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Post by fred on Mar 18, 2011 13:20:02 GMT -6
I thought these next two might be interesting as well. The first was shot from one of the Weir peaks, the second from the loaf. Both show the Middle Coulee and give a fairly decent view of the undulations of the terrain. Steve is correct, however. Cedar Coulee is much more difficult to negotiate. Let me know if you want pictures of Cedar; I have several. Best wishes, Fred. Attachments:
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Post by fred on Mar 18, 2011 13:21:02 GMT -6
This is the one shot from the loaf. Best wishes, Fred. Attachments:
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Post by wild on Mar 18, 2011 14:35:07 GMT -6
. All it says is Reno was to receive support from Custer's column at some point. Now that was not hard to admit.
2. "The status of orders with obligations on all parties to those orders." Reno cannot be faulted for Custer changing his mind, nor can Custer, barring deliberate ruse. Who is looking for faults? The support order ties Custer to Reno.The written order obliges Benteen to advance to Custer because at the time it was written there was one engagement.Custer turns away from MTC splits from Reno thus making the written order redundant and presenting Benteen with a dilemma
he'd probably think it wise to so inform Martin to tell him.The advice to Martin was no more or less than an option on how he should return to his post.
Custer didn't slow his pace. He stopped a few times, the last to tighten his saddles before heading down MTC Gray says he covered 1 mile in 22 minutes [with apologies to Fred]. To achieve anything Custer needs Benteen.The view from Weir Point is not promising. If he waits for Benteen his situation will improve.There is no tactical advantage or purpose going further North.He does not know how long it will take Benteen to come on but he must give him every chance to close up. When he turned away from MTF the battle was lost,Nothing ahead and 7 troops leaderless behind him. Why did he do it?I don't know perhaps the 3000 warriors and auxies decided for him.
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tel
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Post by tel on Mar 18, 2011 22:43:53 GMT -6
I mentioned earlier in this thread that that Custer felt that the Indians were going to run. His strategy, flawed as it was, was directed with this in mind. The direction he sent Reno and Benteen were with this in mind. I agree with a much earlier post on this thread. He should have waited for Benteen but he didn't because he didn't want the Indians to get away. But if he had waited, then Benteen, IMHO would have joined Custer's battalion in their journey to Valhalla. The best thing Benteen and Reno did was "not" to move towards the sound of the guns and certain death. Look what happened at Weir Point. The Indians came at them and they retreated. The fight was all out of these guys by the time Custer and his command was being wiped out. Custer's greatest failure as the commander of the 7th was his inability to bond with either Reno or Benteen. Since they pretty much reviled him, why would they come to his aid? Well, they didn't. Not in the end. From www.mohicanpress.com/battles/ba04001.htmlAs Reno engaged in the valley, Custer continued along the right bank of Reno Creek. Maintaining a connection with Reno's advance through couriers, he then veered to the right, at about the place where Reno crossed the Little Bighorn to begin his charge into the village, and climbed the bluffs. From above, he witnessed a part of the action. From the scurrying activity obvious within the village, Custer received the false impression that the villagers were fleeing, when, in fact, only the non-combatants were doing so; the warriors were rushing to the fight. In any event, Custer was quoted as exclaiming, "We've caught them napping, boys!" Sgt. Daniel Kanipe was sent back to locate the pack train and have them move up with all dispatch. The 5 companies then continued on to the north, passing through a narrow defile - called Cedar Coulee - looking for a suitable ford from which to attack the village, thus relieving pressure on Reno while ensuring none of its inhabitants escaped. With the pack train on its way, and Benteen sure to arrive soon, the matter seemed well in hand. Returning from a brief side trip to a high peak, Custer was aware of Reno's halt to form Cooke's Message skirmishers. He now knew, for certain, that the 7th had a fight on their hands. He gave orders for the Italian immigrant, Giovanni Martini, to have Benteen join up more expediently. Adjutant Lt. W. W. Cooke, uneasy about Martini's poor English, hastily wrote the order down, and handed it to the courier. It read: Benteen Come on. Big Village. Be quick. Bring packs. W. W. Cooke P.S. Bring Packs. Martini galloped towards the rear to find Benteen ... like Kanipe, his life spared! And, what of Benteen? ...
