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Post by wild on Sept 18, 2015 16:08:05 GMT -6
Jodak Reno as senior officer present could take command of Benteen's battalion . He did not formally do so. The Benteen/Reno arrangement was by default and against the intent of the commanding officer.
Dave I have no issues with the manner or style of your posts on the contrary they are informative and challenging.
That being said, Benteen was heads and shoulders above all the officers during the 2 days on the bluff. His decision to assist Reno was the correct choice and a difficult one. Custer was somewhere but Reno was at hand and in need. Nothing wrong with the decision except he made it a mile too soon and 30 minutes too early. If the purpose of his halting was to consoladate and reorganise then this was undone by his losing control of his own battalion and then leaving his post and triggering a leaderless disorganised retreat Northwards.
Cheers
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Post by dave on Sept 18, 2015 18:05:10 GMT -6
Wild I don't see your point of Benteen leaving too soon and triggering a leaderless disorganized retreat North. If I have read and understood my readings, which is a big if, then Benteen did not start North. That was Weir leaving, take your choice---with permission or without permission---and Benteen soon followed and took charge. He ordered the organized retreat and reestablished the command on the bluff. Custer's absence was perplexing to all and no one had any idea of his position other than "he went thataway" to the north. Using the charge he left 30 minutes too early is similar to the charge Reno left the Valley too early. You are---I don't know the proper expression in your football or rugby that corresponds---Monday morning quarterbacking. I enjoy your presentation and expect to learn more from your posts. Regards Dave
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Post by wild on Sept 19, 2015 2:03:09 GMT -6
Sorry Dave I did not make myself clear .I was suggesting that Benteen halted a mile short and 30 minutes too early. Custer's order to "come on" is in effect until it can no longer be progressed or is countermanded. Reno did not countermand Custer's order.
Custer's absence was perplexing to all and no one had any idea of his position other than "he went thataway" to the north. Custer's responsibility to [as Fred mentioned somewhere] reel in his reinforcements.
20 Minutes after Weir departed Benteen followed without orders; destination unknown. The command was spread out over the trail from Reno Hill to Weir Point. A totally pointless exercise and waste of time .One man lost his life and it could have been many more. The only difference between Reno's retreat from the valley and Benteen's retreat from Weir Point was about 5 minutes. An already demoralised command was further demoralised by another headlong flight.
I think the regiment had a fault line in it and that was the Custer clann . It was divisive and probably influenced Weir's unauthorised departure and Benteen's passiveness . But no excuse ; they were both soldiers and obliged to put their oath first. Benteen was lucky that a hero was needed .Happens all the time with disasters . But he is a false hero , Reno if not a hero was honest and gave his men a fighting chance. I would prefare to go to war with Reno [even if he had a bottle]rather than slippy tit Benteen.
Cheers
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Post by dave on Sept 19, 2015 6:11:07 GMT -6
Wild I see we have a large difference of opinion regarding Reno and Benteen. I believe that Reno was overwhelmed by circumstances in the Valley when Bloody Knife was killed and blood and brains sprayed over Reno's face. His order, counter order, order shows to me he was suffering from PTSD or whatever it is called at that moment. Like DC I have no idea of what other action Reno could take to remove his command from the Valley. Hindsight shows he failed to signal his order to all of his troops, failed to set up skirmishers at the river crossing, selected a poor crossing, high banks preventing horses and men to scale, and suffered many casualties. It would be pure speculation not backed by any evidence for me to suggest Benteen would have performed better in the Valley. However, it has been firmly established that his performance on the bluff was far superior to Reno and he was dealing with all of these issues on the fly. I am unsure of just how much he knew about Reno's command and situation since Reno was not in command of his senses as Benteen first arrived. Benteen was faced with a Occam's razor type of situation. He had little information about the enemies numbers other than what he could see, had a confusing missive from Custer, no one knew Custer's whereabouts and he had to assay the condition of Reno's command and establish good military order. I am unsure of what more he should have done in the time he had. Perhaps you are expecting too much from the man? Regards Dave
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Post by dan25 on Sept 19, 2015 7:07:03 GMT -6
I found Reno's report from July 5 either to Sherman or the War Dept. According to this part of his report, Reno claims HE SENT Weir to find Custer and HE led the column evidently toward Weir point.
