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Post by AZ Ranger on Aug 10, 2015 8:44:10 GMT -6
Tubman I have no issues with your opinions, but how do you account for the trip to the Ford D environs. Steve and I have spent time with a number of folks(park employees)that include this trip in their presentations. The maps supplied by John Stands in Timber, include this trip in his "Cheyenne Voice" by Margot Liberty. Michael N. Donahue, presented the same to The CBHMA not so long ago. Yes, Custer was harried after For B, but not seriously. His issues became critical while stopped in the cemetery area after his visit to the Ford D area. This was the time when Keogh's area was collapsing, Custer was pushed towards LHS from this location. For a very long time I bought in to your theory, no more.I'm not trying to prove any particular theory wrong just to show that logic and the more definative evidence can support another scenario. So let me ask you why did Custer leave his command leaderless at the most pivitol point of the battle . The suggested journey north ,not to Ford D, took him nigh on 4 miles away from the action resulting in the loss of at least 30 minutes. Why did they not cross at ford B WO suggests that the Indians hereabouts were no more than a nuisance ? As to your question . The LBH is an industry.It requires a good story . You are not going to bring them out to Montana without entertaining them.An honest "we don't know" would leave people disappointed .How much interest is there in the Fetterman massacre? I'm sure the people you list are all honest historians and I doubt that their presentations proclaim conclusively that Custer did this or that. Also one ne must take into account that there is a certain bias against admitting that in a stand up fight a stoneage tribe would better a regiment of US cavalry. One rout is upsetting but two no way..... A bit like Isandlwana where the ammo supply and unreliable natives let the side down so to the LBH massacre was the result of stupid officers. It is all fascinating stuff Tom ,Feelings run deep but I'm sure we will remain friends and agree to differ. Best Wishes wild Have you been to LBH and heard the talks. They differ with each other and the NPS does not have a fixed script that everyone must adhere to. A look at Benteen's map shows a trail and activity in the ford D area. Markers were placed near the 212 and 95 junction. Kellogg's marker was near the entrance road before the route was changed. It appears in pictures of the dedication ceremony. You really think that Fred works for Montana tourism? Gordie in his research found evidence of the Ford Ds movement. The evidence they use and the recent research by Scott will be presented in the near future. My feeling is that just because I have not done the same research such as the individual NPS employees or Fred and Gordie doesn't mean that I can discount their findings. As far as the visitor most are there for the first time and have very little knowledge of the battle. I would suggest that Custer was a little better known than Fetterman. The markers whether accurate or not are a unique feature. When on visits my visits to Fetterman it doesn't have the same visual impact. Don't forget this was a cemetery and the Custer Battlefield long before the name change to LBH. I attempt to look at the same evidence that those have presented regarding the Ford D information and form my own opinion. Benteen's hand drawn map and notations is very convincing to me. The timber area of Ford D was discovered in the photo archives before they removed the material to build the road bed for the new entrance. I suspect artifacts were moved with the material movement. Regards AZ Ranger
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Post by wild on Aug 10, 2015 9:55:40 GMT -6
Hi WO Those who know me from my other life on this board will know that it is not my usual practice to engage in long discourses I prefare to pin down a single point which can be lost in the more lenghty dispatches. Also it requires a good deal of work to compete with the more articulate. lucid and knowledgeable posters such as your good self ,,,I am old. However I will reply to all your points but to revert to my usual style ........
Any recon by that stage was going to involve one battalion, 90 troopers also being the safe minimum against a band of hostiles. The last division of Custer's forces sealed his fate, can we agree on this ? And you suggest that this was for the purpose of Custer's health and safety ? I'm not being facetious here ,it is a serious question with respect .
5 Troops with another captain could have made a showing, could have presented Benteen with less reason to didder. But Custer by detaching a battalion for escort duty put the last dominio in place.
My old "friend" DC was wont to say that George got all the 50/50 calls wrong.I think in order to frame Custer the majority view saddle him with 100/1 calls. With respect and Best wishes.
