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Post by dave on Aug 12, 2015 16:08:43 GMT -6
Your'e just so heartless. Suggesting that I cripple some poor ole mule. Perhaps the Real Birds would have a 4 wheeler I could rent? Regards Dave
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Post by AZ Ranger on Aug 12, 2015 18:52:12 GMT -6
wild For around $80 you can ride one of the Real Bird's horses. The ride skirts the bluffs and overlooks the river. You turn just before NPS land at the Reno/Benteen battlefield and continue down Cedar Coulee To MTC. Your cross MTC and end up at the Luce, Nye-Cartwright area. If you continue climbing you hit the road travel corridor. The ride turns and passes Butler's marker and then you cross the LBH river to the Real Bird property. Just as WO describes when you are nearing the bottom of MTC you see where you need to ride if you want to cross it and continue north. What interesting is that the Real Birds don't tell you where you end up when you cross. You just do it. I had my GPS so I could look back where we traveled. Then we crossed MTC two times more with Chip Watts. The first trip was down SSR because some think Custer went that way. The second time with Chip we started down Cedar Coulee and crossed the loaf into the drainage below Weir. This route closely follows the road. It is in a map by one of the scouts. So we have ridden three potential routes and crossing MTC ends up the same each time . If you look back after crossing MTC you see how you could support troopers coming in your direction. As you pointed out it is to far to make effective fire toward MTCF. MTC is just one of the travel corridors available to the Indians and most were used on the Custer battlefield. We all know that the Indians did not travel in formations so they can cross the river at multiple locations. The drainages dump into the LBH along the length of the village. So small groups could cross the river simultaneously and use the cover and concealment of the drainages. Next year we are floating the river from at least ford B to the ford Ds. My opinion is that Custer moved off toward the north with offense still on his mind. If he thought defense he could have turned toward Benteen and the pack train. What is obvious to me is that Custer never positioned the 5 companies in a defensive location with over-lapping fields of fire. MTCF is not significant on how Indians can cross the river. In fact it would be more exposed to fire in my opinion. The Indians in small groups can cross at many different locations with better cover and concealment. Of course they could use MTC once the have troopers engaged. It would also be used to move toward Weir even though there are crossings between Ford A and B. The river was a terrible feature to put between Custer and the Indians. It worked against Custer and formation travel and favored Indians in small groups crossing the river at will. Hopefully we will have some photos of the crossings next year. Regards AZ Ranger AZ Do the Real Birds have any Morgan or Percheron horses? I would love to make it to LBH next June but fear I can not find a ride that does not have at least 2 wheels and a motor. At 6'2", 270 lbs I believe my options for riding are pretty slim, and besides I have have PETA problems. Perhaps I could make the float trip down the river, using a tractor tube, and have a couple of cold brews with all the folks who can make the trip in June. Regards Dave I think the Real Birds have a big paint that could do the job. Every year I try to get as light as possible. Regards Steve
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Post by dave on Aug 12, 2015 21:13:45 GMT -6
AZ
Having last ridden a horse that did not cost a quarter at Wal Mart was about 1972. I imagine the horse and I would both be better off if I played the part of Pat Brady to Tom's Roy Rogers? Maybe Wild could be Bullet? If the invite is open for the float party I would be tickled to join and if it is not too deep perhaps I could do without my water wings? The idea of seeing the Little Bighorn battlefield from the water as did the soldiers is enticing and enjoying a cold brew with y'all would just be buttering my biscuit. Hell, I might even acquire enough of a Northern accent to fit in with the Yankees. The folks I met in Montana in 2004 were courteous and very gracious to us transit tourists and asked us to return and visit. Do you think they meant it? Regards Dave
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Post by welshofficer on Aug 13, 2015 18:01:26 GMT -6
Hi WO Fair enough, but all the lettered fords were in reality were crossing points wide enough for cavalry to line up and attack in numbers. I consider Ford C too narrow, and the evidence is that GAC took the same view. There were plenty of places where the hostiles could cross in smaller numbers, so GAC never had the option to simply plug the lettered fords by leaving guarding detachments as he moved northwards whilst awaiting reinforcement from Benteen/McDougalYes in previous discussions AZ has confirmed that the LBH River is crossable along it's entire meandering course through the battle field .And AZ' word is the gold standard on terrain and equine issues . And of course Reno had no difficulty [terrain] in this regard. But how it supports your case , for the life of me I do not know . It just removes Keoghs raison