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Post by edavids on Sept 14, 2015 23:37:39 GMT -6
I know this has been beaten to death but usually from the standpoint of pointing fingers and assigning blame. I'd like to explore what could Reno have done better given the situation on Reno Hill vs. what some people think he should have done to save Custer. This is one part of the battle where my personal jury is still out on whether Reno performed to the best of his ability or, at the other extreme, merely let survival instinct kick in and passed the buck to Benteen. My mind is wide open on this one.
Not going to give my newbie opinions just yet except to state that Reno's one action that I found inexcusable was the jaunt to find Hodgson's body. IMHO, he turned his back on his men for that 30 minutes and left Benteen holding a bag of ****.
It's about 2:15 local sun time on a lonely bluff overlooking the Little Bighorn. You've lost nearly 1/3 of your command (till you get a little good news later), horses are blown, men are panicked and exhausted, ammo is low and Benteen is riding up with his battalion, pistols drawn. What to do next and what are the best possible actions to follow?
Best,
David
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Post by AZ Ranger on Sept 15, 2015 6:14:39 GMT -6
I guess its all how you view it. Were they sure that there were no wounded? In the end the military attempts to make you act as one and the individual relationships should not interfere with the mission. I don't think that is disputed. So on one hand you have Elliot and the other Hodgson.
If compassion was Reno's error than he and a lot of troops could live with that I would think.
I'd like to think if it were my body someone would take some keepsakes to send home.
It sucks to be human instead of a drone sometimes.
What could Reno do differently if he stayed? Troopers were still coming up. Horses were recovering. The wounded were being treated and prepared to move. The error I see is not sending someone to be looking from Weir but that was taken care of by Weir. I don't think Weir himself ever intended to go to Custer or he would have been leading his company rather than sitting on the hill directing it. Just how far would they have gone if the Indians had not appeared.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by jodak on Sept 15, 2015 7:01:53 GMT -6
Hi David,
First of all, it is debatable as to how panicked the men were and how low on ammunition, but I get your point that a good deal of combat effectiveness had been lost, so the first priority was in restoring that. Probably a significant number of men arrived without horses and horses without men, and other horses were likely wandering around outside the perimeter that needed to be rounded up and brought inside. Therefore, one of the first necessities would have been to pair the men needing horses with one from those available that had lost their riders or the spares traveling with the pack train. Second was the need to resupply with ammunition, such that it was needed. However, as I indicated previously, there is disagreement as to how chronic the need for ammunition really was. By at least one account a couple of cases of ammunition were broken open for the troopers to re-supply from, but little was actually taken. Third was the need to restore command effectiveness to the decimated companies. For example, Lt. Wallace from Company G had been serving as the command's engineering officer, but after the other company officer, McIntosh, was killed, Wallace went back to command G. While I don't know for sure that it was done, there may also have been some temporary reassignments of NCOs from companies that could afford to lose them to the companies that needed them, and, possibly, even some redistribution of men. Parallel to all of this was the need to care for wounded men and horses, or to just allow them to recover somewhat from the general level of exhaustion that you noted. I also presume that there was considerable thought and discussion among some of the officers, at least Reno and Benteen, as to what the next course of action should be. Should all or part of the command go in search of Custer? Should they wait to see if Custer came back to them? Should they re-enter the valley and attempt another assault upon the village in accordance with Reno's original orders? Should they do something else entirely, such as retrace their route to the Rosebud? What should they do about the wounded in regard to any of these scenarios?
All of this took time, which is overlooked by those who contend that the command should have immediately gone to Custer's support. Also overlooked in the failure to support Custer argument is that they had no way of knowing that Custer needed support and were likely inclined to wait for Custer to come back and support them! All they knew was that Custer had ridden off along the bluffs, and they had no way of knowing where or what he was doing at present. As several stated, "We felt that Custer could take care of himself", or, as some thought, if he ran into trouble he had likely continued north to link up with Terry/Gibbon. Remember that there was considerable feeling, not just by Benteen, that Custer had abandoned Elliot and his command at the Washita and was not beyond doing it again. It doesn't matter if that was really true or not, but that is what they thought.
In regard to your statement about Reno going in search of Hodgson's body, I suspect that there was more to that than the common perception. To begin with, Hodgson was Reno's adjutant and may have had some documents and other items on him that Reno thought it well to recover. Of course there was no need to go on that errand himself, but there may have been other considerations in play as well, and it may have just not have been as big of a deal as it is generally portrayed.
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Post by montrose on Sept 15, 2015 7:34:47 GMT -6
1. Situation.
a. Friendly. Reno Bn was reconsolidating on the ridge. It would take time for the trailing two Bns to come up. There were many missing men. b. Enemy. Some India elements had followed the BN. But US force had broken contact with enemy main body. c. Action taken were to send a messenger to hurry up trailing elements and warn them of the situation. A patrol was send back to the valley to look for survivors and determine what the enemy was doing.
