Why did Custer turn off Reno's path?

[wild]

Custer was advancing on a broad front.Benteen to some extent was part of this front.
Both sides of the river had to be swept.
The village was a static feature but the Indians were not.There could be a sizeable number of hostiles on the right bank.This possibility had to be covered.
What Custer did not bargain for was the terrain preventing him from getting involved in support of Reno on the left.
What decided Benteen to follow the right hand trail?Gray says Weir followed the left hand trail,the other two troops followed the right hand trail while Benteen took a mid position. Seems Benteen's officers were not certain where the village was either.

[Dark Cloud]

The 'mystery' and the confusion comes from trying to append conversational procedures and terminologies after the fact.

I'm not sure, however technically true, that terms like 'broad front' (how broad is a front of two or four columns, however deep? Is another two column formation five miles away sufficient to consider the land between part of a 'front?'), 'swept', 'static feature' (and no, the village wasn't, given it could move quick; a static feature might be, oh, Weir Point) and such do nothing but cloud the actualities, which can be stated more accurately in less dramatic terms. Said terms that have the additional deleterious feature of not being particularly relevant to Indian fighting.

There could have been no detailed plan till the land was known, an epiphany that came somewhat late in the game for both Reno and Custer. That's why it is irritating that Benteen, the only officer who didn't order moves till he knew against whom on ground he'd seen and evaluated atop estimates of what his own forces were potentially capable, only of late has received broad credit for acting like a responsible officer. And, therefore, a successful one.

Of course, that is the exact point the Custerphiles hate: of the three top officers only Custer, exhibiting the traits adored by perpetual adolescents, failed.

But those traits, present from the beginning in him, would almost mathematically eventually produce this result. It was based upon image making, something of which the Confederacy was aware and would react to. The Indians didn't care if the attacker was Genghis Khan or F troop, they weren't given to awe about individuals they didn't know, and viewed combat as opportunity to display bravery, a goal in itself.

If perchance CH or SB had actual ex Confederate officers in camp advising, and they themselves had authority to command as some might suggest, they would likely have lost reacting to and overthinking the man behind the image rather than the reality before them.

A great deal of Custerland is devoted to re-installing the image and pretending there was reaction to it, as if it were a CW battle, so the terms can be discussed - often to deflect from substance - and the battle can serve as a tool for current needs.

[wild]

Front:- An area over which you can exert influence.Let's say rifle range 300 yards so The front formed by Custer and Reno extended for 1200 yards.This is linear it would also have debth and of course if we are talking visual than you can treble those figures.

The village was static in the same way as your Benteen was mobile.But for the purpose of the exercise it was static.

can be stated more accurately in less dramatic terms. Said terms that have the additional deleterious feature of not being particularly relevant to Indian fighting.
The gunfire had a deleterious effect on the troops.Agreed much less dramatic.Less gunnery sergeant more Jane Austen.


.

[crzhrs]

Girard told Cooke the Indians were not running but coming out to meet Reno.

Reno sent two messengers to Custer telling him the same thing.

It's possible Custer changed his mind about "supporting" Reno and continued down river to possibly hit the "vacant" camp of warriors and taking it along with non-coms.

If so, Custer's failure to inform Reno (unless anyone believes Goldin!) was catastrophic

[fred]

Mar 11, 2011 10:39:49 GMT -6 Dark Cloud said:

There could have been no detailed plan till the land was known, an epiphany that came somewhat late in the game for both Reno and Custer.

Precisely! Precisely, precisely! We may differ, however, in the full extent, i. e., Ford D, but militarily or civilian-wise, I believe you are 100% correct. You can lay the groundwork, but until the full extent is known, any "plan" up to then has to be guesswork, nothing else, and greatly subject to change.

I am not sure, however, that Reno even knew the full lay of the land... never got the chance. He stopped early because there was a ravine with Indians in his way. From there he sought to advance, but was stymied because he was overwhelmed. The timber was not a lot different and he never got to fully understand it because he was being overrun there as well.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[benteen]

Mar 11, 2011 14:22:31 GMT -6 fred said:

[quote author=darkcloud board=theories thread=2888 post=71653 time=1299861589

I am not sure, however, that Reno even knew the full lay of the land... never got the chance. He stopped early because there was a ravine with Indians in his way. From there he sought to advance, but was stymied because he was overwhelmed. The timber was not a lot different and he never got to fully understand it because he was being overrun there as well.