d'etre.....He could not hold the door open for either Custer or Benteen. Surely Custer made enough mistakes without being fitted up for this tactical horror. Cheers Wild, You need to lose your fixation with Ford B, to understand cavalry tactics of that era. Once GAC decided not to cross there, for whatever reason, it became offensively irrelevant. It remained of some defensive concern, despite all the other river crossing points for hostiles, because it could expedite a build-up of hostiles and particularly a mass crossing and movement southwards up MTC towards Benteen/McDougall (travelling north via Sharpshooter/Luce/Nye Cartwright ridges). Not a river crossing to contest, but a place to monitor. The key terrain feature for GAC became Battle Ridge. High ground, overlooking the valley/Fords B&C/MTC, and a position where troopers/guidons would be visible to further battalions approaching from the south. So 2 companies deployed to counter harassment/harrying, with another company ready to ride out and reel in Benteen/McDougall. Both through a light cordon at Henryville, or against a threatening movement from the village via Ford B/MTC when the reinforcing troopers were still further south. WO
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Post by welshofficer on Aug 13, 2015 18:47:20 GMT -6
Hi WO Look forward to your clarification.As requested.... The stage is a battle field with one unit under severe pressure. From Weir Point Custer is no longer in doubt as to the seriousness of his situation. From here on we must judge the activites and actors as per battle field standards and recognise the one overriding factor Custer knows he is greatly outnumbered by a warrior force. Your suggsted scenario Custer splits his immediate command for the purpose of recce .This recce is undertaken at a cost. 1 The split occurs on the battle field and in full view of the enemy. 2 It weakens his force over all 3 Endangers his force of being defeated in detail. 4 Distance and time to his target is unknown. 5 He fails to Support Reno . 5 All this results in very small "platoons" [YOUR DESCRIPTION] operating in a battlefield environment without coordination or direction. Your description of Keoghs deployment would be ok if he were in position behind and supporting a main force.In this case he is the main force and you have him deployed in a passive mode with his own unit in "administrative" reserve. He should have been deployed for defence . The main tactical feature in Keoghs area is Ford B. Keogh is too far back to even delay a crossing here or prevent an attack on the approaching Benteen. The Indians are free to cross unhindered and to in small groups surround and infiltrate his position. (2) Can you think of any reason, other than gross tactical stupidity, why Benteen would turn down Medicine Tail Coulee with or without a pack train in tow?!!! Benteen's route beyond Sharpshooter Ridge is obvious. Luce Ridge, to Nye-Cartwright Ridge and then onwards to Battle Ridge. Who was at the southern end of Battle Ridge? Keogh's battalion. Surprise, surprise.If you peruse your map you will find that the MTCF simplex contains 4 features the Ford ,MTC, Nye Ridge and Deep Cculee. Nye Ridge and Deep Coulee area are a mile and a mile and a half from Keogh's position; well out of carbine range and can be interdicted via the open fORD B. Add this to the passive role you designed for Keogh and you see that the entire Northward excursion is at all levels untenable. (3) Why would Keogh have needed to be within effective carbine range of Ford B?! For whatever reason, probably an empty village, GAC decided not to cross there and moved northwards up Deep Coulee and look for a river crossing further north.To dispute the crossing with the Indians.Once the Indians crossed and massed and the forward dynamic kick in, Keogh was outflanked and dead. (4) Keogh's position did not become untenable once hostiles started to cross at Ford B and envelope it. It became untenable once Keogh did not timeously disengage and vacate northwards once a build-up sufficient to initiate an assault had been reached.Custer's whole position in toto and in detail was untainable North of MTC. But to answer your question.I ment position as in location . Once the Indians got across the river and Custer's recce force seperated and in the air they were all dead. So that takes us back to why Keogh did not keep fending and withdrawing northwards, and the conflict between best viewing Benteen's approach route (I Company) and monitoring the build-up at Ford B and Henryville (L/C Companies). Because such a build-up also made it unlikely that Benteen would be battling through with the pack train, and he had no "battle through" orders from GAC at all.Sorry not sure what your point is here. Cheers Wild, Let's break that down into something tactically logical: (1) Clarification Keogh only came under "severe pressure" by failing to timeously vacate northwards. Why that happened was pivotal. GAC had a good idea of what he was up against at 3411, and yet he continued northwards. I can see no reason why he would have gone to Weir. GAC always knew he was outnumbered, if the hostiles were concentrated and which he knew at 3411. He told his officers to expect 1500 hostile warriors, not the 1000 hostile warriors he was being told. GAC has already split his battalions south of Calhoun Hill, so splitting again was no great surprise. If GAC was assuming (or under the "misapprehension", to quote Sheridan) that the hostiles would not cross the river and initiate a pitched battle, why wait around for Benteen/McDougall with 5 companies. Take Yates and have a look at Ford D, whilst Keogh effects the link-up with Benteen/McDougall. 