|
|
Post by benteen on Mar 31, 2011 18:18:57 GMT -6
A gentleman on the other board, badbob1, posted something I thought was very interesting and had merit.It was basically was the message that Cooke wrote to Benteen what Custer actually ordered. Or did Cooke in his haste foul it up.
I see that things are a little slow now and I thought it might be enjoyable to kick it around a little
Be Well
Dan
|
|
|
|
Post by montrose on Mar 31, 2011 20:27:44 GMT -6
Dan,
Cooke was an experienced staff officer.
Many of electrons have dies needless deaths over this order. Custer told Cooke to border Benteen and the pack train to his location.
Custer placed some emphasis on the pack train, which caused Cooke to repeat it. Custer was likely talking to him while he was writing.
Boston Custer may have played a role here. He met Benteen only a short while after leaving the trains. He may have told Custer that Benteen and the trains were close.
The issue is that the trains were badly scattered, spread out over two miles. The loads were a wreck, ad the trains needed a halt to secure and check loads. And, of course, Benteen could move faster than the trains.
The order to bring up the pack train was going to cost time, and would have been realized by all concerned. Custer was mistaken in that he thought Indians would not be able to react to his movements for at least as long as it took the trains to move up.
As we know, he was wrong.
Respectfully,
William
|
|
|
|
Post by benteen on Mar 31, 2011 21:15:31 GMT -6
Montrose,
Sir, although I agree with all your posts and take valuable lessons from them, in this case I may have not made my assertion clear. My fault not yours.
When Custer sent this order he did not need ammo, what he needed was more fire-power. Reno had expended some ammo of course, but his battalion had not fired a shot.I read what Clair said (sorry) but that the packs were left in a safe position behind the lines.
I honestly believe based on these 2 factors that what Custer may have said or that his orders to Martini was
"Tell Benteen that I need him now. to come quick" AND tell" McDougall to bring up the packs"
Nothing else makes sense to me William.If he wanted the packs then send the message to McDougall, why Benteen. The message itself is contradictory as written by Cooke. If he wanted Benteen to be quick, there is no way he could do it dragging 70 mules. if he wanted the packs Benteen couldn't be quick.
Cooke was certainly a fine Officer, but I think under the stress and urgency he may have fouled up, and in his haste combined both orders into one because he knew Martini didn't have a control of the English language
Be Well
Dan
|
|
|
|
Post by bc on Apr 1, 2011 0:25:34 GMT -6
For my 2 cents I think the order could have been more explicit but it basically said what Custer wanted and needed at the time. He just had a looksee of the whole village and of Benteen and the pack train on the back trail from his hill.
First (and what most people don't bring up), Custer had to countermand the original order to Benteen which was to move to the left and sweep everything before him. Basically to make sure there were no camps to the south that could get away or get to them the way they did Elliot at the Washita. Sending Kanipe to hurry the pack train didn't relieve Benteen of his original mission. Something important enough to be in writing. Although Benteen was originally ordered to return to the trail if he didn't find anyting and by all appearances to Custer he did return, it would still be good practice to countermand the prior order. He may have observed Benteen watering at the morass and thought he needed a little prodding as well.
Second, he had not even commenced his attack or fired much ammo yet. Martini followed the command on down Cedar coulee for about 3/4 of a mile after the order was given by Custer until the time that Cooke wrote the note and give it to him. The messages by Kanipe and Martini were after Custer had his first view of the size of the village. I think Custer abandoned, assuming he ever had one, any plans of crossing the river into the village.
Third, I think he thought an attack across MTC into the village could not be sustained because of its size. His plan was one to drive the NAs away from the village and to the north sans tepees, food, and supplies. From the timber or the bluffs, Reno could have laid down enough fire to keep the NAs from going south. Benteen could help him if necessary. He tried to do this by demonstrating at MTC with one battalion on Luce and one going towards the river to flush the NAs and get them moving north. Yates moved forward and set up skirmish lines on Butler Ridge. This action on the NA flank was all going to be by long range firing. Yates would be close to MTC to deny the NAs the use of the ford.