"I succeeded in reaching the top of the bluff, with a loss of three officers and twenty-nine enlisted men killed and seven wounded. Almost at the same time I reached the top, mounted men were seen to be coming toward us, and it proved to be Colonel Benteen's battalion, Companies H, D, and K. We joined forces, and in a short time the pack-train came up. As senior, my command was then A, B, D, G, H, K, and M, about three hundred and eighty men, and the following officers: Captains Benteen, Weir, French and McDougall, First Lieutenants Godfrey, Mathey, and Gibson, and Second Lieutenants Edgerly, Wallace, Varnum, and Hare, and Acting Assistant Surgeon Porter.
First Lieutenant De Rudio was in the dismounted fight in the woods, but, having some trouble with his horse, did not join the command in the charge out, and hiding himself in the woods, joined the command after night-fall on the 26th.
Still hearing nothing of Custer, and, with this re- enforcement, I moved down the river in the direction of the village, keeping on the bluffs.
We had heard firing in that direction and knew it could only be Custer. I moved to the summit of the highest bluff, but seeing and hearing nothing sent Captain Weir with his company to open communication with him. He soon sent word by Lieutenant Hare that he could go no farther, and that the Indians were getting around him. At this time he was keeping up a heavy fire from his skirmish line. I at once turned everything back to the first position I had taken on the bluffs, and which seemed to me the best. "
This is from Benteen's report on July 4th.
" About a mile farther on I met a sargeant of the regiment with orders from Lieeutenant-Colonel Custer to the officer in charge of the rear - guard and train to bring it to the front with as great rapidity as was possible. Another mile on I met Trumpeter Morton, of my own company, with a written order from First Lieut. W. W. Cook to me which read:
"Benteen, come on, Big village. Be quick. Bring pacs. W. W. Cook P. Bring pac's."
I could then see no movement of any kind in any direction; a horse on the hill, riderless,being the only living thing I could see in my front. I inquired of the trumpeter what had been done, and he informed [me] that the Indians had "skedadded," abandoning the village. Another mile and a half brought me in sight of the stream and plain in which were some of our dismounted men fighting, and Indians charging and recharging them in great numbers. The plain seemed to be alive with them. I then noticed our men in large numbers running for the bluffs on right bank of stream. I concluded at once that those had been repulsed, and was of the opinion that if I crossed the ford with my battalion, that I should have had it treated in like manner; for from long experience with cavalry, I judge there wre 900 veteran Indians right there at that time, against which the large element of recruits in my battalion would stand no earthly chance as mounted men. I then moved up to the bluffs and reported my command to Maj. M. A. Reno. I did not return for the pack-train because I deemed it perfectly safe where it was, and we could defend it, had it been threatened, from our position on the bluff; and another thing, it savored too much of coffee-cooling to return when I was since a fight was progressing in the front, and deeming the train as safe without me."
Hope I am some what correct on this. I have been unable to find any mention as to weather Reno did, or did not order Benteen to stay with him. I read somewhere that Army Regulations at that time stated, "The most recent order from a superior may countermand a previous order, to supercede a previous order, the fault and liability lies with the officer giving such order" If this is correct, that let's Benteen skate free from any disobedience of orders. As for Reno, since there was no Court - Martial, or any evidence of an investigation then his excuse, had he given that order must have been convincing enough to justify it. Sort of like, let's cover each others butt's. Or it's two to one against Weir.
regards dan25
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Post by AZ Ranger on Sept 19, 2015 8:08:05 GMT -6
Dan
I think you will find that Weir took off on his and went no further than Weir Point. Reno sent Hare to Weir to have him open communications with Custer. Weir went no further than Weir Point. Edgerly went further with the company but Weir recalled the company.