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Post by wild on Mar 19, 2011 0:28:15 GMT -6
How big would the village have had to have been for Custer to have turned away? A village 3 miles long 1/2 a mil wide would be geting close to the size that would have put most men off.
Did the fact that there was nothing at stake reduce the fight in Custer's senior officers?
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tel
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Post by tel on Mar 20, 2011 22:36:44 GMT -6
How big would the village have had to have been for Custer to have turned away? A village 3 miles long 1/2 a mil wide would be geting close to the size that would have put most men off. Did the fact that there was nothing at stake reduce the fight in Custer's senior officers? I don't believe he would have turned away of the village had been twice as big. His senior officers felt little or no allegiance to Custer so if things went bad (as they did), why would they try to break through to Custer's battalion. When I used to war game this battle with other amateur military buffs one scenario we used to play, unlikely as it is, was what if Benteen's battalion had been commanded by Tom Custer or Yates? I believe they would have tried to ride through the whole Sioux nation to get to Custer. Of course Custer kept his family and friends close and so they died. But what if they were in command of the other battalions? Interesting to think about.
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Post by wild on Mar 20, 2011 23:52:23 GMT -6
Hi tel There is no telling how blood ties would have effected decision making but Weir's enthusism for going on dissipated when he saw what lay beyong Weir Point.
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Post by fred on Mar 21, 2011 9:13:39 GMT -6
His senior officers felt little or no allegiance to Custer so if things went bad (as they did), why would they try to break through to Custer's battalion. I think there are too many people entirely-- on this board and the other-- who have no clue how a military officer views his duty and I believe those views are too often tainted by prejudice and pre-disposition. The mere suggestion that men like Fred Benteen, Tom Weir, and Tom French would have shirked their duty and allowed more than 200 men to die because of any animosity to one person appalls me. Of course, prejudice and a failure to assess a situation properly will do that to you. Benteen was stunned when Reno even suggested they leave behind a handful of seriously wounded to try to attempt a breakout. Weir assessed the situation and as close as he was to George Custer, decided it would be insane to ride into that mob. Why would George Yates think differently? Why even Tom Custer? That opinion is simply an utter failure to grasp any sort of reality. It smells like Clair Conzelman's "hussar" stupidity. If one reads enough-- and fans away the smoke blowing from one's top-- one would discover that these officers-- as late as the morning of the 27th-- had no inkling that Custer was killed and were dumbfounded-- to use one's own word-- when they were told what had happened. Like I said, it appalls me to think all these never-serving, civilian strategists think so lowly of the American officer corps-- or any officer corps outside of equatorial Africa-- to think Benteen and others would deliberately allow any man to die, whether it be George Custer or Private Ryan. Why don't all you non-service civilians out there who think that way of officers begin a movement to do away with the officer corps and run the military with everyone a private and having an equal vote? I'm sure that would produce another Napoleon, O'Connor, or Manstein. Hell, even Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge discovered that didn't work! Like I said... prejudice and ignorance. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by montrose on Mar 21, 2011 11:11:17 GMT -6
Fred,
Lol, your main point is how do you have a rational discussion with someone who is not rational. Folks like Custerwest and Conz have attached their own egos to LBH. When you question their highly suspect, if not delusional, statements, you are questioning their own self image, vice an opinion. This leads to emotion laden arguments short on facts and long on the poster's own ego and emotional issues.
Forum seems to be having issues, per usual. I am updating threads in command and control, and the Reno reinforcement threads. You can not see posts in the most recent posts function. You need to go look at the specified threads.
Respectfully,
Will
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Post by wild on Mar 21, 2011 11:27:51 GMT -6
Hi Fred, I'v been discussing with DC the status of the addendum to Reno's orders the "I will support you" portion. I imagine that your sentiments expressed above would support my contention.Not only would Reno'sorder's place obligations on all parties but this officers code you speak of would join Reno and Custer at the hip for operational purposes.
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Post by fred on Mar 21, 2011 15:13:37 GMT -6
Wild,
You are an old fox, you are!
But let me sort of clarify my ire. First of all, none of it was directed your way. None! Second, if the old gray cells haven't failed me completely, my recollection is that you spent a career working with or for your army. Cartography or some such endeavor, if I remember correctly. So you, at least, are more familiar with an officer corps than most.
