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Post by mac on Jul 25, 2015 6:38:49 GMT -6
One might, perhaps, be able to justify the lack of information gathering if Custer had simply followed Reno and attacked down the valley. Instead he manouvred into unknown territory with absolutely no knowledge of his enemy's disposition or strength. I cannot see how this can be argued to be sound practice at any time. Cheers
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 25, 2015 11:52:22 GMT -6
So Custer sees some Indians up on the bluffs and deviates.
Just how far up Reno Creek could those Indians observe Custer coming?
Did they see Custer move toward them?
Did Custer kill them all?
Yet we are to believe that Custer as opposed to Reno was not discovered first when he moved toward the bluffs.
AZ Ranger
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Post by wild on Jul 25, 2015 14:15:59 GMT -6
Hi AZ My point is that the 7th did not have a dedicated recce component with the training or even the means by which tactical information could be conveyed in a useable form to the officer commanding and his officers and NCOs . My guess is that napoleonic armies of the day did not require such info ; battles being mainly of the set piece variety. That is not to say that recce played no part in the military system , obviously it did but I think it was at the strategic level not the tactical level . Example ; Reno's recce of some days prior was strategic.
Mac Instead he manouvred into unknown territory with absolutely no knowledge of his enemy's disposition or strength. I cannot see how this can be argued to be sound practice at any time. Well the military mindset is not always given to sound practice. 40 Years after the LBH the practice of the day was to march thousands of men across open ground into the muzzles of known machine guns. I think Custer was a soldier of his time .He led from the front and as WO said did his recce on the hoof.
Cheers
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 25, 2015 20:21:36 GMT -6
wild
They were a dedicated "recce" or scout unit for the time. There were enlisted Indian scouts. They received all the training they needed for the time. What training do you think they lacked for 1876?
It's kind of like marksmanship for smoothbore and rifled barrel. Once the rifled barrel produced a more accurate fire the training changed.
The same goes for the horse and motorized transportation.
Radio and electronic communication allowed for a change for data to be reviewed and transformed to intel. It worked both ways the Indians could not be warned by radio communication to flee.
So the playing table is level and the "recce" was accomplished by both sides using similar methods.
They were more primitive compared to today and observation were made visually so the value of the data was dependent upon timeliness and determined by distance the scouts were from the decision maker.
What's funny to me is that the Marine Corps has been teaching Marines how to hunt. A skill most Indian scouts would take for granted.
In my opinion Custer failed to do even a minimal scouting effort after crossing MTC and did not move so fast that was not time to do it right.
Moving toward the Indians on the bluffs caused Custer to fail to support Reno in a timely fashion. He could have sent a smaller unit to make observation. Instead he move 5 companies out of supporting distance of Reno and placed two NOGO terrain features between himself and the village. I am sure the Indian scouts made him aware of the NOGO terrain features before Custer directed them to go with Reno.
I guess my question to you wild is what observations did the Indian scouts and other scouts fail to give to Custer in a timely manner?
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by mac on Jul 26, 2015 2:47:08 GMT -6
Hi AZ My point is that the 7th did not have a dedicated recce component with the training or even the means by which tactical information could be conveyed in a useable form to the officer commanding and his officers and NCOs . My guess is that napoleonic armies of the day did not require such info ; battles being mainly of the set piece variety. That is not to say that recce played no part in the military system , obviously it did but I think it was at the strategic level not the tactical level . Example ; Reno's recce of some days prior was strategic. Mac Instead he manouvred into unknown territory with absolutely no knowledge of his enemy's disposition or strength. I cannot see how this can be argued to be sound practice at any time.Well the military mindset is not always given to sound practice. 40 Years after the LBH the practice of the day was to march thousands of men across open ground into the muzzles of known machine guns. I think Custer was a soldier of his time .He led from the front and as WO said did his recce on the hoof. Cheers Do you mean to suggest that had it been the ACW he would have mounted his attack in exactly the same way? Cheers
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Post by wild on Jul 26, 2015 11:33:19 GMT -6
mac AZ
Do you mean to suggest that had it been the ACW he would have mounted his attack in exactly the same way? At regimental level you could not take a day out for the purpose of recce. What recce was done at Balaclava? Now the LBH was a special case ; an independent action allowing Custer to make his own arrangements . Now AZ suggests that the Indians/scouts were responsible for passing back tactical information on which Custer would base his plan of attack. That being so then they must bear full responsibility for the disaster . I say this because they failed to inform Custer that a right flanking maneuver against the village would be impeded by high bluffs and a meandering river rendering it a very risky exercise .
