walkingstar
New Member
Life is but a dream...
Posts: 39
|
Post by walkingstar on Aug 10, 2008 17:24:11 GMT -6
I can not but feel that the foremost, critical step in coming to a reasonable conclusion regarding Custer's movement is to disregard anything Reno may have said. After all, Reno testified that he had no "confidence" in Custer as a soldier; grounds for prejudicial testimony at the least.
Also, Reno's his original report filed before the Reno Inquiry(7/5/1876) conflicted with his testimony in numerous areas.
The number one priority fir the military was to find the hostiles and engage them. The ultimate concern was to prevent the escape of the Indians. Not one officer in any command considered the possibility that the Indians would stand.
Obsessed with this compulsion, Custer was frothing at the mouth to round them up. As Fred posted, Cooke's information was recognized as an Indian "rearguard" action being the women and children were escaping north.
|
|
|
Post by Dark Cloud on Aug 11, 2008 7:56:26 GMT -6
Grounds for honest testimony as well, given he didn't have to say it. Reno and Benteen's testimony actually blows the whole conspiracy of melded testimony to shreds, given they both willingly open the door for Lee to talk about any number of issues and enter into extended spates of recall RATHER than the clipped, short, answers of someone trying to hide stuff. Benteen especially seems willing to have talked all day and send out for pizza.
Reno thought Custer was an empty suit of an officer, in which resentment surely was featured. Nonetheless, Reno was hardly the only one with that opinion. Custer had as many enemies as friends in high places. Grant himself had blamed Custer, so it's to be doubted Reno's opinion swayed many minds.
I keep reading about all the supposed 'conflict' in Benteen and Reno's testimony from their early reports to their RCOI testimony. Examples, please. Not summations, but quotes in context. Bear in mind it would be most suspicious if there were not, and that memories do malfunction, and that what they thought at the time might well be different than what they thought later with new info at the RCOI.
Benteen is burdened of late over his thinking Custer was dead when he got the note from Martin, but he's quite clear it's what he thinks now at the RCOI, whereas at the battle he had no reason to think Custer was even in combat. It takes a deceptive framing to construe it as a lie.
AZ may support here (or not) or any professional litigators, but there are boilerplate levels of conflict in testimony, distances and time especially, that are expected and not indicative of dishonesty. (Even with today's extensive prep for testimony, there are still honest conflicts between honest witnesses.) This is neither surprising nor absent from any other such hearings. It would be highly suspicious if these conflicts weren't there.
We KNOW that two honest soldiers in the same foxhole during a battle can recall wildly different events, and the ones they both remember they recall at different times. Half the Titanic survivors didn't notice the rending apart of their ship as it went down on a clear night, while others recalled two sections sinking separately which they sketched out for newspapers. These witnesses included trained observors from the crew, and they don't all agree. If they'd been under fire - it may be the liquor talking here, but.... - it's possible the eyewitness survivor stories would be even more wildly divergent.
|
|
|
Post by AZ Ranger on Aug 12, 2008 9:33:46 GMT -6
I would suspicious if the written report and the testimonies matched perfectly. If they did you would not have the witness testifying from memory except that he memorized his report. The closer to the event the more likely you get the persons view of what they thought at the time if they are honest. Over time and reflection they have built defenses for decisions made under battle stress. Also included in RCOI and even asked for by the recorder is their current thoughts upon what happened. That is much different than what where you thinking in 1876 at LBH. Other than their report it would be hard to remember later exactly what was thought when you made a decision without hindsight creeping in to your thought process. A report should be to refresh your memory not replace it.
An example - A friend dies and you think that recovering something from the body must be done sooner rather than later or it will not be there. That may be an under high stress tunnel vision thought of what needed to be done. Years later you have trouble explaining why that was only thing you thought about at the time during the battle.
If you haven't made some tunnel vision thoughts and actions you have not had enough stress. We train a lot to avoid tunnel vision and the resulting action or inaction but I doubt much was done in training prior to 1876.