Benteen was to move along the bluffs with the pack train to bring his troops plus the extra ammo that would be needed to support the two prong attack on the village.
Unfortunately the NAs found places to cross at the Miniconjou ford at MTC flanking Yates and they also crossed at the Real bird ford at Deep Coulee and were close to surrounding Yates on Butler Ridge as well as the battalion behind him on Luce. Custer moved to Calhoun to keep from getting flanked and to find a better location to fire on the village that was along Onion Creek leaving the void to be filled in by Benteen.
bc
|
|
|
|
Post by benteen on Apr 1, 2011 9:24:54 GMT -6
For my 2 cents I think the order could have been more explicit but it basically said what Custer wanted and needed at the time. He just had a looksee of the whole village and of Benteen and the pack train on the back trail from his hill. bc bc, If I'm reading you correctly Britt, you believe that certainly Custer would like to have both men and ammo, but his more immediate concern was ammo. And if it took more time for the troops to get there he was willing to accept that fact. In that case I will take it as your vote would be that Cooks message was basically correct, that is what Custer ordered . OK Be Well Dan |
|
|
|
Post by Dark Cloud on Apr 1, 2011 9:45:21 GMT -6
It's little more than a Yee-Haw, here's the village, come join the fun and make sure the fiasco that is our train makes it to where we can use it at need.
Keep it simple, conducive to the Custer known to history and to the abilities of the 7th as known to its officers. Unless the officers were idiots, they did not postulate that Reno's men, 25% holding horses, were enough with single shot carbines to stem thousands heading in any direction, including directly at them. They'd have to hit something with regularity to concern their targets. That wasn't happening and wouldn't. Officers knew what sufficient training was, and the 7th didn't have it.
They did not think the Indians would stand, much less turn on them in bulk, and they had no alternative to regress to at need.
Again: look at the near desert that was the LBH battleground in the early photos for years. That was due to the mass herds of game and ponies that kept it nubbed down. It bore no resemblance to the lush field today.
The air was fuzzy with dust with thousands of men and animals moving even before the smoke, and these blase assumptions of glances to the morass or to LSH from Weir Point and seeing anything are rather dubious, as are flensing distinctions by dust cloud as if the units beneath dyed them for identification and they weren't covered by nearer ones.
And again (again), you cannot logically just ignore known events that would explain detritus and artifact exclusively in order to substitute a theory. There's no evidence at all soldiers rode along the LBH down river to below LSH from MTCF. We know Sioux and Cheyenne in soldier garb and on soldier mounts did around the field and way north, and that sequential firing lines by Custer uphill to the north and east failed in desired effect.
We know that those hiding by the river who somehow heard Custer's firing miles away with huge bluffs between somehow did not hear Weir's and Godfrey's, which was much closer and later. We only know that they could NOT have been confused in time and conflated events as they told it later, because that would bleed drama from the tale.
There is a need to fluff the known and most probable tale. The result isn't truth and this allows Bevo Boy and Costume Lad to pose as combat and cavalry authorities for their own needs, not history's.