I don't agree with AZ . The military culture of the age would not countenance the officer class being advised by such "low life".Even Benteen a brevet Colonel was told where to go when he advised Custer to keep the regiment together. I mean we have scenarios suggested in our discussions of recces being carried out by companys necessating splitting the command . If there was a functioning recce component , why was this not tasked with the mission ?
I think the practice of the day was recce by the force commander.That's how Stoneball got himself shot yes ? And there being no system of communication the best method was on the hoof with the command close at hand so that action could be initiated without delay. Cheers
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 26, 2015 16:50:47 GMT -6
Wild,
The minimum of what GAC required could easily have been conveyed to him by Varnum/Hare from Crow/Ree trackers and/or closer personal observation. 8-10K concentrated village between Ford A and Ford D. No satellite villages to the south (or north). Overnight movement possible between Ford A and Ford D via Eastern Bluffs, hidden by Battle Ridge to the movement's west, for dawn attack on 26th (if village still in situ). Intermediate possible crossing points at Fords B and C, suitability for offensive cavalry crossing undetermined (probably impossible via Ford C, due to narrowness, even from a binoculars inspection from Battle Ridge at sunset on the 25th). That's not a recce that's a brief description of the area on which the Custer action took place.
I would say that is simply the minimum intel required for the battle that GAC fought.
GAC's recon should have told him about the valleys to the south (so as not to waste Benteen's 3 companies at the critical moment), that pony herd to the west, and the movement to the north (if so) into new battle terrain on the 26th.
For a terrain recce to be of any use then it must be undertaken by the attack leader.
That's 2 separate issues: (1) Why do you say it is good practice for a leader to attack blind rather than rely upon dedicated subordinates? (2) Was GAC relying upon Bouyer's memory, to a certain extent?
And we are dealing with a cavalry regiment whose piece de resistance involves a single direct movement to the front devoid of any pretence of maneuver .Thus if a recce is going to involve a delay of a day and time being of the essance is it really required ?
So why do you think GAC abandoned "a single direct movement to the front devoid of any pretence of maneuver" and tried the valley hunting ad infinitum to the left and the fancy stuff on the eastern bluffs?
If anybody wished to try and make such a case, what intel would Reno's advance down the valley provide GAC with? How would a recon be consistent with Reno's orders from GAC/Cooke and how would/could GAC benefit from any intel obtained by such a recon at that late stage...? Well Custer was not consistent with his own orders so.....
Agreed.
Reno's action highlighted what mood the Indians were in ,were they running or massing against Reno ,what was their firepower and warrior strenght like,was the village breaking up.
How precisely would Reno's attack inform GAC of the firepower and warrior strength? Half the warriors were never involved in the fight with Reno.
It gave him sufficent information as to what his chances were of success .
How do you make that leap? What information was "sufficient" when he ascended the eastern bluffs?
A inadequacy in the recce department did not result in our hero's demise rather he was undone by personal considerations . Undoubtedly "personal considerations" came into play, but you don't consider no knowledge of enemy numbers, location/s or battlefield terrain "inadequate"...?
GAC had the resources available to gather enough intelligence to formulate and implement a provisional plan of attack at dawn on the 26th. GAC needed to personally see nothing on the 25th. Just held his regiment far enough back to hole up undetected. Time is a dimension , the use of which can win or lose battles .
Agreed, GAC failed to productively use 25 June 1876 to tactically achieve on 26 June 1876 the required operational goals.
His recce people could be discovered ,his command could be discovered ,Terry's approach might be discovered .
(1) There was no guarantee that he hadn't been discovered when he attacked on the 25th. (2) Those were ever present campaign risks. Terry would be some distance away, and the other 2 should have been mitigated. The entire problem stemmed from bringing the regiment too far forward on the 24th. (3) What would you prefer, the hostiles panic scattering on the 25th under pursuit from GAC or orderly dispersing unimpeded on the 26th with the 7th Cavalry smashed?
He has surprise he has to strike immediately. Who do you say got the biggest surprise on 25 June 1876, if not GAC? Charging blind is never tactically sound.