AZ Ranger
|
|
|
Post by wild on Mar 9, 2011 17:41:25 GMT -6
With gratitude to Diane for the reprieve.
I posted the following on the other board but it gained no traction or comment. From all I'v read on the subject and from all the board exchanges it seems accepted that Custer divided his attack force. I suggest that he did not, but initiated a concerted attack along both banks.
I think that there was a lenghty debate either on this board or over on the other board regarding the speed of cavalry horses.Well the greatest speed achieved that day was by Reno's command during it's flight from the valley. I'm sure some contributers have experience of the terrain over which Reno led his defeated command.I can only judge it by Google Earth.Sure it has been cleaned up and farmed but is it not the finest terrain for cavalry anywhere on the battle field?Yet Custer passes up the chance to launch an attack with all 8 troops over this ideal approach to the village. Why?I suggest that he was ignorant of the nature of the terrain in front of him,he was ignorant of the position of the village and he was ignorant of the meanderings of the river. What cavalry commander would pass up such an ideal avenue of attack and take his main force into such a nightmare of rough undulating broken terrain with no certainty of even getting across the river? It all points to Custer attacking blindly along both banks in concert with Reno.There was no intended division of the attack force but rather a two pronged attack acting in mutual support. It backfired because Reno struck the entire Indian force while Custer struck air with the terrain and river cutting him off from the discomforted Reno.
Extra
Benteen's orders --oblique left was the price Custer paid for ignorance.Three Troops and his best soldier expended on a useless recce. This oblique left fatigue also demonstrates Custer's lack of intell on the disposition and location of the village.And this lack of intell motivates his advance along both banks.
Why did Custer turn off Reno's path In order to cover the possibility that a substantial portion of the village was located on the East Bank.
Extra extra And having blundered he compounded the blunder by stubbornly refusing to fall back on his supports.
|
|
|
Post by montrose on Mar 10, 2011 11:59:28 GMT -6
Wild,
I will try to answer your post.
1. Restated Theory. Custer's plan from the lone tepee was a two pronged offensive along both banks of river. The two forces were in mutual support to attack village on both or either bank.
2. Situation. At the divide Custer sent Benteen to the left. He then followed Sun Dance Creek with Reno on the left bank and Custer on the right.
At the lone tepee/Gerard's knoll; Custer ordered Reno to attack a fleeing Indian band. The two columns remained parallel for a few miles. In the area where the north fork of the creek joins the main branch the columns diverged. Reno went to and crossed LBH river, and Custer moved to the bluffs.
3. I follow your argument along Sun Dance Creek. But upon reaching the LBH river, the two columns moved out of mutual support range.
At 3411 Custer was not a mile from Reno, the bluffs and river blocked any such approach. He would have to countermarch back to Ford A and swing up the valley to reach Reno. This meant a distance of 5 miles.
From 3411 he could see that the main Indian reaction to Reno was to send a large mounted force past Reno's unsupported, exposed left flank. This force rapidly cut Reno off from Ford A. So if Custer moved to support Reno, he would have to fight a superior force of Indians to get there.
3. Control LBH river. There is some merit into following the LBH along both banks. However, the gap between the river and bluffs means the majority of the regiment should be on the left. A single company is sufficient to control the right bank.
Further north, the terrain could shift, requiring adjusting forces on both banks. I agree that from Gerard's knoll, there was no way to predict with a tactical level of certitude the exact width of the valley at every point downstream, nor the exact location and disposition of enemy forces.
4. Available intelligence. So what did Custer know in the Gerard Knoll area?
a. Gerard. Gerard saw a small band of fleeing Indians. He was very excited, and gave his famous running like devils comment. He did not and could not see the village, which was five miles away.
Some people posit he did, on various posts. This is erroneous. When Gerard's knoll was located near the north folk juncture, it was stated that there was a notch in the terrain that could allow a limited view of LBH valley. Some folks rapidly jumped from could to did.
Now Gerard said that the fleeing Indian band was a village. It wasn't. No other US or Indian account placed a village that far up Sun Dance Creek.
