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Post by Dark Cloud on Mar 26, 2011 12:57:07 GMT -6
Through the very beginning of WWI, stretcher bearers were not protected absent a truce to gather wounded, and were fair game to both sides, according to conscience. Of course, they could be posing as such to aide their cause, and it was a very dangerous thing in No Man's Land for these CO's and religious types who risked all with no protection or hope of any. That changed, but still.
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Post by wild on Mar 26, 2011 16:39:27 GMT -6
This is exactly related to the LBH, where Custerphiles demand that Reno and Benteen sacrifice the mission and the 7th by pointlessly rushing to Custer to die heroically with him. Custer wasn't left behind, he left his regiment behind. I don't think for a second he'd have gazed approvingly on the linear lines of mounted soldiers and packtrain being butchered and pillaged heading his way. At heart, he was no romantic, but he would play the role
How does the ship's captain who has left behind men in the water because of a fear of an enemy submarine in the vicinity fit into this mold?
In answer to DC and Fred.
Comradeship is an indivual function.It is not a function of a regiment or naval unit or even a section.It is the relationship between yourself and your fellow soldiers. Fred would know this he has been in the blood and the muck.Comradeship as the citation often reads is above and beyond the call of duty.Comradeship is personal.It is not about the regiment,politics or even the f***ing mission.It's the sticking stuff that makes individuals into regiments.
So again, my point is, why? What would Edgerly's and Harrison's death have done for the command? Not about the command Fred it's about your brother.
Edgerly's action was within the call of duty.But what about the trooper who put his life at risk to save LT Hodjson in circumstances where the Indians were closer than 15ft?I know who I would prefer at my side.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Mar 26, 2011 18:15:10 GMT -6
There is a wide tundra of possibility between making no attempt to protect and carry the wounded and all dying to live up to a maxim that in the cold light of logic must draw the line before 'never ever.'
Since Hackworth certainly knew and suggests, following that mentality would lead the sequential obliteration of every unit. It's what kills me about those damning Reno, who shoulda/coulda set up sequential firing lines while mathematically leaving further casualties that would need to be carried out on foot, because of dead mounts. There are times when this sort of gallantry cannot be distinguished from stupid and self-defeating process without point.
And suppose a casualty later learns that his arbitrary rescue caused 15 more, and a third of them are dead? Was he actually saved, then? I'd doubt it. Was he worth it? He'd be consumed by guilt, which is seemingly common enough in combat vets anyway.
If someone is fortunate enough to evade being shot themselves, and through skill and fortune brings back a wounded peer, all hail and thank heavens. But it's possible even the bravest and most skilled have to let some such opportunities for bravery pass: they've survived by knowing their limitations and quickly ascertaining the odds. And, if an officer, they have more than one obligation.
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Post by fred on Mar 26, 2011 18:33:40 GMT -6
Wild,
I know what you are saying and I don't really disagree except for the circumstances and the degree involved in a particular incident.
I do not believe you can compare the Hodgson/Fischer incident with the Charley/Edgerly/Harrison situation. Fischer was in the water, as was Hodgson and Fischer didn't stop to aid him. He may have slowed a bit-- of course the water may have seen to that equally-- but Fischer merely offered Hodgson a stirrup to grasp.
With Vincent Charley, Indians were already on the Weir "sugarloaf," and more were charging up Cedar Coulee. Unlike soldiers who would slow down while descending a coulee like Cedar-- primarily to maintain formation-- the Indians had no such compunction and were probably moving up that coulee with considerable momentum and speed.
Charley was shot through the hips; incapacitated. And it would have involved dismounting and helping him aboard Edgerly's or Harrison's horse. That wasn't the case with Hodgson. So I do not know that that is a good comparison.
Again, however, I return to my original argument. It is all about circumstance and degree. This was one of those impossible situations and if Edgerly and Harrison had stopped and were killed, we would be sitting here criticizing them, just as we would had Fred Benteen run willy-nilly to Custer's "aid," bypassing Reno and his demoralized command. What would it have proven? Charley was a goner the moment he collapsed off his horse and neither the duo of Edgerly and Harrison, nor the fickle finger of fate would have saved him. We criticize Custer for being rash and "sacrificing" his command, we would have done the same thing to Edgerly.
