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Post by AZ Ranger on Aug 7, 2015 19:19:55 GMT -6
AZ As far as what was in Custer's mind I think that is important and is a common tool used in law enforcement investigations. It doesn't mean you always get it right but it can't be ignored or simply dismisse.How do you assertain what was in the mind of a deceased person ? Our friend Keogh of the adjoining parish claims Custer intended to fix and flank the village. In the light of what you are now saying should we review our critism of his scenario? I understand [and tubman will correct me here]that there was no written Indian language . And direct interpretation to English was not possible. Cheers That doesn't change whether it is an account or not. You are talking about accuracy of an account which Tom and I all ready addressed. I am sure that some are as good as some of the other accounts. There were lots of troopers that could not read or write and signed with an X. Not only could that same trooper give an account he could also testify in court. Sometimes wild I think you argue for no apparent reason. There are lots of books published with Indians accounts. Just like the horse we also gave some of the Indians the ability to use our alphabet but write their words. Verbal accounts are used to get a search warrant when an officer uses it in the affidavit . They do that on the Navajo reservation and the account may originate in the native language. www.native-languages.org/Regards AZ Ranger
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Post by AZ Ranger on Aug 7, 2015 19:21:01 GMT -6
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Post by wild on Aug 8, 2015 1:32:27 GMT -6
Hi AZ WO and myself were having a conversation re Custer's operations North of MTCF. WO described a key method he used to understand the progress of the battle ; To understand and explain all that happened, save for the Keogh battalion collapse, one only has to implant one assumption into GAC's head. You posted in the light of this discussion and apparently in support of WO's position ; As far as what was in Custer's mind I think that is important and is a common tool used in law enforcement investigations. It doesn't mean you always get it right but it can't be ignored or simply dismissed. Am I not justified in asking for clarification on this key point? So again how do you assertain what was in the mind of a deseased person?Are you in favour of the implanting of assumptions into a subjects head ? Cheers
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Post by welshofficer on Aug 8, 2015 7:05:51 GMT -6
Hi WO Again thanks for a most interesting and enlighteng reply. I was working my way through your opus ,answering each point you were making when I came to this.... 11) To understand and explain all that happened, save for the Keogh battalion collapse, one only has to implant one assumption into GAC's head. That he was the hunter, and the hostiles were the prey. The hostiles would not swarm up the eastern bluffs and initiate a pitched battle against the US Army. Sitting Bull would not have central command to orchestrate it. They would scatter, at worst orderly disperse. Defend the river barrier to the east of their village, with the various narrow pinch point fords facing the 7th. Secure their non-combatants, pony herd and apparel, and avoid a pitched battle. There were clues to GAC's mind set. His view's on Reno not following the trail with 6 companies. The number of hostiles that Division and the Indian Agents were reporting as off reservation. The decision not to accept Maj Brisbin's cavalry battalion. And the decisions not to backtrack at 3411 or at Ford B.The above rendered any attempt of mine at a rebuttal pointless. Beyond MTCF we know nothing . You and I use the same material from which to form an understanding of the possible reasons for the victory .We sift through the same debris of battle,the same tactics,same character studies ,the terrain is the one constant ,and yet our conclusions are poles apart . And the reason for this is our application of "assumptions" to the mix. Your's above might be one assumption but it comes complete with 7 seperate effects . You suggest some clues with which to justify the mind set you are implanting in GAC head . The number of hostiles that Division and the Indian Agents were reporting as off reservation. The decision not to accept Maj Brisbin's cavalry battalion.His scouts were telling him otherwise . The decision not to accept Maj Brisbin's cavalry battalion.I'll accept this but it is not conclusive . Another unit with a major attached could cramp his style. And the decisions not to backtrack at 3411 or at Ford BNot without merit