WO
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 26, 2015 17:23:35 GMT -6
mac AZ
Do you mean to suggest that had it been the ACW he would have mounted his attack in exactly the same way?At regimental level you could not take a day out for the purpose of recce. What recce was done at Balaclava? Now the LBH was a special case ; an independent action allowing Custer to make his own arrangements . Now AZ suggests that the Indians/scouts were responsible for passing back tactical information on which Custer would base his plan of attack. That being so then they must bear full responsibility for the disaster . I say this because they failed to inform Custer that a right flanking maneuver against the village would be impeded by high bluffs and a meandering river rendering it a very risky exercise . I don't agree with AZ . The military culture of the age would not countenance the officer class being advised by such "low life".Even Benteen a brevet Colonel was told where to go when he advised Custer to keep the regiment together. I mean we have scenarios suggested in our discussions of recces being carried out by companys necessating splitting the command . If there was a functioning recce component , why was this not tasked with the mission ? I think the practice of the day was recce by the force commander.That's how Stoneball got himself shot yes ? And there being no system of communication the best method was on the hoof with the command close at hand so that action could be initiated without delay. Cheers Wild,
What's the basis for your assertion that "at regimental level you could not take a day out for the purpose of recce"? The entire campaign had been a recon for the 7th, especially the Reno scout with the right wing of the regiment and everything from the 22nd. The question is "Why prematurely cease recon and commence action on the 25th without knowledge of enemy strength, location/s and battlefield terrain?"
I don't understand your recon point about the Battle of Balaclava? Why was there a failure of recon there? Balaclava had flaws, and the Charge of the Light Brigade into the wrong valley wrote the manual on issuing ambiguous orders, but why was that battle a recon failure?
I agree that the LBH gave GAC far too much operational freedom for his history and tactical acumen. This has extensively been discussed on other threads.
Why would the scouts/trackers/guides be to blame for GAC attacking an area they haven't inspected, most of whom then get blindly sent into battle with Reno?! Do we have any evidence that Bouyer recommended the movement up the eastern bluffs on to poor defensive terrain? What was GAC thinking in crossing a river and ascending bluffs...?
Varnum and Hare were detailed to bring the scouting/tracking/guiding function within the officer class. Who was GAC reportedly chatting with at the Crow's Nest? Why did GAC have the 6 Crows?
Benteen challenged/queried a direct order, not provide requested input or intel.
3 of the 4 battalions were conducting recon after the fourth was engaged in combat. And recon mostly of pre-battle requirements. Would GAC have sent 125 troopers on this recon if he knew those valleys were empty and the hostiles were concentrated in one huge village of 8-10,000?
Pre-battle recon was seldom done by force commanders. Take a look at the Zulu War 1879 for scouting practice, especially given the problems for the local British infantry regiments in having no cavalry regiment in South Africa. Particularly Lonsdale/Darnell and Durnford triggering Isandwana for Thesiger/Glyn/Pulleine.
As regards Thomas Jackson, I hope we can all agree that the closing stages of the Battle of Chancellorsville did not pre-date the Battle of Chancelllorsville! The Confederates got their pre-battle right for that one, just as they got it wrong at the next one (Gettysburg).
It was a battle on the hoof, and it ended as you would expect such a battle to end without there being enemy incompetence.
WO
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Post by wild on Jul 27, 2015 14:02:20 GMT -6
Hi WO You have set me some task there. Very interesting well done.
I was never involved in anything above platoon level but the drill at that level was two point men out front ,one some distance in front of the second . Point takes fire ,signal goes back to the platoon CO who joins his point, takes their assement and checks the situation ,Returns to his orders group [section commanders]Briefs them and issues his orders. You see the sequence ? Visual first then orders . Custer got the sequence wrong. He committed his units before the visual. I seem to differ from you and AZ in that I hold that the attack commander must see the terrain and enemy location . The Custer area of operations must have extended for over 10 sq miles .He has to see the field himself.Even if he had a dedicated recce component there is no way they could verbally paint a picture for him .
I would say that is simply the minimum intel required for the battle that GAC fought. No again that is based on hindsight . A dozen different actions could be fought over that terrain .You are using the features that were close to the action.