|
|
|
|
Post by bc on Apr 1, 2011 10:15:43 GMT -6
For my 2 cents I think the order could have been more explicit but it basically said what Custer wanted and needed at the time. He just had a looksee of the whole village and of Benteen and the pack train on the back trail from his hill. bc bc, If I'm reading you correctly Britt, you believe that certainly Custer would like to have both men and ammo, but his more immediate concern was ammo. And if it took more time for the troops to get there he was willing to accept that fact. In that case I will take it as your vote would be that Cooks message was basically correct, that is what Custer ordered . OK Be Well Dan So far, I think so. It began with Kanipe's message after viewing the size and extent of the village. The troops were carrying an ammo load designed for a basic chase of the running NAs and then hold and burn the vill before the NAs return to counter attack. Once they heard and saw the NAs were coming out to meet Reno along with the number they were facing, it meant, and I think Custer and staff recognized, that a protracted and long range firefight was ahead of them. They would need more ammo and more troops in the fray. To move the NAs along, it would take some massive show of force and massive volley firing. Said volley firing was heard from Reno Hill and those in the timber. But massive firing can be maintained for so long and will have to be restrained if they don't know they can readily be resupplied. Once they moved north whether by plan, by NA force, or combination thereof, they lessened their chance of resupply which meant they had to restrain their firepower and look for other options in dealing with the NAs. The beginning of the end. A move north would also be warranted to get the NAs in a cross fire when Benteen came up on their rear as well as go after some of the noncoms and some of which may have been in the Deep Coulee area when Yates went down there. Maybe the noncoms that crossed the LBH running from Reno necessitated the NAs to come across the river to face Custer. |
|
|
|
Post by benteen on Apr 1, 2011 11:25:51 GMT -6
and I think Custer and staff recognized, that a protracted and long range firefight was ahead of them. They would need more ammo and more troops in the fray. . bc, That's the point Britt. Yes in a long protracted battle you are going to EVENTUALLY need more ammo, but what was his immediate need. I believe it was more fire-power, more soldiers, and he needed them fast. Reno was getting his head handed to him and in danger of being decimated. Ammo certainly is important but having people able to use it is more important. If he doesn't get help to Reno real quick there will be no protracted battle or need for ammo. It will be over fast (As it was for Custer's battalion) I would guess that Custer's men didn't fire half their ammo before they were wiped out. Be Well Dan |
|
|
|
Post by bc on Apr 1, 2011 13:06:29 GMT -6
Guess we'll disagree on part of this Dan. At the time Martini was sent, Reno wasn't charging up the bluffs yet. I suspect he figured some ammo mules would be diverted to Reno as he watched the fight. Some of Custer's command shot most or all of their ammo, some did not, and some lost their spare ammo on the horses when some horses were driven off. I think those on Luce, NC, and Calhoun expended much more ammo than those who ended up on LSH. Clear as mud.
bc
|
|
|
|
Post by fred on Apr 1, 2011 17:53:06 GMT -6
Once again we figure out a way to yank an even more specific event out of an already specific event. It is rather neat and I enjoy your back – and – forth.
There are a few things however, that should be considered before one arrives at any conclusions regarding this note business. First of all, we have all been under the impression about rising dust and Custer being able to figure out who was where and when before he headed into the “tunnel.” I also believed that for a long time, but after doing all the work I have done on my time – line, I now doubt seriously the dust issue when it comes to Benteen and the packs.
I am convinced Custer was at 3,411 when Benteen turned onto Reno Creek from No – Name Creek. No – Name was narrow and unused and I would think dust was not an issue, not during a trot—why would Benteen either walk or gallop down it?—so nothing would be seen until some movement on Reno Creek. The morass was Benteen’s first stop and at any sort of speed it would have taken him only about four minutes to reach it, hardly enough to send dust plumes billowing into the atmosphere. His command would have closed up fairly rapidly so there would have been a minimum of dust raised… and besides, that dust would have been at far away as six or seven miles; Benteen had a meager force of only 117 men; and there were high intervening bluffs separating Reno Creek at that point from the northern hills. In addition, there were intermediate hills, viz, Benteen Hill and Reno Hill, separating the two commands.
Of course there are those who would argue that Custer sat atop Sharpshooters’ Ridge, but those people are arguing without any evidence and refuse to take their heads out of the sand.
My work tells me Custer sat at 3,411 for less than ten minutes—why more?—and would have reached the head of Cedar Coulee in only about four minutes from 3,411. Cooke was with him and Custer would have instructed Cooke as they rode toward the command, to send back a messenger to look for and speed up, Benteen.
The dichotomy contained within the note was not because of pressure or worry—Reno was doing rather well at the time and was in no serious trouble—and Custer’s troops had not fired a single shot yet. So why the packs? Why the emphasis? I have always believed—and still do—that it was because George Custer wanted those extra men. How many packs contained ammo? If memory serves me right, the command carried 25,000 extra carbine rounds. At 1,000 per case and two cases per mule, that would equate to 13 mules. If Custer was in such a sweat for ammo, why didn’t Cooke simply write, “Bring the ammo mules” or “Cut out the ammo mules”? It would have been a lot easier—as Benteen had ordered Hare to do on Reno Hill—to push ahead 13 mules than it would be to herd 175 at any speed. Cooke was a top – flight officer and adjutant and I doubt he would have made a mistake of that nature if Custer had specifically told him the ammo. Besides, the Indians were in the valley, not in the hills, and if they were going anywhere it was down valley, away from the pack train.