but going back was admitting a blunder.Admitting that he had sent Reno into the unknown. If we agree on your implanted mindset then surely Reno's stalling and the village visual from Weir Point must have disavowed him of such thoughts. He was seeing with his own eyes that his assumptions were at least past their sell by date. For Custer to successfully reach Ford D and return the Indians must act out their prescribed role . They must allow him to transit in full view [remember you have him at Ford D attracting their attention]across their front for at least 4 miles . Unfortunately the Indians were not aware of their prescribed role . Looking at the village from 500 yds or so you could not differenciate between warriors and domestics .The village was just teeming. Not having command and control is now being touted as the reason they did not react to Custers close encounter. I'm always amazed at the speed at which the first responders reacted to Reno.Not content at stopping him they counter attacked out flanking him and driving him back .Then getting into the timber on his flanks.And not a bit of command and control in sight. These warriors had mounted a preemptive drive against Crook fighting him to a stand still. Are we to believe that these same warriors lined the bank of the river observing Custer parade with his puny force 80 men in full view across their front? They knew their strenght and there was bragging rights ;what warrior/tribe would lead the assult . Later that day : Standing up there amid the carnage and wreckage on battle ridge exulting in their victory they must have been as high as kites. They must have thought [having no idea as to the enormity of the US] that they had defeated their white tormentors for ever . A band of brothers as every there was, heros all.Parading around in army uniforms,trying out their new weapons and if there was whiskey.... That is what Weir & co were witnessing from Weir point . I have no idea as to the timing here .What would you give a celebration? Custer possibly was dead long before Weir arrived . The journey north by Custer required two disasters to befall Custer's command. Like two engines on an aircraft failing at the same time from different causes. What odds that happining ? .01 I'm not going to debate the Keogh action suffice to say the "accepted" scenario is somewhat tactically exotic. (a) The timeline would be all wrong;Times beyond MTCF have to be extrapolated from Weir Point and fail to take into consideration the after battle delay on Battle Ridge (b) You would have to ignore practically all hostile accounts of the GAC wing massacre, including the northern excursion;There are no hostile accounts .The board had gone to war over this. (c) You would have to ignore nearly all the archaeological findings, particularly on Calhoun Hill;Same as above .Might support other evidence but problematic on it's own. (d) You would have to explain how Kellogg's body ended up where it did;No Idea but then some bodies were never found. (e) You would have to explain why GAC dispersed in the face of assault, rather than was assaulted as a result of dispersal - it is implausible that a continued engagement from Ford B did not result in a concentrated defensive position rather than a scattering of corpses;
You have to suggest two seperate and complex disasters to explain the mess . You have Custer turning away at mtcf in full view of the village.I suggest the warriors reacted as they did to Reno's approach. Custer had taken his command into the maw of the village . I'm sure you are familiar with Durnford's brilliant delaying action at Isandlwana? Durnford kept his distance .Reno did not and but for the timber was dead. Custer failed to keep his distance ,failed to fight a withdrawal type action ...tired horses ,retreating up hill no need to paint a picture . (f) You would have to explain why there were so many corpses in company formation, even if scattered across terrain to varying degrees, as most identified corpses were where we would expect them to be with the notable exception of 1st Lt Smith (Dr Lord treating or secured corpse?) or co-mingled consistent with this domino rout.Perhaps someone more knowledgeable might assist us here? i think body distributation was not as clear cut [sorry] as you make out.I think there is evidence to show that the battle progressed wave like from Calhoun to LSH...Calhoun troopers found with Keogh ,Keogh troopers found on LSH. I'll leave it ther Wo .It's been a pleasure and hope I have not been too cynical ot flippant. Best Regards Richard The Keogh scenario is full of the same Wild, When it comes to evidential issues, you may wish to step back and focus upon the totality and the corroboration. We