(1) Why do you say it is good practice for a leader to attack blind rather than rely upon dedicated subordinates? As the Yanks would say the situation was time sensitive , second hand recce is real low grade stuff ,Indians were innocent of military tactics and but for numbers one village is much the same as another. Strike while the iron is hot.
Was GAC relying upon Bouyer's memory, to a certain extent? Don't know WO.
So why do you think GAC abandoned "a single direct movement to the front devoid of any pretence of maneuver" and tried the valley hunting ad infinitum to the left and the fancy stuff on the eastern bluffs? Yeh I know,I mean Benteen told him to keep the regiment together . The epitome of stupidity .
How precisely would Reno's attack inform GAC of the firepower and warrior strength? Half the warriors were never involved in the fight with Reno It was strong enough to halt 3 charging companys . And I think it was only the fire from a handful of first responders which stopped Reno.
How do you make that leap? What information was "sufficient" when he ascended the eastern bluffs? It was obvious he was snookered;could not support Reno and Benteen not even on the sandtable.
Undoubtedly "personal considerations" came into play, but you don't consider no knowledge of enemy numbers, location/s or battlefield terrain "inadequate"...? Not dodging the question but his lack of ammo would have been more of a concern. And on the positive side he had surprise and was attacking an opposition encumbered with their domestic arrangements.
Agreed, GAC failed to productively use 25 June 1876 to tactically achieve on 26 June 1876 the required operational goals Could use of the 25th have won it for him a 50/50 chance but as my old sparing partner DC was wont to say he got every possible 50/50 call wrong.
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What's the basis for your assertion that "at regimental level you could not take a day out for the purpose of recce"? The entire campaign had been a recon for the 7th, especially the Reno scout with the right wing of the regiment and everything from the 22nd. The question is "Why prematurely cease recon and commence action on the 25th without knowledge of enemy strength, location/s and battlefield terrain?" Because what you refer to as a recon was not a recon atall atall it was the search element of a search and destroy operation. He was supremely confident and needed only to know the whereabouts of his quarry.
I don't understand your recon point about the Battle of Balaclava? Why was there a failure of recon there? Balaclava had flaws, and the Charge of the Light Brigade into the wrong valley wrote the manual on issuing ambiguous orders, but why was that battle a recon failure? A brigade charging blindly . The culture of the day.
Why would the scouts/trackers/guides be to blame for GAC attacking an area they haven't inspected, It is you my good friend who has elevated trackers to recon . That being so then they must bear the blame for the disaster. My point is that they have as much to do with recon as the look out on the Titanic had to do with radar.
Benteen challenged/queried a direct order, not provide requested input or intel. Just an example of the military culture within the regiment . No one but the CO has an input into decision making. See " what asshole moved the regiment forward without my permission "
3 of the 4 battalions were conducting recon after the fourth was engaged in combat. And recon mostly of pre-battle requirements. Would GAC have sent 125 troopers on this recon if he knew those valleys were empty and the hostiles were concentrated in one huge village of 8-10,000? Bernteen was not on a recon .He had been order to pitch in against anything he found .
Pre-battle recon was seldom done by force commanders. Take a look at the Zulu War 1879 for scouting practice, especially given the problems for the local British infantry regiments in having no cavalry regiment in South Africa. Particularly Lonsdale/Darnell and Durnford triggering Isandwana for Thesiger/Glyn/Pulleine. I think no recce was done full stop. Check out Magersfortain where the Scotish brigade was destroyed by riflemen dug in at ground level rather than on the slopes . Or even the Spion kop where the Brits dug a trench which was enfiladed end to end by higher peaks .
It was a battle on the hoof, and it ended as you would expect such a battle to end without there being enemy incompetence Well put. Hurrah
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Post by montrose on Jul 27, 2015 16:24:13 GMT -6
Wild,
Glad to see you posting again.
Leader's recon. A leader's personal recon is a vital part of the military art. The problem is that as units get larger, there is a point where you must delegate to someone else. In my experience, the breaking point seems to be Battalion and above. So as an officer moves to higher positions, he must learn to change his leadership style. GAC acted as a highly aggressive and motivated company commander at LBH. The problem is that he was the regimental commander, and his actions as a company commander were a disaster as a regimental commander.
Sidebar. What was your military occupational specialty? Infantry? We call them 11B in my Army. The process you describe of a point man and trail man is very familiar to me. Point man is looking for bad guys. His trail man is normally the compass guy, keeping the unit going in the right direction.