I was reading a post on the other boards this evening, one by a fellow who goes by the moniker, "brittles." He seems to be a pretty savvy fellow, yet he is one of those who is in the condemn-Benteen-for-not-going-fast-enough mode, simply because he knows no better; he is not particularly well informed and his posts reflect the opinions of secondary sources rather than a well-researched analysis. If you study the various testimonies, then try to fit events into the mold those narratives left us, you have finite distances and finite times. It isn't easy work, but when you take the time to do it, patterns emerge with brilliant clarity. When you begin to research various "subjective" items that have relevance to this event and you put those findings into the mix, more and more narration becomes clear. By doing all of this, you find out that Benteen didn't go much slower down Reno Creek than Custer did... maybe one mile per hour less. But that wasn't from 4 MPH down to 3; it was from 8 1/2 down to 7 1/2, hardly a measurement of dawdling.
This shows an element of responsibility some feel Benteen lacked. Studies show that speed increased as Benteen came closer to the gun-firing, and that shows an even greater sense of urgency and responsibility. But what would we say had Benteen irrationally and irresponsibly by-passed Reno with a smile and a wave and went to his doom alongside Custer?
To me, Edgerly showed-- in microcosm-- the same sense of responsibility to others that Benteen showed on Reno Hill. Quite frankly, I have no patience for anyone who says Benteen should have gone to Custer immediately. That person is a fool and I do not suffer fools very well. Quite frankly, if I had an officer capable of that measure of stupidity, I would have relieved him on the spot. And let us not forget-- as so many Benteen-haters and detractors do-- his orders were dual in nature: hurry and bring the packs, a military dichotomy. Every bit of work I have done for the last 3 1/2 years points to the fact that Benteen was hurrying long before he ever got the note from Martini, and he stepped on it even more when he stuck that slip of paper in his pocket. Those who disagree only hide behind the faulty research of Utley, Liddic, Donovan, Stewart, Unger, and so many more who have neither the patience nor the wherewithal to do the serious work to prove "fact," one way or the other. And if and when I ever manage to get that study published there will be those who will cite clowns like Peter Thompson as "proof positive" of my shortcomings.
It is all in the circumstances and the situation... and our belief systems.
best wishes, Fred.
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Post by wild on Mar 27, 2011 11:05:54 GMT -6
Where the Geneva Convention is adhered to no heroics are needed to potect the wounded or captured. Where the convention does not apply and wounded and captured face abuse, torture,beheading,mutilaton and such, then the idea of leaving the fallen to face such horrors is not acceptable. It becomes the moral obligation of the military to foster a culture whereby a soldier serving in such an environment knows he will not be left to the tender mercies of his captors. To- day you don't leave comrades behind in Iraqi, Afganistan,Somalia,Vietnam,and you can go back in history. adding to the list. A tradition would have become established particulary among the militaries of colonial powers of the heroic rescue of the fallen warrior. It is the bedrock of any esprit de corps.Without such a spirit the default motivation of "everyman for himself"kicks in. It is a philosophy by which the soldier lives his career not just in battle but in all his stations. I draw your attention to the incident involving Lieutenant Jaheel Brenton Carey.Carey took the Hedgson option in similar circumstances and spent the rest of his career an outcast among his fellow officers.
And suppose a casualty later learns that his arbitrary rescue caused 15 more, and a third of them are dead? Was he actually saved, then? I'd doubt it. Was he worth it? He'd be consumed by guilt, which is seemingly common enough in combat vets anyway.That sort of claim can be laid against all military actions. Even the most sophisticated technical opeations can result in blue on blue.
If someone is fortunate enough to evade being shot themselves, and through skill and fortune brings back a wounded peer, all hail and thank heavens. But it's possible even the bravest and most skilled have to let some such opportunities for bravery pass: they've survived by knowing their limitations and quickly ascertaining the odds. And, if an officer, they have more than one obligation It is an aspiration not an obligation.Just don't be seen in the mess again.
This was one of those impossible situations and if Edgerly and Harrison had stopped and were killed, we would be sitting here criticizing them All the logic is with Edgely,all the emotion with Charley.