2. Patrol. The patrol makes sense. It was the right thing to do. It was not a bury a single dead guy task, that came later. The patrol went to the river. Several members stated they refilled their canteens. (Reno getting water is interesting for the Reno was drunk crowd, but that crowd left rational thought and analysis several years ago). There were Indians still in the area, but mainly across the river. Enemy main body was not visible. The patrol recovered one wounded G Company soldier hiding in the brush. This person is very famous for later accounts of this battle. Guess who.
3. Burial detail. The subsequent decision to send a patrol to bury the adjutant was not a sound decision. The burial detail could not start until after the shovels arrived, with the supply train. Burying one guy was simply irrelevant at that point in time. It reflects a decision based on emotion, and not what a commander should have been doing. The contrast between Benteen and Reno remains stark. Many of the critical decisions made on the ridge were from Benteen, vice Reno.
4. Weir's decisions also show a commander unhinged by emotion, making bad decision after bad decision. His job was to command his company and prepare for future action. Wandering aimlessly around the prairie was useless. A recon patrol is linked to a decision matrix. If you find something, how do you inform main body and what is the plan?
Weir's company followed him without orders. They identified hundred of Indians on their side of the river, on Battle Ridge. Then they sat there and did nothing. They did not inform Reno and they did not take action against the Indians.
Meanwhile Benteen reorganized the regiment's 3 Bns and prepared to move the Regiment (-) forward. Benteen realized they had too many Indians to the north to attack with his litter parties, dismounted men, and supply train and recommended to Reno that they form a hasty defense.
5. Hindsight. There is a belief that Reno should have known of the Ford D recon and the enemy response to it. All he needed was a few drones and satellites.
What did Reno know? He knew that the plan was for the Reno Bn to advance to contact in the valley, and then LTC Custer would reinforce him with 5 companies. LTC Custer failed to do his job, and failed to send any messenger announcing a change of plan.
The Indian village was in the valley west of the river. The Indian pony herds were west of the village. The badlands east of the river was empty prairie, of no significance.
Now we know that Custer placed his 5 companies in 5 different positions, none in supporting distance of any other. How should Reno have known or predicted such an incredible execution of tactics.
6. What exactly would have happened if Weir had attacked Battle Ridge with his company, followed by Benteen with 2 additional companies 20 minutes later? I do not understand what any course of action that has the regiment rear attack LSH makes any tactical sense. It would fail.
It was not Reno's job to search the prairie for Custer. It was Custer's job to enter the battle in support of the regiment advanced guard. How is LTC Custer's tactical incompetence the fault of anyone on the regiment rear? May as well blame Old Barnum. Or Fred.
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Post by edavids on Sept 15, 2015 7:39:09 GMT -6
@ Steve and Jodak - thank you for your thoughtful and knowledgeable replies. I can soften my stance a little bit on Reno's Hodgson quest and agree 100% that the Major's better course of action would have been to send out a few small details looking for wounded, etc. Can also see Reno giving instructions on what to do if Hodgson did get found by one or more detail. Benteen's arrival helped make a few things possible. Given what Reno did end up doing, he couldn't do much better than entrusting his men to Benteen, but I still believe there were wiser courses of action.
@ Jodak - yes, perception is reality and I do not believe that will ever change in the course of human existence.
Agree with some of your prior posts Steve (if I recall correctly), that the Weir movement was relatively useless and the act of an impatient subordinate. Whether he was trying to save face or genuinely attempting to check into what was befalling Custer is anyone's guess. My perception is a bit of both.
To be clear, I do not believe a hurried, disorganized rush to find Custer would lead to anything but catastrophe and have never had issues with the time it took to start moving.
This is definitely a "newbie" question but did Reno still have access to NA scouts and would it have been feasible to send them in small groups further north to ascertain what was going on in the Custer sector? I would think that, if it were possible, Arikara and/or Crow scouts would be harder to detect than squadrons of troopers. Stop me now if this is getting into a flight of fancy.
