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Post by montrose on Mar 13, 2011 12:36:06 GMT -6
Darkcloud,
I don't see us in disagreement.
My visit to the Crow's Nest was 20 years ago, and is hazy. I remember seeing a series of ridges, which masked a significant area of low ground. The significance of Ash creek and tributaries is that the valleys could contain Indian forces masked by the surrounding ridges.
I thought the lone tepee area was not visible from the Crow's Nest, but I could be wrong. I looked at Custer's actions; and he seems to be preparing for action on the upper end of Ash creek.
We talk about Custer's haste this day. Haste could also mean he was misreading intelligence indicators to think Indians were closer than they were. He was interpreting what he wanted to see, vice what he actually saw.
Let us look at three possible Indian village locations: Lone Tepee, Ford A, and Ford B.
Lone Tepee. Custer had Benteen in position to sweep north up the south fork into the village, blocking any enemy retret south in the process. He had Reno and his own column bracketing the village with easy access across the creek bed. He would have 11 companies in or near the battle.
Ford A area. Benteen had been left behind. Custer now had 8 companies for a fight here. The problem is that outlier villages were less likely in LBH, he should expect to see larger bodies of Indians. I think he expected the various villages to be spread out more than they were in the LBH valley.
So as he closed in on the Indian main bdsy, he was on a path that led him into larger and larger enemy forces, while he kept advancing with smaller and smaller forces.
The decision to split off from Reno is difficult to understand. He must have assumed that there was a ford close by that would put him on the other side ofan Indian village. He may have expected several villages spread far out, and was hoping to cut off and destroy the southernmost village.
His judgment was poor, with haste ahead of logic. If you don't know, scout. Recall Benteen to the Ford A area as a reserve, put Reno across to hold a bridgehead. Sent scouts up the bluffs for a look.
Fifteen minutes could save you a lot more than $500.
Ford B. Custer's plans were OBE (overcome by events) when he saw the actual village location. Reno was isolated in the valley. Benteen was back down his trail, Custer had badly outrun the trains. The tactical situation demanded a consolidation and a new plan. For whatever reason, CUster decided to keep going with only his five companies.
Now let's talk flanks. Custer likely believed he was operating on the flanks and rear of the Indians. As you pointed out, the Indians did not think like that. When Custer became the closest US force to the village, he became the Indians front.
Custer's movements along Battle Ridge were across the Indians front. This means Custer was the one with an exposed flank, not the Indians.
The center of gravity of this battle became the Keough Bn against the Indian main body. The Indians recognized this, Custer did not. The Indian victory here doomed the troops north of Calhoun Hill. It also blocked any counterattack from Weir Peak. Reno would have to attack uphill against vastly superior forces.
Tel raised a point about the need for speed to attack the Indians. The quickest way to attack the Indians was to cross at Ford A and send all 8 companies down the valley.
Wild raises a point that Reno needed support on his left. Custer had not given Reno enough companies to control the valley.
Custer had weighted his right all the way from the Crow's Nest. It appears he was thinking a right flanking attack all the way down the creek, no matter what the terrain and enemy activity revealed. He is like the famous boxer Glass Joe from some old video game that only had one punch, a right hook.
So when the situation changed indicating he should move his main force to Reno's left; he didn't pay attention. He kept trying to wedge in a right attack, even when it was clearly inappropriate. I have been an evaluator for numerous exercises. I have seen tired commanders fall into this same error. When they are tired they stick with a template of what they want to do, even if circumstances change. Makes you wonder; he wasn't 23 anymore.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Mar 13, 2011 15:05:26 GMT -6
I don't necessarily see us in disagreement, and in any case I have no particular argument.
"Let us look at three possible Indian village locations: Lone Tepee, Ford A, and Ford B.
Lone Tepee. Custer had Benteen in position to sweep north up the south fork into the village, blocking any enemy retret south in the process. He had Reno and his own column bracketing the village with easy access across the creek bed. He would have 11 companies in or near the battle."
Well, that's my issue. How could Custer have deliberately put Benteen in position to sweep north up south fork, given he could have no clue when Benteen's mission would be designated over or completed and where? He twice sent messengers saying keep going as he travelled down Ash Creek which doesn't suggest he had much of a clue.