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Post by wild on Aug 10, 2015 10:39:48 GMT -6
Hi AZ Good Post.
Have you been to LBH and heard the talks. No ,next year for sure and hopefully I might meet up with some of you fuckers.
They differ with each other and the NPS does not have a fixed script that everyone must adhere to. A look at Benteen's map shows a trail and activity in the ford D area. Markers were placed near the 212 and 95 junction. Kellogg's marker was near the entrance road before the route was changed. It appears in pictures of the dedication ceremony. 5 companies of uniforms,boots,jocks,saddles and a myriad of personals passed into the village via the main fords .Much of it would have been discared .That archaeological stuff is good for showing the gear and personals of the period and even health of the troopers but for tactical movements it ia contaminated beyond use.
You really think that Fred works for Montana tourism? Ha Ha.
Gordie in his research found evidence of the Ford Ds movement. See above
My feeling is that just because I have not done the same research such as the individual NPS employees or Fred and Gordie doesn't mean that I can discount their findings. All the good pieces have long surfaced.What might be unearthed now will be of interest but conclusive ? doubt it.But who knows perhaps in some attic....
The markers whether accurate or not are a unique feature. Agreed that is where research begins and simply nothing else comes close to their importance.
I attempt to look at the same evidence that those have presented regarding the Ford D information and form my own opinion. Benteen's hand drawn map and notations is very convincing to me. The timber area of Ford D was discovered in the photo archives before they removed the material to build the road bed for the new entrance. I suspect artifacts were moved with the material movement. If the 7th's 12 companys and impedimenta passed over Ford D and a year later you took your trusty metel detector over the site you would find nothing accept for one or two boxes of hard tack which had a tendency to come loose.
Regards
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Post by wild on Aug 10, 2015 10:48:05 GMT -6
Roger that Tom and thanks.
By the way, I still feel that Crazy Horse, may very well have traversed the whole village and come at Custer from the north. Not the conventional wisdom here. Must take a look at this. Cheers
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Post by welshofficer on Aug 10, 2015 12:19:42 GMT -6
Hi WO Those who know me from my other life on this board will know that it is not my usual practice to engage in long discourses I prefare to pin down a single point which can be lost in the more lenghty dispatches. Also it requires a good deal of work to compete with the more articulate. lucid and knowledgeable posters such as your good self ,,,I am old. However I will reply to all your points but to revert to my usual style ........
Any recon by that stage was going to involve one battalion, 90 troopers also being the safe minimum against a band of hostiles.The last division of Custer's forces sealed his fate, can we agree on this ?And you suggest that this was for the purpose of Custer's health and safety ? I'm not being facetious here ,it is a serious question with respect . 5 Troops with another captain could have made a showing, could have presented Benteen with less reason to didder. But Custer by detaching a battalion for escort duty put the last dominio in place. My old "friend" DC was wont to say that George got all the 50/50 calls wrong.I think in order to frame Custer the majority view saddle him with 100/1 calls. With respect and Best wishes. Wild, I appreciate that you have been away from this board for some time, but I have consistently posted that Keogh's failure to timeously vacate northwards was the event that sealed GAC's fate. So not the Yates/Keogh split per se. I do not believe that 5 companies could have held out until the 27th, due to the terrain features and the ammo situation, but they could have punched a hole through any northern cordon and ridden towards Terry/Gibbon/Brisbin. Politically horrible for GAC, however. WO
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Post by welshofficer on Aug 10, 2015 12:47:04 GMT -6
