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Post by crzhrs on Jul 20, 2015 10:42:44 GMT -6
In a previous thread I asked what Custer's biggest mistakes were. Now we need to ask:
What did Custer Do Right?
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Post by tubman13 on Jul 20, 2015 10:58:54 GMT -6
Saved the last bullet for himself?
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Post by crzhrs on Jul 20, 2015 12:42:39 GMT -6
While there is some speculation that Custer or someone else (Tom Custer) made sure GAC did not fall into the hands of the Indians while alive the thought that Custer "saved the last bullet for himself" seems unlikely. His history doesn't lend itself to committing suicide but one never knows. Custer's main concern was not allowing the village to break up and scatter leaving the 7th open-mouthed and gawking as to the speed and efficiency of the Indians breaking camp and scattering. Obviously Custer had done enough to get his command within striking distance of the village before Indians were even aware there were soldiers nearby. For all the credit the Indians are given for being able to survive off the land and endure all the depravities of fighting/living on the run the one thing that baffles us is why they didn't have some sense of security to prevent surprise attacks. It may be at the LBH that the size of the village lent itself to thinking they were invulnerable to attack, re Low Dog (paraphrase): "We did not thing anyone would attack such a large village . . ." (meaning anyone who would attack such a large village would be a fool) or . . . they thought that with all the brave and famous fighters (aka Crazy Horse, Crow King, Sitting Bull, Lame White Man, et al) they were more than ready and capable to defend their village regardless of who and what attacked them. In the end the Indians were right and the Military wrong. The Indians were more than capable and ready to protect and defend themselves from whomever attacked. Custer may have done everything within his means to give the 7th the edge of achieving victory but at some point everything broke down and failed. We can blame the US military for fumbling their advantage but for some reason we don't give the Indians the credit for overcoming the shock and awe of a more potent and powerful attack and turning the tables on the aggressors and ending up the victors in the last major military battle in North America.
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 20, 2015 12:53:24 GMT -6
In a previous thread I asked what Custer's biggest mistakes were. Now we need to ask: What did Custer Do Right? GAC,
On 24 June 1876, GAC had ridden down (undetected) and was about to position his cavalry regiment to the south of the hostile village. Terry would seal the north.
It's the last 24-36 hours of GAC's life where catastrophic mistakes were made.
WO
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Post by Colt45 on Jul 20, 2015 13:40:46 GMT -6
Custer moved his unit undetected up through the 24th. He sent Benteen on a left scout to make sure there was nothing to his left flank that could endanger the main unit, though this would not have been necessary if he had properly scouted the area before the 25th. He properly supported the company that moved toward ford B by having the Keogh battalion provide deep cover from the N/C and Luce ridge positions. Those are the actions I believe he did right.
After the 24th, there really isn't too much he did right. He wore his regiment out prior to battle by making the night march, then failed to recall Benteen before launching Reno against the village, then changed his mind about supporting Reno from the rear, and communicated almost nothing to his battalion commanders about his overall "plan". And he flew by the seat of his pants after turning up the bluffs and didn't recognize a bad situation in time to prevent the disaster.
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Post by jodak on Jul 20, 2015 13:53:32 GMT -6
For all the credit the Indians are given for being able to survive off the land and endure all the depravities of fighting/living on the run the one thing that baffles us is why they didn't have some sense of security to prevent surprise attacks. I'm not sure that this is entirely correct. There is little doubt that they were aware of Gibbon and had scouts watching him (after all that is why the camp broke up on the 26th), and some accounts say that they also had scouts watching Crook, although there is some question as to whether those scouts were still watching or had returned to the village to report that he had withdrawn. If they were still watching him, then Custer came in the side door and missed them, as they would have been further down the Rosebud.