1. Re-splitting Yates/Keogh would also potentially divide the hostiles between defending Fords B/C/D. Yates recon would put all 3 fords under threat. 2. It weakened the defensive concentration deployment of 2 battalions, undoubtedly. IF there was a perceived threat when the recon began. 3. It increased the risk of a defeat in detail of Keogh/Yates, but GAC had already dispersed Reno/Benteen/McDougall and separated from them. 4. Distance and time to the Ford D area could be reasonably accurately calculated by Bouyer. 5. GAC failed to directly support Reno when he ascended the eastern bluffs, without notifying Reno or responding to Reno's 2 messengers. 6. There is no evidence that F/E separated from each other until returning to the cemetery area. C/I/L could vacate northwards or close-up within mutual support. Keogh was only passive in the limited sense that GAC was still formulating his assault plan and awaiting reinforcement by Benteen/McDougall. I Company was not in "administrative reserve". It was both monitoring Ford C area/infiltration and positioned to reel in reinforcing battalions. In the (no doubt perceived) unlikely event that a mass of hostiles suddenly crossed at Ford B and headed southwards up MTC towards reinforcing battalions, Keogh would have one company (I) uncommitted and ready to go. Whether other companies would/could follow would depend upon the level of build-up and harassment against Calhoun Hill. (2) MTC You didn't answer what act of stupidity would have enticed Benteen to proceed from Sharpshooter Ridge to Calhoun Hill via MTC? I would hope that we could both agree that Benteen would not avoid Keogh's guidons on Calhoun Hill and instead proceed down MTC and assault the village with McDougall's pack laden mules..... (3) Dispute Ford B Why would Keogh have disputed Ford B? He would have had to deploy on low ridges, less visible to troops from the south, and made himself incredibly vulnerable to infiltration from all the other river crossing points and hostiles seizing higher ground/ridges to his rear. He could not have monitored Ford C, and very soon would soon have lost visual contact with GAC/Yates. (4) Untenable As long as GAC's 5 companies/2 battalions could re-concentrate under threat and retain their mobility, there did not have to be a massacre. A victory was beyond them after moving northwards from Ford B, but there was no pre-destined defeat in detail to the last man. (5) Fending The build-up that overwhelmed Keogh would have also meant that Benteen wouldn't be battling through that build-up with a pack train. The best battalion command position to monitor the build-up was with Calhoun (L), the best battalion command position to ride out and reel in Benteen was with Porter (I). So the key question remains - why didn't Keogh pull back and re-join GAC before he was unable to disengage? Back to Keogh's command positioning and Harrington's charge.... Trust this assists. WO
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Post by wild on Aug 14, 2015 12:02:26 GMT -6
Hi WO A solid cerbral piece .
GAC has already split his battalions south of Calhoun Hill, so splitting again was no great surprise. If GAC was assuming (or under the "misapprehension", to quote Sheridan) that the hostiles would not cross the river and initiate a pitched battle, why wait around for Benteen/McDougall with 5 companies. Take Yates and have a look at Ford D, whilst Keogh effects the link-up with Benteen/McDougall. This goes to the heart of the issue. Are we not agreed that Custer committed a catastrophic error in the initial deployment of his forces South of MTC ? His view from Weir Point makes it clear that he at the very least has problems . His regiment is scattered with one battalion hard pressed, onother detached far to the left and the packs back the trail. He is also aware of the challenging terrain over which he must operate . And he is aware of numbers facing him and the extent of the village. Weir point gives him a chance to attempt to remedy his predicament. His message to Benteen and packs indicates he wants his forces to close up, rapid . This is where you and the majority view comes in. You ignore Custer's intent and have him commit not just another catastrophic error but a double whammy cataclysmic error. The message is evidence of a totally different intent than the one you ascribe to him. You need more evidence to take that leap .
If GAC was assuming (or under the "misapprehension", to quote Sheridan) that the hostiles would not cross the river and initiate a pitched battle, why wait around for Benteen/McDougall with 5 companies. Take Yates and have a look at Ford D, whilst Keogh effects the link-up with Benteen/McDougall That would only appeal to those who have taken leave of their critical faculties If you can supply Custer with assumptions that have no logical, cultural or tactical basis then you can write any scenario you please. Your problem is that you must construct a scenario where the cretinous hero does every thing correct within the confines of a blunder .
