tel
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Posts: 19
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Post by tel on Mar 24, 2011 15:47:29 GMT -6
It's always good to have people draw conclusions about others on the board. We all don't need to talk up our military background. I was unaware that people had to have military background to be bona fide experts. Before you start breast - beating over a life of regrets, try re-reading what I put up there so you may be able to figure out its context. Usually I do not "talk up" my military background until I get some clown who decides to pontificate about what goes through an officer's mind during battle. Do tell!As for the Vincent Charley incident, I noticed no private soldiers were back that close to the on-rushing Indians to lend a hand. It seems to me, the Indians, at that moment, were rather close, and Charley would have taken an inordinate amount of time to be transported back. He was shot through the hips and couldn't re-mount. So tell me, General Tel, what is a soldier to do, officer or otherwise? Before your cork pops, here is a little tidbit for you... In a 1911 interview with Walter Mason Camp, SGT Thomas W. Harrison told Camp that Edgerly instructed the wounded Charley to crawl into a ravine and Edgerly would come back for him as soon as he could get reinforcements. As Edgerly and Harrison rode on and looked back they saw the Indians finishing off Charley [Liddic/Harbaugh, Camp On Custer, 98]. So how close does that put hundreds of Indians? I also seem to remember it was Lieutenant Godfrey who stopped his panicking men, turned them around, and formed a skirmish line to hold off those Indians... it was Lieutenant Godfrey who sent his horses baqck so his men would maintain that line. I also seem to remember that it was Captain Benteen who rallied the men, Captain Benteen who led the charge to roust the Indians off the bluffs, and it was Captain Benteen who the officers and men credited with saving the command. So can you tell me, please, what was in his mind? And as for drawing conclusions, maybe you should try to understand what I wrote before you draw yours. Best wishes, Fred. Fred Thanks for the promotion to General. Never got that high. Close but not that high. They weren't giving our brevet commands in Viet Nam. I don't know for sure what Godfrey was thinking but I was once in a very similar situation during Tet in 1968. We were getting overrun and a man was wounded in the leg. Could not walk. A small squad turned back to rescue him and carry him out while another squad provided covering fire. It was tight but we got out. I don't know what was on Godfrey's mind but what was on my mind was to get my man out. But it is a good question. And by the way, we were getting the crap kicked out of us on that particular day. Morale was down and we were hot and tired. But get the man out. Don't leave him behind. I think I made the right decision. TEL
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Post by fred on Mar 25, 2011 4:45:46 GMT -6
TEL,
First of all, let me say this. As a fellow - Vietnam veteran, you and I should not be bickering. Actually, we shouldn't be bickering anyway, but this makes it even more so.
Second... while I appreciate your analogy, it this instance it holds no more water than Michael Madden's camp kettle. First of all, being nearly overrun or not, we had automatic weapons in Vietnam, plus a little stinker (and I mean that in a loving way) called the M-79, which, if memory serves me correctly, ol' Charlie was petrified of. There's a lot of difference in holding off charging Charlie with automatic weapons than there is in holding off charging Cheyenne with a semi-loaded pistol.
Edgerly and Harrison were two of the last people off the Weir "sugarloaf," and Edgerly had had a devil of a time trying to mount his horse (he was 6' 4" tall-- the tallest man in the regiment-- and that may have had something to do with it...? Or not? I'm not really sure...). According to CPL George W. Wylie, Charley was wounded and Edgerly stopped to speak to him. Wylie says this is when Edgerly had trouble getting back on his horse. “This was some distance south of Edgerly peaks (and probably about opposite the ravine on east side of bluffs in which the cedar trees are growing).”
Personally, I tend to doubt this because Wylie was probably long gone by this time as Edgerly and Harrison were still well behind the rest of D Company. In addition, Harrison said the place where Edgerly had trouble mounting his horse was at the northeast end of the sugarloaf. Both Weir and the company “had stopped back at the south end of this sugarloaf and Edgerly said he would go out to the end of the sugarloaf to look down and see if he could see Custer while they were out there.”
Then, according to Harrison, Charley was shot during Weir’s retreat—“near a ravine to the left. Perhaps a ¼ mile or less from the two peaks.” That smells like Cedar Coulee— as opposed to what some refer to as "Middle Coulee"— and Cedar was the route the Indians were taking. Also, apparently, Harrison and Edgerly stayed long enough on the Weir Peaks “sugarloaf” to have to fight their way through Indians.
