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Post by tubman13 on Jul 21, 2015 14:05:37 GMT -6
Benteen,
Seems to sum it up nicely. Now can we work on a fool proof investment strategy? Ok just kidding. Tired soldiers, horses, unfamiliar terrain, lack of a shared plan, no proper scouting, all part of the 100 level courses taught at Hudson High. They corrected the 100 level courses the next year when Ranald Mackenzie entered the school, either that or someone deserved to graduate at the bottom of his class. That someone was unpredictable when his leash was too lose.
Regards, Tom
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 21, 2015 14:12:09 GMT -6
Benteen, I agree with most of what you say, but I lean towards GAC genuinely was intending to hole-up on the 25th and attack on the 26th. GAC would still have been ahead of Terry, unless the village had moved as far north as near the mouth of the LBH on the 25th. But he brought his regiment too far forward, and hurriedly attacked on the 25th out of fear of losing the element of surprise and fearful of the hostiles dispersing on the 25th if he waited another day. WO Welsh Officer, OK Sir, fair enough. My main thrust was that Custer wanted this victory for himself and no one else. Since your opinion doesnt contradict that, in that if Custer attacked on the 26th he could still leave out Terry, I can respect and accept it. I would like to explore the second part of your post in that Custer attacked on the 25th because he felt the Indians might scatter, you may very well be correct on that. But I would like to pose a question to you or anyone else who would like to reply,not as a disagreement but an honest question. Is it wise for a commander commit his troops to a coarse of action, with no plan, based only on what the enemy Might do rather than what they are doing. what I mean is that Custer had pushed his men and horses hard for 3 days they were tired not in the best combat shape. Couldnt he have had an Officers call and made plans in the event the Indians did attempt to move. Then observe them to see what they were doing while his men rested. I know there is a time element involved, and Indians were good at packing up the village and leaving, but Sir to me this is not a village, this is a small city with 8=10 thousand people and tens of thousands of ponies. The men on Reno Hill said that when they left it looked like a mass exodus and took most of the afternoon. So I believe if observig them they looked as if they were going to leave, Custer would have plenty of time to institute whatever he had in mind especially since there would be a plan in place. Be Well Dan Dan,
I agree entirely with your main thrust that GAC "wanted this victory for himself and no one else". 100% agree.
As for the rest, I have been beating the drum for a considerable period that GAC's fatal mistake was not scouting far enough ahead and bringing the regiment up too close on the 24th. That triggered the hurried attack on the 25th, the fear of having been discovered having inadvertently come within "touch" range.
There is no excuse for any commander attacking without knowledge of enemy numbers, location and terrain. Only 3 of his 12 companies ever assaulted that village (and yes, that village was one of the largest conurbations west of the Missouri) and 8 companies were doing recon when Reno was assaulting.
Cascading problems. GAC ascending the bluffs. Not notifying Reno. Not backtracking at 3411. Not backtracking at Ford B. Not timeously vacating Battle Ridge before Keogh's situation became critical.
WO
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Post by benteen on Jul 21, 2015 14:29:04 GMT -6
Benteen, Seems to sum it up nicely. Now can we work on a fool proof investment strategy? Ok just kidding. Tired soldiers, horses, unfamiliar terrain, lack of a shared plan, no proper scouting, all part of the 100 level courses taught at Hudson High. They corrected the 100 level courses the next year when Ranald Mackenzie entered the school, either that or someone deserved to graduate at the bottom of his class. That someone was unpredictable when his leash was too lose. Regards, Tom Tom, Be Well Dan
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Post by benteen on Jul 21, 2015 14:33:16 GMT -6
[/p] I agree entirely with your main thrust that GAC "wanted this victory for himself and no one else". 100% agree.
As for the rest, I have been beating the drum for a considerable period that GAC's fatal mistake was not scouting far enough ahead and bringing the regiment up too close on the 24th. That triggered the hurried attack on the 25th, the fear of having been discovered having inadvertently come within "touch" range.
There is no excuse for any commander attacking without knowledge of enemy numbers, location and terrain. Only 3 of his 12 companies ever assaulted that village (and yes, that village was one of the largest conurbations west of the Missouri) and 8 companies were doing recon when Reno was assaulting.
Cascading problems. GAC ascending the bluffs. Not notifying Reno. Not backtracking at 3411. Not backtracking at Ford B. Not timeously vacating Battle Ridge before Keogh's situation became critical.
WO
[/quote] Welsh Officer, I think your opinion is logical and reasonable and most probably spot on as to what happened. I watched a movie "Saving Pvt Ryan" and they used a term which I believe sums up Custers actions that day.........FUBAR Be Well Dan
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 21, 2015 14:44:48 GMT -6
Dan,
It was salvageable as a battle, if GAC had backtracked from 3411.
It was salvageable from defeat, if GAC had backtracked from Ford B.
It was salvageable from massacre, if GAC's wing had timeously vacated northwards/eastwards from Battle Ridge.
But GAC was winging it on the 25th, because of mistakes made on the 24th. GAC attacked blind, which left no margin for error. Recon on the hoof.