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 27, 2015 17:15:58 GMT -6
Wild,
Very interesting post.
(1) Platoon point duty
But that's not a scouting function, that's column/main body security. That's a standard advance guard, equivalent to the F Company detail ahead of RHQ/HHD on 25/06/1876.
(2) Attack commander
How realistic is it for an attack commander of his era to personally inspect the terrain? Different for a commander on the defensive, but GAC was attacking in unfamiliar terrain. I agree with you that GAC got the secondary sequence wrong. The first sequence was for the recon to give him the general details. The second sequence was for the attack commander to verify the terrain/enemy before triggering the actual assault. GAC did neither. I don't understand why GAC was incapable of painting that battlefield picture. Other contemporaneous US Army commanders could.
(3) Minimum Intel
It's not the battle I would have fought, in GAC's boots, but that was the absolute minimum intel he required of the actual terrain where he fought. When he ascended the eastern bluffs, basic intel would have told him of his assault options and the perils of himself getting assaulted up there.
(4) Time sensitive
But why did it become "time sensitive", if indeed it was?
(5) Second hand recon
Why is second hand recon poorer than no recon...?
(6) Epitome of stupidity
Indeed, and Benteen gets criticised post-battle for his performance on 25/06/1876.
(7) Three charging companies
That sounds impressive, but was it not the equivalent of 3 charging platoons? Even the gross underestimate providing by the Indian agents should be able to account for that force long before GAC can enter the fray via the eastern bluffs? Back to committing assets without his primary intel and before his secondary visual at 3411.
(8) Snookered
Why not backtrack from 3411 to Reno, and bring up Benteen in support? Why keep moving further and further away from the support of the rest of his regiment?
(9) Ammo concerns
If they existed, fall back into the valley with the pack train to his rear? Although it was hardly intended for re-supply during battle.
(10) Encumbered with their domestic arrangements
A key point. Did not GAC simply need to force the hostiles to flee without their means of sustenance? That was the operational goal, to force the hostiles back to the reservations?
(11) Odds
Do you see the odds as 50/50, on a divided blind attack (and even if the presumed hostile strength was remotely accurate?)?
(12) Search & destroy
I have no problem with the recon being conducted by GAC and Benteen, whilst Reno was fighting for his life, being described as a "search and destroy" in one sense (if we must use modern terminology, as there was no terrain to clear and hold). A blind assault, with no pre-battle recon.
(13) Balaclava
Did the Light Brigade charge blindly at Balaclava? The British Army knew what Russian assets were in the two valleys, and the redoubt objectives. The Brigade knew exactly why not to charge into the valley they did. They had been ordered to charge into the wrong valley, as far as they were concerned. A monumental fiasco, but hardly a failure of intel. Everybody groaned at the assault. The higher command watching a charge into the wrong valley, and the cavalry making that charge.
(14) Trackers
Agreed, they were not used to obtain the minimum intel after the Crow's Nest. Blind attack it was to be.
(15) Within the regiment
Indeed, now we are touching upon the command dysfunction within that particular regiment. We will no doubt explore that further. Why were the 7th so poor, and why did no other regiment suffer such a calamity?
(16) Benteen's pitch in
When an attack is that blind, it's a recon still. Would he pitch into a village or villages that were too strong for his small battalion? You see where I am heading? It may end in a "search and destroy", it may end in a recon and withdrawal. That depends what he stumbles across, which is not the basis for traditional "search and destroy" based upon intel of hostile forces and then going out to destroy them.
(17) No recon
But wasn't Magersfontein a generation later a classic example of poor maps and an inability to carry out recon due to the tactics of the enemy? GAC had no recon sketch maps from Varnum/Hare, and there was no organised hostile prevention of recon? But Spion Kop was (another) classic example of the pitfalls of poor or no recon, both in failing to appreciate the significance of Dundonald's movement and the later Kop debacle. Neither LBH or Spion Kop were typical of military doctrine of the era.
(18) Battle/recon on the hoof results
No disagreement between us there!