Best wishes,
Fred.

Fred,

Perfect Capt. I wish I could do that copy and paste thing so I could display this post every time (weekly) that I get the Reno was drunk scenario <G>

Be Well
Dan

[fred]

Mar 11, 2011 6:59:20 GMT -6 AZ Ranger said:

I believe that Custer knew his troops were not in supporting distance of each other but he didn't think it mattered which is different then stating "but he didn't know that".

Steve,

I think your supposition here is correct, but only after Custer decided to move toward Ford B. Up until then, he may have believed he and Reno were mutually supportable, but when he learned Reno had pulled out, that changed everything. I think he may have then reasoned he was gambling with his own money. From that point on-- his move farther north-- he was on his own hook and it made Benteen's arrival that much more important.

That may not have concerned him because he may have counted on the Indians chasing Reno and not of Reno interjecting himself between Custer and Benteen. That changed everything. I cannot fathom why he would have continued north if he knew that possibility existed.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[Dark Cloud]

1. They were driven there.

2. Or, Custer or A Custer was wounded and they wanted to get back and away.

3. It's worth looking at the old photos again and seeing how unlush that land generally was and how much more like a dry prairie and high desert it resembled, because that's what it was.

Swaths of dust, near sand, in photos till well into the 1900's. Herds of bison and game chomped it low and the ponies did a good job. Any imagining of the dust level based upon today's field would be very wrong. This was thick, choking dust, plus black powder smoke, plus camp smoke, and I don't think they could see far at all, neither into the village or beyond, or back on their own trail pining for Benteen.

The land is deceptive NOW on a good day. Through curtains of dust and smoke resolution does not improve, and they may or may not have had an idea beyond 'away' once they started moving. It strikes me that Keogh's and Yates group couldn't see each other well or maybe at all if one was down by the river and the other at Calhoun with a huge fight going on with horses running around.

Remember how the average high school football fields looked back in the day towards the end of the season? Dirt. Now dry it all out and play a game with rising heat. Now polo. It's not hard to imagine.

[tel]

Mar 11, 2011 7:20:52 GMT -6 AZ Ranger said:

"Custer's tactical disposition was faulty " If a "tactic" is the only way thought of to do something and the alternative is an emergency is it tactical? I am thinking that Custer's disposition is faulty for many reasons and there was no tactical planning because of it.

AZ Ranger

I was fortunate some years back to do a complete tour of the battlefield including the crows nest (or at least where we believe the Crows nest to be). The guide who gave us the tour had connections and we were allowed to traverse areas that were on private land. It took several days and was quite inclusive. So perhaps I have had the luck to have had access to areas that other have not. This was in the 1990's and the guide is no longer in business and may have passed on. Not sure of that.

As to the rest, like many here, I have read widely on Custer including historical documents and because I have an inquiring mind, I have drawn certain conclusions.
I believe they have value but recognize others might not feel the same. That is okay. I feel no need to justify myself. I thoroughly enjoy the perspectives of others.

I mean no disrespect.

[fred]

Mar 11, 2011 14:54:12 GMT -6 benteen said:

I wish I could do that copy and paste thing so I could display this post every time (weekly) that I get the Reno was drunk scenario <G>

Dan,

Just "hi-lite" what you want to copy-and-paste or cut-and-paste. Then go up to edit and choose your option, cut or copy. If you want to hi-lite or quote areas on these boards, simply type in the word "quote" and surround it with brackets. At the end, type in /quote and surround it with brackets. It's the same when you hi-lite a word and click on the bold or italics button above.

Whenever you hi-lite something and copy or cut it your computer will remember that hi-lited word or phrase until you do it with another.

Hope you are doing well my friend. Hope to see you again soon.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[wild]

Place Custer with 200+ men somewhere near MTF.
Tell him he has blundered.
Tell him there are somewhere near 2000 warriors within 3 minutes of his force.
Tell him there is no chance of an unopposed crossing of the river.Tell him Reno is defeated.
Tell him Benteen will scoff if he retreats.
Tell him he will be a social outcast if he is defeated.
Tell him he has 70 minutes to retrieve the situation.

