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Post by conz on Dec 3, 2007 13:46:55 GMT -6
Fred believes that it was Cooke's word that made up Custer's mind, and I think that most probable. If Reno's messages had any impact, it would be to confirm what Cooke said...that the Natives were standing before their village and intended to fight, NOT run.
Clair
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Post by harpskiddie on Dec 3, 2007 13:54:09 GMT -6
Conz:
That's part of his overall theory, I think, although he posted it as a response to yours. He could tell you better if that was actually his theory that he posted.
You have limited the reasons for Custer's move to the high ground to the north to only three, while there are several other possible impetuses [is that the plural?] which you have omitted. I would ask you why you did that, but it would lead to a debate of my theory, in which, as you are well aware [or should be] I will not participate. I do not debate ANYONE'S theory. Not yours, not Fred's not any.....
This type of discussion/debate is exactly what transpires on the main boards. This should have been posted under your theory thread, I think. It looks as if nobody else will post his theory. Mine is being revised as we speak. Revision # 1826. See also under Introduction.
Gordie MC
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Post by conz on Dec 3, 2007 14:31:02 GMT -6
Is there a way to add options after the fact? Perhaps if we want a bunch of options I didn't think of, we could delete this thread and make a new one with them.
I don't know of any other options...would be glad to hear them, though!
Clair
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Post by fred on Dec 3, 2007 14:38:36 GMT -6
Clair--
Try to "modify" your original post. If that doesn't work I will delete the whole thing-- saving the posts-- and start it all over again.
And yes... I believe Custer turned north after separating from Reno because of the information Gerard gave Cooke.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by bc on Dec 4, 2007 11:17:26 GMT -6
Let's think about what was said from the horse's mouth, Major Reno, in his July 5, 1876 report from the Camp on Yellowstone River to Captain E. W. Smith. This is exhibit # 4 from the RCOI containing 4 pages.
From page 1 of the Reno report and page 561 of the RCOI, in the fourth paragraph: Cooke, ...... "came to me and said the village was only two miles ahead and running away; to move forward at or rapid a gait as prudent and to charge afterwards, and that the whole oufit would support me. I think those were his exact words." ....
From page 4 of the Reno report and page 564 of the RCOI, in the second full paragraph: "After traveling over his trail it is evident to me that Custer intended to support me by moving further down the stream and attacking the village in flank. That he found found the distance greater to the ford than he anticipated; that he did charge, but his march had taken so long, altho' his trail shows he had moved rapidly, that they were ready for him. That Co's, C. and I and perhaps part of E crossed to the village or attempted it, at the charge; were met by a staggering fire and that they fell back to find a position form which to defend themselves, but they were followed too closely by the Indians to permit time to form any kind of line. I think had the regiment gone in as a body and from the woods from which I fought advanced upon the village, its destruction was certain. But he was fully confident they were running away or he would not have turned from me. I think (after the great number of Indians there were in the village) that the following reasons obtain for the misfortune. His rapid marching for two days and one night before the fight; attackin the daytime at 12 M and when they were on the oui vive instead of early in morning, and lastly his unfortunate division of the regiment into three columns."
It is clear to me that Reno knew (abeit after the battle) what Custer meant by support. Other conclusions drawn from Reno's report are that he traveled Custer's trail and the evidence of the tracks left by the horses indicated to him a rapid movement and also that there was a charge at the ford. Reno had the experience with horse tracks enough to know what they represented. He clearly thought that Custer thought that the Indians were running. For those who say there were too many Indians vs. the cavalry, Reno still thought ten days later that he thought the village's destruction was certain with an attack from the woods where he had been by the whole regiment. Since Reno used the terms regarding the village's destruction, that suggests that the mindset was to destroy the village to help force the Indians back on the reservation.
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Post by bc on Dec 4, 2007 11:25:11 GMT -6
Fred believes that it was Cooke's word that made up Custer's mind, and I think that most probable. If Reno's messages had any impact, it would be to confirm what Cooke said...that the Natives were standing before their village and intended to fight, NOT run. Clair I'm not sure the message made any difference to Custer whatsoever as he was already committed to his movement and attack. They all knew there was going to be some fighting involved. Another thing is that Reno had the opportunity to ask for support or reinforcements and did not do so. That left the impression Custer that Reno could handle the fight he was in without any help.
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Post by fred on Dec 4, 2007 12:33:16 GMT -6
bc--
You may want to consider this:
Reno reached the head of the column and shortly after, Cooke gave him an order from Custer: “General Custer directs you to take as rapid a gait as you think prudent and charge the village afterwards, and you will be supported by the whole outfit.” [561] • Reno was asked a question about this support. “From the manner I received the order I could not conceive of any other manner of being supported except from the rear.” [579] • “… n my opinion there was no other way to support me.” [584]
You may also want to consider the fact that Benteen said he felt Custer never went to the ford and you also may want to consider the fact there were people who broke down the battalion make-up. Keogh: C, I, and L; Yates: E and F.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by conz on Dec 4, 2007 13:54:51 GMT -6
The way Custer's decision-making breaks down for me is that:
If the natives are truly running from Reno, it is useless to go up the bluffs...that is way too slow, and you'll never catch them. It is much faster to take the quick, flat, valley route and begin your pursuit. If you are worried about Natives moving east, you might send a squadron up the bluffs, but they'll fall behind if the Natives are high-tailing it to the west (their most probable escape route).
