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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 28, 2015 9:25:41 GMT -6
it's ironic that the only indication of a leader's recon is in Thompson's account which is rejected by most.
AZ Ranger
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 28, 2015 9:42:42 GMT -6
So am I straight on this. A leader's recon is a subset of recon or recce? Also would scouting be a subset of recon.
I believe that as far as terrain one gets a fair idea of what lies ahead from Weir toward MTC and forward t. There is one obvious route and that is primarily the current route of the road if one wants to move north and observe the drainages toward the river and village.
thanks
AZ Ranger
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Post by wild on Jul 28, 2015 10:00:30 GMT -6
.Hi AZ
So do you believe that the Army wasted money hiring Indian scouts since they could not make tactical decisions? They were not hired to make tactical decisions.They were hired to track their own kind.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 29, 2015 10:07:41 GMT -6
.Hi AZ So do you believe that the Army wasted money hiring Indian scouts since they could not make tactical decisions?They were not hired to make tactical decisions.They were hired to track their own kind. Apparently you believe that all recons require making a tactical decision. On that I disagree. You can scout a route or provide a location of an activity. I believe a recon can lead to making a decision without the person making the decision having to be there. Custer did not turn up Davis Creek based upon his own recce. Regards AZ Ranger
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Gerry
Junior Member
Peter
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Post by Gerry on Jul 29, 2015 10:40:37 GMT -6
it's ironic that the only indication of a leader's recon is in Thompson's account which is rejected by most. AZ Ranger AZ, If you are referring to Custer dropping down off North Weir Point and riding to the scout at the river, as viewed by Thompson; I do not consider as a recon, but as a ride down to dispatch a scout. Custer had his other scouts and Headquarters on top of the bluff above Thompson, viewing the Reno valley fight. There are several other indications of a leader recon on the 25th. The Crows Nest for one. Then a second after coming off the Crows Nest, Custer found the command had moved out and moved the troops into a deep depression in the valley for a rest. At this time Custer made an second leader recon. Thompson described the recon as, "Custer rode some distance ahead of us and then turning to the right ascended to the highest point of the hills where he must have been able to see a long distance. He was not long in returning; and then the bugle was blown for the first time for a number of days. It was a call for the officers". Sgt Knipe described the recon as, "After marching up the divide several miles, General Custer halted the regiment, and, accompanied by his bugler and six scouts, went on. Two hours later he returned from his scouting trip and we learned that possibly the Indian camp had been located. The General divided the regiment at this time." At the officers call, Gerard says he heard the General also telling the other officers that were gathering around him that the Indians were running away. Thompson wrote, "From the manner of the conversation it would seem as though Custer had discovered something that was of great importance. We could not hear the conversation, but we could see that they were all deeply interested. The younger officers did not seem to take any part in the conversation but paid great attention while Custer and the more experienced officers were seeking to solve some difficult problem." This leader recon took about two hours prior to the officers call on the divide. Custer and scouts could cover a lot of ground during two hours. Where Custer went is speculation, but I suspect he went as far to see the village in Ash/Reno Creek and to see the village packing up and moving in great hast, leaving supplies behind, fires still burning, and further down passing the lone tepee. As Custer left the view of the village breaking up, Custer may have felt the the Indians were running and influenced the officers call. Thompson described the village as, "One of their camps must have been broken up in confusion for numerous articles were left behind; such as coffee pots, tin plates, cups, axes, hatchets, and other articles that were good for further use. These articles were scattered about from one end of the camp to the other. The sight of these things puzzled us greatly. Was it for the purpose of lightening their burdens that they might travel the quicker or for the transporting the buffalo that they had slaughtered? Or was it a hasty flight?" The hasty flight of this village in Reno Creek was most likely what Custer viewed during his second leader recon, which influenced the officers call, as Gerard heard Custer say "that the Indians were running away". The General would soon divide the regiment. Sgt Knipe would describe, "When we started away, Major Reno was at General Custer's left and abreast, and Captain Benteen's troops were to the left of Major Reno. A man would know that General Custer intended to strike the Indian camp three places; at the same time to stampede the warriors." Gerry