Let's return after 70 minutes and examine Custer's test paper.
He has written one line --Benteen come onThen there is nothing more than a grubby stain.
A death wish?He was incapacitated by death?He had a mental break down?
Let's be charitable and mark his paper "Room to improve"

[montrose]

1. I believe Custer was prepared for an outlying village on Ash Creek after crossing the divide.

a. Indian tendency. Plains Indians had a tendency for outlying villages, as shown in the last three decades. It was very difficult to keep and maintain a large central village. Water, fuel, grazing, latrine and other logistical factors means that such a large village could only be sustained for a brief period of time.

The Washita battle was against an outlying camp from the main village area.

Of course, the reason for a centralized village was for defense from US attacks. The tight concentration of the Indian villages was a tactical surprise for US forces in 1876.

b. Custer's tactics. Custer's advance down Ash Creek show that he was ready to find an outlier village on his approach march. He bracketed Ash Creek with Reno and one battalion on the left and himself with two battalions on the right.

Benteen's movement is a clear indicator that Custer was concerned about Ash Creek and its' tributaries. Benteen was in position to see and fight Indians in the south fork of Ash Creek.

His scout was 10 miles from the LBH valley. I have always had trouble figuring out why Custer launched an entire Bn on this task. The fastest way to the LBH valley is to follow Ash Creek. The terrain is very rugged, and it is difficult to imagine how much data he would get on Indians in the LBH valley.

But the move makes a lot more sense if he was protecting the advance down the creek. Especially if Custer suspected an enemy village near the south branch juncture.

c. Intelligence. The regiment had seen signs that the Indian force was growing. Converging trails had been seen. The summer roamers were following their usual pattern, in addition to an unusual surge of warriors leaving the reservation. From the Crow's Nest the scouts had already seen signs of scattered Indians far from the main village. So there were indicators that made an outlier village a possibility.

2. Adjusted plan. The best site for a village from the divide to the LBH was where the south fork joined. It had been used shortly before the 25th. This area is where the lone tepee was found, and contains Gerard's knoll.

Upon reaching the possible village site, Custer adjusted his orders. The next likely village site would be in the LBH valley, on the west bank.

a. Changing intelligence. Custer now had reports of a small band of 30-40 Indians fleeing ahead of US forces at the lower end of Ash Creek. These Indians crossed at Ford A and headed downstream. Varnum said the village was out of site, but the LBH valley was full of Indians. Both terrain and enemy activity pointed to a village downstream from Ford A.

b. Cooke delivered Custer's order to Reno. Cooke stated that the village was two miles ahead, and running away. Now, at this point, Reno is 1.7 miles from the river. So Custer thought the village was much closer than it was.

c. Custer moved parallel to Reno as both forces followed Ash Creek to LBH. Near where the north fork joined Ash Creek, Custer diverged from Reno and went up the bluffs.

I assume Custer realized by this point that the village was not .3 miles from Ford A. He saw no reason to adjust Reno's orders. Reno was to cross and attack anything he found downstream.

3. Support. Moving to the bluffs meant Custer would not be able to support Reno. Custer had a good eye for terrain, and he would know this.

a. The bluffs were not suitable for a village, so he was not hunting a viilage.

b. The move was not to protect Reno's right flank. The bluffs and river protected his flank, and there was no significant Indian force east of the river.

c. What makes sense is that Custer expected a ford downstream. His scouts likely told him there were fords downstream. Otherwise, Custer's move appears irrational.

d. I believe Custer made two errors here. First he expected the village to be closer to Ford A than it was. Second, he assumed the Ford B area was on the far side of the village, and I assume he thought it was closer than it actually was.

e. Support gap. Custer's move does not mean he had no intention of supporting Reno. It means he created a gap in time and space where he could not support Reno, with the intention of closing that gap upon reaching Ford B.

f. 3411. When he got to 3411 he finally knew where the village was. He could see Reno and the Indians massing against him. He could see the Ford B area, and I mean the stretch from Thompson's ford to MTC. He may not know the exact depth and bank heights over the entire stretch, but it should have been readily apparent that he could ford in that area. Custer changed his plan again, but that belongs in a different thread.