Gerard was an interpreter. He was absent from his assigned duty. He had no experience as a scout, and was just an amateur. The Ree scouts could have provided valuable intelligence at this juncture, if Gerard was executing his assigned task.
b. Varnum. Scout leader reported to LTC Custer that there was no village in sight. He could see large numbers of Indians in the valley on the left bank of LBH.
c. Terrain analysis. The left bank was flat, with timber and water. The Indian trail they had been following crossed the river at Ford A. The right bank showed the bluffs.
This meant that the village could only be on the left bank. People and animals needed water. Access to wood would help for both cooking and shelter requirements.
I accept your view that further downstream terrain conditions could change, and a more viable village site appear on the right. But that was certainly not true with the information available when the decision was made. (The terrain on the right remained unsuitable, but you raise a valid point that Custer did not know that with certainty).
5. Decision. Custer's decision was to launch Reno to attack up the left bank of LBH. Custer stayed to Reno's right. This is an indicator right away that he did not intend to follow Reno.
a. Main effort. It is obvious that the Indians were on the left bank in force. The village could only be somewhere downstream on the left. Yet Custer sent 3 companies left, and five right.
b. Probable assumptions. Reno was not the main effort. I believe it probable that Custer expected the village was close. He assumed the village was between Ford A and MTC/Ford B. His move right would put him beyond the Indian force and village, When he crossed at B, he would be able to attack enemy rear, not that far from Reno's force.
c. Advance guard myth. You want to know how to identify an advance guard? Locate the main body. The main body will be one tactical bound directly behind the advance guard. A lot of electrons have died useless deaths in support of this tactical fantasy.
Custer did not cross at Ford A. He did not move two miles up the left bank of the LBH river. He did not react to the Reno force making contact with the enemy. He did not support the Reno force while in contact. He did not provide a support position that the Reno force could fall back on.
6. Summary. I believe your theory holds merit if the village was located on Sun Dance Creek. Custer's actions was consistent with being prepared to find a village along this avenue of approach.
a. Benteen. Look at Benteen's move. Going due west from where he started to the LBH valley is some 12 miles over horrible terrain. What was closer was the south fork of Sun Dance Creek. Where does the south fork join the main branch?
At the lone tepee.
Custer's movements are consistent with a village at this area. Not only was this area suitable for a village site, it had been. Not only that, but is was suitable on both banks.
Benteen was in an excellent position to stop any Indians fleeing up the south fork. In addition, he would be in supporting distance of Reno to his right. All 3 columns were in an ideal posture for an attack on a village at the south fork juncture. Each was in supporting distance of one another. By controlling both banks, Custer was also protecting any Indians trying to get around him to attack the trains.
His tactical dispositions for an attack here is superior. It would be difficult to come up with a better tactical disposition.
b. So I believe you are dead on the money in Custer's decisions on the upper end of this creek.
The counterargument is that the data from the scouts was that main body was further downstream. Yet previous experience was that Indians would have a cluster of outlying villages. Custer's actions are perfectly reasonable.
v/r William
|
|
|
Post by Dark Cloud on Mar 10, 2011 14:47:29 GMT -6
From the Crow's Nest, a village of any size could be seen on Ash/Reno/Sun Dance Creek, and there was nothing there. I recall that the 'lone' or several single lodges could be seen. There was also the location of the pony herd on the other side of LBH forming visual waves or worms, and the utter lack of village smoke in the 'valley' of Ash Creek. It was this utter lack looking north towards Tullochs that I'd bet precluded Custer from sending Herendeen, given the other evidence. There would always be smoke.
It's for that reason I don't buy the To Hell With Honor supposition, although as you point out it is in keeping with Custer's distributions of manpower.
But Ash Creek did not dribble enough water to make much of a support for a large village of the sort they were following unless at the point it joined LBH. It's also something of a mischaracterization to discuss the 'banks' of this arguably damp natural feature in that it leaves the impression it was an impediment of some sort in the way that discussion of banks in the LBH were. They didn't water at the Creek, but at the morass.