actually have a considerable body of evidence, corroborating each other, and much of it is overlooked: (1) We know the tactical doctrine of the US Cavalry in 1873, it was even codified and written down. The 7th was never sufficiently concentrated for field officers to do much unique to the regiment, and GAC himself was disinterested in such matters. Whatever training there was, it was by line officers at company level. (2) We know GAC's tactical history, going back 15 years. Hell, we can even see how GAC concentrated behind a ridge line (Observation Ridge) at the Washita before deploying and sending 3 of his 5 battalions off on their movements against Black Kettle's village. We also have the note from Adj Cooke to Benteen, summoning. (3) We have the battlefield evidence of the remainder of the regiment and Terry column, in the immediate aftermath. Particularly the identification of corpses, despite the mutilation and decomposition issues. How many RHQ/F/E troopers were identified towards the southern end of Battle Ridge...? (4) We have the hostile accounts. It's not testimony, formally tested to destruction. It comes with a health warning over initially admitting participation in the battle, hostile culture focussing on one's own actions, translation issues, assumptions made by questioners, and terminology. But when you sift through it, even in isolation, you get a reasonably coherent picture of a battle. When you get an incongruity against other evidence, it is invariably resolved by moving the described event from the Ford B/Calhoun Hill axis to the Ford C/LSH axis or vice versa. We even have E Company riding greys, courtesy of GAC, to help the hostiles give accounts and separate between battalions. (5) We have the archaeological evidence. Again we have contamination issues over time, but not to the extent required to undermine Calhoun Hill. I suspect you will be hard pressed to give me a single instance in US military history of a force moving from initial tactical disintegration to tactical cohesion on the cusp of being massacred...? So we have plenty of independent sources of evidence, and plenty of corroboration between them. Dealing briefly with your points: (a) Your timeline is seriously implausible, hence Montrose's 0.1% comment. You don't just have the Weir Point evidence pointing to a battle concluding 4.30-5.00pm. We know that GAC veered off up the eastern bluffs around 1.20pm. Being generous, not allocating a rush to relieve the pressure on the engaged Reno, we know that GAC would be at Ford B by around 3pm. If a running battle ensues from there, with respect, it's all over by 3.45pm latest against that number of hostiles. So why do we know that was very implausible, before we start looking at the corpse locations/archaeological evidence/hostile accounts? Reno fled the valley before 2.30pm. In the next hour, the hostiles minding him and defending the southern end of the village would see the dust clouds of two more cavalry columns closing in. They have the better interior lines of communication, and yet you believe that the hostiles slaughtering GAC didn't react and move towards Weir Point before 4.45-5.00pm....? Especially the Sioux warriors, whose worldly goods would be under initial threat to the south from fresh battalions? (b) What exactly were GAC's scouts telling him, and did he believe them? He couldn't see "the worms in the grass" from the Crow's Nest? He valued Varnum's set-up so highly that most of the "scouts" went with Reno into the valley fight?! All his actions were consistent with 12 companies being sufficient. Declining Maj Brisbin (what's another battalion, when the 7th were seldom together as a whole?) reinforces that impression, especially as GAC subsequently abolished the 7th's tactical wing structure on the eve of battle (another sign of complacency?). Now you and I know, with the benefit of hindsight, that the failure to admit a blunder and turn back towards the rest of the regiment at 3411 and at Ford B led to disaster. But did GAC appreciate that he was making a blunder? Or was he still feeling in control and assuming hostile flight? Or a bit of both? Six of one, and half a dozen of the other? (c) With respect, there were not two disaster's befalling GAC. Keogh did not vacate northwards timeously, due to a simple tactical error, and that was all that undid those 5 companies. A domino effect, from there. Such was the absence of any combat resilience to an unanticipated defensive pitched battle between Calhoun Hill and Ford C. (d) When one first read's about the Little Bighorn, GAC's actions are puzzling. Why did he refuse the offer of another cavalry battalion? Why did he not heed the tracker warnings? Why did he