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Post by benteen on Jul 29, 2015 12:55:31 GMT -6
A man would know that General Custer intended to strike the Indian camp three places; at the same time to stampede the warriors." Gerry Gerry, With due respect to Sgt Knipe, how could he believe Custer planned a simultaneous attack when he knows Benteen is miles away valley hunting. Reno is attacking. Custer is sitting on hill 3411 doing more recon. Be Well Dan
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Gerry
Junior Member
Peter
Posts: 63
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Post by Gerry on Jul 29, 2015 13:15:29 GMT -6
Gerry, With due respect to Sgt Knipe, how could he believe Custer planned a simultaneous attack when he knows Benteen is miles away valley hunting. Reno is attacking. Custer is sitting on hill 3411 doing more recon. Be Well Dan Dan, that would have been at the division point after the officers call on the divide. Gerry
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Post by benteen on Jul 29, 2015 13:52:55 GMT -6
Dan, that would have been at the division point after the officers call on the divide. Gerry Gerry, Oh, OK, This was before all the action and separation took place. Thanks for clearing that up for me. Be Well Dan
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Post by wild on Jul 30, 2015 2:04:51 GMT -6
Hi AZ
Apparently you believe that all recons require making a tactical decision. The exchange with WO was the issue of a battle field recce , You have extended the range to include tracking ,spying ,trailing , scouting, shopping and all back of the trail domestic activities appertaining to navagation. And if you wish to include all these activities under the heading of recce then no problem but lets not allow this to cloud the issue ; "Custer had no dedicated battlefield recce component" . Hurrah
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Post by montrose on Jul 30, 2015 6:14:21 GMT -6
Wild, Glad to see you posting again. Leader's recon. A leader's personal recon is a vital part of the military art. The problem is that as units get larger, there is a point where you must delegate to someone else. In my experience, the breaking point seems to be Battalion and above. So as an officer moves to higher positions, he must learn to change his leadership style. GAC acted as a highly aggressive and motivated company commander at LBH. The problem is that he was the regimental commander, and his actions as a company commander were a disaster as a regimental commander. Sidebar. What was your military occupational specialty? Infantry? We call them 11B in my Army. The process you describe of a point man and trail man is very familiar to me. Point man is looking for bad guys. His trail man is normally the compass guy, keeping the unit going in the right direction. Montrose,
Look at how GAC deployed his regimental recon assets after the Crow's Nest? How many accompanied GAC and his RHQ/HHD to LSH? Bouyer. And he was just like the British Empire in 1876, in "splendid isolation".......!
WO
We may need to start a scouting thread. I see a lot of confusion on the concepts of scouting and reconnaissance. And then there is the issue of using your own soldiers vice indigenous folks. Here is an observation. In Indian Wars we hired indig due to their ability to track and interpret trail signs. In my wars, Afghan/Iraq, a few places I am not sure I can name, we track better than the indig. We hire them to track the human terrain. What tribes are we dealing with, who hates who, etc. Theory. LTC Custer did not understand the operational environment of the Indian Wars. His use of native assets was very weak, in the bottom 10% of all officers in the US Army 1860-1900. He did not understand how to use Indians in an intelligence collection plan. He did not understand how to use Indians in combat. The efficiency and effectiveness of Indian scouts is unmistakable under competent leadership. We do not have to go far to see more competent leaders in this very campaign. Crook, Miles, Gibbon, Mackenzie. I can blow gaping holes in the incompetent use of Indians at LBH. But figuring out on the day of battle that your management plan is useless reeks of incompetence not just on the manager but his supervisor. Varnum's performance as Chief of scouts is mind boggling. I have raised this before, and no one bit at the bait. If you think Custer appointing an other officer to lead the scouts on the day of battle is a mark of confidence in Varnum, you do not know military culture. If GAC had survived, Varnum would have a wonderful 40 year career, and retired as a Captain.