One thing that is puzzling to me is that some accounts and actions, while not actually saying so, seem to indicate that they were also aware of Custer. This, for example, includes the formation of "The Suicide Boys". I believe that their formation and the vow they took was to fight to the death during the "next" battle, but the fact that this occurred on the night of the 24th gives rise to the question of whether that was just a coincidence or if they were aware of something and expecting this next battle to in fact occur the following day. Several portions of John Stands in the Timber's account also provide interesting insight. These include - 1) The attack of General George Custer on the Cheyenne and Sioux on June 25, 1876, did not surprise the Indians as much as many people think. They knew the soldiers were in the country looking for them, and they expected trouble, though they did not know just when it would come. My grandfather, Lame White Man, told my grandmother the morning before the fight that scouts had reported soldiers on the Rosebud, and when they went farther down they also saw the steamship that had brought them supplies, there in the Yellowstone River. 2) ...So each party knew pretty well where the other was. 3) After the main camp on the Little Horn had been established the Sioux leaders sent word that they wanted all the chiefs to gather to discuss what to do if the soldiers came. They had decided not to start anything, but to find out what the soldiers were going to do, and to talk to them if they came in peacefully. "It may be something else they want us to do now, other than go back to the reservation," they said. "We will talk to them. But if they want to fight we will let them have it, so everybody be prepared." They also decided that the camp should be guarded by the military societies, to keep individual warriors from riding out to meet the soldiers.
There also seems to be little doubt that a party of Indians that left the camp to return to the agency sighted Custer's command on the morning of the 25th (this is what precipitated Custer attacking on the 25th), but there are differing accounts as to whether any of them returned to the camp to alert it. If they did not, this would seem to be rank callousness, and, if they did, it doesn't appear that this information was widely shared in any sort of Paul Revere type ride through the camps.
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Post by tubman13 on Jul 20, 2015 15:31:53 GMT -6
Jodak, You are correct The NA's new that trouble was afoot and Sitting Bull as well as other leaders were willing to talk. Sitting Bull met with Nelson Miles twice before the Cedar Creek battle four months later. So they were willing to engage. I have read somewhere that was also the case in June, although the attack on Crook would seem to indicate a different posture.
Regards, Tom
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Post by tubman13 on Jul 20, 2015 15:34:36 GMT -6
While there is some speculation that Custer or someone else (Tom Custer) made sure GAC did not fall into the hands of the Indians while alive the thought that Custer "saved the last bullet for himself" seems unlikely. CH,
Sorry, that was just me being me.
Regards, Tom
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 20, 2015 16:05:47 GMT -6
Custer moved his unit undetected up through the 24th. He sent Benteen on a left scout to make sure there was nothing to his left flank that could endanger the main unit, though this would not have been necessary if he had properly scouted the area before the 25th. He properly supported the company that moved toward ford B by having the Keogh battalion provide deep cover from the N/C and Luce ridge positions. Those are the actions I believe he did right. After the 24th, there really isn't too much he did right. He wore his regiment out prior to battle by making the night march, then failed to recall Benteen before launching Reno against the village, then changed his mind about supporting Reno from the rear, and communicated almost nothing to his battalion commanders about his overall "plan". And he flew by the seat of his pants after turning up the bluffs and didn't recognize a bad situation in time to prevent the disaster. Colt45,
I find it hard to give GAC any credit on the 25th, because he got himself in a position where he attacked hurriedly and blind. If you do that, you can't expect much in the way of sympathy and/or empathy if it all goes horribly wrong. That's a concept the other board mostly doesn't grasp.
WO
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Post by benteen on Jul 20, 2015 16:40:30 GMT -6
[/p] I find it hard to give GAC any credit on the 25th, because he got himself in a position where he attacked hurriedly and blind. If you do that, you can't expect much in the way of sympathy and/or empathy if it all goes horribly wrong. That's a concept the other board mostly doesn't grasp.
WO
[/quote] Welsh Officer, I couldnt agree with you more. What makes it even worse is that this hurried and blind attack and catastrophic mistakes were not done in any furtherance of a mission, but rather Custers relentless thirst for fame. Especially now as he was in the dog house and his silver oak leaf was starting to tarnish. This was to be a victory for him and no one else. He was going to attack on the 25th come hell or high water, before Terry was in position and God forbid Crook shows up, that would really rain on his parade. I understand you cant ask a man to do more than die for his short comings, but he took 209 other poor souls to their horrible deaths, who didnt share in his visions of fame. He was a brave man but he didnt care about his men and I doubt he ever did. Thats why I have no use for him. Sorry if I let my bias rear its ugly head. It does from time to time Be Well Dan
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 20, 2015 17:06:02 GMT -6
Benteen,
I agree with most of what you say, but I lean towards GAC genuinely was intending to hole-up on the 25th and attack on the 26th. GAC would still have been ahead of Terry, unless the village had moved as far north as near the mouth of the LBH on the 25th.
But he brought his regiment too far forward, and hurriedly attacked on the 25th out of fear of losing the element of surprise and fearful of the hostiles dispersing on the 25th if he waited another day.