Harrison went on and said that Edgerly instructed the wounded Charley to crawl into a ravine and Edgerly would come back for him as soon as he could get reinforcements. As Edgerly and Harrison rode on and looked back they saw the Indians finishing off Charley.
What most people do not understand is that Indians were left behind, both in the valley and on the ridges east of the river when the majority left the Reno area after Benteen arrived. Other accounts allude to chasing Indians away as Benteen arrived on Reno Hill and ordered a skirmish line set up. These were some of the 200 or so Indians in the immediate vicinity as Edgerly and Harrison were speaking to Charley.
Edgerly alluded to this when he claimed that after going down the “valley,” Weir—still on the bluff—motioned for them to swing back to where Weir was. Edgerly’s men dismounted and engaged the Indians, who had begun firing at them. According to Edgerly, this firing lasted about 30 minutes and was clearly directed at "Reno" Indians, not "Custer" Indians.
So the circumstances between what you may have experienced in Vietnam and this situation are vastly different. There is no requirement—either in the UCMJ or the law of morality—for someone to do anything other than what Edgerly and Harrison did in leaving Charley behind. When you look at that situation, anything else would have meant certain death, and precisely what good would it have done for those two men—an officer and an enlisted man—to have given their lives in that situation? It would have been nothing more than suicide and it would have cost two very good men and Charley would have suffered the same fate; the man couldn't be moved without effort and time. Would you have done differently had you been Edgerly or Harrison, regardless of what you may think was an officer's "mind-set"? I was a captain and a company CO in Vietnam and under similar circumstances I would have left him and returned when I could. Anything else would have been a stupid and an irresponsible decision. An officer has a responsibility for more than just one man.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Mar 25, 2011 4:51:35 GMT -6
Same problem with duplicate posting... and I see TEL had the same issue, as well. Why doesn't someone at ProBoards pull his head out of his posterior long enough to solve this issue?
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by wild on Mar 25, 2011 11:28:12 GMT -6
You never leave a fallen comrade. Comradeship has a price and it's your life. By standing by a fallen comrade you are doing what you would expect of him in similar circumstances. Master Sergeant Gary Gorden Somalia 1993 Sergeant first class Randal Shughart Somalia 1993 Trooper Paddy Mullins Congo 1961 Ich hatt einen kameraden
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Post by AZ Ranger on Mar 25, 2011 11:43:37 GMT -6
I once had a comrade, you won't find a better one. The drum was rolling for battle, he was marching by my side |: in the same pace and stride. A bullet flew towards us meant for you or for me? It did tear him away, he lies at my feet |: like he was a part of me. He wants to reach his hand to me, while I'm just reloading my gun. "Can't give you my hand for now, you rest in eternal life |: My good comrade!"
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Post by wild on Mar 25, 2011 12:10:10 GMT -6
Way to go AZ.
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Post by fred on Mar 25, 2011 13:17:35 GMT -6
I find it real interesting to hear people who were not there or were never under the same circumstances second-guessing a man who thought it wasn't worth giving up his own life in a hopeless situation. I also noticed that Tom Harrison, a sergeant, didn't see too willing to sacrifice needlessly either. It always amazes me how willing some people are to spend another's life or someone else's money.
Best wishes, Fred.
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tel
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Posts: 19
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Post by tel on Mar 25, 2011 22:59:25 GMT -6
I was a marine officer and and we didn't leave men behind. It was pounded into us by our superiors and by the corp in general (right or wrong). But I respect your take Fred.
However back to LBH. None of us was there. We're all conjecturing anyway. That's what this board is about so I will respect anyone's theory. IMHO, the Reno and Benteen Battalions were beaten or not generally motivated. That they went to Weir point was a miracle and solely due to Weir's willingness to disobey orders and make a try of it. he other followed out of guilt (and some bravery).
But in any case by that time it was too late. Custer's command was being wiped out. If they had gone forward at that time there just would have been more bodies found by Terry. If someone gave me the opportunity to go back in time to the LBH battlefield to observe I would rather be an American Indian. Better chance to survive.