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Post by montrose on Jul 30, 2015 6:16:24 GMT -6
it's ironic that the only indication of a leader's recon is in Thompson's account which is rejected by most. AZ Ranger AZ, If you are referring to Custer dropping down off North Weir Point and riding to the scout at the river, as viewed by Thompson; I do not consider as a recon, but as a ride down to dispatch a scout. Custer had his other scouts and Headquarters on top of the bluff above Thompson, viewing the Reno valley fight. There are several other indications of a leader recon on the 25th. The Crows Nest for one. Then a second after coming off the Crows Nest, Custer found the command had moved out and moved the troops into a deep depression in the valley for a rest. At this time Custer made an second leader recon. Thompson described the recon as, "Custer rode some distance ahead of us and then turning to the right ascended to the highest point of the hills where he must have been able to see a long distance. He was not long in returning; and then the bugle was blown for the first time for a number of days. It was a call for the officers". Sgt Knipe described the recon as, "After marching up the divide several miles, General Custer halted the regiment, and, accompanied by his bugler and six scouts, went on. Two hours later he returned from his scouting trip and we learned that possibly the Indian camp had been located. The General divided the regiment at this time." At the officers call, Gerard says he heard the General also telling the other officers that were gathering around him that the Indians were running away. Thompson wrote, "From the manner of the conversation it would seem as though Custer had discovered something that was of great importance. We could not hear the conversation, but we could see that they were all deeply interested. The younger officers did not seem to take any part in the conversation but paid great attention while Custer and the more experienced officers were seeking to solve some difficult problem." This leader recon took about two hours prior to the officers call on the divide. Custer and scouts could cover a lot of ground during two hours. Where Custer went is speculation, but I suspect he went as far to see the village in Ash/Reno Creek and to see the village packing up and moving in great hast, leaving supplies behind, fires still burning, and further down passing the lone tepee. As Custer left the view of the village breaking up, Custer may have felt the the Indians were running and influenced the officers call. Thompson described the village as, "One of their camps must have been broken up in confusion for numerous articles were left behind; such as coffee pots, tin plates, cups, axes, hatchets, and other articles that were good for further use. These articles were scattered about from one end of the camp to the other. The sight of these things puzzled us greatly. Was it for the purpose of lightening their burdens that they might travel the quicker or for the transporting the buffalo that they had slaughtered? Or was it a hasty flight?" The hasty flight of this village in Reno Creek was most likely what Custer viewed during his second leader recon, which influenced the officers call, as Gerard heard Custer say "that the Indians were running away". The General would soon divide the regiment. Sgt Knipe would describe, "When we started away, Major Reno was at General Custer's left and abreast, and Captain Benteen's troops were to the left of Major Reno. A man would know that General Custer intended to strike the Indian camp three places; at the same time to stampede the warriors." Gerry Nice post Gerry. Because of huge quote, will answer in another post
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Post by montrose on Jul 30, 2015 6:32:39 GMT -6
Okay, let my start with the lone village hypothesis.
Theory. An isolated village was located vicinity the lone tepee. GAC saw this from the Crow's nest and initial actions of the regiment were designed to attack this village.
My analysis.
GAC did assume a small village at this area. It is physically impossible to see this from the Crow's Nest by the way.
Benteen's mission was to scout into SFRC and then move into attack position against this supposed village.
All actions from the divide to the lone tepee are consistent with this theory.
But the problem is: the assumption was false. There was no village vicinity the lone tepee. Anyone want to provide an Indian primary source of a village here. You can not, because there was not.
So Thompson saw scattered debris from a village in the lone tepee area. There is no dispute that the Indians camped here. This is where they did the religious ritual, and where they launched the Rosebud attack. I challenge anyone to provide evidence that this debris occurred on 25 Jun, vice a week earlier.
Gerry, you make me think a lot. I am constantly forced to look at my own assumptions. There is truth in Thompson. But he also embellished his account to make a sexier tale. Meaning he lied a lot. A few years back, I decided to ignore him to the same degree as Goldin. Because of your work, I use him as much as I can. But I assume even you must admit there is an element of bullshit in his work?
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 30, 2015 7:04:03 GMT -6
I think there is more significance to SFRC . I would agree that they had moved from that area and not there on the 25th. I am interested on how much was known of SFRC as a travel corridor. Apparently it was used to travel to the Rosebud battle.
AZ Ranger
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 30, 2015 7:07:37 GMT -6
Hi wild
I thought you had stated there were no scouts only guides and trackers. I was not talking about duties only the title of the employed. How the scouts were used would be up to Custer.
AZ Ranger
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 30, 2015 7:24:51 GMT -6
WO
The scouting set-up was inadequate, but it was their use rather than their sufficiency that was the problemI think you misunderstand the problem . Custer had no "scouts", what he had were trackers and guides . Indians and civvies had no idea as to the tactical information required by Custer or the means by which to convey such information. They could find the enemy for him but that is about it. Even using trained officers would not have been much use to him . A verbal description is very limited.Relative distances ,the realtionship between terrain features, even the dispositions of the tribal circles would be difficult to visualise from a verbal description. Custer himself needed to see what he was up against and Weir Point was far too late to check out the opposition. Perhaps an officer with a sketch pad up on the bluffs But this takes time and Custer was not going hang about . The price of a really good recce is time and risk of discovery . Really the odds favoured his advance to contact. A case could be made that Reno was a recce in force . Hi Wild This is the post I refer to . I think it is Custer that did not maximize the use of the Indian scouts not necessarily the ability of the scouts. I believe there are examples where they were used more efficiently by other commanders. I don't think it would take much skill to follow thousands of Indians and horses. Information such as could the divide be crossed in day light without observation goes beyond tracking and guiding. I would think it would have direct bearing upon decision making. Regards AZ Ranger
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