attack blind on the 25th? Why did he ever ascend the eastern bluffs, terrible defensive terrain for the Springfield 1873, in the first place? Why did he keep moving northwards with Keogh/Yates, away from the exposed Reno and the rest of the regiment? Why did he order Benteen to come up into the combat zone, with the packs? Why did he keep vacating battle space as he moved northwards, not seeking to block river crossing pinch points? Why did he not close-up in time, through placing his companies within mutual support in the event of being assaulted on the eastern bluffs by the hostiles? And then you add the mind set that he was the hunter, the hostiles the prey. The hostiles would defend the southern end of the village and the river crossing pinch points with screens, unable to launch a pitched battle assault on the eastern bluffs against a force as large as the 7th. And then it all makes sense, in a sad and depressing way. Who was there to act as a restraint on GAC? TWC? Cooke? Keogh? Yates? Calhoun? Nobody that was with him, in truth, once he ascended the eastern bluffs. You could see a Benteen or a West or a Merrill acting as a restraint, but none of them. Nepotism ruled. (e) I will wait to see if anybody answers your corpse location "SOS", before responding to that point and the battle flow implications. I trust this clarifies. WO P.s. at Isandlwana, Durnford was falling back on an encampment of Pulleine's imperial infantry whilst conducting a fighting retreat, and was reinforced by the rest of his (No.2 column) troops and joined by Bradstreet and much of the colonial irregular cavalry. It was also likely that Pope was (precariously!) extending his reinforced company of 2/24 to provide additional support. GAC had no infantry in close proximity, it was a long ride to Brisbin's cavalry/Bradley's scouts if he punched a hole through the hostile cordon and rode northwards towards Terry. And career ruining, as set out in my first post.
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Post by welshofficer on Aug 8, 2015 8:47:28 GMT -6
Justin, One thing that we are in lockstep on is poor scouting. Three interesting things really hit home while in Montana in June bouncing around GAC's back trail with AZ. 1.How could the trail of warriors headed to meet Crook have been overlooked and discounted? 2.How could the high ground south of ford A not at least been considered for some use in the battle plan? You can see the whole valley from there, from ford A to the marker on LSH. We could see this promontory easily from Crow's nest. 3.Not sending the scout to Terry through Tullock's. From the other end of Tullock's scouts were sent out by Terry's command(they even found some Buffalo) while looking for that scout and an update as to GAC's progress. Regards, Tom Tom, 1. Pretty much tunnel vision from the Crow's Nest. If they have moved southwards, they are back now and in the LBH. Pony herd sighting. 2. The battle plan was made on the hoof, still developing in GAC's mind way north of Ford A. 3. Herendeen riding north up Tullock's Creek would have restricted GAC's freedom of action, and his mind set was changing as the 24th wore on. WO
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Post by AZ Ranger on Aug 8, 2015 8:56:44 GMT -6
wild There is nothing in a deceased persons mind. We have been discussing for years how it got that way. WO put it together in a post that was clear and to the point.
As far as law enforcement we do try to figure what was and is in a persons mind. A court does the same. It goes to culpability, intent, and what you convict someone for the same act.
I would suggest that the military does the same when trying to anticipate what the enemy will do next.
A person charged with first degree murder in this country does not have to testify against themselves. That would mean the defendant does not have to state what was in his mind. The state presents evidence (similar to what WO did) to establish intent or what was in the defendants mind that caused him to act and make the decisions that would be used to convict him of first degree murder. If you can't prove the intent it may drop it a lesser charge.
So I don't know what is in your mind regarding the existence of Indian accounts or what was in Custer's mind but it has more to do with debate for the sake of arguing would be my observation.
I think you would agree that even you can predict what keogh on the other board would post in regards to who was at fault.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by welshofficer on Aug 8, 2015 9:43:25 GMT -6
AZ,
If the actus reus was GAC being massacred piecemeal on the eastern bluffs, what was his mens rea (if it was not assuming away defensive danger?)?