If Custer was thinking about protecting the trains, he'd have kept them closer would he not? I don't get the sense that anyone was under the impression they might get hit heading down Ash Creek. Were there flankers out?
There is cognitive dissonance to me in the discussion of Benteen's scout. If the ground was immediately apparent as god awful and unsupportive of many Indians at all in that direction and for quite a ways, and if indeed Custer knew there was a south fork he'd also already know that no Indian village could be there: bad ground, no water.
I'm not sure Custer ordered Reno to attack a fleeing band. A stern chase is a long chase. If the band had continued to the shoulder lands to the west of the LBH was Reno to follow? I think the band was to serve as indicator of village location only.
|
|
|
Post by fred on Mar 10, 2011 17:02:31 GMT -6
I hope no one minds if I tackle DC's post first; his are always so delicious and his reasoning is generally impeccable. From the Crow's Nest, a village of any size could be seen on Ash/Reno/Sun Dance Creek, and there was nothing there. I recall that the 'lone' or several single lodges could be seen. Truer words have never been spoken and this issue of a subsidiary village has been a bug-a-boo of mine for several years. People today talk about it, but no eye-witnesses do... and I do not quite understand that. Participants' narratives range from one lodge to one and a half, to "two or three," but never about a "smaller village." The Herendeen/Tulloch's Creek business also forms a whacky theory of mine. In my mind Custer had an obligation to scout-- or at least send a scout-- down Tulloch's. That is why he had Herendeen in the first place. Actually, it was the only reason he had Herendeen. There was-- and is-- a natural gap between the Rosebud valley and the Tulloch's valley. On the morning of the 24th, Custer told Herendeen to cut westward and head down Tulloch's. Herendeen told him it was too early and that they had not yet reached that inter-valley gap. Boyer agreed. So Herendeen waited until they would reach it. At about one o'clock that afternoon, Herendeen or someone else reported to Custer that they had missed a trail that branched off the main trail toward the southeast. Custer halted the column and ordered Varnum to go back and check it out. Varnum claimed he missed no trail, but took some scouts and headed back. Custer had his tent pitched and they waited in that spot for some four hours. In the meantime Crows came back and reported fresh new trails and the fact that if the command pushed it they could find the village within a day. Varnum returned and reported that there was indeed a divergent trail, but it appeared that there were so many Indians in the valley that a group had merely branched off, took that easier route, and returned to the main trail. Custer sequestered himself during virtually that entire four-hour period. My "theory"-- if it can even be called that-- is that Custer was musing with the idea of ignoring his orders, following the trail wherever it might lead, and attacking as soon as he could. This is sheer speculation, but it could fit certainly, especially since he would have to pull something of the wool over his officers' eyes by trying to justify not going all the way to the Rosebud headwaters and attacking prematurely, all the while excluding Terry from the festivities. There is tenuous support in the fact that when the column once again began its march at around 5 PM, by 6 PM they had reached the Tulloch's gap and Herendeen told Custer it was time for him to go. Custer ignored him completely and Herendeen remained with the column. Custer had not yet made up his mind. All true generally, but Ash Creek was larger then than it is today. And the village did camp there one night. The spring thaw had filled Ash and its attendant tributaries, e. g., North Fork, so the site was decent enough for an overnight sojourn. No more. I would agree with this. I agree here as well. There were no flankers, per se, but there were scouts to the left-- Varnum, Strode, and a bunch of Rees-- and there were more out to the right: Hare, the white interpreters, Crows, and some Rees. The F Company scouts were sent out as they reached the flats and the M Company scouts were sent forward when Cooke gave Reno his orders. There is some little testimony that Custer spoke very briefly directly to Reno. I would venture to say this was when Custer told Reno to send out these scouts, for Reno immediately ordered French to do so. Custer was unaware of all of this. So was Benteen... at least initially. No one knew-- nor could they see from the Crow's Nest-- how wide the intervening valleys were or even where they began to the south. I have been at the Crow's Nest and you cannot tell very much other than that there is a variety of ridges... and they all appear to be the same height. I will defend forever the sending of Benteen's battalion on that scout and I will equally defend Benteen's decision to cut it when he did. I agree. Not a chance. This is why I do not buy Kanipe's assertion of having seen 50 to 100 Indians on the ridges. Yes, there were Indians in Ash Creek... its lower reaches... Hare saw 40 to 50; Davern reported 20 to 40. Those were the Indians spotted, but they were seen on Ash Creek, not near Reno Hill. More Kanipe dissembling. Best wishes, Fred.
