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Post by jodak on Sept 17, 2015 17:12:56 GMT -6
Sorry Guy's, I didn't mean that Reno intended to stay and defend the timberline, I ment that when things went wrong on the field, that must have been the closest place to go to regroup and for some shelter. Some feel just as you state, that Reno ordered the command into the timber for perceived relative safety and to regroup. Others, including me, believe that he never had any thought of defending the timber and only went there to collect the horses, which were sheltered there, and get out.I thought I read that Reno had no choice but to leave the timber line, that he was going to be over run. Reno and most of those with him in real time felt that the timber was not a good location to be and it was best to get out. Others, including a number that viewed the site later while not being shot at, contended that the site was a good defensive spot and should have been held. However, I refer you to my previous post in which I indicated that there was no reason to hold it just to hold it.Also read that the Indians either did or started to set the brush on fire. Could use some help with this please. There are some accounts saying that occurred, but attempting to set the brush on fire and succeeding are two different things. My thoughts are that, even if the Indians had succeeded in starting a few small fires in places, and even if was dry enough and the wind was right, etc., it would still have taken some time, if ever, to grow to proportions that truly threatened the soldiers. I consider this a non-factor.As for falling back and regrouping, this is usually done to a predetermined position. I don't think Reno had any more knowledge of the terrain than Custer did. You are correct. Reno's intent was to fall back to the ford B area, which he had just crossed and had at least some familiarity with, but the Indians in his rear forced him to deviate toward the river earlier than expected and cross at a different location, with which he had no familiarity. It turned out to have been a poor crossing location, with steep banks from which the troopers had to leap their horses into the river, and many of the dismounts and casualties occurred there.Having even the slightest knowledge of the terrain is an extremely important fact in any military operation. And before Benteen, or the pack train or McDougall arrived I don't think Reno could go any where with out the Indians being hot on his heels. I also don't think he had a sufficient number of men to mount a rear guard while the rest escaped considering the men needed to help with the wounded, even if they tried a leap frog action. A rear guard would have been largely ineffective for the reason that there was no rear, as Indians were all around and already in the rear, rear of any rear guard that could have been attempted. There are some indications that some sort of rear guard action, likely at the instigation of Captain French, did take place, but its value was negligible. The only exception to this is that it is possible that some sort of force could/should have been detailed to cover the actual river crossing.
Once every one did arrive Reno had a some what of a formidable force, atleast compared to Custer. And yes he should have used it more wisely. Please correct me if I'am wrong. I read a post here a while back saying Custer stripped 6 men from each company to form a guard company for the pack train. I have found several rosters to the contrary. Custer stripped 47 men from his own co's. taking only 6 from Reno and 4 from Benteen and 0 from McDougall. The troopers were not detailed to the pack train to guard it but to manage it, as there were only a few civilian packers. Technically, most of the pack train was not assigned to the regiment as a whole, but to the individual companies, each of which had its own allotment of mules for carrying that company's effects (largely rations and camp equipment), and the troopers detailed to the train were basically there to look after their own companies' mules, hence each company was represented in roughly equal proportions, with a few extra thrown in to manage the mules carrying the headquarter's effects and the ammunition.
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Post by fred on Sept 17, 2015 17:33:51 GMT -6
If I am not mistaken-- and I could be; I would have to double-check my notes-- each company was allotted 12 mules. I believe that may have been in addition to the ammo mules. I am sure a couple were assigned for Custer's personal effects: only Custer had a tent, so I am sure he also had a couple pieces of furniture along for the ride. There were originally some 12 packers leaving the PRD, but it seems only five accompanied the column up the Rosebud. K Company may have had only 6 men assigned to the train rather than seven; the overages from the other companies were strikers, cooks, horse-minders for the extra horses, and possibly even some orderlies not accompanying their units. All told, there were 2 officers and 141 enlisted personnel with the train, a unit larger than Benteen's battalion.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Sept 17, 2015 17:42:48 GMT -6
Just a newbies thought, not to defend Reno's actions. Has anyone considered a possible infliction related to combat? "posttraumatic Stress", "Self Preservation" even "Survivors Guilt". dan25, Every other year I go to the LBH and meet up with five very good and dear friends. (We had to postpone this year's adventures, but we will be going in June 2016.) One of those friends-- Gary Lemery-- feels exactly as you feel. I am not sure I buy into it because I think Reno did just fine-- at least up until the retreat from the timber-- but Gary-- and you-- may be on to something. I cannot say because I am not very proficient in such matters. What I will say is Reno's actions in the valley were a lot better than what we saw on the hilltop. He is given tremendous criticism for the method of retreat, but like Dark Cloud used to say, prove any other way would have been better. Or something like that. And you know what? No one has ever been able to do so. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by dan25 on Sept 17, 2015 18:42:20 GMT -6
Jodak and fred, thank you both for the corrections and the help.