Third, while we do not always agree, I respect your opinions because I believe you are quite well-read and quite well-informed.
I have no issue with civilians—hell, I'm one of them now—in discussing history, strategy, or tactics. Those are all debatable and flexible subjects open to various interpretations and situations. Not even the German General Staff and the army group commanders could agree on what their strategic objectives should be and unlike Conz, I do not profess to be the world's leading authority on anything... except maybe myself, and even that is iffy. It is because of that belief that I participate in this forum.
My objection to some of this criticism is more "subjective – based" than "objective – based." We can debate all day on whether or not Fred Benteen, at the head of 4, 5, or 6 full companies, could have charged successfully, willy-nilly, into the horde of Indians. Or if he should have even tried. My ire is in the impugning of the man's character... which, by extension, tends to impugn most or all officers, regardless of their tactical skills. To imply a man like Benteen would allow more than 200 soldiers to die because of his dislike of one man is sheer lunacy and patently outrageous. It calls into question the character of every American soldier who has ever worn a silver bar. If you want to damn the man, then do so for what he did or did not do, and not for what he may have intended or for his feelings.
Fred Benteen was no "Salt" Smith. Nor was he of the same ilk as men like Jacob Shellabarger, John Daniel, Charles Cox, Frank Commagére, William Clark, Lee Gillette, or David Wallingford. Those men were all drummed out of the service, and not because they were simply heavy boozers.
As for your discussion with DC, I do not look at the "you'll be supported" phrase as an addendum. I think it was part and parcel of the whole order.
I spoke with "montrose" the other day and he brought up an exceptionally good point about this order. Reno-- I believe at the RCOI-- said he was the "advance guard." An attacking force going in all by itself is not an advance guard. Reno's comment suggests he fully believed Custer would be behind him, thereby making Reno this "advance guard." Reno never changed his story; never deviated from it; never waffled about it; it remained the same until the day he died. (Quite unlike Curley, Kanipe, Goldin, Martini, and probably some others as well.)
I am not sure how my "sentiments" would either support or disclaim your argument, but if you maintain that Reno's orders placed obligations on both him and George Custer, then I believe that argument to be correct. If Custer were to change that order (he did so), he would be obliged to inform his subordinate (he did not). He left Reno with no guidance whatsoever and it then befell Reno to use his best judgment in what he should do.
And Wild, I do not espouse any particular "officer code." Generally, officers are better educated than enlisted personnel. I had to take an oath and I was also responsible for the welfare of my men. Over here we are going through the college basketball season and the sport is rife with cheaters, liars, and crooks, many of them college coaches. Win, win, at all costs. What some of these dogs do not understand is that it is about the kids and the education you give them. Coaches have an obligation to these boys and girls, and part of that obligation is that they become literate, responsible adults... and that they have a chance to graduate and go on to better things in life. An officer has a parallel responsibility to his men. If that is the "officer code" you speak of, then so be it. The proudest things I will take to my grave will be a lieutenant colonel's report on my performance in Vietnam saying the morale in the company I commanded was the best he had ever seen... and this guy was a WWII vet... and my former driver's comments to me, just recently, about what my men thought of me and how selfless they thought I was. You cannot buy that kind of praise. You will have to excuse me if those colors show sometimes beneath this façade.
As for George Custer and his officers... they were all joined at the hip at the LBH. Benteen acted the way he did because he was no fool and he had no clue what was happening. What would any reasonable officer have done?
Best wishes, Fred.