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Post by wild on Mar 26, 2011 0:04:09 GMT -6
Tel IMHO, the Reno and Benteen Battalions were beaten or not generally motivated. From being the shooters they became the turkeys in an instant.Must have been devastating for morale.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Mar 26, 2011 5:37:45 GMT -6
I am sure that even my Marine Corps has left men behind. Certainly we were taught not to do it but it happens.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Mar 26, 2011 5:42:34 GMT -6
I was a marine officer and and we didn't leave men behind. It was pounded into us by our superiors and by the corp in general (right or wrong). But I respect your take Fred. However back to LBH. None of us was there. We're all conjecturing anyway. That's what this board is about so I will respect anyone's theory. IMHO, the Reno and Benteen Battalions were beaten or not generally motivated. That they went to Weir point was a miracle and solely due to Weir's willingness to disobey orders and make a try of it. he other followed out of guilt (and some bravery). But in any case by that time it was too late. Custer's command was being wiped out. If they had gone forward at that time there just would have been more bodies found by Terry. If someone gave me the opportunity to go back in time to the LBH battlefield to observe I would rather be an American Indian. Better chance to survive. Weir never went any further foward then a non hostile environment would allow, When the going gets rough the rough gets going. Certainly being mounted on individual transportation units increases the possibility of being left behind. Pvt Thompson is an example of Custer leaving troopers behind. Semper Fi AZ Ranger
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Post by Dark Cloud on Mar 26, 2011 6:08:58 GMT -6
At this point, I'd like to suggest it is counterproductive to continue those small fictions. Marines have surrendered, left men behind (they had to, and they'd be irresponsible to have lost more in some pointless regression to save one), and so have all our forces, and everyone's. There are also incidents where heroic rescues occurred. Still, the history is out there, generally written by Marines and soldiers, and enough know about both sorts of incidents that it alienates people when it is demanded of them they participate in a pointless fiction by loudly agreeing to contrived myth not unique to Corps or country.
The conditions that forced these events absolutely justify them, and nobody has ever damned those who surrendered on Wake or collapsed and retreated when China entered Korea or any of that. After a while, those mythologies have the negative effect of projecting our combat forces as idiots, chanting jingles about their heroism and irresponsible ones at that. It's enough to know, I'd hope, that all that can be done to point, will be.
It is that very consideration that makes me dread being a soldier facing that decision. In all, both the military and I are glad I never served.
This is exactly related to the LBH, where Custerphiles demand that Reno and Benteen sacrifice the mission and the 7th by pointlessly rushing to Custer to die heroically with him. Custer wasn't left behind, he left his regiment behind. I don't think for a second he'd have gazed approvingly on the linear lines of mounted soldiers and packtrain being butchered and pillaged heading his way. At heart, he was no romantic, but he would play the role.
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Post by fred on Mar 26, 2011 6:33:39 GMT -6
I was a marine officer and and we didn't leave men behind. It was pounded into us by our superiors and by the corp in general (right or wrong). But I respect your take Fred. However back to LBH. None of us was there... IMHO, the Reno and Benteen Battalions were beaten or not generally motivated. That they went to Weir point was a miracle and solely due to Weir's willingness to disobey orders and make a try of it. he other followed out of guilt (and some bravery). Yes, well, I was an army officer, a captain, a company commander-- paratrooper, ranger; all the requisite nonsense-- and I had the same thing drummed into my head... no difference, regardless of what Marines may think. And I have a fairly good idea of that, since my son was a Force Recon Marine in the Gulf War in 1991, and saw a fairly sharp bit of action at the Kuwait City Airport. Just to belabor the point a little more, here is something I have "cherry-picked" (God forbid!) from my own work on the subject, so we can draw our conclusions or righteous indignation from here: [At a specific point in time...] "The last of D Company leaves the Weir 'sugarloaf' down a draw and into Cedar Coulee. Edgerly struggles with his horse as his orderly, SGT Harrison stands nearby. Edgerly had trouble mounting and claimed Indians got within 15 feet of him and his orderly, an old veteran. The horse kept moving away from him, so SGT Harrison moved in such a way to prevent the horse from going any farther. He smiled and told Edgerly the Indians were bad marksmen from so close." So again, my point is, why? What would Edgerly's and Harrison's death have done for the command? In the army, an officer has an obligation to the living as well as the seemingly doomed. How does the ship's captain who has left behind men in the water because of a fear of an enemy submarine in the vicinity fit into this mold? Is he to be condemned, or do we excuse that because of the price tag associated with a capital ship? Or maybe it is more because of the lives on board than anything else. Edgerly had that same responsibility to his men. Again, what does needless dying prove... other than stupidity? What about the wounded man in a "no-man's" zone, you know, the one in between your position and the enemy machine gun? He's the guy they use for bait. Who has the responsibility to go get that guy? That's why they have the Medal of Honor... it was never an army requirement to be awarded one; nothing in the UCMJ about that. No moral responsibility there. And I am sure the parents and wives of those who have one hanging on their walls would prefer Option B. As for "beaten" troops, I would hardly ever have called Benteen beaten and anyone who says he dawdled [see the neighbors for more information] or held back because of a distaste for GAC simply isn't reading enough. Varnum wasn't beaten; Hare wasn't; Wallace wasn't; French certainly wasn't. If we interpret the Cooke/Martini note one way-- "hurry"-- we must include all the rest-- "bring packs." Benteen left only when he saw the packs were within a mile of reaching the hilltop and McDougall was riding hell-bent-for-leather in front. That's called "bringing the packs." Benteen was also bringing the wounded, and not leaving them behind.But... and please do not take this personally, TEL-- no offense is intended-- maybe this is why we see no (or few) books on strategy and tactics written by Marine Corps officers. Bios, yes... otherwise...? Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by montrose on Mar 26, 2011 8:57:00 GMT -6
I would like to return to the theme of this thread.