The only other answer is that Custer wanted those additional troops, plus McDougall’s command, together, 121 men, plus the extras on DS, maybe as many as 137. You add those numbers together—210 + 117 + 137 = 464—and you have a pretty decent attack force. You sequester the packs in the hills… and the question arises, Who cares? If Custer loses that battle, what does anyone care about the packs?
This was also—to me—another way of bringing all his forces together and doing it as quickly as possible. I think Custer feared a chase, his worst nightmare, because that would lead to scattering. By the time he was at 3,411, he could be reasonably assured he had found the village and that everything was downstream, nothing upstream. That would culminate Benteen’s mission. Again, however, I believe that note was written not under duress, but under anticipation.
Best wishes,
Fred.
|
|
tel
New Member
Posts: 19
|
Post by tel on Apr 1, 2011 19:25:43 GMT -6
I think Custer wanted the troops (Benteen's) and the ammo that was in those packs. Plain and simple. I once read that when Custer got excited he talked very fast and Cooke probably wrote very fast and then sent Martini off with the message. Martini's English wasn't that very because if memory serves, Benteen did ask him what was up. His answer in broken English was something along the lines of the fact that the Indians were running. Had Custer and Cooke sent someone who spoke decent English, Benteen w ould probably have had more concise information. But of course Martin lived and got to tell his version of the story which was different that Benteen's version. www.astonisher.com/archives/museum/john_martin_little_big_horn.html |
|
|
|
Post by wild on Apr 2, 2011 1:15:04 GMT -6
The dichotomy contained within the note was not because of pressure or worry—Reno was doing rather well at the time and was in no serious trouble.
The first action Custer must take is the support of Reno.The attack is developing and must be supported as per orders.
The action on Reno's front will develop and reach a critical point well before the arrival of Benteen et al.
We just cannot park Reno ,we cannot ignore a charge in progress.
The arrival of the packs is not intended as the trigger for a general attack but as support for the attack now developing.
As a "secondary " force it was not required piecemeal.The note ties Benteen to the ammo to the packs to the reserve.A compact reserve which lends itelf far better to command and control.
|
|
|
|
Post by AZ Ranger on Apr 2, 2011 8:49:40 GMT -6
tel
The problem with Martin's version is which do you want to use. There are at least three and details change. That is quite characteristic of memory over time.
As a side note I believe you stated you were a Marine Corps officer. Were you a enlisted man before becoming an officer? My nephew is currently an enlisted man and just got out of training in Florida at the Naval Intelligence school. He intends to do one enlistment than apply to be an officer. He graduated from Long Beach State University in southern CA.
Regards
Steve Andrews
|
|
|
|
Post by benteen on Apr 2, 2011 14:55:02 GMT -6
Thought that a key to unlocking one of the mysteries of the LBH was found. But when 5 people, 3 of them combat Officers say(In a gentlemanly way) that the key is bent and doesn't unlock anything ,well time for the white feather. Back to the drawing board. Thanks all for taking the time to respond.
Badbob if it is any consolation I thought the idea had merit. But then again if I bought a cemetery people would stop dying <G>
Be Well
Dan
|
|
|
|
Post by montrose on Apr 2, 2011 18:27:49 GMT -6
Dan,
You started an interesting discussion. Don't hang your head.
I am still researching a response to comments on this thread, so give me time, sir.
Your hypothesis is sound. I don't agree with it, but worthy of discussion.
I would propose this. Reno crossed Ford A and hugged the river on his right as he advanced. Custer moved right from Ash creek. So now Ford A is completely unprotected. From 3411 Custer could see that the Indian response to Reno was to head down his unprotected left flank. The Indians were closer to the pack train than any US element.
So Custer's order is to give protection responsibility to the exposed packs to Benteen, and to have both elements follow Custer to the right.
Never apologize, it is a sign of weakness.
Respectfully,
William
|
|