Best,
David
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Post by edavids on Sept 15, 2015 7:42:58 GMT -6
1. Situation. a. Friendly. Reno Bn was reconsolidating on the ridge. It would take time for the trailing two Bns to come up. There were many missing men. b. Enemy. Some India elements had followed the BN. But US force had broken contact with enemy main body. c. Action taken were to send a messenger to hurry up trailing elements and warn them of the situation. A patrol was send back to the valley to look for survivors and determine what the enemy was doing. 2. Patrol. The patrol makes sense. It was the right thing to do. It was not a bury a single dead guy task, that came later. The patrol went to the river. Several members stated they refilled their canteens. (Reno getting water is interesting for the Reno was drunk crowd, but that crowd left rational thought and analysis several years ago). There were Indians still in the area, but mainly across the river. Enemy main body was not visible. The patrol recovered one wounded G Company soldier hiding in the brush. This person is very famous for later accounts of this battle. Guess who. 3. Burial detail. The subsequent decision to send a patrol to bury the adjutant was not a sound decision. The burial detail could not start until after the shovels arrived, with the supply train. Burying one guy was simply irrelevant at that point in time. It reflects a decision based on emotion, and not what a commander should have been doing. The contrast between Benteen and Reno remains stark. Many of the critical decisions made on the ridge were from Benteen, vice Reno. 4. Weir's decisions also show a commander unhinged by emotion, making bad decision after bad decision. His job was to command his company and prepare for future action. Wandering aimlessly around the prairie was useless. A recon patrol is linked to a decision matrix. If you find something, how do you inform main body and what is the plan? Weir's company followed him without orders. They identified hundred of Indians on their side of the river, on Battle Ridge. Then they sat there and did nothing. They did not inform Reno and they did not take action against the Indians. Meanwhile Benteen reorganized the regiment's 3 Bns and prepared to move the Regiment (-) forward. Benteen realized they had too many Indians to the north to attack with his litter parties, dismounted men, and supply train and recommended to Reno that they form a hasty defense. 5. Hindsight. There is a belief that Reno should have known of the Ford D recon and the enemy response to it. All he needed was a few drones and satellites. What did Reno know? He knew that the plan was for the Reno Bn to advance to contact in the valley, and then LTC Custer would reinforce him with 5 companies. LTC Custer failed to do his job, and failed to send any messenger announcing a change of plan. The Indian village was in the valley west of the river. The Indian pony herds were west of the village. The badlands east of the river was empty prairie, of no significance. Now we know that Custer placed his 5 companies in 5 different positions, none in supporting distance of any other. How should Reno have known or predicted such an incredible execution of tactics. 6. What exactly would have happened if Weir had attacked Battle Ridge with his company, followed by Benteen with 2 additional companies 20 minutes later? I do not understand what any course of action that has the regiment rear attack LSH makes any tactical sense. It would fail. It was not Reno's job to search the prairie for Custer. It was Custer's job to enter the battle in support of the regiment advanced guard. How is LTC Custer's tactical incompetence the fault of anyone on the regiment rear? May as well blame Old Barnum. Or Fred. Thank you!
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Post by montrose on Sept 15, 2015 7:45:40 GMT -6
David,
Reno had no way to communicate with the Indian scouts. Dorman was dead, Gerard was hiding, Mitch with Custer, Bloody Knife dead. The Indian auxiliaries tried to be useful, many fought, and they had taken KIA and WIA.
Sending Indians forward to scout, with the ability to tell them what to do, or understand any report they brought back, was useless.
Whatever patrol that went out would have to be US.
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Post by Beth on Sept 15, 2015 14:45:08 GMT -6
This is probably a dumb question but why didn't at least the older officers have some working knowledge of some of the Indian languages, particularly sign or perhaps the Ree language since they lived and worked closely? Was it a matter of protocol?
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Post by edavids on Sept 15, 2015 17:24:52 GMT -6
This is probably a dumb question but why didn't at least the older officers have some working knowledge of some of the Indian languages, particularly sign or perhaps the Ree language since they lived and worked closely? Was it a matter of protocol? If I were a smart man I'd keep quiet and let some of the really knowledgeable people on this forum answer. Since I'm just the opposite I'll try a little conjecture (and that is all this is!). - I'd guess that the officer wanted as little to do as possible with hired NA's, what with fighting them from time to time, dealing with their subordinate troopers, other officers, the boredom of frontier life, etc. Whether a little bigotry might be involved, misunderstanding, annoyance or whatever, I believe using NA scouts & guides might have been considered a necessary evil and not much more. Why learn the language when other hired hands could interpret for you?
- Keep in mind, translators tended to be people who lived among the NA's, in close proximity, or did business with their tribes (furriers, etc.). Translators had often lived a significant chunk of their lives like this. Was it Fred Gerard who lived in close proximity as a fur trader for 31 years or so prior to LBH?
- Learning an NA languages wasn't like picking up a copy of Rosetta Stone in order to learn conversational French. None of the languages (with the possible exception of the Cherokees) were written among other obstacles so the only way to learn was to live among or close to them. I do not know anything about "grammer" with these languages but I am guessing nothing similar with the so-called Romance Languages or Germanic tongues. See bullet point #2 as well.