I'm not trying to prove any particular theory wrong just to show that logic and the more definative evidence can support another scenario. So let me ask you why did Custer leave his command leaderless at the most pivitol point of the battle . Why did they not cross at ford B WO suggests that the Indians hereabouts were no more than a nuisance ? A bit like Isandlwana where the ammo supply and unreliable natives let the side down so to the LBH massacre was the result of stupid officers. Wild, Just concentrating on these key points: (1) How do you arrive at more "definitive evidence", by discarding evidence such as the hostile accounts and 1980s archaeological evidence? (2) How do you arrive at "his command leaderless"? GAC stopped being in a position to command his entire regiment when he ascended the eastern bluffs? Taking HHD/F/E northwards to recon Ford D would in no way changed the command structure for Keogh's battalion? (3) What would crossing at Ford B achieve? The village extended far to the northwards, where the non-combatants had already headed? (4) Was not Isandlwana simply a failure to concentrate available defensive force to meet the unexpected threat emerging? Pulleine reinforcing Cavaye with Mostyn, and then Younghusband, suggests that Pulleine had failed to grasp that Durnford had located and triggered an attack by the entire Ulundi impi? Who were the "stupid officers" at LBH? We have GAC proceeding on a false assumption, or "a misapprehension of the situation" to quote his mentor Gen Sheridan in 1877, and a potential single mistake by Keogh in prioritising the wrong primary threat and failing to position himself at Calhoun Hill to oversee the Ford B/Greasy Grass ridge/Henryville build-up? Those who know me will warn you that my approach is to test every sentence to destruction and beyond! WO
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Post by wild on Aug 10, 2015 14:55:45 GMT -6
Hi WO
Let's settle this first .You are standing by your opinion that Custer needed 2 companies for safety reasons?
I appreciate that you have been away from this board for some time, but I have consistently posted that Keogh's failure to timeously vacate northwards was the event that sealed GAC's fate. So not the Yates/Keogh split per se If Keogh had had the Custer 2 company escort the parameters in his sector would have been different .
but I have consistently posted that Keogh's failure to timeously vacate northwards was the event that sealed GAC's fate. The configuration of Keogh's command is your suggestion [as per perscribed regulation].That it's reason for failing is also yours . An assumption based on an assumption ? The problem we have is, because the terrain is broken and the companies are scattered over various land features you get a mix of tactical correct positions and tactical horrors.If you go for the complex solution you have to find excuses for those companies such as Keogh ,Harrington and Smith who occupy awful positions. Keogh's excuse ; administrive reserve ,Harrington performs a local charge without orders. Smith something similar. The simplex solution needs none of this "fitting" for want of a better word . I'm sure I had a punch line to finish this off but it has escaped me for the moment ...so there. Best wishes
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Post by wild on Aug 10, 2015 14:59:46 GMT -6
Oh yes I know what the punch line was now We [well a solitary we]make no claim for tactical cohesion no claim for maneuvers and we are ok for time.And to use some contaminated evidence it fits in with something about dinner Cheers
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Post by welshofficer on Aug 10, 2015 16:30:25 GMT -6
Tom,
Your thoughts on the Washita...?
This is important, because if it was noticed, nothing was said about the potential tactically fatal flaw in GAC's tactical abilities i.e. ignoring a fundamental military precept in attacking an enemy of unknown strength on a battlefield whose terrain was equally unknown. See his comment to Little Beaver. Altogether an eerie precursor of what was to come in 1876.
GAC was lucky at the Washita. His force outnumbered Black Kettle and there were no unexpected terrain problems.