Respectfully,

Montrose

[wild]

Montrose
Again nicely argued

Custer diverged from Reno and went up the bluffs
You don't tell us why.But maybe I'm being pedantic so I'll accept that his intention is to attack across the river.
His attack is not coordinated with Reno's.So two seperate attacks will go in.Resulting in both attacks being under strenght.
Custer is not attacking a flank.A flank is the vulnerable extreme of "European"armies.Indian forces have no formations or command and control thingies so no flanks.
Custer's attack is dependent on the location of a suitable ford.A ford in the middle of the village will not allow for an unopposed crossing.And can I add that the crossing point needs to be clear of the bluffs.You also have Custer intending to attack into a now alert village.
So we have a weakened force,an alert village and a dubious ford.To say nothing of the overwhelming numbers
Any one of these factors could derail Custers plans.

What makes sense is that Custer expected a ford downstream. Otherwise, Custer's move appears irrational.

With respect.
I contend that an advance along the right bank was tactically sound.
Your position is that unless he attacks across the river an advance along the right bank is irrational.
How can we reconcile these two positions?

and there was no significant Indian force east of the river.
The bluffs were not suitable for a village, so he was not hunting a viilage
If Custer wants to attack another point of the village everything would favour an attack from the left.That is moving out beyond Reno's left flank.This would pin the Indians against the river and cut off their escape.All 8 troops going in at the same time.A coordinated joint surprise attack.Might have stood a chance.
There had to be another reason why he choose the right bank.
I think that because he was in doubt as to the disposition of the village he had to cover the right bank.

[Dark Cloud]

See, this is what rather amuses me. I don't mean that condescendingly, but it inevitably will seem to be so. You'll have to take my word I do not mean it as such, but I wanted to address that up front.

Near everyone agrees that it makes no - zero - sense for Custer to end up where he did, and only marginal sense for him to move north on high and bad ground east of a river and his target to find and utilize a notional ford to attack. Of course, once elevation - even before Weir Point but certainly by there - was attained he, and we, are forced to admit that the concept of 'support' for Reno is a ship that has sailed and, in fact, has rounded the Horn and is taking water off Coronel.

Without stropping Occam's razor, isn't the easiest, most plausible scenario is that he was driven from there against intent and will?

This is halted by the descent of fists on the table saying 'aha!' because there is no evidence for a sizable or sufficient Indian presence to deter 5 companies. So, now furiously stropping that razor, what could possibly occur that might, within Custer's command, set in motion a jaunt northwest and north that would override other issues and result in the field as found?

Montrose,

"Custer's tactics. Custer's advance down Ash Creek show that he was ready to find an outlier village on his approach march. He bracketed Ash Creek with Reno and one battalion on the left and himself with two battalions on the right."

Ash Creek is pretty visible from the CN, and the scouts saw the white lodge (s) from there. Five lodges, say, aren't really a village or a concern.

"Benteen's movement is a clear indicator that Custer was concerned about Ash Creek and its' tributaries. Benteen was in position to see and fight Indians in the south fork of Ash Creek."

This assumes he, Custer, was aware of a 'south fork' and that it would appear about where the one/two lodges were. There is no indication he was so aware. If he'd been told that, and realized where it attached to Ash Creek, he'd have also been told that there was zero chance for a village within those crevasses to the south, given the impracticality and danger and there would be no reason to put one there with huge water and grass and ease a few miles west. Benteen's scout is, I susggest, mere testament to Custer's ignorance of the land.

I also suspect this is an example of how word use distorts unintentionally.

"Fork" is often used to reference a diversion of tributaries from rivers. While legally true that Ash Creek has tributaries, the same term 'fork' suggests a substance that these runoff gullies don't have. It implies Ash Creek itself is more than it is. It was such a nonentity they had to water at the bog. Reading about following a fork in a water feature sounds more sane than the reality: following a dry, seasonal runoff bed in ridiculously narrow and high gullies into a somewhat larger dry, seasonal, runoff bed.

