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Post by welshofficer on Jul 23, 2015 16:58:36 GMT -6
Wild,
Thought provoking.
The fact that they were primarily trackers and guides was exactly the inadequacy to which I referred.
That's why 2 officers were specifically detailed from the 7th's already severely understrength officer corps.
They could, and finding the hostile trails and what they observed from the Crow's Nest was not "finding". That's pointing GAC in the general direction.
The minimum of what GAC required could easily have been conveyed to him by Varnum/Hare from Crow/Ree trackers and/or closer personal observation. 8-10K concentrated village between Ford A and Ford D. No satellite villages to the south (or north). Overnight movement possible between Ford A and Ford D via Eastern Bluffs, hidden by Battle Ridge to the movement's west, for dawn attack on 26th (if village still in situ). Intermediate possible crossing points at Fords B and C, suitability for offensive cavalry crossing undetermined (probably impossible via Ford C, due to narrowness, even from a binoculars inspection from Battle Ridge at sunset on the 25th).
GAC had the resources available to gather enough intelligence to formulate and implement a provisional plan of attack at dawn on the 26th. GAC needed to personally see nothing on the 25th. Just held his regiment far enough back to hole up undetected.
And the price of no recon at all and attacking blind as to numbers, location/s and terrain is a disaster on the scale of 25 June 1876, units dispersed out of mutual support with the largest in the face of 8-10,000 hostiles being Reno's 140 trooper battalion. 3 companies assaulting a village, 8 companies still carrying out recon, and 1 company guarding a pack train, all uncoordinated.
The odds seldom favour a blind advance against an enemy of unknown and/or unverified strength, location/s and terrain, but believed to be numerically stronger.
If anybody wished to try and make such a case, what intel would Reno's advance down the valley provide GAC with? How would a recon be consistent with Reno's orders from GAC/Cooke and how would/could GAC benefit from any intel obtained by such a recon at that late stage...?
WO
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Post by wild on Jul 24, 2015 3:25:10 GMT -6
Hi WO
The minimum of what GAC required could easily have been conveyed to him by Varnum/Hare from Crow/Ree trackers and/or closer personal observation. 8-10K concentrated village between Ford A and Ford D. No satellite villages to the south (or north). Overnight movement possible between Ford A and Ford D via Eastern Bluffs, hidden by Battle Ridge to the movement's west, for dawn attack on 26th (if village still in situ). Intermediate possible crossing points at Fords B and C, suitability for offensive cavalry crossing undetermined (probably impossible via Ford C, due to narrowness, even from a binoculars inspection from Battle Ridge at sunset on the 25th). That's not a recce that's a brief description of the area on which the Custer action took place . For a terrain recce to be of any use then it must be undertaken by the attack leader. And we are dealing with a cavalry regiment whose piece de resistance involves a single direct movement to the front devoid of any pretence of maneuver .Thus if a recce is going to involve a delay of a day and time being of the essance is it really required ?
If anybody wished to try and make such a case, what intel would Reno's advance down the valley provide GAC with? How would a recon be consistent with Reno's orders from GAC/Cooke and how would/could GAC benefit from any intel obtained by such a recon at that late stage...? Well Custer was not consistent with his own orders so..... Reno's action highlighted what mood the Indians were in ,were they running or massing against Reno ,what was their firepower and warrior strenght like,was the village breaking up. It gave him sufficent information as to what his chances were of success . A inadequacy in the recce department did not result in our hero's demise rather he was undone by personal considerations .
GAC had the resources available to gather enough intelligence to formulate and implement a provisional plan of attack at dawn on the 26th. GAC needed to personally see nothing on the 25th. Just held his regiment far enough back to hole up undetected. Time is a dimension , the use of which can win or lose battles . His recce people could be discovered ,his command could be discovered ,Terry's approach might be discovered . He has surprise he has to strike immediately.
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 24, 2015 6:30:31 GMT -6
Wild,
(1) That's the basic intel that GAC required from a proper recon, plus some details of the terrain at the northern and southern end of the village. There were few armies where you would have seen a Lt Col crawling around at sunset on 25 June. That was Varnum's job. Time was not of the essence, or it wouldn't have been had GAC not moved too far forward on the 24th. Terry/Gibbon were not even due at the mouth of the Little Bighorn before the 26th/27th.
(2) Inadequate recon meant that Benteen was not where he was needed, in the valley with Reno instead of sweeping empty valleys at the critical time, and GAC was doing recon on the hoof as he moved northwards along the eastern bluffs. GAC should have backtracked to Reno at 3411. With proper pre-battle recon, he would not have been discovering the size of the village from 3411 after battle had commenced.
(3) That's the situation GAC created, a blind attack on the 25th. His fatal mistake was bringing the regiment too far forward on the 24th. My money would have been on Varnum and the 6 Crows obtaining the required intel on the 25th without (meaningful) detection. The hostiles were not a structured force. See how the Curtiss detail was not reported back to the hostile village until after the battle. There is a difference between surprise and simply charging blind at an enemy of unverified strength, location and on unreconnoitred terrain...
WO
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 24, 2015 6:31:10 GMT -6
This shows another example of DCs complaint of a glossary of terms and use of definitions. Wild stated there were no scouts there. Maybe but if some were enlisted in the United States Army as an Indian scout then there would be scouts there regardless of the activity they were requested to do. I think wild has an idea of what he believes the activities constituting a scout should be. That would have no bearing on the actual person doing it is titled. The last Indian scout was in Arizona and left service in 1947. In Camp Verde the Apache scouts were placed on a small separate reservation. Its downtown along the Verde River. I am not sure if these United States Army Indian scouts ever performed all the activities that wild mentioned but I do know they were scouts by enlistment. Here is a Military Indian Scout Good to see you here wild Regards AZ Ranger
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 24, 2015 6:47:02 GMT -6
wild
Could you define your use of recce?