WO
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Post by welshofficer on Aug 10, 2015 17:02:24 GMT -6
Hi WO Let's settle this first .You are standing by your opinion that Custer needed 2 companies for safety reasons? I appreciate that you have been away from this board for some time, but I have consistently posted that Keogh's failure to timeously vacate northwards was the event that sealed GAC's fate. So not the Yates/Keogh split per seIf Keogh had had the Custer 2 company escort the parameters in his sector would have been different . but I have consistently posted that Keogh's failure to timeously vacate northwards was the event that sealed GAC's fate.The configuration of Keogh's command is your suggestion [as per perscribed regulation].That it's reason for failing is also yours . An assumption based on an assumption ? The problem we have is, because the terrain is broken and the companies are scattered over various land features you get a mix of tactical correct positions and tactical horrors.If you go for the complex solution you have to find excuses for those companies such as Keogh ,Harrington and Smith who occupy awful positions. Keogh's excuse ; administrive reserve ,Harrington performs a local charge without orders. Smith something similar. The simplex solution needs none of this "fitting" for want of a better word . I'm sure I had a punch line to finish this off but it has escaped me for the moment ...so there. Best wishes Wild, For safety reasons, amongst others. One would expect GAC to take the entire Yates battalion for a recon with probe at Ford D (let's not get carried away, that battalion was a mere 80 troopers). One company covering the other. One would certainly not expect GAC to split the Yates battalion and leave E Company with Keogh. If there was enough pressure upon Keogh for GAC to consider that, then forget the entire northern recon. 2 companies would be my minimum force in case of running into a hunting/war party. What did Wolf Tooth have with him up on the eastern bluffs? 50 warriors approx? There was nothing fundamentally tactically unsound with Keogh's deployments, as long as it was recognised that it was a temporary fending position in the face of any unexpected assault. The terrain itself was worthless. L Company dismounted and providing the defensive skirmish line against any infiltration via Ford B, with C Company protecting its right flank. I Company to the rear, maintaining an eye on Ford C and ready to ride out and reel in Benteen on his expected approach via the Sharpshooter, Luce, N-C ridge complex. All tactically orthodox, straight out of Upton's manual of the time. But if Keogh positioned himself with his host company, he was out of position to command his battalion when the primary threat became a massive build-up via Ford B and growing infiltration from Ford C. Harrington rides out to sweep Deep Coulee (more likely of his own volition or in response to Calhoun, than from Keogh further along the ridge and with messengers probably impossible), overplays his hand (Lame White Man in his draw ends up behind him), and the first domino falls. And there was no way to stop them falling. And rapidly. Why there was very little cartridge evidence of a prolonged engagement other than at Calhoun Hill (army) and "Henryville" (hostiles). With 5 companies widely dispersed out of mutual support, there would not be a prolonged battle and no heavy hostile casualties. And that fits perfectly with what was found on 27 June 1876. How many F/E troopers were identified on the southern end of Battle Ridge...? WO
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Post by wild on Aug 10, 2015 21:10:27 GMT -6
Hi WO For safety reasons, amongst others. One would expect GAC to take the entire Yates battalion for a recon with probe at Ford D (let's not get carried away, that battalion was a mere 80 troopers). He split the command for safety reasons ?
One would certainly not expect GAC to split the Yates battalion and leave E Company with Keogh. If there was enough pressure upon Keogh for GAC to consider that, then forget the entire northern recon. 2 companies would be my minimum force in case of running into a hunting/war party. What did Wolf Tooth have with him up on the eastern bluffs? 50 warriors approx? I think the fact that Reno, was in the process of being chopped up was pressure enough to suggest that splitting the command was not a wise thing to do. Numbers alone without any obvious activity gives rise to preaaure; 120 v 793.5 ?
I think that we should not identify the ford . It give the impression that Custer knew it's whereabouts . Much more accurate to say Custer departed the scene in a Notherly direction. Cheers
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Post by welshofficer on Aug 11, 2015 4:36:57 GMT -6
Wild,
(1) That's not what I wrote. GAC retained 2 companies, the safe minimum number to detach for the northern recon. For Bouyer to lead GAC to the next suitable river crossing with just F Company would have been imprudent. Keogh to await Benteen, GAC/Yates to verify Ford D/D1 terrain.
(2) As I have written, GAC was in an offensive mindset. He was the hunter, the hostiles the prey. Labouring under a sense of security that never existed. He was not expecting them to initiate a pitched battle assault against Keogh on the eastern bluffs, after he moved northwards with Yates. Something and/or someone triggered that. Harrington's sweep too far.
(3) This battle was all about river crossings, and Bouyer had some knowledge of the Little Bighorn Valley. The hostile non-combatants were fleeing northwards and Ford C was far too narrow for a cavalry assault. A lethal pinch point. The Ford D/Ford D1 area was far more suitable.