fred, I am probaly wrong about this also, but I read three rosters on line that gave the names and rank of those that was assigned to the pack train. They didn't mention any strikers, cooks or horse-minders. This was the assignments I read.
Co. M, 1st Lt. Edward G. Mathey assigned to lead the so called Co. for the pack train. Co. G, Sgt. Alexander Brown and 2 Pvts. Co. A, 2 Pvts. Co. K, Sgt. John J. Rafter and 2 Pvts. Co. H, 1 Pvt. Co. C, Sgt. Richard P. Hanley and 7 Pvts. Co. E, Sgt. James T. Riley and and 8 Pvts. Co. F, Sgt. William A. Curtiss and 8 Pvts. Co. I, Sgt. Milton J. Delacy and 7 Pvts. Co. L, Sgt. John Muller and 11 Pvts. Total 56 This was to guard the pack train, and McDougall's Co. was the rear guard behind the pack train.
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Post by fred on Sept 17, 2015 18:53:27 GMT -6
fred, I am probaly wrong about this also, but I read three rosters on line that gave the names and rank of those that was assigned to the pack train. They didn't mention any strikers, cooks or horse-minders. This was the assignments I read. Co. M, 1st Lt. Edward G. Mathey assigned to lead the so called Co. for the pack train. Co. G, Sgt. Alexander Brown and 2 Pvts. Co. A, 2 Pvts. Co. K, Sgt. John J. Rafter and 2 Pvts. Co. H, 1 Pvt. Co. C, Sgt. Richard P. Hanley and 7 Pvts. Co. E, Sgt. James T. Riley and and 8 Pvts. Co. F, Sgt. William A. Curtiss and 8 Pvts. Co. I, Sgt. Milton J. Delacy and 7 Pvts. Co. L, Sgt. John Muller and 11 Pvts. Total 56 This was to guard the pack train, and McDougall's Co. was the rear guard behind the pack train. Dan25, I do not know where you got that, but I have put together what I believe is the most comprehensive and correct list of those assigned to the pack train. It is incomplete because we simply do not know who was assigned, specifically, where. We can make some fairly good educated guesses because of those who survived, who maybe shouldn't have were they with their assigned units. Anyway, here is what I believe is a much better list: ➢ Thought to be assigned to the packs: o A Company (2): Franklin Ionson o B Company (3): Campbell (?) Carey (?) Stowers (?) o C Company (8): SGT Hanley Bennett Fowler Jordan Mahoney McGuire Mullin Whitaker o D Company: None known o E Company (9): SGT Riley Miller Spencer Berwald James Kimm Lange Liddiard McKenna (?) o F Company (10): SGT Curtiss Gregg Howard Hunter Lefler Lyons Myers Pickard Reiley Rooney o G Company (3): SGT Brown Campbell McEagan o H Company (1): Adams o I Company (9): SGT DeLacy Braun Jones Kennedy McNally McShane Owens Ramsey Cooney o K Company (4): SGT Rafter Burkardt Raichel Robers o L Company (13): SGT Mullen Abrams Banks Brown Burkman Etzler Logue Marshall McHugh Moore Rose Stoffel Sullivan o M Company (1): SGT McGlone Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by edavids on Sept 17, 2015 20:10:12 GMT -6
Dave agus Dave eile Gentlemen It is a basic principle of the conduct of offensive action that men and units do not turn aside or halt their forward movement least of all to assist defeated units. A halt will cause confusion among other units,.it will stall the momentum ,it will undermine morale and it will hand to the enemy the initiative. It might, as at the LBH produce a favourable outcome but in the general round of armed conflict it will lose more battles and cause far more lives to be wasted. A commander guilty of such action would face court martial with very serious consequences. Custer's location was Custer's problem not Benteen's. Reno as senior officer present could order Benteen to halt . Benteen presented his orders to Reno and Reno having read them made no comment. It was for Benteen to then ask for clarification and if his orders were to be countermanded to request that countermand in writing. No such proceedings took place. stopping to restore a blown command to some level of fighting efficiencyFar from restoring fighting efficiency Benteen lost