Custer could not have assumed Benteen would hit South Fork and ride to Ash Creek, because Benteen could become engaged somewhere along the line and Custer could not know of South Fork's existence. If he HAD known of it's existence, he'd know something about the land he'd sent Benteen to cover, which would preclude such a move.
"For whatever reason, CUster decided to keep going with only his five companies."
I have a hard time with that. I think more highly of him. If Fred would repost that high res photo of the view from WP north that shows the land's many, many surprises (there are many more NOT visible, as it happens) I can buy he attempted something at Ford B or was attacked while adjusting saddles and with a key member wounded, they retreated in some disorder with growing desperation and staked out delaying action firing lines in two roughly parallel group moves to LSH.
The Japanese enshrined that syndrome of plodding ahead with a clearly OBE plan. I hope that's gone today, and all power to them for undergoing what must be a horror beyond measure. A significant portion of their nation is destroyed, far more than our 9-11 or Katrina, and the nuclear aspect is pretty terrifying. They're a major industrial power, and how they do affects everyone around the globe in both quick and lasting ways.
Small panic, no looting, on the job. May it be their finest hour, because it has to be, and shame the rest of us for our whining.
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Post by wild on Mar 13, 2011 18:13:57 GMT -6
Custer had weighted his right all the way from the Crow's Nest. It appears he was thinking a right flanking attack all the way down the creek, no matter what the terrain and enemy activity revealed. He is like the famous boxer Glass Joe from some old video game that only had one punch, a right hook. Not until you illiminate the simplist reasons can you move on to examine more complex reasons for Custer's move down the right bank.A right flanking attack is a complex action and the chances of it succeeding are slim if it is attempted via a river ford. A right flanking attack is suggested by most contributers but Custer never shaped to attack thus.
The center of gravity of this battle became the Keough Bn against the Indian main body. The Indians recognized this, Custer did not. The Indian victory here doomed the troops north of Calhoun Hill. It also blocked any counterattack from Weir Peak. Reno would have to attack uphill against vastly superior forces. Custer in his excurshion North was never beyond 3 minutes of being outnumbered 10 to one. I suggest he was attacked soon after Martin left ,forced further North and trapped on Battle ridge and destroyed in a matter of minutes.
The Japanese tragedy is dreadful. In many tragedies such as this, shoddy building and design and faults in seaward defences are shown up.Is it too early to ask why nuclear power stations were built on active geographical faults.Could we be facing a dozen chernobyl?
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tel
New Member
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Post by tel on Mar 14, 2011 19:27:01 GMT -6
Custer had a reputation of not taking care of his men. He took care of his favorites whom he crowded into "his" battalion (Companies C,E,F,I,L). I just don't buy that he really was thinking of Reno or Benteen except to reinforce his right hook. Had Benteen made it, I believe an additional 120-130 bodies would have been found on with Custer.
Benteen. Come on. Big village. Be quick, bring packs. W. W. Cooke. (P. S. Bring pac-s)
Benteen went right to where he was needed most and that was to reinforce Reno. It may not have been his plan and it certainly was not Reno's intention to end up on a hill surrounded by Indians. But for any of the 7th to have survived, the way it ended up was best given the circumstances.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Mar 14, 2011 20:14:48 GMT -6
Mentioned on the other board and I cannot currently find it, but:
In the RCOI, Martin recalled that Cooke told him him to deliver the message to Benteen and stay with him but come back to Custer if there was no danger and he was able to do so, otherwise stay with his company. That doesn't sound as if Cooke or Custer was under the impression Benteen was to zoot to Custer with no discretion or bow to realities.
If the baseline for consideration was what became known when Benteen arrived on Reno Hill, I think you're correct and it very much turned out the best of all realistic possibilities. It surely could have been worse, easy enough.