Situation. After reaching the old village site on Ash Creek Custer changed the regimental formation. Up until that point, Custer and Reno had been traveling side by side.
Reno was ordered to the front. Custer now followed Reno several hundred yards back. The majority of the scouts were sent to Reno. Custer retained Bouyer and some Crows, to act more as guides than scouts. He needed some advisers who knew the local terrain.
Scout screen. The deployment of scouts strongly point to a regimental scouting screen. A ten man detachment from M Company was deployed directly to Reno's front. There were Indians on both sides of this element. On the left front were some Rees and I believe the Lakota scouts. On the right front were Crows and Rees.
First contact was made by the right group of Indians. This group killed Deeds and a group of six woman and four children.
Everything looks like a Regimental advance. There is a scout screen, advance guard, and main body.
And then a mile and a half later, Custer changes his plan.
What information did he receive to change his tactical deployment?
Gerard. Gerard reported seeing fleeing Indians.
Chief of scouts reported large numbers of Indians in the valley, village was out of sight.
Reno reported Indians were coming out in force, though Custer may have started to move before the messengers reached him.
So we have contradictory messages of fleeing Indians and attacking Indians. The preponderance of evidence indicates at least an Indian rear guard fight to allow time for the village to flee. There was going to be a fight in the valley. Custer would have heard the first shots.
Bouyer. I believe Bouyer and the Crows played a crucial role here. There is no possible way Custer could see the MTC ford areas. The move to the right had to be based on certain knowledge that he could reach a ford on the far side of the bluffs.
Main effort. He took 5 companies out of 8. This means his main effort had changed from a regimental attack down the valley to two separate attacks. It is interesting to note that he failed to tell Reno, Benteen, and McDougall of his change of plan.
Haste. I believe Custer planned a rapid move to a northern ford. By all accounts, the pace on the move north was rapid, and several horses fell out. Failure to inform of subordinates is a sign of haste.
Dawdling. It is interesting to note that after 3411, Custer slowed down or stopped. Whatever he saw from 3411 caused him to order Benteen and McDougall to his position. He then conducted reconnaissance of the MTC/Ford B/Thompson ford area.
Some argue he saw too many Indians to attack. Others say he saw too few Indians and his target was forces north of the ford area. But now I am long past the decision to break off from Reno.
Respectfully,
William
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Post by lew on Mar 26, 2011 11:15:37 GMT -6
From a Col. David Hackworth interview: Q: A female guerrilla leader said that sometimes, when they shot an American soldier, his comrades would come up to get the body and then they'd all burst into tears, which she said was a wonderful opportunity to shoot them or to grab their weapons. Is that a fair comment?
Hackworth: It's right on the mark. The problem with the Americans fighting that war was that, as the war went on, they lost leadership. They lost their hard core professional leader. A professional soldier does not go after wounded; he leaves that to the medics. But soldiers that are not well trained, and not well disciplined by their leaders, tend to become more of a group of fraternity buddies who care very much for their fallen comrade and who want to get him out of the line of fire.
In Vietnam it was known that the standard technique to use was to hit the first guy, then take out anybody going after him. That was how they would add to their casualty list. I have had my soldiers tell me that a guy might have been hit in the leg in a hot firefight, and his opponent, only ten or fifteen feet away, would be pointing his weapon at him, giving him the finger... doing all these things to tease him while he's waiting for somebody to come up and pull him away. Then they could blow that guy away.
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