So Reno did send Weir through Hare to go to Custer. Too many Indians prevented the company from advancing.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by dan25 on Sept 19, 2015 8:51:09 GMT -6
AZ,Just thought I'd mention how things can change. I also added an edit to my post regarding if Reno did or did not order Benteen to stay.
dan25
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Post by dan25 on Sept 19, 2015 9:13:21 GMT -6
Fred, from your post Sept. 17
Dan25,
I do not know where you got that, but I have put together what I believe is the most comprehensive and correct list of those assigned to the pack train. It is incomplete because we simply do not know who was assigned, specifically, where. We can make some fairly good educated guesses because of those who survived, who maybe shouldn't have were they with their assigned units. Anyway, here is what I believe is a much better list:
➢ Thought to be assigned to the packs: o A Company (2): Franklin Ionson
o B Company (3): Campbell (?) Carey (?) Stowers (?)
o C Company (8): SGT Hanley Bennett Fowler Jordan Mahoney McGuire Mullin Whitaker ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fred, first I would like to tell you how much I envy you, for your trips to LBH. I know how exciting it is to walk an study a battle field. I wish I was interested in LBH years ago, I would have made the trip myself.
In regards to your list of the men assigned to the pack train, I checked my list for just Co. A and Co. C and they are exactly the same. Here's my info on the two from Co.A and I just listed a few from Co. C.
7Th US Cavalry Co. A Franklin, John W. Born: Providence, RI. 1850 Enlisted: June 1875 Age: 25 Assign: Pvt. Co. A Former Occupation: Stableman Death: Unknown (Duty June 1876, Pvt. assigned to pack train)
Jonson, Emil O. Born: Kalmar, Sweden 1853 Enlisted: June 1874 Age: 21 Assign: Pvt. Co. A Former Occupation: Unknown Death: Hartford, Conn. Jan. 1906 (Duty June 1876, Pvt. assigned to pack train)
Co. C Hanley, Richard P. Born: Boston, Mass. 1843 Enlisted: Sept. 1873 Age: 30 Assign: Pvt. Co. C Former Occupation: Unknown Death: Boston, Mass. Sept. 1923 (Duty June 1876, Sgt. assigned to pack train. Won Medal of Honor at Hill Top fight)
Bennett, James C. Born: Shelby, Ohio 1848 Enlisted: Sept. 1875 Age: 27 Assign: Pvt. Co. C Former Occupation: Laborer Death: July 5, 1876 onboard the Far West (Duty June 1876, Pvt. assigned to pack train. Wounded at Hill Top fight)
Fowler, Isaac Born: Ohio, 1844 Enlisted: Sept. 1873 Age: 29 Assign: Pvt. Co. C Former Occupation: Farmer Death: Indiana, Dec. 1881 (Duty June 1876, Pvt. assigned to pack train)
I hope this is the same info you have, which would make mine correct.
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Post by fred on Sept 19, 2015 9:33:22 GMT -6
In regards to your list of the men assigned to the pack train, I checked my list for just Co. A and Co. C and they are exactly the same. Here's my info on the two from Co.A and I just listed a few from Co. C. 7Th US Cavalry Co. A Franklin, John W. Born: Providence, RI. 1850 Enlisted: June 1875 Age: 25 Assign: Pvt. Co. A Former Occupation: Stableman Death: Unknown (Duty June 1876, Pvt. assigned to pack train) Jonson, Emil O. Born: Kalmar, Sweden 1853 Enlisted: June 1874 Age: 21 Assign: Pvt. Co. A Former Occupation: Unknown Death: Hartford, Conn. Jan. 1906 (Duty June 1876, Pvt. assigned to pack train) Co. C Hanley, Richard P. Born: Boston, Mass. 1843 Enlisted: Sept. 1873 Age: 30 Assign: Pvt. Co. C Former Occupation: Unknown Death: Boston, Mass. Sept. 1923 (Duty June 1876, Sgt. assigned to pack train. Won Medal of Honor at Hill Top fight) Bennett, James C. Born: Shelby, Ohio 1848 Enlisted: Sept. 1875 Age: 27 Assign: Pvt. Co. C Former Occupation: Laborer Death: July 5, 1876 onboard the Far West (Duty June 1876, Pvt. assigned to pack train. Wounded at Hill Top fight) Fowler, Isaac Born: Ohio, 1844 Enlisted: Sept. 1873 Age: 29 Assign: Pvt. Co. C Former Occupation: Farmer Death: Indiana, Dec. 1881 (Duty June 1876, Pvt. assigned to pack train) I hope this is the same info you have, which would make mine correct. This is great work, Dan. Here is what I have: Franklin's enlistment date was January 11, 1875. I do not have a death date or even a location for Jonson (aka, Ionson).... Where did you get that from? If you can provide me with a source, I have update my book. The rest is right-on. By the way, while I do not like touting my own work, the publisher is putting out a 2nd edition of Participants in the Battle of the Little Big Horn, probably some time in November. It will contain the names of more than 5,000 Indians who could have been at the battle, plus updates on a number of other names. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by dan25 on Sept 19, 2015 9:43:02 GMT -6
Fred, thank you for the info on the book. As soon as I can back track and find the web-address for the other info I will post it for you. I have visited so many sites looking for info my eyes are crossed.