WO
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 27, 2015 17:19:45 GMT -6
Wild, Glad to see you posting again. Leader's recon. A leader's personal recon is a vital part of the military art. The problem is that as units get larger, there is a point where you must delegate to someone else. In my experience, the breaking point seems to be Battalion and above. So as an officer moves to higher positions, he must learn to change his leadership style. GAC acted as a highly aggressive and motivated company commander at LBH. The problem is that he was the regimental commander, and his actions as a company commander were a disaster as a regimental commander. Sidebar. What was your military occupational specialty? Infantry? We call them 11B in my Army. The process you describe of a point man and trail man is very familiar to me. Point man is looking for bad guys. His trail man is normally the compass guy, keeping the unit going in the right direction. Montrose,
Look at how GAC deployed his regimental recon assets after the Crow's Nest? How many accompanied GAC and his RHQ/HHD to LSH? Bouyer. And he was just like the British Empire in 1876, in "splendid isolation".......!
WO
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Post by wild on Jul 28, 2015 6:48:39 GMT -6
Hi Montrose nice to be back thank you.
Sidebar. What was your military occupational specialty? Infantry? We call them 11B in my Army. The process you describe of a point man and trail man is very familiar to me. Point man is looking for bad guys. His trail man is normally the compass guy, keeping the unit going in the right direction. My military backgrond is somewhat brief; 4 years in the reserves [Sunday soldiers]and 4 year with the regulars corps of engineers where I trained as a cartographer going on to work for the national mapping agency [WO would know this as the OS ]. However to this brief soujourn with the military I add years envolved in adventure sports ;long range navagational races and such like. I have first hand experience how the body performs under stress and exhaustion.I have seen people unable to process information unable to make a decision ,unable to reach a summit no more than a few metres higher. Military heros ;Lannes ,Paddy Cleburne ,Tom Barry ,and a sneeking regard for Gen.Beauregard . I believe Custer was over run very soon after MTCF .No recces or detached units or fancy maneuvers . No one has ever factered in time spent by Indians plundering Custer's command and whooping it up in cavalry uniforms.Take an hour off the "accepted"time for the end of the Custer Fight and see what that does to the suggested scenarios. I'm reading Ardennes at the moment.Very biased,expected better from Antony Beevor.
I agree with yours re battalion as the point of division for personal recce because beyond that level personal leadership does is not practical . There is tactical detail which the brigade CO does not need to know but which is very relevant at battalion level. Hurrah
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 28, 2015 7:06:45 GMT -6
mac AZ
Do you mean to suggest that had it been the ACW he would have mounted his attack in exactly the same way?At regimental level you could not take a day out for the purpose of recce. What recce was done at Balaclava? Now the LBH was a special case ; an independent action allowing Custer to make his own arrangements . Now AZ suggests that the Indians/scouts were responsible for passing back tactical information on which Custer would base his plan of attack. That being so then they must bear full responsibility for the disaster . I say this because they failed to inform Custer that a right flanking maneuver against the village would be impeded by high bluffs and a meandering river rendering it a very risky exercise . I don't agree with AZ . The military culture of the age would not countenance the officer class being advised by such "low life".Even Benteen a brevet Colonel was told where to go when he advised Custer to keep the regiment together. I mean we have scenarios suggested in our discussions of recces being carried out by companys necessating splitting the command . If there was a functioning recce component , why was this not tasked with the mission ? I think the practice of the day was recce by the force commander.That's how Stoneball got himself shot yes ? And there being no system of communication the best method was on the hoof with the command close at hand so that action could be initiated without delay. Cheers That's not what I suggested at all. I suggested that duties and responsibilities of US Army Indian Scouts were different than the criteria you use as I understand your definition of recce. If you read a Cavalry tactics manual of the time they appear to be more about formations rather than our current use of the term tactics. This has nothing to do with culture. Its about the use of terms. There were Indian scouts and the Army called them that. I am not sure how you're using the word recce. It appears that you believe only Custer could do a recce according to your statements. So do you believe that the Army wasted money hiring Indian scouts since they could not make tactical decisions? Do you think Custer turned up Davis Creek on his own volition or due to the scouting efforts of the Indian Scouts? I believe the Indians and others advised Custer of many options including don't go there and also go fast depending on which account you read. I think Custer would and should use the scouts to make an informed decision not as a recommendation of what tactics to use. Regards AZ Ranger
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Post by wild on Jul 28, 2015 8:12:38 GMT -6
Ho W0 Platoon point duty
But that's not a scouting function, that's column/main body security. That's a standard advance guard, equivalent to the F Company detail ahead of RHQ/HHD on 25/06/1876. A lot of these tasks overlap and are closely related by a common purpose of insurance .