If the natives stand to protect their village and delay pursuit, why send more forces up against that barrier? Breaking the Native firing lines will take too long, and won't be that effective...they'll conduct a fighting withdrawal. So if they are standing, you want to make a flank move against them...in this case you don't need to get to the front as quickly as possible...you actually get the Natives quicker by moving around the flank of their resistance.
Clair
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Post by bc on Dec 4, 2007 13:58:20 GMT -6
bc-- You may want to consider this: Reno reached the head of the column and shortly after, Cooke gave him an order from Custer: “General Custer directs you to take as rapid a gait as you think prudent and charge the village afterwards, and you will be supported by the whole outfit.” [561] • Reno was asked a question about this support. “From the manner I received the order I could not conceive of any other manner of being supported except from the rear.” [579] • “… n my opinion there was no other way to support me.” [584]
I have considered that. That is his testimony at the RCOI reflecting his impressions before the battle. I was just adding additional facts to the debate with his report of 7-5-76. But is Reno's testimony at the RCOI on that realistic considering the fact that he knew also that Benteen was headed south to the boondocks and Custer's column was diverging away from him to the north and east. How could Reno think the support would be coming from his rear on the 25th when he knew that Custer was not riding behind him in Reno's track but going off on his own away from Reno? Benteen was technically in Reno's rear but was he realistically available to come up and support Reno from the rear? I know Reno states at the RCOI there was no other way for support except from the rear but his letter/report of July 5, 1876 sure indicates very quick that he identified another way of support when following Custer's trail. I guess I will have to dig around, look at Girard's message and actions, other messengers, and other stuff to see if something else suggests that Reno knew or thought Custer was somewhere other than behind him.
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Post by bc on Dec 4, 2007 14:23:36 GMT -6
bc-- You may also want to consider the fact that Benteen said he felt Custer never went to the ford and you also may want to consider the fact there were people who broke down the battalion make-up. Keogh: C, I, and L; Yates: E and F. That may put Benteen in direct conflict with Reno's report of 7-5-76 regarding Custer going to the ford at a charge. But then was Benteen, or Reno for that matter, talking about Custer, in person, going to the ford or just his troops? That begs another question, is Benteen and Reno talking about the same ford. I believe there is evidence Benteen was at ford B after the battle because of his description of it but this map he drew identifying 30 bodies close to ford D indicates that Benteen could be also talking about ford D. Or was Benteen just saying that Custer just never reached the water? If Benteen was saying he felt no troops at all went to the ford (B) then there is too much other evidence to the contrary so his thought wasn't correct but still in conflict with Reno. They surely rode the same ground on the 27th. Harps, (thank you very much) told me about Benteen's map in Graham's notes/book that reflect about 30 bodies well north of deep ravine. But then this is another controversy as none of the burial details discuss it and apparently there are not 30 bodies unaccounted for. This is probably the wrong thread to get into that here.
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Post by erkki on Dec 4, 2007 14:57:43 GMT -6
Elizabeth Custer: "The general planned every military action with so much secrecy that we were left to divine as best we could what certain preliminary movements meant." (Keegan, Book of War 1999::225).
SGT Culbertson: "I heard Captain Weir ask Captain Moylan, when he was adjutant, whether General Custer ever gave him any particular orders about doing anything. Whether we were to go here or there. Captain Moylan said 'no,' that when he was adjutant General Custer never told him what he was going to do, he would order him to tell the company commanders to go to such and such a place and that was all." (RCOI 1996:379)
Jacob Horner: "He was a daredevil. He wouldn't send a man where he himself wouldn't go.... He changed his mind too often. He was always right. He never conferred enough with his officers. When he got a notion, we had to go. He wouldn't listen to the other officers." ("Jacob Horner of the 7th Cavalry." North Dakota History 16.2 (1949):99)
GAC: "I am not impetuous or impulsive. I resent that. Everything that I have ever done has been the result of the study that I have made of imaginary military situations that might arise. When I became engaged in campaign or battle and a great emergency arose, everything that I had ever read or studied focussed in my mind as if the situation were under a magnifying glass and my decision was the instanteous result. My mind worked instantaneously, but always as the result of everything that I had ever studied being brought to bear on the situation." Quoted in Connell: 1984:35.
Napoleon : "No rule of war is so absolute as to allow no exceptions." "Unhappy the general who comes on the field of battle with a system." "To be defeated is pardonable; to be surprised, never"
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Post by fred on Dec 5, 2007 20:00:58 GMT -6
bc--
In Reno's testimony at the RCOI, he mentioned he expected Custer to support him. He expected that support to be from the rear. He did not know, when he started down the valley, that Custer was not going to support him from that direction.