WO
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Post by tubman13 on Aug 8, 2015 10:07:25 GMT -6
AZ, If the actus reus was GAC being massacred piecemeal on the eastern bluffs, what was his mens rea (if it was not assuming away defensive danger?)? WO For those of you without your Latin dictionary the above refers to "Guilty Act"!
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Post by AZ Ranger on Aug 8, 2015 11:50:10 GMT -6
A funny real life situation. Myself and a senior officer went to Prescott for a deposition. The defense attorney asked the senior officer " have you ever been deposed?" I don't know what he heard but answered no sir I have never been outside of Arizona.
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Post by wild on Aug 9, 2015 12:31:59 GMT -6
WO Thank you for that ,a fair amount of work went into it and I'm sure it is appreciated by all on the board.
There is no issue as to the amount of evidence but rather the quality and how we use it. Take for instance your negative interpretation of Custer's operations along the Washita; It is unusual to use a successful mission to criticise a commanding officer. It does suggest a less than neutral approach. At the Washita Custer employed a fire base of sharpshooters. His seperate attack units allowed for more efficient command and control.In fact it possibly allowed Elliot to grab a platoon and head off in pursuit of a fleeing band. And his faint when informed of approaching Indians worked a dream. You have described him as a disinterested soldier without taking into account that it was a peace time garrison army in a State with no natural enemies . Custer was a warrior not a peace time soldier.
(5) We have the archaeological evidence. Again we have contamination issues over time We have the hostile accounts.It comes with a health warning The archialogical evidence and "Indian acconts" are issues wnich have given rise to threads of dozens if not hundreds of pages resulting in internecine war.So I'm not going there other than to say that the minority view does not need contaminatED eviidence to support it's case .
Keogh deployed according to standard contemporaneous doctrine to deal with expected nuisance harassing hostiles To reduce hundreds of warriors to a nuisance is extreme at least.And another example of the polemic method used by the majority view of the debate. This nuisance had checked Reno and inflicted a tactical check on Custer at the ford . The command were in contact with the enemy who were no more than 4 minutes away . Any thing less that DEFCON 1 would have been criminal lunacy . Unless the battalion was mounted or dug in they were in the air /non effective , The markers show no stand on Calhoun Hill and Keogh destroyed out of position. Calhoun hill contains 11 markers with a further 21 spread out over 500 metres stretching down towards MTCF.The Keogh and Custer sites tell a similar tale.No organised defence.
(d) When one first read's about the Little Bighorn, GAC's actions are puzzling. Why did he refuse the offer of another cavalry battalion? Why did he not heed the tracker warnings? Why did he attack blind on the 25th? Why did he ever ascend the eastern bluffs, terrible defensive terrain for the Springfield 1873, in the first place? Why did he keep moving northwards with Keogh/Yates, away from the exposed Reno and the rest of the regiment? Why did he order Benteen to come up into the combat zone, with the packs? Why did he keep vacating battle space as he moved northwards, not seeking to block river crossing pinch points? Why did he not close-up in time, through placing his companies within mutual support in the event of being assaulted on the eastern bluffs by the hostiles? If puzzling , your case exacerbates the situation containing as it does as many puzzles . Why take two companies with him on a recce? Why take the RHQ with him? Why leave a developing situation ;one unit engaged,one unit in transit,one unit stationary without leadership or direction ,? Why take a newspaper reporter ,medic,and brothers on a domestic recce? Why halt on LSH wnen Keogh is just 600 meters off.? Why is there no organised defence on LSH.?