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Post by benteen on Mar 14, 2011 20:32:01 GMT -6
Custer had a reputation of not taking care of his men. He took care of his favorites whom he crowded into "his" battalion (Companies C,E,F,I,L). I just don't buy that he really was thinking of Reno or Benteen except to reinforce his right hook. Had Benteen made it, I believe an additional 120-130 bodies would have been found on with Custer. Benteen. Come on. Big village. Be quick, bring packs. W. W. Cooke. (P. S. Bring pac-s) Benteen went right to where he was needed most and that was to reinforce Reno. It may not have been his plan and it certainly was not Reno's intention to end up on a hill surrounded by Indians. But for any of the 7th to have survived, the way it ended up was best given the circumstances. Tel, I couldn't agree with you more. Everything you have said in my opinion is right on target. I just don't know how to say it as well as you did Be Well Dan
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Post by wild on Mar 15, 2011 2:22:28 GMT -6
When the note was written there was for all practical purposes only one action.Custer and Reno were acting together.There is only one location to head for. The battalions split apart presenting Benteen with a practical dilemma. Standing orders obliged him to report his command to Custer but changed circumstances made this impractical.
Tel Benteen went right to where he was needed most and that was to reinforce Reno. It may not have been his plan and it certainly was not Reno's intention to end up on a hill surrounded by Indians. But for any of the 7th to have survived, the way it ended up was best given the circumstances This judgement is made with the benifit of hindsight. So if you employ hindsight I'm sure you will allow me a little shudda cudda wodda. Benteen should have gone to Custer,This could have allowed Custer a chance of escape and would have saved far more of the regiment than were saved.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Mar 15, 2011 2:38:54 GMT -6
No, Wild. When the note was written, Reno was in combat and Custer was behind Weir Point, a mile or more away and uphill as the crow glides, but around five miles as a horse travels. Reno certainly wished Custer was doing something, and in Custer's heart he may have so intended, but they were not, and could not, act together in an Afternoon Activity. The Great Camp Counselor in the Sky had a Free Swim for Reno followed by sprints and Custer was scheduled elsewhere. Again, as Cooke's aside to Martini shows from the RCOI, Custer was not intending Benteen to come to him exclusive of reason.
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Post by wild on Mar 15, 2011 10:09:13 GMT -6
Hi DC I'm doing my darndest to rehabilitate Benteen and there you go ruining it for both of us. My Touring the Battle Field technicolour map shows Weir point opposite Reno's skirmish line.There is one fight going on and Custer is obliged to come to Reno's support.We know how far Custer was from Reno when the message was written but Custer did not other than by crow..If it is Custer's intention to assist Reno then there is but one engagement and thus Benteen does not need a destination because the command is not split.The split comes only when Custer turns away from MTF.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Mar 15, 2011 10:35:54 GMT -6
He doesn't need your rehab, Wild. He did nothing wrong whatever. In any case, he's not under attack here, although for a few years you've been accusing him, on this board and elsewhere, of being negligent at best. Now, for conversational value, you try to use him as an excuse for your misstating the situation while still claiming he should have gone to Custer, for which now or then there is no evidence he should have.
This is what I mean when I say these guys deserve better.
It's also silly to say the division in space and time between Custer and Reno does not constitute a split. Again, I direct your attention to Cooke's directions to Martini at the RCOI. That's a pretty illustrative statement of how Regimental Command viewed the situation and the possible adjusted situation that Martini and Benteen might find when they got up, and it doesn't support any of the more asinine Custerphile theories whatever.
Also, along with the utterly forced and fake use of 'Aye', now they break out reference to soldiers as 'chaps.' If there was a Smiley symbol for affected British lisp, it should attach to conz and keogh's posts. Or, better, Smilies for Chickenhawk, Miniver Cheevie, or Grown Man in Costume and Adjacent Reality.
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Post by wild on Mar 15, 2011 15:53:37 GMT -6
Hi DC
It's also silly to say the division in space and time between Custer and Reno does not constitute a split. Custer and Reno were acting in concert As per I will support you.We must allow Custer to decide the time and space in which he can support Reno.Taking Custer at his word there was no intended operational split between the units.
When the message was written Cooke saw the action as one engagement.If he saw it as two then your time and space factors kick in and we torment ourselves in trying to decipher his dispatch.
If you see an intended split then you must provide some reason for Custer's apparent avoidance of contact with the enemy.
If you see an unintended split then it's first blood to the Indians and the message is written in great haste.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Mar 16, 2011 11:53:32 GMT -6
Wild,
You take leave of sanity and vague up your language to cover it.