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tel
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Post by tel on Mar 23, 2011 15:04:52 GMT -6
His senior officers felt little or no allegiance to Custer so if things went bad (as they did), why would they try to break through to Custer's battalion. I think there are too many people entirely-- on this board and the other-- who have no clue how a military officer views his duty and I believe those views are too often tainted by prejudice and pre-disposition. The mere suggestion that men like Fred Benteen, Tom Weir, and Tom French would have shirked their duty and allowed more than 200 men to die because of any animosity to one person appalls me. Of course, prejudice and a failure to assess a situation properly will do that to you. Benteen was stunned when Reno even suggested they leave behind a handful of seriously wounded to try to attempt a breakout. Weir assessed the situation and as close as he was to George Custer, decided it would be insane to ride into that mob. Why would George Yates think differently? Why even Tom Custer? That opinion is simply an utter failure to grasp any sort of reality. It smells like Clair Conzelman's "hussar" stupidity. If one reads enough-- and fans away the smoke blowing from one's top-- one would discover that these officers-- as late as the morning of the 27th-- had no inkling that Custer was killed and were dumbfounded-- to use one's own word-- when they were told what had happened. Like I said, it appalls me to think all these never-serving, civilian strategists think so lowly of the American officer corps-- or any officer corps outside of equatorial Africa-- to think Benteen and others would deliberately allow any man to die, whether it be George Custer or Private Ryan. Why don't all you non-service civilians out there who think that way of officers begin a movement to do away with the officer corps and run the military with everyone a private and having an equal vote? I'm sure that would produce another Napoleon, O'Connor, or Manstein. Hell, even Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge discovered that didn't work! Like I said... prejudice and ignorance. Best wishes, Fred. It's always good to have people draw conclusions about others on the board. We all don't need to talk up our military background. I was unaware that people had to have military background to be bona fide experts. By the way, the Reno-Benteeen group did leave behind one of their men at Weir point. Farrier, PVT. Vincent Charley. He was left never-the-less even though he begged an officer NOT to leave him. L ate in the afternoon of June 25, 1876, troops commanded by Captain Thomas Weir made an abortive attempt to contact the Custer column. When the troops reached Weir Point, warriors on Last Stand Hill saw them and moved to counter-attack. After a brief skirmish, the cavalry retreated back towards their previous position on the bluff now called Reno's Hill. Charley was shot through the hips just as the withdrawal on Weir Point began. Unable to mount or walk, he crawled after his departing comrades. Lieutenant Edgerly called back for him to hide in a nearby ravine until the company could be formed to rescue him, thus leaving Charley to his fate. His body was later found with a stick rammed down his throat
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tel
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Post by tel on Mar 23, 2011 15:07:22 GMT -6
His senior officers felt little or no allegiance to Custer so if things went bad (as they did), why would they try to break through to Custer's battalion. I think there are too many people entirely-- on this board and the other-- who have no clue how a military officer views his duty and I believe those views are too often tainted by prejudice and pre-disposition. The mere suggestion that men like Fred Benteen, Tom Weir, and Tom French would have shirked their duty and allowed more than 200 men to die because of any animosity to one person appalls me. Of course, prejudice and a failure to assess a situation properly will do that to you. Benteen was stunned when Reno even suggested they leave behind a handful of seriously wounded to try to attempt a breakout. Weir assessed the situation and as close as he was to George Custer, decided it would be insane to ride into that mob. Why would George Yates think differently? Why even Tom Custer? That opinion is simply an utter failure to grasp any sort of reality. It smells like Clair Conzelman's "hussar" stupidity. If one reads enough-- and fans away the smoke blowing from one's top-- one would discover that these officers-- as late as the morning of the 27th-- had no inkling that Custer was killed and were dumbfounded-- to use one's own word-- when they were told what had happened. Like I said, it appalls me to think all these never-serving, civilian strategists think so lowly of the American officer corps-- or any officer corps outside of equatorial Africa-- to think Benteen and others would deliberately allow any man to die, whether it be George Custer or Private Ryan. Why don't all you non-service civilians out there who think that way of officers begin a movement to do away with the officer corps and run the military with everyone a private and having an equal vote? I'm sure that would produce another Napoleon, O'Connor, or Manstein. Hell, even Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge discovered that didn't work! Like I said... prejudice and ignorance. Best wishes, Fred. It's always good to have people draw conclusions about others on the board. We all don't need to talk up our military background. I was unaware that people had to have military background to be bona fide experts. By the way, the Reno-Benteen group did leave behind one of their men at Weir point. Farrier, PVT. Vincent Charley. He was left never-the-less even though he begged an officer NOT to leave him. L ate in the afternoon of June 25, 1876, troops commanded by Captain Thomas Weir made an abortive attempt to contact the Custer column. When the troops reached Weir Point, warriors on Last Stand Hill saw them and moved to counter-attack. After a brief skirmish, the cavalry retreated back towards their previous position on the bluff now called Reno's Hill. Charley was shot through the hips just as the withdrawal on Weir Point began. Unable to mount or walk, he crawled after his departing comrades. Lieutenant Edgerly called back for him to hide in a nearby ravine until the company could be formed to rescue him, thus leaving Charley to his fate. His body was later found with a stick rammed down his throat