WO
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Post by dave on Jul 21, 2015 9:45:33 GMT -6
I understand you cant ask a man to do more than die for his short comings, but he took 209 other poor souls to their horrible deaths, who didnt share in his visions of fame. He was a brave man but he didnt care about his men and I doubt he ever did. Thats why I have no use for him. Sorry if I let my bias rear its ugly head. It does from time to time
Be Well
Dan
Dan I think you have accurately described GAC's attitude and beliefs. The only thing GAC accomplished, besides losing 5 companies and other killed and wounded, was the beginning off the end for the Indian's way of life. What had been a hap hazard campaign against the NA's changed into a full focused onslaught to end the "Indian problem" once and for all. GAC was able to turn a minor campaign into one of the most, if not the most, written about military action in American history for all the wrong reasons. Regards Dave
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Post by crzhrs on Jul 21, 2015 11:30:11 GMT -6
While Indians may have known there were soldiers in the area and soldiers were out to get them it's still surprising that the camp was taken by surprise. Reno got very close to the village and it was only the combination of his "timidity" and warriors swarming to blunt his advance that saved that part of the village. Whether Reno would have gotten very far into the village and at what cost to him is debatable, but it still would have caused high casualties and havoc among Indians there. Custer meanwhile did absolutely nothing to "support" Reno but continued on. How much he knew of what was occurring with Reno is open to debate. Reno did more with less than Custer did with his command, not even getting close to the village and in fact inflicting any casualties to the Indians. Up until Custer's orders to Reno to charge after the Indians he had the advantage. Once the battle "Plan" was set it completely fell apart. Where it started to fall apart should be discussed.
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Post by Colt45 on Jul 21, 2015 12:09:07 GMT -6
The "plan", as it were, fell apart the minute Custer turned up the bluffs and abandoned the original intent of following Reno into the valley. That move left Reno hanging out to dry, plus separated Custer from Reno and Benteen, making 3 separate units operating independently. He had his chances to change things, first at 3411, if he saw Reno getting into trouble. Whether he stayed there long enough to make that assessment is debatable. I think his actions show he saw Reno when things were still going pretty well, hence his continued move northward. If he had seen Reno in trouble, he still had time to backtrack to ford A and cross to Reno's aid.
Once he arrived at ford B, and found that crossing there put him in the middle of the village, he still had a window of opportunity to move back south toward Reno Hill, which would have been the smart thing to do. But, the "plan" had fixated in his mind, so he continued north, trying to get around the end of the village. All the while, it appears he was oblivious to the increasing number of Indians coming across the river to engage him. I don't think it ever dawned on him his goose was cooked until he was on Cemetery Ridge, wondering where all those Indians were coming from.
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Post by benteen on Jul 21, 2015 13:42:15 GMT -6
Benteen, I agree with most of what you say, but I lean towards GAC genuinely was intending to hole-up on the 25th and attack on the 26th. GAC would still have been ahead of Terry, unless the village had moved as far north as near the mouth of the LBH on the 25th. But he brought his regiment too far forward, and hurriedly attacked on the 25th out of fear of losing the element of surprise and fearful of the hostiles dispersing on the 25th if he waited another day. WO Welsh Officer, OK Sir, fair enough. My main thrust was that Custer wanted this victory for himself and no one else. Since your opinion doesnt contradict that, in that if Custer attacked on the 26th he could still leave out Terry, I can respect and accept it. I would like to explore the second part of your post in that Custer attacked on the 25th because he felt the Indians might scatter, you may very well be correct on that. But I would like to pose a question to you or anyone else who would like to reply,not as a disagreement but an honest question. Is it wise for a commander commit his troops to a coarse of action, with no plan, based only on what the enemy Might do rather than what they are doing. what I mean is that Custer had pushed his men and horses hard for 3 days they were tired not in the best combat shape. Couldnt he have had an Officers call and made plans in the event the Indians did attempt to move. Then observe them to see what they were doing while his men rested. I know there is a time element involved, and Indians were good at packing up the village and leaving, but Sir to me this is not a village, this is a small city with 8=10 thousand people and tens of thousands of ponies. The men on Reno Hill said that when they left it looked like a mass exodus and took most of the afternoon. So I believe if observig them they looked as if they were going to leave, Custer would have plenty of time to institute whatever he had in mind especially since there would be a plan in place. Be Well Dan
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