regards dan25
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Post by wild on Sept 19, 2015 11:00:51 GMT -6
AZ
So Reno did send Weir through Hare to go to Custer. Well to be exact ;Weir had already departed when Reno sent Hare after him .
Too many Indians prevented the company from advancing. This is not correct . No attempt was made to try to force the route to Custer . The decision not to was a judgement call. Cheers
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Post by wild on Sept 19, 2015 11:54:10 GMT -6
Hi Dave Custer lost his command . Benteen endangered the command. Reno saved his command And on Reno hill Benteen ignoring Reno's orders failed to entranch his company and as a result his company took the greatestnumber of casualties. I rest my case. Cheers
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Post by dave on Sept 19, 2015 14:35:13 GMT -6
Hi Dave Custer lost his command . I agreeBenteen endangered the command. I disagree since he acted on the missive from Cooke as best as he could determine the facts and reorganized Reno's commandReno saved his command I agree by retrograding from the valley when he didAnd on Reno hill Benteen ignoring Reno's orders failed to entranch his company and as a result his company took the greatestnumber of casualties. I agree he failed to act properlyI rest my case. Just go ahead Regards DaveCheers
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Post by jodak on Sept 19, 2015 15:26:11 GMT -6
And on Reno hill Benteen ignoring Reno's orders failed to entranch his company and as a result his company took the greatestnumber of casualties.
I agree he failed to act properly
Benteen's company occupied the most exposed portion of the perimeter from a terrain perspective. You could argue that was all the more reason to entrench, and Benteen claimed that he sent to the pack train for shovels to do so but none were available, and he didn't push the matter to require the men to do the best that they could with knifes and cups and so forth, as was done in some other companies, as he thought that such efforts would be largely fruitless and he felt it better for the men to rest than spend their time on entrenching efforts of dubious value. They did make use of some hardtack boxes and saddles to construct rudimentary breastworks, but these turned out to be of little value, as the vast majority of the companies' casualties resulted from fire coming from the rear on the opposite side of the perimeter. In short, most of H's casualties were the result of the exposed position and crossing fire, not the failure to entrench.
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Post by edavids on Sept 19, 2015 22:24:41 GMT -6
This may be slightly off-topic but here goes: I was trying to follow the "General Nelson Miles" thread on the other board. It was started with an agenda and got wildly off topic very quickly. Keeping somewhat with the thought of "What could Reno Have Done Better", what do people here think of General Miles' account of the Little Bighorn. Any idea as to why he might have defended Custer (were they friends at one point in time)? As, from what I can see, an experienced, respected and successful Indian fighter, how legitimate were his praises of Custer and criticisms of Reno & Benteen? I'm not looking for another agenda-driven controversy. I am curious as to just how much to weight to add Miles' opinions to my overall concept of the battle.
I have read the document once; am not sure whether or not the original poster on the other board pasted the whole thing or cherry picked, and I just cannot find the document on the Web this evening to link to. A bit tired and my head is filled with ZZ Top (Great Concert).
Any enlightenment on the General Miles account is appreciated.
Best,
David
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