherwise. If nothing else, the man was reasonably well-educated. We share a mutual opinion of this guy!
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by wild on Apr 6, 2011 9:06:32 GMT -6
If it was ONE big village then most certainly Custer expected him to take on most if not all of them. Absolutely correct!… as stated above.
By appearances, at this time of the discussion, it appears that he believed that they were all strung out like they were at the Washita… No longer the case once he sat atop 3,411.
The above exchange would suggest that whether one big village lay ahead or a string of smaller ones Reno was expected to attack the lot?
I was always of the opinion that Custer wanted to bag the lot.But are we saying here that from the getgo Custer was content to snap up just one village?
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