I am not sure what would require the "attack leader" to be on any particular operation. I think in the US that scouting must be a much broader defined term than how you use it. Either our Force Recon has lots of attack leaders or they are not complying with your definition.
I believe a lot of recon goes on without any particular plan to attack.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by montrose on Jul 24, 2015 7:11:15 GMT -6
Modern military uses a term called Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. IPB.
To put it simply, it is the So What test applied to data collection and decision making.
Recce assets are also combat assets. If you picked the right folks, their find data value exceeds their combat value. But this depends on the ultimate military mantra: DOTS. Depends on the situation.
So what is missing in this discussion is the relationship of data collection and decision making.
Custer scattered his intel and combat assets all over the battlefield. In fact, many of the intel collected and combat actions that followed: he never knew.
SO proper scouting, proper intelligence gathering, proper preparation of the battlefield,...are useless when the commander creates a situation when:
1. He cannot receive the information gathered
2. He can not respond to opportunities or vulnerabilities detected in the data gathering process
The military makes a distinction between information and intelligence.
Information is raw data.
Intelligence is processed information, where we analyze it with respect to the military decision making process. (Long term for the so what test).
Am I making sense here? I intended to go further in analyzing MDMP at LH, but sometimes my terms confuse folks.
Respectfully,
William
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 24, 2015 7:23:57 GMT -6
Will,
I wish you would go further. I recall I once asked where the recon assets were, apart from Bouyer and a few subsequently released Crows, even after battle was joined. No response. Not even a comment that Varnum/Hare rode with the only combat battalion that assaulted, not with any of the other 3 combat battalions still conducting recon.
WO
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Post by dave on Jul 24, 2015 8:11:48 GMT -6
Montrose You make perfect sense and please continue with the lesson. Regards Dave
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Post by wild on Jul 24, 2015 10:36:47 GMT -6
WO
The minimum of what GAC required could easily have been conveyed to him by Varnum/Hare from Crow/Ree trackers and/or closer personal observation. 8-10K concentrated village between Ford A and Ford D. No satellite villages to the south (or north). Overnight movement possible between Ford A and Ford D via Eastern Bluffs, hidden by Battle Ridge to the movement's west, for dawn attack on 26th (if village still in situ). Intermediate possible crossing points at Fords B and C, suitability for offensive cavalry crossing undetermined (probably impossible via Ford C, due to narrowness, even from a binoculars inspection from Battle Ridge at sunset on the 25th). I would suggest that yours above is influenced by hindsight and thus your suggested recce includes only those features over which the action was fought . You say nothing of the terrain on the West bank and fail to mention that the front door was wide open . Now I think that terrain was far too complex for a verbal description .Custer needed a visual . Just by way of explanation re terrain interpretation ; we sent 10 surveyers to map terrain not unlike that through which the LBH flows. We got 10 different maps back. Now put yourself in Custer's position . What he'll get from a recce is a verbal terrain interpretation which he then has to interpretate. Second hand info and a day late. It's a judgement call Custer has to make ;risk discovery ,against , a situation he could not handle .And anyway he had to get the job done before Terry arrived.
What intell is required when attacking an Indian village which has been caught napping ? How many Indians are there .If the odds are not in your favour then local knowledge can be of some assist. Cheers
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Post by wild on Jul 24, 2015 10:58:22 GMT -6
AZ Could you define your use of recce? The acquisition of such intell as to be of benifit to a mission.
I am not sure what would require the "attack leader" to be on any particular operation. I think in the US that scouting must be a much broader defined term than how you use it. Either our Force Recon has lots of attack leaders or they are not complying with your definition. We are discussing 1876 .Technowledgy has replaced the point man with drones and satellites and such things .
Cheers and thanks
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Post by benteen on Jul 24, 2015 12:59:11 GMT -6
gentlemen,
Some knowledgeable and informative posts by all. I am not well versed in the art or method of scouting and intel gathering, but I do think it would be more prudent to gather what information you need before you commit 1/4 of the regiment to an attack. He has promised support to this unit and promptly put himself on the other side of an impediment, a river, and doesnt know where or even if he can cross it to provide that support. Seems to me you should know at least that much.
Be Well Dan
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Post by wild on Jul 24, 2015 15:48:45 GMT -6
Very much agree with Dan but would add this in Custer's defence . If you were going to dispense with a recce what better situation to do so than an attack on a village containing thousands of women and children with the home guard on R and R. Cheers
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Post by benteen on Jul 24, 2015 16:30:21 GMT -6
Very much agree with Dan but would add this in Custer's defence . If you were going to dispense with a recce what better situation to do so than an attack on a village containing thousands of women and children with the home guard on R and R. Cheers Richard, Good point, but I dont think Reno would agree with you that the home guard was on R and R Be Well Dan
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Post by wild on Jul 24, 2015 16:45:30 GMT -6
Sorry Dan correction ; thought to be on R and R Regards
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 24, 2015 21:54:46 GMT -6
AZ Could you define your use of recce? The acquisition of such intell as to be of benifit to a mission. I am not sure what would require the "attack leader" to be on any particular operation. I think in the US that scouting must be a much broader defined term than how you use it. Either our Force Recon has lots of attack leaders or they are not complying with your definition.We are discussing 1876 .Technowledgy has replaced the point man with drones and satellites and such things . Cheers and thanks I agree and some Indians were United States Army Scouts. They enlisted and wore uniforms. I think the Indian scouts were beneficial. Their duties were what was needed in the 1876 era. I think your right things change with time but those Indians that were Army scouts and others that were Army scouts were called scouts long before any current definition of recce or point man. Regards AZ Ranger
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