(a) Your timeline is seriously implausible, hence Montrose's 0.1% comment. You don't just have the Weir Point evidence pointing to a battle concluding 4.30-5.00pm. We know that GAC veered off up the eastern bluffs around 1.20pm. Being generous, not allocating a rush to relieve the pressure on the engaged Reno, we know that GAC would be at Ford B by around 3pm. If a running battle ensues from there, with respect, it's all over by 3.45pm latest against that number of hostiles. So why do we know that was very implausible, before we start looking at the corpse locations/archaeological evidence/hostile accounts? I don't have Fred's timeline with me at the moment but using Gray's we have Custer in MTC at 3.46 .Weir arrrives at the point 5.25 ,That is an 1 hour 39minutes in which to see off Custer and plunder .Sioux seen advancing on Weir point 5.35. Custer is possibly dismounted on LSH and fighting for his life approx 4.06. I see no time issues here .
and yet you believe that the hostiles slaughtering GAC didn't react and move towards Weir Point before 4.45-5.00pm....? Especially the Sioux warriors, whose worldly goods would be under initial threat to the south from fresh battalions? These were competitive warriors.not only individually but also at tribal level. Their status depended on how they performed in battle .Can you just imagine the bragging rights that went with a springfield and cavalry jacket ? Battle ridge must have been as an Aladdin's caveto them . As for any threat ; they had beaten Crook ,whipped Reno ,and slaughtered Custer.What threat ?
There is another thread covering much of this subject and I was going to post on it but there were already several pages .So to get an idea of what people were saying I read through it .The majority view held sway ,in fact there was a bit of slapping down .But there was a considerable uneasyness at the tactical naivety being attributed to Custer and Keogh. I don't think the majority view is as cut and dried as is being made out. Having said that, it is not my intention to try to prove a scenario wrong but rather to suggest that there is a less complex altar at which some of us might wish worship . Best Wishes
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Post by tubman13 on Aug 9, 2015 16:03:25 GMT -6
Wild,
I have no issues with your opinions, but how do you account for the trip to the Ford D environs. Steve and I have spent time with a number of folks(park employees)that include this trip in their presentations. The maps supplied by John Stands in Timber, include this trip in his "Cheyenne Voice" by Margot Liberty. Michael N. Donahue, presented the same to The CBHMA not so long ago. Yes, Custer was harried after For B, but not seriously. His issues became critical while stopped in the cemetery area after his visit to the Ford D area. This was the time when Keogh's area was collapsing, Custer was pushed towards LHS from this location. For a very long time I bought in to your theory, no more.
Regards, Tom
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Post by welshofficer on Aug 9, 2015 16:23:06 GMT -6
Wild,
Thank you.
(1) Washita
Do you really consider this battle "successful" in tactical terms? It was a pivotal battle, because it first raised many of the issues that fatally raised their ugly head 8 years later. Scouting failure, on that occasion not locating the satellite villages. Intricate and wide dispersal of companies/battalions. A commander can win one battle, whilst making half a dozen or so blunders but lose another through a single mistake. Why the military analyse "success" and not just "failure".
I have never heard anybody describe the Washita as a successful command and control exercise. As you say, his deputy went AWOL and was killed. The Elliott and Thompson columns were late arriving in position. Both GAC and Myers misjudged their terrain and their columns were too far from the village. The band got lost at one point, and had to backtrack.
GAC was disinterested in preparing (effectively) his regiment for combat. He had Maj Gibbs in 1868. Who did he have in 1876....?
So what's the inconsistency between Cooke's "sharpshooters" at the Washita and Calhoun's skirmish line on LSH?
(2) Evidence
Is it better to wish away hostile accounts and archaeological evidence, whatever the shortcomings, rather than address them?
(3) Hostiles on the eastern bluffs
Where do these "hundreds" of warriors come from? Many were fighting Reno, others with the pony herd, others escorting non-combatants towards Squaw Creek area. Hostile accounts place few warriors at Ford B? As long as F was covering E, and CIL was covering FE, there was little reason for an immediate running battle to develop?
Which hostile bands are thought to have been up the eastern bluffs prior to the battle, other than Wolf Tooth....?
And what would markers tell you about tactical cohesion, if you ignore all the hostile accounts? You need shell casings for that.
And is it correct to say there was no "organised" defence at the GAC site? Where are the identified F and E (Smith excepted) corpses, other than with their designated company?