(2) Attack commander
How realistic is it for an attack commander of his era to personally inspect the terrain? Different for a commander on the defensive, but GAC was attacking in unfamiliar terrain. The lay of it may have beem unfamiliar but it was the same stuff he had been wending his way over for the past few days.So yes he can attack over it and adjust if necessary . I don't understand why GAC was incapable of painting that battlefield picture. Other contemporaneous US Army commanders could. It is not possible to convey geographical information verbally . As there were no maps available recce other than personal was futile. He had suprise , no prepared defences to condend with and his opposition were in domestic mode .
(3) Minimum Intel
It's not the battle I would have fought, in GAC's boots, but that was the absolute minimum intel he required of the actual terrain where he fought. When he ascended the eastern bluffs, basic intel would have told him of his assault options and the perils of himself getting assaulted up there. Custer knew without recce on which side of the river the village was positioned yet he choose to put it between himself and his opposition. He was told by Reno that the Indians were in front of him .He saw from Weir Point all he needed but did nothing to improve his situation. A verbal description of the terrain was not going to change his mind. Custer's problem is that he is committed .To reverse course would be to admit a blunder .Personally I feel that the battle of the LBH was won on the Rosebud .
(4) Time sensitive
But why did it become "time sensitive", if indeed it was? Surprise has a best before date
(5) Second hand recon
Why is second hand recon poorer than no recon...? Didya ever look in one of those distorted mirrors .Which is better distorted image or no image?
(7) Three charging companies
That sounds impressive, but was it not the equivalent of 3 charging platoons? Even the gross underestimate providing by the Indian agents should be able to account for that force long before GAC can enter the fray via the eastern bluffs? Back to committing assets without his primary intel and before his secondary visual at 3411. Custer was attacking come hell or high water .
(8) Snookered
Why not backtrack from 3411 to Reno, and bring up Benteen in support? Why keep moving further and further away from the support of the rest of his regiment? Can you imagine Custer doing a u turn and admitting a mistake ?
(10) Encumbered with their domestic arrangements
A key point. Did not GAC simply need to force the hostiles to flee without their means of sustenance? That was the operational goal, to force the hostiles back to the reservations? I think he only had to dispossess them of their impedimenta and sleeping quaters .
(11) Odds
Do you see the odds as 50/50, on a divided blind attack (and even if the presumed hostile strength was remotely accurate?)? I think the unit was not fit for purpose . But for Custer purposes Blind v surprise I think 50/50 is the going rate .
.
(13) Balaclava
Did the Light Brigade charge blindly at Balaclava? Yes . Ours not to reason why
The British Army knew what Russian assets were in the two valleys, and the redoubt objectives. The Brigade knew exactly why not to charge into the valley they did. They had been ordered to charge into the wrong valley, as far as they were concerned. A monumental fiasco, but hardly a failure of intel. Everybody groaned at the assault. The higher command watching a charge into the wrong valley, and the cavalry making that charge. You see where verbals get you ,Up the wrong valley.
(15) Within the regiment
Indeed, now we are touching upon the command dysfunction within that particular regiment. We will no doubt explore that further. Why were the 7th so poor, and why did no other regiment suffer such a calamity? That's for our friends the Yanks to answer .
(16) Benteen's pitch in
When an attack is that blind, it's a recon still. Would he pitch into a village or villages that were too strong for his small battalion? You see where I am heading? It may end in a "search and destroy", it may end in a recon and withdrawal. That depends what he stumbles across, which is not the basis for traditional "search and destroy" based upon intel of hostile forces and then going out to destroy them. It was Indians he was going up against not regular Viet Cong .
(17) No recon
But wasn't Magersfontein a generation later a classic example of poor maps and an inability to carry out recon due to the tactics of the enemy? GAC had no recon sketch maps from Varnum/Hare, and there was no organised hostile prevention of recon? But Spion Kop was (another) classic example of the pitfalls of poor or no recon, both in failing to appreciate the significance of Dundonald's movement and the later Kop debacle. Neither LBH or Spion Kop were typical of military doctrine of the era. Recon can be defeated .See battle of the Bulge.
Hurrah
Y
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