WO
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Post by AZ Ranger on Aug 11, 2015 6:01:56 GMT -6
Tom, Your thoughts on the Washita...? This is important, because if it was noticed, nothing was said about the potential tactically fatal flaw in GAC's tactical abilities i.e. ignoring a fundamental military precept in attacking an enemy of unknown strength on a battlefield whose terrain was equally unknown. See his comment to Little Beaver. Altogether an eerie precursor of what was to come in 1876. GAC was lucky at the Washita. His force outnumbered Black Kettle and there were no unexpected terrain problems. WO I think the winter factors at Washita increased the odds of Custer being lucky and thinking he knew what he was doing. It is also a clear view into what Custer was willing to do without proper recon at the LBH. Custer wasn't willing to fight the Indians who were severely at a disadvantage due to the conditioning of their horses. Yet he was willing to spread a half strength regiment against Indians in large numbers and horses in good condition, I suspect that this is a good reason why the Army didn't want to look to deep into Custer's actions. He was consistent with what he was willing to do and that it did not require adequate recon. He should have been corrected by the chain of command but it was a partial success . No doubt Custer could lead a charge but he needed help in doing all the things necessary to make it a success. Custer was usually good at emergency thinking on the run. Custer created the emergency situation at the LBH by advancing without proper scouting and underestimating the Indians. With a simple scout a little further up the Rosebud he could have valuable information regarding how many warriors were willing to fight and to take the fight to the Army. Change the winter conditions at Washita to summer and have all the warriors ride to confront Custer before he reaches the village. Regards AZ Ranger
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Post by tubman13 on Aug 11, 2015 6:17:19 GMT -6
Tom, Your thoughts on the Washita...? This is important, because if it was noticed, nothing was said about the potential tactically fatal flaw in GAC's tactical abilities i.e. ignoring a fundamental military precept in attacking an enemy of unknown strength on a battlefield whose terrain was equally unknown. See his comment to Little Beaver. Altogether an eerie precursor of what was to come in 1876. GAC was lucky at the Washita. His force outnumbered Black Kettle and there were no unexpected terrain problems. WO WO, My knowledge of this battle, comes from a number of readings, the best and most recent, an e-book by Jerome Greene. I have also visited the battlefield. The terrain was all laid out before Custer, looking down from the high ground. The 7th sat on that high ground for most of the night. They listened to dogs and babies crying, while nearly freezing and waiting for dawn. At dawn all was before them and the village was not a large one, Custer had most of the avenues of escape covered. The Washita River edges were used by some NA's to escape toward the other camps further on.
Complete scouting and knowledge of the numbers of NA's camped further along the river was obviously a huge issue. Interestingly Elliott followed the trail along the river to the other camps, this trail would not have been seen by Custer or his scouts prior to the battle. There was snow on the ground and the 7th followed the only hot trail to Black Kettle's camp.
There is more but that is a thumbnail sketch, I have read a couple of Greene's books, he does a good job.
Regards, Tom
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Post by crzhrs on Aug 11, 2015 11:13:16 GMT -6
There was a huge difference between the Washita and LBH. First the Washita was a WINTER campaign when the Indians were hunkered down and never expected any type of attack that time of year. Second Custer kept his command secreted and waited until dawn for an attack when the village was still asleep. And finally and maybe most important it was the hapless Black Kettle that was attacked, not Sitting Bull, not Crazy Horse or other hardliners and staunch defenders of their way of life. Custer lucked out at the Washita but at the LBH it was a summer campaign and attacked during the middle of the day when most of the village was about and stirring. The terrain did not suit an attack since the command had to cross a river and navigate over steep and rugged terrain (except for Reno) who got across the river and had open ground for a straight on charge. However the warriors put up enough of a resistance to force Reno to stop. Custer had the Washita in his grasp and succeeded . . . he had the village at the LBH in his grasp and failed.
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