You didn't answer what act of stupidity would have enticed Benteen to proceed from Sharpshooter Ridge to Calhoun Hill via MTC The feature lies across his axis of march.
Why would Keogh have disputed Ford B? Ford B allows for a quick build up of Indians .Plug it and you at least delay their massing.
As long as GAC's 5 companies/2 battalions could re-concentrate under threat and retain their mobility Numbers trump everything .The 7th were moribund ,totally unfit for a man on man brawl.
Calling Custer's pipsqueak units battalions is an example of how misleading military terminology can be when applied to this disasterious rout. Left wing and right wing ,enveloping attacks,flanking maneuvers and such like.I'm just as guilty my self .You would think Custer had a corps of the Waffen SS at the Lbh. He had a tin pot regiment unfit for anything other than garrison duty in the East.
Cheers
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Post by welshofficer on Aug 14, 2015 16:30:32 GMT -6
Wild,
I don't think we particularly disagree over the overall battle, particularly the dispersal of force south of Ford B. I just don't think your explanation for the final massacre beyond Ford C is tactically plausible.
We do not disagree about events before Ford B, save that I do not think that GAC went to Weir Peak. GAC made a blunder of the first order in ascending the eastern bluffs, but his intent was clear: to get around the screen deploying against Reno and, whilst Reno pinned down hostile warriors to the south, to concentrate the rest of the regiment on the eastern bluffs and to go after the fleeing village occupants and then return and burn the village. GAC made a fatally incorrect assumption, that the remaining hostile warriors would screen the rest of the occupants by using the natural barrier of the river and in particular the now lettered ford "pinch points" required by GAC to form up his troops and cross in assault. It was not an unreasonable assumption in terms of non-existent hostile central command and control, but failed to grasp the consequences if there was a river crossing by sufficient numbers of hostiles to, instead of harrying/harassing, get GAC pinned down on the poor undulating terrain of the eastern bluffs and chiefs reacted to each other's actions at a localised level. And Reno was defeated, intercepting Benteen/McDougall by his distressed flight, and freeing up more hostiles to move against GAC. Including some of the "stars".
What is this "double whammy cataclysmic error"? GAC assumed away the risk of a pitched battle on the eastern bluffs. No more, no less. And if the hostiles did cross at Ford B or C, they would have to follow him into the valley via Ford D. When he did not cross at Ford B, the attention turned to Ford D (Ford C was too narrow to deploy his cavalry - a few hostile repeaters across the river would cause carnage if they crossed in narrow file). Given GAC's character, do you then see him stopping on Battle Ridge to smoke a pipe or have a nap for half an hour whilst waiting for Benteen and McDougall? No chance, he would want to take a first look at Ford D and the village flight. He lost Kellogg on his return.
I am not sure what you mean by describing MTC as "across his axis of march"? MTC was a low coulee to Benteen's left, leading to Ford B, and not on his route to Keogh on Battle Ridge. There was no reason for Benteen to have gone down there, with or without McDougall.
And how exactly would GAC plug Ford B? To fully plug it, he would have to contest the river crossing at Ford B? It would not stop hostiles crossing to the north and south of him, and getting behind the troops allocated to the task. Why do this, when the battle was moving to Ford D? You suggest a key reason would be to block a hostile crossing there and mass movement southwards up MTC towards an approaching Benteen? How plausible would that be? Crossing the river, moving away from the village apparel and the northwards fleeing non-combatants, moving away from the overlooking soldiers on Battle Ridge (who had at least 1 company ready to ride out and attack from behind), towards Benteen's battalion that would clearly see their approach?
We have regularly had this very debate about the regiment during your exile i.e. GAC's higher ACW command and his tendency to deploy widely dispersed platoon size companies like they were regiments or brigades, and the quality of the regiment and its officer corps.
Once GAC turned northwards from Ford B, the intended assault would be at Ford D and the battle would be fought in the northern valley. Battle Ridge was no more than high ground, to reel in the summoned Benteen and as the assault staging place behind the ridge line for the attack northwards. The hostiles did not co-operate, going up the eastern bluffs in more than harrying/harassing numbers and then further building-up numbers in response to local chief initiatives and tactical mistakes by the Keogh battalion. And then further reinforced by Reno's flight.
For me, the key question was why Keogh overstayed his welcome on Battle Ride?. The collapse of his battalion created a wipe out massacre, not 200+ troopers withdrawing northwards or eastwards under pressure.
WO
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