control of his own battalion and actually left his post without informing Reno. Benteen endangered the command by triggering an unorganised ad hoc movement Northwards. Benteen simply went missing until reality forced him to do his job. Cheers Duly noted and interesting concept. Not ready to "take a walk on the Wild side" (yes, I really did say that) and agree with you but I'd be interested in some of our military experts weighing in. I do agree to an extent that the move to the Weir point area proved relatively useless but 20/20 hindsight Reno & Benteen likely would have been pilloried even worse had they not made the attempt. Still trying to figure out how not risking the entire command to reach Custer constitutes "high treason" in some people's minds. Best, David
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Post by edavids on Sept 17, 2015 20:11:02 GMT -6
Illogical logic has been with us for all of humankind. I'll plead guilty to it sometimes. Point well taken, Jodak. I've always been curious how certain elements believe that Benteen could just "join" Reno in the timber completely discounting that he would have had to fight his way through 500-900 warriors with his dinky force of 115. That same element also believe that Benteen could take the same 115 and romp his way through 1,000-2,000 warriors on miserable terrain in order to bail out Custer. Just catch 'em in a cross-fire from 3500 meters if worse comes to worse (and it did!). Extremely good post. Nice work. Best wishes, Fred. Thank you, Fred.
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Post by dave on Sept 17, 2015 20:41:49 GMT -6
Dan
Like you I wonder if Reno did not suffer from PTSD, at least temporally. Consider that Bloody Knives' head exploded and drenched him with blood and brains. How could a man not be affected by that experience? Fred, Steve and other combat vets can address this matter far beyond my poor efforts but how could an event so violent and so close not cause Reno to be addled a little bit if not more? Reno was unable to determine where Benteen was let alone Custer. Those who fault Reno for not knowing to stay in the timber longer (Dan I was not before or now referring to you) have no basis for their belief. Custer went north and was not seen supporting or flanking the Indians. I am only familiar with one documented case of a commanding officer drinking to excess and becoming drunk. General James Ledlie, stayed in a bombproof while his division was attacking at the Battle of the Crater. Yet they bring out this canard about Reno based on the suspected testimony of disgruntled civilian packers. Reno was drunk and behaving in an unmilitary manner in 1877 at Fort Abercrombie but not at the LBH. Without a doubt Reno was his own worst enemy and a difficult man to like or respect. But he was not the cause of the 7th Cavalry's disaster, that was Custer's little red wagon and his alone. Regards Dave
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Post by wild on Sept 17, 2015 23:09:32 GMT -6
Hi Dave
Still trying to figure out how not risking the entire command to reach Custer constitutes "high treason" in some people's minds What I'm suggesting is an organised aggressive advance as far as conditions allowed .A risk far less than the awful circus which Benteen did lead forward
Duly noted and interesting concept. Not ready to "take a walk on the Wild side" (yes, I really did say that) and agree with you but I'd be interested in some of our military experts weighing in If I'm not mistaken Col Montrose [hope I'm not doing him an injustice]has posted that Benteen endangered the command. Capt Fred [perhaps Major] always seems non committal on the subject . Marines Dan and AZ are totally in the Benteen camp. The late lamented DC was a great defender of Benteen and only recently I saw a photo of the man and marvelled at how alike Benteen he seemed .Perhaps a reincarnation ?
Wild was a trooper in Keogh's I troop.