(4) Northern Recon
Why would GAC not ride with his RHQ (although I prefer Montrose's HHD description of what it actually was)?
Any recon by that stage was going to involve one battalion, 90 troopers also being the safe minimum against a band of hostiles.
There was nothing when GAC headed northwards to suggest that Keogh's battalion was not under his apparent command and control, and it was unlikely to have been heavily engaged. That would have been a tactical pre-condition for the northern recon.
I don't believe that GAC halted at LSH on the return, but rather in the cemetery area. They went up LSH as a last resort, when the Keogh battalion collapsed. There are reasons for GAC not to backtrack all the way to Keogh, from equine preservation to blocking Ford C, but I find that omission troubling with the hostiles aggressive and in gathering large numbers. A fatal pause. LSH was a desperate final move, as how do you organise a defence on exposed high ground? That was a last ditch move.
(5) Timeline
I am not the person to discuss Gray's timeline, as I have little confidence in it and his theories. That is more the army officer in me than the interested LBH reviewer. GAC riding to LSH under heavy pressure after dropping Calhoun, tactical cohesion at Calhoun Hill but little further north, and absence of hostile casualties for that speed of battle, all make Gray's theories on the wing's demise implausible.
Wagner has the GAC battle ending at 4.40pm, and the first hostiles from that battle arriving at Weir Point about 5.10pm to meet that threat. Absolutely plausible, in tactical terms.
(6) Movement to Weir Point
There were so many hostiles on the eastern bluffs that the troopers would have been stripped bare in minutes, many of the CIL before HHD/F/E were even finally assaulted. With riders notifying two more columns arriving from the south (Benteen/McDougall) and moving northwards, the better war chiefs were out of there and would have been off to face the new threat. Non-combatants may have been evacuated, but that village contained all their worldly possessions. Not to be thrown away, undoing all recently achieved.
(7) Tactical naivety
I can't really comment on this, because I don't see any "naivety" as such. I see GAC's thought and decision making process fatally undermined by one erroneous assumption. And I see Keogh making one mistake, identifying the wrong gravest threat to his position and that undid him once 2nd Lt Harrington took his charge too far (1st Lt Calhoun was left exposed, with his horse holders too far to his rear).
I trust clarifies.
WO
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Post by welshofficer on Aug 9, 2015 17:11:29 GMT -6
Wild,
Always worth remembering what Gen Sheridan wrote in 1877, in response to the Lt Philo Clark report.
"There is much interesting information in this report, and Lieut. Clark's description of the capabilities of the Indian for offensive warfare is very accurate; but the narratives of the Indians should be read with a considerable degree of allowance and some doubt, as Indians generally make their descriptions to conform to what they think are the wishes of those who interview them.
As to the number of Indians in the fight, and the number killed, accounts greatly differ. Thert certainly were enough Indians there to defeat the 7th Cavalry, divided as it was into three parts, and to totally annihilate any one of these three detachments in the open field, as was proved in the destruction of one of them and its gallant commander. The reasons given why Major Reno should have remained where he was driven, on the top of the bluff, that he afterwards fortified and held, are very good; but there are other reasons no less strong. For instance, he could not abandon his wounded, who would have been slain by the enemy, and furthermore, he had no knowledge of the whereabouts of Custer nor of the straits he was in, and it is natural to presume that he supposed Col. Custer would return to his support when he discovered the superiority in numbers of the Indians, in order that the regiment might be reunited.