|
|
|
Post by wild on Mar 10, 2011 18:36:21 GMT -6
Hi Montrose, Delightful post.Very clear,concise and soldierly. Thanks for the effort. Until such time as I retrieve my books and source material [sad tale]I haven't as much as map I'll confine myself to one or two brief observations.
c. Terrain analysis. The left bank was flat, with timber and water. The Indian trail they had been following crossed the river at Ford A. The right bank showed the bluffs. This meant that the village could only be on the left bank A trail will indicate direction not disposition.
a. Main effort. It is obvious that the Indians were on the left bank in force. The village could only be somewhere downstream on the left. Custer was only aware of this after decision was made and he was committed to atacking along both banks
He assumed the village was between Ford A and MTC/Ford B. He was not aware of these fords.
His move right would put him beyond the Indian force and village, When he crossed at B, he would be able to attack enemy rear, not that far from Reno's force. Such a plan required timing otherwise his units would be defeated in detail as they were.
His tactical dispositions for an attack here is superior. It would be difficult to come up with a better tactical disposition.His units were acting independently and circumstance would have them dirverging from this tactical nirvana
Custer did not cross at Ford A. He did not move two miles up the left bank of the LBH river. He did not react to the Reno force making contact with the enemy. He did not support the Reno force while in contact. He did not provide a support position that the Reno force could fall back on. Agreed.Someone had blundered. Best Regards
|
|
|
Post by Dark Cloud on Mar 10, 2011 19:15:37 GMT -6
Regarding Tulluch's, I'm just saying it wasn't necessarily an unthinking kissoff on Custer's part. The trail indicated a village of size awaited, somewhere west, and there would be smoke visible up Tulluchs if the actual village's smoke was visible from CN in twilight dawn to the scouts, none of whom - even in self preservation mode - thought there was anything of note up there. Also, I suspect the assumption was anyone sent wouldn't return or make it to Terry, at least in relevant time. And, of course, that all proved correct. I'd think it was an acceptable command decision on the field with new info rendering the original instructions (Terry pointedly didn't call them orders) susceptible to change. Herendeen was a handy guy, not to be wasted. On the other hand, he might not have wanted his bonus that much under the circumstances and he remains the sole source for Custer ignoring him. He WANTED to ride to his death in the dark for no point in a direction devoid of reason to go since the village WAS in the LBH, General Terry, and so I still deserve some part of that bonus, don't ya think? Eh?
Why was Ash Creek larger then? Was that year heavy on runoff in the Wolf's? If they watered in a green bog, it doesn't speak to a huge runoff. Ash Creek could be twice what it is now and not demand white water vessels. I recall it as an easy cross without damping the pant cuffs. The LBH itself is fairly lizard lethargic most of the time. Bighorn can qualify as scary, though, and the Yellowstone is in spades. It even looks scary on nice days.
Since nobody had a real clue about the location of the Rosebud or LBH headwaters - the maps certainly betray no excessive accuracy and 'Here Be Monsters' (or maybe Mormons) would not look out of place - I doubt Custer would worry much. Decidedly dubious cartography would resonate with all field officers of the time, and they could understand his command decision in the field. I'd think, anyway.