"Custer and Reno were acting in concert As per I will support you." Clear intent to support, clear fail to do so.
"We must allow Custer to decide the time and space in which he can support Reno." Right. That's the sort of thing to decide before committing Reno because the enemy can rapidly make the point moot.
"When the message was written Cooke saw the action as one engagement." Whatever that means. There was only one action going on, Reno's, and we don't know what Cooke saw or what Custer thought.
"If you see an intended split then you must provide some reason for Custer's apparent avoidance of contact with the enemy."
No, I do not, and no, Custer was not avoiding the enemy but doing overdue recon and finding a place to achieve contact. In any case, there's no reason to think what you here call an "intended split" was intended to be as long as it became, unavoidably, by terrain.
While only a mile away as the crow flies, he was five by the means of actual support by way of Reno's route once on Weir, with another two to MTC and the river ford, then back south.
"If you see an unintended split then it's first blood to the Indians and the message is written in great haste."
The split was unintended in its duration, first blood had long ago been spilled, and the message was written in haste, given it's repetitive in twelve words and 'packs' is absent a letter.
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jody
Junior Member
Posts: 53
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Post by jody on Mar 16, 2011 14:01:23 GMT -6
I'm confused about the need to scout the valleys and ridges to the south of Reno Creek. The possibility of them containing Indian villages is brought up over and over again on these boards. But there is no comment on them from those at the Crow's Nest. They do mention smoke from the main village rising from behind the bluffs in LBH valley 15 miles away, and specks taken to be white horses on the hills beyond, but no one says anything like, "And we could also see smoke from camps, dust, tepees, and horses between us and the river."
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Post by wild on Mar 16, 2011 17:30:05 GMT -6
Hi DC
"Custer and Reno were acting in concert As per I will support you." Clear intent to support, clear fail to do so. Failure is not the issue intent is. Failure came after the message was written. We take Custer at his word.At the time the message was written he intended to support Reno who as you say was in action.He would cross to Reno's side at the first opportunity.The developing situation would see both units engaged in one action.It is fair to say that Custer never envisaged a split occuring between the two units.When it did it rendered Cooke's message redundant. If Benteen needs no rehab at least we can clear up the confusion regarding the message.
"We must allow Custer to decide the time and space in which he can support Reno." Right. That's the sort of thing to decide before committing Reno because the enemy can rapidly make the point moot. If that was the attitude no plans would be made
"When the message was written Cooke saw the action as one engagement." Whatever that means. Example Reno's 3 troops were engaged in one action not three individual actions.
we don't know what Cooke saw or what Custer thought.I wrote at the outset that I was basing this on what Custer said rather than what he thought.Cooke is just the scribe and wrote what he was told.
"If you see an intended split then you must provide some reason for Custer's apparent avoidance of contact with the enemy." No, I do not, Well I would have hoped you could have helped us understand why he split from Reno.
and no, Custer was not avoiding the enemy but doing overdue recon and finding a place to achieve contact. When I read that word RECONI thought for one awful moment I was replying to Conz.Excuse me for a moment AGHHHHH.Sorry about that.Now where was I? I don't think contact was a problem.
In any case, there's no reason to think what you here call an "intended split" was intended to be as long as it became, unavoidably, by terrain. Agreed
While only a mile away as the crow flies, he was five by the means of actual support by way of Reno's route once on Weir, with another two to MTC and the river ford, then back south . If he knows before the message is written that circumstances will locate him as far North as LSH then the status quo prevails and we curse Cooke.
The split was unintended in its duration, OK
first blood had long ago been spilled, I did no mean literally but rather that a strategic advantage had been gained by the Indians .
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Post by fred on Mar 17, 2011 6:52:40 GMT -6
DC,
Sorry I haven't been on here in a while; been busy as hell and have only just glanced over some of the posts.
It is nice to see friendly disagreements and friendly concords. I noticed "wild's" shot at Conz-- and I totally agree with him. It's enough to drive a crazy man sane.
I also noticed something about a picture-- Weir Point?-- that you mentioned. Am I correct? Let me know what you want to see and I will look around for it.
Hope you're doing well.
Best wishes, Fred.
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