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Post by fred on Mar 23, 2011 16:35:16 GMT -6
It's always good to have people draw conclusions about others on the board. We all don't need to talk up our military background. I was unaware that people had to have military background to be bona fide experts. Before you start breast - beating over a life of regrets, try re-reading what I put up there so you may be able to figure out its context. Usually I do not "talk up" my military background until I get some clown who decides to pontificate about what goes through an officer's mind during battle. Do tell!As for the Vincent Charley incident, I noticed no private soldiers were back that close to the on-rushing Indians to lend a hand. It seems to me, the Indians, at that moment, were rather close, and Charley would have taken an inordinate amount of time to be transported back. He was shot through the hips and couldn't re-mount. So tell me, General Tel, what is a soldier to do, officer or otherwise? Before your cork pops, here is a little tidbit for you... In a 1911 interview with Walter Mason Camp, SGT Thomas W. Harrison told Camp that Edgerly instructed the wounded Charley to crawl into a ravine and Edgerly would come back for him as soon as he could get reinforcements. As Edgerly and Harrison rode on and looked back they saw the Indians finishing off Charley [Liddic/Harbaugh, Camp On Custer, 98]. So how close does that put hundreds of Indians? I also seem to remember it was Lieutenant Godfrey who stopped his panicking men, turned them around, and formed a skirmish line to hold off those Indians... it was Lieutenant Godfrey who sent his horses baqck so his men would maintain that line. I also seem to remember that it was Captain Benteen who rallied the men, Captain Benteen who led the charge to roust the Indians off the bluffs, and it was Captain Benteen who the officers and men credited with saving the command. So can you tell me, please, what was in his mind? And as for drawing conclusions, maybe you should try to understand what I wrote before you draw yours. Best wishes, Fred.
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tel
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Post by tel on Mar 24, 2011 15:44:40 GMT -6
It's always good to have people draw conclusions about others on the board. We all don't need to talk up our military background. I was unaware that people had to have military background to be bona fide experts. Before you start breast - beating over a life of regrets, try re-reading what I put up there so you may be able to figure out its context. Usually I do not "talk up" my military background until I get some clown who decides to pontificate about what goes through an officer's mind during battle. Do tell!As for the Vincent Charley incident, I noticed no private soldiers were back that close to the on-rushing Indians to lend a hand. It seems to me, the Indians, at that moment, were rather close, and Charley would have taken an inordinate amount of time to be transported back. He was shot through the hips and couldn't re-mount. So tell me, General Tel, what is a soldier to do, officer or otherwise? Before your cork pops, here is a little tidbit for you... In a 1911 interview with Walter Mason Camp, SGT Thomas W. Harrison told Camp that Edgerly instructed the wounded Charley to crawl into a ravine and Edgerly would come back for him as soon as he could get reinforcements. As Edgerly and Harrison rode on and looked back they saw the Indians finishing off Charley [Liddic/Harbaugh, Camp On Custer, 98]. So how close does that put hundreds of Indians? I also seem to remember it was Lieutenant Godfrey who stopped his panicking men, turned them around, and formed a skirmish line to hold off those Indians... it was Lieutenant Godfrey who sent his horses baqck so his men would maintain that line. I also seem to remember that it was Captain Benteen who rallied the men, Captain Benteen who led the charge to roust the Indians off the bluffs, and it was Captain Benteen who the officers and men credited with saving the command. So can you tell me, please, what was in his mind? And as for drawing conclusions, maybe you should try to understand what I wrote before you draw yours. Best wishes, Fred. Fred Thanks for the promotion to General. Never got that high. Close but not that high. They weren't giving our brevet commands in Viet Nam. I don't know for sure what Godfrey was thinking but I was once in a very similar situation during Tet in 1968. We were getting overrun and a man was wounded in the leg. Could not walk. A small squad turned back to rescue him and carry him out while another squad provided covering fire. It was tight but we got out. I don't know what was on Godfrey's mind but what was on my mind was to get my man out. But it is a good question. And by the way, we were getting the crap kicked out of on that particular day. Morale was down and we were hot and tired. But get the man out. Don't leave him behind. I think I made the right decision. TEL
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