Just saying that if the To Hell with Honor thesis is correct (spoiler alert: it ain't) then Custer would have had to know about South Fork, an even lesser damp paper towel than the mighty Ash Creek, whose entire spring runoff was used in the 70's in a Bounty towel absorption commercial, and if he knew about South Fork, he'd have a clue as to condition of the land from which it came. He didn't, as he sent Benteen, which I thought degraded the assumption the pincer movement was for the Sans Arc Lone Tipi grouping.
We all have this tendency to accord a plan to this, but beyond a general initiation of action to Reno, and a later exhortation to Benteen to join the fun, and a vague concept based upon squat that he could cross at a convenient place just up a ways...... maybe a ways more. WTF? Hold up, everyone. Mumble......
Oh, Mitch, got a moment? Remember just recently how we were, you and I, discussing possible crossing points from east to west on the Little Bighorn, you Bridger of the Bighorn Basin, you? I'm somehow sensing a slight diversion between your demented fever dream of what the land was like and this horrendoplasty before me. See my problem? Well, now it's yours as well...... What's that? Only a mile and half further? You think? So pleased. Well, toodle on everyone, Daniel Boone Redux here has it under control.
Right, like it's MY fault, Mitch. Always MY fault.......You've been here twice, and somehow this land - reminiscent of every square foot of land between the Rockies and the Mississippi, slipped in memory. Well of course I COULD have scouted it earlier, but everyone does that, and they'd be expecting us, and surprise is my forte.
No, not when I'M surprised, Mitch.
I heard that.
|
|
|
Post by benteen on Mar 10, 2011 21:06:44 GMT -6
Darkcloud,
What??? You have to get over the fact that John Fox my Giant defensive co-coordinator is coaching your team and you will have a good season.I realize I'm not the sharpest knife in the drawer but what was this post all about.
Be Well Dan
|
|
tel
New Member
Posts: 19
|
Post by tel on Mar 10, 2011 23:29:11 GMT -6
The analysis on all parts is excellent but it is, in my opinion, an overlong explanation of Custer's tactics. No disrespect meant.
Everything he did had the goal of striking the village and getting to the Indians before they could scatter. He attacked on the 25th instead of waiting to the 26th because he was sure he had been spotted by elements of the village and that they would flee. His disposition of his forces were meant to cut off any fleeing Indians. Yes, he wanted Benteen to make sure that there were no hidden village like Washita but primarily his job was to pitch into any Indians he found (as in Indians fleeing).
That was foremost in Custer's mind. It is a theme that comes up over and over in the Little Big Horn Battle.
The Indians didn't flee. Custer's tactical disposition was faulty because the Village stood and fought. He spread his forces out so that they could not effectively support each other (but he didn't know that) and so the Indians were able to defeat his regiment in detail.
Walk the battlefield. It is all there.
|
|
|
Post by wild on Mar 11, 2011 3:19:22 GMT -6
.I realize I'm not the sharpest knife in the drawer but what was this post all about. Thank God someone else in the class put their hand for that one.
He spread his forces out so that they could not effectively support each other Montrose agrees with you---But upon reaching the LBH river, the two columns moved out of mutual support range Range would suggest distance but this is not the case.The two units were still within sight of each other still on parallel courses with Custer committed to supporting the other.[we have to take Custer at his word. More accurate to say they became seperated.And the cause of that seperation was accidental not intentional. Reno engages the enemy. Custer's reaction to this is not that of a commander seeing everything going to plan.He does not progress his suggested plan to attack either the flank or rear of tne village rather he engages in hat waving ,climbing hills and writing messages.Exotic behavior for a commander who has victory within his grasp.Just as the Light Brigade charged down wrong valley Custer charged down the wrong bank.
.
|
|
|
Post by fred on Mar 11, 2011 6:22:40 GMT -6
This is the smartest, savviest discussion I have seen on these or any boards in a long, long time, and the odd part about it all is that we seem to all be in general agreement. Plus... excuse me for idol worship here... but I thought "tel's" past was written by me!