The average reader rationally assumes a certain relativity if the term is used between a fork of Ash Creek and a fork of the Yosemite. It's my same beef with the term 'village.' Villages, when attacked, did certain things - run, for example - always. But big villages didn't because they couldn't, and this for the same reason concepts like flank and other military appellations make no sense to apply to them: they had no command structure and no social institutions that allowed one. Entities with flanks have a command system that could react to an attack on one, a central nervous system as it were. The tribes didn't have one.

I've noticed of late that people are qualifying the description of the encampment with terms like 'circles' and 'families' to accept that it wasn't really a cohesive single village and very large. Fine. But the contemporary remarks of the vets use 'village,' and that's the term and false image that they and the Army and media as a whole used and suffered for. For us to start using the terms of circle and family to show our PC knowledge removes us from the mindset of the then contemporary army.

I don't recall reading an Indian flank was aligned along the fork of Ash Creek, but someday we surely will.

fred,

Got your PM, and it was most kind.

[montrose]

Darkcloud,

I don't see us in disagreement.

My visit to the Crow's Nest was 20 years ago, and is hazy. I remember seeing a series of ridges, which masked a significant area of low ground. The significance of Ash creek and tributaries is that the valleys could contain Indian forces masked by the surrounding ridges.

I thought the lone tepee area was not visible from the Crow's Nest, but I could be wrong. I looked at Custer's actions; and he seems to be preparing for action on the upper end of Ash creek.

We talk about Custer's haste this day. Haste could also mean he was misreading intelligence indicators to think Indians were closer than they were. He was interpreting what he wanted to see, vice what he actually saw.

Let us look at three possible Indian village locations: Lone Tepee, Ford A, and Ford B.

Lone Tepee. Custer had Benteen in position to sweep north up the south fork into the village, blocking any enemy retret south in the process. He had Reno and his own column bracketing the village with easy access across the creek bed. He would have 11 companies in or near the battle.

Ford A area. Benteen had been left behind. Custer now had 8 companies for a fight here. The problem is that outlier villages were less likely in LBH, he should expect to see larger bodies of Indians. I think he expected the various villages to be spread out more than they were in the LBH valley.

So as he closed in on the Indian main bdsy, he was on a path that led him into larger and larger enemy forces, while he kept advancing with smaller and smaller forces.

The decision to split off from Reno is difficult to understand. He must have assumed that there was a ford close by that would put him on the other side ofan Indian village. He may have expected several villages spread far out, and was hoping to cut off and destroy the southernmost village.

His judgment was poor, with haste ahead of logic. If you don't know, scout. Recall Benteen to the Ford A area as a reserve, put Reno across to hold a bridgehead. Sent scouts up the bluffs for a look.

Fifteen minutes could save you a lot more than $500.

Ford B. Custer's plans were OBE (overcome by events) when he saw the actual village location. Reno was isolated in the valley. Benteen was back down his trail, Custer had badly outrun the trains. The tactical situation demanded a consolidation and a new plan. For whatever reason, CUster decided to keep going with only his five companies.

Now let's talk flanks. Custer likely believed he was operating on the flanks and rear of the Indians. As you pointed out, the Indians did not think like that. When Custer became the closest US force to the village, he became the Indians front.

Custer's movements along Battle Ridge were across the Indians front. This means Custer was the one with an exposed flank, not the Indians.

The center of gravity of this battle became the Keough Bn against the Indian main body. The Indians recognized this, Custer did not. The Indian victory here doomed the troops north of Calhoun Hill. It also blocked any counterattack from Weir Peak. Reno would have to attack uphill against vastly superior forces.

Tel raised a point about the need for speed to attack the Indians. The quickest way to attack the Indians was to cross at Ford A and send all 8 companies down the valley.

Wild raises a point that Reno needed support on his left. Custer had not given Reno enough companies to control the valley.

Custer had weighted his right all the way from the Crow's Nest. It appears he was thinking a right flanking attack all the way down the creek, no matter what the terrain and enemy activity revealed. He is like the famous boxer Glass Joe from some old video game that only had one punch, a right hook.

So when the situation changed indicating he should move his main force to Reno's left; he didn't pay attention. He kept trying to wedge in a right attack, even when it was clearly inappropriate. I have been an evaluator for numerous exercises. I have seen tired commanders fall into this same error. When they are tired they stick with a template of what they want to do, even if circumstances change. Makes you wonder; he wasn't 23 anymore.