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tel
New Member
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Post by tel on Mar 27, 2011 13:52:43 GMT -6
I was a marine officer and and we didn't leave men behind. It was pounded into us by our superiors and by the corp in general (right or wrong). But I respect your take Fred. However back to LBH. None of us was there... IMHO, the Reno and Benteen Battalions were beaten or not generally motivated. That they went to Weir point was a miracle and solely due to Weir's willingness to disobey orders and make a try of it. he other followed out of guilt (and some bravery). Yes, well, I was an army officer, a captain, a company commander-- paratrooper, ranger; all the requisite nonsense-- and I had the same thing drummed into my head... no difference, regardless of what Marines may think. And I have a fairly good idea of that, since my son was a Force Recon Marine in the Gulf War in 1991, and saw a fairly sharp bit of action at the Kuwait City Airport. Just to belabor the point a little more, here is something I have "cherry-picked" (God forbid!) from my own work on the subject, so we can draw our conclusions or righteous indignation from here: [At a specific point in time...] "The last of D Company leaves the Weir 'sugarloaf' down a draw and into Cedar Coulee. Edgerly struggles with his horse as his orderly, SGT Harrison stands nearby. Edgerly had trouble mounting and claimed Indians got within 15 feet of him and his orderly, an old veteran. The horse kept moving away from him, so SGT Harrison moved in such a way to prevent the horse from going any farther. He smiled and told Edgerly the Indians were bad marksmen from so close." So again, my point is, why? What would Edgerly's and Harrison's death have done for the command? In the army, an officer has an obligation to the living as well as the seemingly doomed. How does the ship's captain who has left behind men in the water because of a fear of an enemy submarine in the vicinity fit into this mold? Is he to be condemned, or do we excuse that because of the price tag associated with a capital ship? Or maybe it is more because of the lives on board than anything else. Edgerly had that same responsibility to his men. Again, what does needless dying prove... other than stupidity? What about the wounded man in a "no-man's" zone, you know, the one in between your position and the enemy machine gun? He's the guy they use for bait. Who has the responsibility to go get that guy? That's why they have the Medal of Honor... it was never an army requirement to be awarded one; nothing in the UCMJ about that. No moral responsibility there. And I am sure the parents and wives of those who have one hanging on their walls would prefer Option B. As for "beaten" troops, I would hardly ever have called Benteen beaten and anyone who says he dawdled [see the neighbors for more information] or held back because of a distaste for GAC simply isn't reading enough. Varnum wasn't beaten; Hare wasn't; Wallace wasn't; French certainly wasn't. If we interpret the Cooke/Martini note one way-- "hurry"-- we must include all the rest-- "bring packs." Benteen left only when he saw the packs were within a mile of reaching the hilltop and McDougall was riding hell-bent-for-leather in front. That's called "bringing the packs." Benteen was also bringing the wounded, and not leaving them behind.But... and please do not take this personally, TEL-- no offense is intended-- maybe this is why we see no (or few) books on strategy and tactics written by Marine Corps officers. Bios, yes... otherwise...? Best wishes, Fred. No offense taken. I am not one of "those" Marines. Not leaving men behind was drummed into our heads but I am not saying it didn't ever happen anywhere ever. I never felt that the marines were better than the army or vice versa. It really got down to leadership and unit moral and of course bravery and intelligence. I don't know about how many books were written by Marine Corp officers. I don't think that has to do with anything. And I am in complete agreement that Benteen and Reno should NOT have marched to the sound of the guns. More bodies strewn between Last Stand Hill and Weir Point. But I would point out as strange as it may seem that I have never believed that the Weir point move was meant to really support Custer. Weir may have thought it was for that reason but Reno and Benteen, even though they eventually followed Weir, did not have the thought of looking for more Indians. They were just trying to survive. I think they wanted to see what they could see and what they saw, they didn't understand (the last moments of Custer's command) and what they did understand was the sudden advance of more Indians on their position. So they retreated (including Weir). The Reno-Benteen unit was in no position for offensive action. Too many wounded and morale was at a low point.
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Post by wild on Apr 5, 2011 15:29:47 GMT -6
And again from a slightly different angle--- Question: How many warriors did Custer imagine Reno would encounter in his attack 300? Did he think Reno could handle any number of warriors? The intell Custer had would indicate that the opposition was in considerable strenght.If that is the case then launching Reno's gallant 140 troopers in a solo attack was ludicrious. But we know that Custer promised to support the attack. So what he was doing was committing 8 troops to this action. But it is written in stone on these discussion boards that the attack was Reno's.This position cuts Custer free from his committment to Reno and gives him the freedom to execute military cartwheels up and down every river and knoll in Montana. Having surprised the village he attacked with what he had available which was 8 troops. In chess you can make a move and without losing a piece see that the game is lost. At Weir Point without having lost a man Custer saw that the battle was lost.
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