- Remember the Wind Talkers of WWII. In the Pacific Theatre Navajos were used to communicate important information on Japanese military anything. Messages were then translated by English speaking Navajos. The Japanese evidently drove themselves nuts trying to figure out this "code".
Of course, it could be as simple as no one thought learning the myriad of western frontier NA languages should even be a consideration. Clear as mud? Again, these are random thoughts on the topic.
Best,
David
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Post by Beth on Sept 15, 2015 18:17:28 GMT -6
They wouldn't have had to learn dozens of languages just some key words with those tribes they worked with the most. Also there was sign which I believe I read Custer was fairly fluent in. As for the code talkers--there were a number of tribes (and even uncommon languages like Basque) that were used in the War, not just Navaho. Meskwaki was used in North Africa.
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Post by edavids on Sept 15, 2015 22:29:08 GMT -6
They wouldn't have had to learn dozens of languages just some key words with those tribes they worked with the most. Also there was sign which I believe I read Custer was fairly fluent in. As for the code talkers--there were a number of tribes (and even uncommon languages like Basque) that were used in the War, not just Navaho. Meskwaki was used in North Africa. Beth, I get what you are saying, it's a great point, and makes good sense. I just am not sure whether the concept of officers training in native languages was even, pardon the modern phrase, on the radar screen. I do believe that the native languages varied widely as to often be unintelligible to one another and while sign language helped bridge the gap, it was not foolproof. Communications had to be very basic from what I understand. I do recall reading that Custer did learn sign language. No idea as to his level of proficiency. Thank you for the information on other languages used as code in WWII. David
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Post by dave on Sept 16, 2015 8:02:14 GMT -6
They wouldn't have had to learn dozens of languages just some key words with those tribes they worked with the most. Also there was sign which I believe I read Custer was fairly fluent in. As for the code talkers--there were a number of tribes (and even uncommon languages like Basque) that were used in the War, not just Navaho. Meskwaki was used in North Africa. Beth Very interesting story. I had not heard of the Meskwaki action. Regards Dave
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Post by wild on Sept 16, 2015 10:32:01 GMT -6
"Napoleonic battles"[ of which the LBH was one] were always decided by the reserves . Napoleon's best troops were the Guard and were always committed as the final act . Commanders of that era could only control a battle through their reserves. At the LBH Benteen was the de facto reserve . Without Benteen's three troops Custer had nothing with which to recover the situation . The lowest point for the military that day was Benteen's decision to halt .He pulled the plug on all offensive action and for all practical purposes withdrew his services as a soldier and a leader. He triggered what I describe as the Weir Point rout . Best Wishes
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Post by edavids on Sept 16, 2015 11:45:52 GMT -6
"Napoleonic battles"[ of which the LBH was one] were always decided by the reserves . Napoleon's best troops were the Guard and were always committed as the final act . Commanders of that era could only control a battle through their reserves. At the LBH Benteen was the de facto reserve . Without Benteen's three troops Custer had nothing with which to recover the situation . The lowest point for the military that day was Benteen's decision to halt .He pulled the plug on all offensive action and for all practical purposes withdrew his services as a soldier and a leader. He triggered what I describe as the Weir Point rout . Best Wishes Hello Wild Input appreciated as always. In keeping with the thread's theme: * What role do you feel Reno played in this decision and how could he have done better? My understanding is that Reno practically pleaded with Benteen to help him get his command put back together then took off to find Hodgson's body, leaving Benteen in complete command for 30 minutes. What is your opinion on Benteen being obliged to make his command subordinate to Reno? On a side note, what impact do you believe Benteen would have had in the Custer sector had he chosen to continue and not stop for Reno? Genuine opportunity to salvage a positive outcome of some sort or would it have been no more than the proverbial "college try?" Best, David
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Post by dave on Sept 16, 2015 13:01:13 GMT -6
"Napoleonic battles"[ of which the LBH was one] were always decided by the reserves . Napoleon's best troops were the Guard and were always committed as the final act . Commanders of that era could only control a battle through their reserves. At the LBH Benteen was the de facto reserve . Without Benteen's three troops Custer had nothing with which to recover the situation . The lowest point for the military that day was Benteen's decision to halt .He pulled the plug on all offensive action and for all practical purposes withdrew his services as a soldier and a leader. He triggered what I describe as the Weir Point rout . Best Wishes Wild How could Benteen not stop and render assistance to Reno and his command? He was faced with the reality of a badly disorganized command needing assistance as compared to a possible command, Custer, that may have needed assistance. Also how could Benteen's small battalion have crossed over Weir Ridge and been of any assistance to Custer? They would have been engulfed by the Indians and been a small snack. Perhaps your vision is clouded by personal rancor for a participant? Regards Dave PS I appreciated your attempt to assist on the other board but alas it was for no good.
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