Regards
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Post by edavids on Sept 18, 2015 8:01:57 GMT -6
Hi Dave Still trying to figure out how not risking the entire command to reach Custer constitutes "high treason" in some people's mindsWhat I'm suggesting is an organised aggressive advance as far as conditions allowed .A risk far less than the awful circus which Benteen did lead forward Duly noted and interesting concept. Not ready to "take a walk on the Wild side" (yes, I really did say that) and agree with you but I'd be interested in some of our military experts weighing inIf I'm not mistaken Col Montrose [hope I'm not doing him an injustice]has posted that Benteen endangered the command. Capt Fred [perhaps Major] always seems non committal on the subject . Marines Dan and AZ are totally in the Benteen camp. The late lamented DC was a great defender of Benteen and only recently I saw a photo of the man and marvelled at how alike Benteen he seemed .Perhaps a reincarnation ? Wild was a trooper in Keogh's I troop. Regards Well put. I also realize that my last statement about "treason" and how people can think that way could be taken as being aimed at you. It was not. It was a sidebar comment as I have read nonsense on the Web from some people stating that Reno and Benteen should be charged with "murder" and/or "high treason" for delaying/failing to ride toCuster's aid. My apologies for my poor wording positioning. At rhis time I cannot yet agree with you about Benteen turning his command over to Reno I will agree with you that the whole Weir incident and command move north later was a bad fire drill and did put the remnants of the command in danger. Anyone else care to weigh in on Benteen submitting his battalion to Reno? Best, David
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Post by jodak on Sept 18, 2015 8:22:43 GMT -6
There is no doubt that Reno could have taken command of Benteen's element if he desired, as he was Benteen's superior both by rank and position (I.e., acting regimental executive officer). Most people tend to focus on the first, but I put more stock in the second, as I feel that an order from the regimental XO carries more weight. Also, some contend that, as Benteen had been given a separate battalion command "by orders" from Custer, only Custer could rescind that arrangement. However, I would argue that, in the absence of the commander, the XO had that authority, while it would be iffy for someone who was just another battalion commander, although of higher rank, to do so without very good reason and willingness to explain/defend his actions later.
In any event, at the time in question, both were serving as essentially co-equal battalion commanders, and their initial interactions seem to have been along those lines, with various things that both men said and did seeming to indicate that both considered Benteen's to still have been a separate command. However, at some point, not sure exactly when, Benteen placed himself under Reno's command. This didn't have to be any sort of formal process but could have been something as simple as Benteen saying, "What do you want me to do now", indicating that he then recognized Reno as his commanding officer.
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Post by fred on Sept 18, 2015 8:29:42 GMT -6
What am I missing here? What am I non-committal on?
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by edavids on Sept 18, 2015 8:38:58 GMT -6
What am I missing here? What am I non-committal on? Best wishes, Fred. This time I will throw Wild under the bus ;-)
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Post by dave on Sept 18, 2015 8:39:34 GMT -6
Wild Your brief statement regarding how much DC looked like Benteen was very apt. I tend to believe they had very similar personalities in that whether you could handle it or not, you got the TRUTH. Straight from the shoulder, no padding and no coddling. That being said, Benteen was heads and shoulders above all the officers during the 2 days on the bluff. His decision to assist Reno was the correct choice and a difficult one. Custer was somewhere but Reno was at hand and in need. Regards Dave
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Post by dan25 on Sept 18, 2015 9:48:56 GMT -6
Fred, first I would like to tell you how much I envy you, for your trips to LBH. I know how exciting it is to walk an study a battle field. I wish I was interested in LBH years ago, I would have made the trip myself.
In regards to your list of the men assigned to the pack train, I checked my list for just Co. A and Co. C and they are exactly the same. Here's my info on the two from Co.A and I just listed a few from Co. C.
7Th US Cavalry Co. A Franklin, John W. Born: Providence, RI. 1850 Enlisted: June 1875 Age: 25 Assign: Pvt. Co. A Former Occupation: Stableman Death: Unknown (Duty June 1876, Pvt. assigned to pack train)
Jonson, Emil O. Born: Kalmar, Sweden 1853 Enlisted: June 1874 Age: 21 Assign: Pvt. Co. A Former Occupation: Unknown Death: Hartford, Conn. Jan. 1906 (Duty June 1876, Pvt. assigned to pack train)
Co. C Hanley, Richard P. Born: Boston, Mass. 1843 Enlisted: Sept. 1873 Age: 30 Assign: Pvt. Co. C Former Occupation: Unknown Death: Boston, Mass. Sept. 1923 (Duty June 1876, Sgt. assigned to pack train. Won Medal of Honor at Hill Top fight)
Bennett, James C. Born: Shelby, Ohio 1848 Enlisted: Sept. 1875 Age: 27 Assign: Pvt. Co. C Former Occupation: Laborer Death: July 5, 1876 onboard the Far West (Duty June 1876, Pvt. assigned to pack train. Wounded at Hill Top fight)
Fowler, Isaac Born: Ohio, 1844 Enlisted: Sept. 1873 Age: 29 Assign: Pvt. Co. C Former Occupation: Farmer Death: Indiana, Dec. 1881 (Duty June 1876, Pvt. assigned to pack train)
I hope this is the same info you have, which would make mine correct.
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