Some at the RCOI were asked if Custer's move around the flanks was considered supporting Reno, and if I am not mistaken (without having to delve through my notes!), some said yes, others were not so sure. Regardless, if we were to believe Reno (and Wallace)-- and I do-- the expected support was clearly to come from behind, not up into the hills and around.
The business with Benteen vs Reno/Ford B is tricky. Very little in the way of ammo casings was found there, either then or subsequently. But that really means very little. It was a major crossing point for the Indians, both to the battle and from. Whatever was deposited there from Company E, was quite possibly obliterated that same day, and whatever the Indians' ponies didn't stamp on had to be wiped out by a century of rain and snow. Besides, to my way of thinking, there was precious little action there to begin with.
The fact remains, that only one body was found anywhere near Ford B (though one trooper was found in the village) and he was attached to HQ, and was missed by most post-battle observers (Trumpeter Dose). Foley was found farther up the coulee system and could very easily have tried to bolt the C Company mayhem. Butler was found on the ridges between MTC and Deep Coulee, and it is thought-- through Indian testimony-- that he tried to get away, but was nailed where they found him. Since no other HQ personnel were found anywhere but the Last Stand Hill/SSL/Deep Ravine environs, and an escape from that hell to as far away as Dose was found seems like utter fancy, it leads me to believe Custer was close to Ford B.
And... our good buddy, "erkki," has been kind enough to post the best stuff of all. Custer would have been there, not sitting back on his haunches some place.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by mwkeogh on Dec 5, 2007 20:28:14 GMT -6
bc-- You may want to consider this: Reno reached the head of the column and shortly after, Cooke gave him an order from Custer: “General Custer directs you to take as rapid a gait as you think prudent and charge the village afterwards, and you will be supported by the whole outfit.” [561] • Reno was asked a question about this support. “From the manner I received the order I could not conceive of any other manner of being supported except from the rear.” [579] • “… n my opinion there was no other way to support me.” [584]
I have considered that. That is his testimony at the RCOI reflecting his impressions before the battle. I was just adding additional facts to the debate with his report of 7-5-76. Excellent point you bring out here bc. Those who profess to believe Reno's version of events must choose between which version he gave. Like yourself, I tend to believe his original field report writtten days after the battle, which indicates that he understood that Custer's support was intended to come from a flank attack downriver. Others choose to believe Reno's altered accounts 3 years later at the suspect RCOI, where Reno contradicted his earlier version to insist that Custer could only have supported him from the rear. Each individual will have to make up their own mind as to which Reno report reflected his true feelings and which was a fabrication. I won't argue with you on this one. I think most researchers are fairly comfortable placing more emphasis on accounts made earlier and closer to the event than one made years after, especially when there are heavy consequences to consider.
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Post by gary on Aug 10, 2008 12:32:43 GMT -6
I don't agree with any of these options. I think that GAC had good intentions with regard to supporting Reno, but events and the terrain overtook him.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Aug 10, 2008 17:15:06 GMT -6
Absolutely, Custer had good intentions and wanted to support Reno and do so in a manner that would win the battle and enhance his reputation. There are no mutual exclusives in the assumption that everyone thought he'd support from the rear, as he may have indicated, but was either distracted by Indians seen on the east bank up north, or had seen the village wasn't as near as thought, or had been told by the scouts of the MTC crossing. All that is plausible and no fault attaches to anyone that he rode north until Weir Point. It turned out to be a very bad move, but he had no time to reconoiter after committing three companies.
When he summitted Sharpshooter and/or Weir Point, the true circumstances appeared, and the what and why of his actions from then on is unknown. It was still possible to reunite the command and attack on good cavalry ground, and a good case can be made that, if not 'win', at least retain the services of far more of the 7th than whatever actually occured allowed. But he did not, which was either by choice or command beheading and/or enemy momentum.
That Reno thought something at the time that later facts exposed as unlikely and which changed his mind isn't detrimental to him. He thought he would be supported in an Indian fight, notoriously fast moving and changing affairs, and when nothing happened behind as he initially had thought, and he himself could see small hope of an effective crossing or a crossing at all down stream, after a half hour or more things had apparently changed and not for the good.
Custer made too many assumptions: that he could cross at leisure and location of choice, that Indians would always run, that the 7th was better than it was. Benteen was quite blunt when he saw Reno's men, the size of the village, and the general situation that this was clearly not their day, but the Indians'. Save the majority of the regiment and its stores, Custer had probably been deflected and would ride north to Terry.
Not having benefit of the gooey artistic renderings sometimes considered necessary to reach the desired conclusions these days, they felt no need to risk unnecessary casualties for unknown purpose which, in any case, all information suggested was unlikely to be accomplished. If Custer was mounted, he was moving, and that away from them. If down and surrounded, as proved to be the case, the 7th could not walk in with wounded and packs and join him in what all could see was terrible and indefensible ground far from water (and village). If he couldn't break out and come to them, unencumbered, then obviously they couldn't, with their slow moving charges, break in.
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