DC,
From everything I have read, the spring "run-off" that year was quite substantial, so every branch, every fork, every tributary was bloated. That does not mean you are wrong, however, and I pretty much agree with you. Nothing posed any sort of obstacle... except the Yellowstone, to me, a pretty fiercesome river under the best of circumstances.
As for Tulloch's, I think the whole issue is more academic than either practicable or militarily important. Custer's failure to scout it was more an issue of depriving Terry of an alternate route, one he wasn't likely to take anyway.
As for Custer's "plan," well... I still have not read all of "wild's" posts here, or "montrose's" for that matter, something I hope to do today... I have been picking and choosing... and doing no one a service.
I do agree with "tel," however, virtually every word. In my mind Custer's "plan" was never really complete, simply because he did not have all his intel until the Ford D trek. I believe he had it in his mind what he should do, but he was clearly winging it and I do not believe anyone would be wrong in assessing the man's motives once he left Calhoun Hill. By that time he had blown his support and I think he understood that, but was willing to take the chance, simply because he still underestimated the intentions of the Indians.
Things are more straightforward than many like to admit... complicated plans and ideas stroke egos... but military operations do not usually work that way. Benteen was sent out to ensure there was nothing upstream. Custer knew Benteen and knew he would return as soon as he realized he had fulfilled a simple mission. He had three companies, just in case.
Reno's mission was equally simple: attack. Custer knew that would do one of two things: (1) drive through the Indians, or (2) tie down enough warriors to make an end-run feasible. When Gerard reported the Indians weren't running, (2) became operable.
Still, Custer did not know the extent of the village or its configuration. As mentioned, when Custer sat atop 3,411, he and Reno were still within supporting range. Custer continued north because he believed Reno had things pretty much in hand... time to make sure Benteen was hurrying. Now he was needed.
Was this a plan yet? No... because Custer still did not have all the pieces. Speed and data were essential. The puzzle was filling in, but pieces were still missing. How many, where, intentions? The answers were all down-river.
Best wishes, Fred.
|
|
|
Post by AZ Ranger on Mar 11, 2011 6:59:20 GMT -6
The analysis on all parts is excellent but it is, in my opinion, an overlong explanation of Custer's tactics. No disrespect meant. Everything he did had the goal of striking the village and getting to the Indians before they could scatter. He attacked on the 25th instead of waiting to the 26th because he was sure he had been spotted by elements of the village and that they would flee. His disposition of his forces were meant to cut off any fleeing Indians. Yes, he wanted Benteen to make sure that there were no hidden village like Washita but primarily his job was to pitch into any Indians he found (as in Indians fleeing). That was foremost in Custer's mind. It is a theme that comes up over and over in the Little Big Horn Battle. The Indians didn't flee. Custer's tactical disposition was faulty because the Village stood and fought. He spread his forces out so that they could not effectively support each other (but he didn't know that) and so the Indians were able to defeat his regiment in detail. Walk the battlefield. It is all there. tel Without the analysis how do you make an informed decision to form your own opinions and theory. Montrose's analysis have been a great asset to this board. I suspect that Fred has had numerous discussions with Will outside the public postings. Depending on what you call the battlefield I am not sure you can walk it. There are private properties with some having a trespass that you can purchase and other areas that you can not. The stretch between Reno and Custer is private and a lot happened in that area. The Indians didn't flee. Custer's tactical disposition was faulty because the Village stood and fought. He spread his forces out so that they could not effectively support each other (but he didn't know that) and so the Indians were able to defeat his regiment in detail.
I believe that Custer knew his troops were not in supporting distance of each other but he didn't think it mattered which is different then stating "but he didn't know that". I think you are on the right track on how he viewed things and made decisions so what caused him to make those decisions? AZ Ranger
|
|
|
Post by AZ Ranger on Mar 11, 2011 7:20:52 GMT -6
"Custer's tactical disposition was faulty " If a "tactic" is the only way thought of to do something and the alternative is an emergency is it tactical? I am thinking that Custer's disposition is faulty for many reasons and there was no tactical planning because of it.
AZ Ranger
|
|