WO
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Post by benteen on Jul 23, 2015 9:06:41 GMT -6
Dan, It was salvageable as a battle, if GAC had backtracked from 3411. It was salvageable from defeat, if GAC had backtracked from Ford B. It was salvageable from massacre, if GAC's wing had timeously vacated northwards/eastwards from Battle Ridge. But GAC was winging it on the 25th, because of mistakes made on the 24th. GAC attacked blind, which left no margin for error. Recon on the hoof. WO Welsh Officer, I think all of your statements are logical and I agree 100% with the last 3. Not sure about the first one. When you say the battle was salvageable do you mean the mission was salvageable or there could have been a victory. I would agree with the first but not the later. Sir,I honestly dont believe any regiment even under competent leadership were going to beat these Indians, on this day, at this location. Be Well Dan
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Post by wild on Jul 23, 2015 11:53:31 GMT -6
Custer might have done everything right and still have failed.
WO mentions lack of sufficent scouting/recce. Any contact with a scouting force would give the game away .
Just a quick reply as Dan informs me that I have been reinstated. Regards to all and thanks to Diane .
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Post by tubman13 on Jul 23, 2015 12:25:13 GMT -6
Wild, good to have you back. One old fool to another. Just remember the Cheyenne could count. Also don't mess with W.O. he is smarter than you.
Regards, Tom
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 23, 2015 13:25:52 GMT -6
Dan, It was salvageable as a battle, if GAC had backtracked from 3411. It was salvageable from defeat, if GAC had backtracked from Ford B. It was salvageable from massacre, if GAC's wing had timeously vacated northwards/eastwards from Battle Ridge. But GAC was winging it on the 25th, because of mistakes made on the 24th. GAC attacked blind, which left no margin for error. Recon on the hoof. WO Welsh Officer, I think all of your statements are logical and I agree 100% with the last 3. Not sure about the first one. When you say the battle was salvageable do you mean the mission was salvageable or there could have been a victory. I would agree with the first but not the later. Sir,I honestly dont believe any regiment even under competent leadership were going to beat these Indians, on this day, at this location. Be Well Dan Dan,
The operational mission was still salvageable, with some sort of fight to a standstill in the valley south of the village. Still possible with backtracking from 3411.
Terry was still closing from the north. The hostiles would still have had to abandon much of their supplies.
GAC never needed to outright tactically defeat in battle what he came across with the 7th. That wasn't an an operational requirement. It would just have been a campaign expediting bonus.
WO
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 23, 2015 13:46:26 GMT -6
Custer might have done everything right and still have failed. WO mentions lack of sufficent scouting/recce. Any contact with a scouting force would give the game away . Just a quick reply as Dan informs me that I have been reinstated. Regards to all and thanks to Diane . Wild,
The scouting set-up was inadequate, but it was their use rather than their sufficiency that was the problem.
Lt Godfrey described it as "touch and go". There was too little focus on getting more information and getting closer before the regiment "touched", and too much focus/emphasis on charging blind once coming into "touching range". When GAC decided to attack on the 25th, he personally knew nothing beyond the followed trail and what the scouts had told him at the Crow's Nest. Practically nothing from which to formulate an attack plan; numbers, location/s and key terrain features.
A scouting party, whether 1 man or 6 men, is not there to be a "force". It's not there to fight, it observes and withdraws. Preferably undetected.
WO
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Post by benteen on Jul 23, 2015 14:49:24 GMT -6
Welsh Officer, I think all of your statements are logical and I agree 100% with the last 3. Not sure about the first one. When you say the battle was salvageable do you mean the mission was salvageable or there could have been a victory. I would agree with the first but not the later. Sir,I honestly dont believe any regiment even under competent leadership were going to beat these Indians, on this day, at this location. Be Well Dan Dan,
The operational mission was still salvageable, with some sort of fight to a standstill in the valley south of the village. Still possible with backtracking from 3411.
Terry was still closing from the north. The hostiles would still have had to abandon much of their supplies.
GAC never needed to outright tactically defeat in battle what he came across with the 7th. That wasn't an an operational requirement. It would just have been a campaign expediting bonus.
WO
Welsh Officer, Thank you for the clarification. I agree that the operational mission was still salvageable. So that makes all four that I agree with. Be Well Dan
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Post by fred on Jul 23, 2015 14:56:46 GMT -6
Just a quick reply as Dan informs me that I have been reinstated. Regards to all and thanks to Diane . Wild, you old scoundrel... nice to see you back. And yes, thanks to Diane. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by wild on Jul 23, 2015 15:38:17 GMT -6
WO
The scouting set-up was inadequate, but it was their use rather than their sufficiency that was the problemI think you misunderstand the problem . Custer had no "scouts", what he had were trackers and guides . Indians and civvies had no idea as to the tactical information required by Custer or the means by which to convey such information. They could find the enemy for him but that is about it. Even using trained officers would not have been much use to him . A verbal description is very limited.Relative distances ,the realtionship between terrain features, even the dispositions of the tribal circles would be difficult to visualise from a verbal description. Custer himself needed to see what he was up against and Weir Point was far too late to check out the opposition. Perhaps an officer with a sketch pad up on the bluffs But this takes time and Custer was not going hang about . The price of a really good recce is time and risk of discovery . Really the odds favoured his advance to contact. A case could be made that Reno was a recce in force .
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Post by wild on Jul 23, 2015 15:40:52 GMT -6
Thanks Fred nice to see you too. Enjoyed the book. Seeya around
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Post by dave on Jul 23, 2015 16:10:25 GMT -6
Wild Welcome. I look forward to your posts. Regards Dave
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