The history of the battle of the Little Bighorn can now be told in a few words. The Indians were actually surprised, and in the confusion arising from the surprise and the attempt of the women and children to get out of the way, Col. Custer was led to believe that the Indians were retreating and would escape him; furthermore, from the point he left Major Reno he could see only a small portion of the Indian encampment, and had no just conception of its size, consequently he did not wait to close up his regiment and attack with its full strength, but, ordering Major Reno to attack the village at its upper end, he started directly down the stream on the further side of the bluffs which concealed the river from his view, and hid him from the Indians, with five companies of the 7th Cavalry. Upon reaching a trail that led down to the river, opposite about the middle of the village, he followed it down nearly to the stream, and then, without even attempting to cross (for no bodies of men or horses were found upon either side of the stream near the ford), he went back for a few hundred yards and started directly up the line of the fatal ridge where his body and the bodies of his command were afterwards found, with the evident intention of going to the lower end of the-village and crossing and attacking the Indians there. It was upon this ridge that he was completely surrounded and his command annihilated. There are no indications whatever that he attempted to go back and rejoin Major Reno. Had he done this after reaching the ford above named, Capt. Benteen, having in the meantime joined Major Reno, he would have had his whole regiment together, and could have held his own, at least, and possibly have defeated the Indians. If the Indians had really known that he was coming, they would have gone out to meet him, as they did to meet Gen. Crook only eight days before, in order to let the women and children and the village get out of the way. Again, if Col. Custer had waited until his regiment was closed up and crossed it at the point Major Reno did, and had made his attack in the level valley, posting some of his men in the woods, all the Indians there could not have defeated him. I do not attribute Col. Custer's action to either recklessness or want of judgment, but to a misapprehension of the situation and to a superabundance of courage."
Remember that Lt Philo Clark's map placed some elements of the 7th in the vicinity of Ford D...
WO
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Post by wild on Aug 10, 2015 1:22:40 GMT -6
Tubman I have no issues with your opinions, but how do you account for the trip to the Ford D environs. Steve and I have spent time with a number of folks(park employees)that include this trip in their presentations. The maps supplied by John Stands in Timber, include this trip in his "Cheyenne Voice" by Margot Liberty. Michael N. Donahue, presented the same to The CBHMA not so long ago. Yes, Custer was harried after For B, but not seriously. His issues became critical while stopped in the cemetery area after his visit to the Ford D area. This was the time when Keogh's area was collapsing, Custer was pushed towards LHS from this location. For a very long time I bought in to your theory, no more. I'm not trying to prove any particular theory wrong just to show that logic and the more definative evidence can support another scenario. So let me ask you why did Custer leave his command leaderless at the most pivitol point of the battle . The suggested journey north ,not to Ford D, took him nigh on 4 miles away from the action resulting in the loss of at least 30 minutes. Why did they not cross at ford B WO suggests that the Indians hereabouts were no more than a nuisance ? As to your question . The LBH is an industry.It requires a good story . You are not going to bring them out to Montana without entertaining them.An honest "we don't know" would leave people disappointed .How much interest is there in the Fetterman massacre? I'm sure the people you list are all honest historians and I doubt that their presentations proclaim conclusively that Custer did this or that. Also one ne must take into account that there is a certain bias against admitting that in a stand up fight a stoneage tribe would better a regiment of US cavalry. One rout is upsetting but two no way..... A bit like Isandlwana where the ammo supply and unreliable natives let the side down so to the LBH massacre was the result of stupid officers. It is all fascinating stuff Tom ,Feelings run deep but I'm sure we will remain friends and agree to differ. Best Wishes
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Post by tubman13 on Aug 10, 2015 5:16:44 GMT -6
wild, My feelings don't run that deep. When I become combative it is generally because others feelings run deep and their feelings get hurt. I have been reduced to personal attacks, in general after being attacked, or when someone I care about or respect has been attacked for no good reason. I have been known to get under others skin, that is one of my failings. I have a fair amount of Irish flowing in the veins, German, and even a wee bit of NA. Sometimes that stuff gets all mixed up and I am willing to fight with myself. One thing I don't do is carry a grudge and never will, they cloud your focus and judgement.
By the way, I still feel that Crazy Horse, may very well have traversed the whole village and come at Custer from the north. Not the conventional wisdom here.
Regards, Tom
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