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Post by Yan Taylor on Oct 31, 2014 6:15:55 GMT -6
Hi everyone, I just thought that I would start up a thread concerning any move by the Custer column down Medicine Tail Coulee, so here goes.
If Custer entered this drainage feature following a move down Cedar, how much could he see as he viewed the mouth from this distance? Could he in fact see any of the village? Now let’s say that he and his column moved as a unit with the F Coy detail moving along the ridgeline ahead and to his right, now as he neared the centre of the coulee, could he have viewed things that made him change his strategy, as at first he could have been determined to attack in strength and use this coulee as a major route. But what if he changed his mind mid flow, this change of any plan could involve Keogh branching off to follow the F Coy detail, E Coy carrying on to the flats at the bottom and Custer/Yates separating a little further down and keeping to any high ground between Keogh and Smith.
If it happened like this then this could mean a shift in strategy, this shift could be from all-out attack to a more cautious probe. So I wonder what could have caused any shift.
Ian.
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Post by tubman13 on Nov 1, 2014 10:05:05 GMT -6
Flatulence, may caused a shift in Custer on this given day, a change in the wind, whatever. I am of the school of thought that Custer was flying by the seat his pants all day long. Many, smarter than I feel, differently. I walked into the water at ford B last summer, the crossing there would have been easy, but I was not there in June of 1876 and there were no bullets flying.
Regards, Tom
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Post by Yan Taylor on Nov 1, 2014 13:00:41 GMT -6
Thanks for the reply Tom, I was beginning to think that I had started a “lame duck” with this thread. What I meant was that Custer may have wanted an all-out attack from the right flank, now did the view from 3411 change his mind or did he alter his plan and split into three as he moved down MTC, because I reckon that he changed his mind and went from full on assault to a cautious positioning move.
Ian.
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Post by tubman13 on Nov 1, 2014 14:59:18 GMT -6
I think, if he planned an all out assault the entire command would have proceeded to ford B, they did not. There is plenty of room down there for a full scale attack. The resistance when he would have arrived would have been relatively light, he probably would have had initial success, followed by what I am not sure, but if he had stopped in the center of the village to fight, I fear the results would have been the same. He may have inflicted more damage on the NA's. We will never know. Confusion and indecision ruled the day. Everything played out poorly, after Crows Nest, lack of knowledge snowballed, lack of shared plan doomed.
Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Nov 2, 2014 10:52:30 GMT -6
Tom: I do not share your view that there was plenty of room at B for an assault. Let's leave that for a moment because you have stated, either on purpose or by accident, a summation of everything Custer did from his turn to the right onto the bluffs to the very end - Followed by what. There was no good follow by what, no matter what he could try offensively.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Nov 2, 2014 11:08:19 GMT -6
Good afternoon gentlemen;
Where I was going with this is, when he split from Reno he effectively built two combat groups, he lets one off the lease to move up the valley and he proceeds with the largest group off to the right to attack from a different direction, and I don’t think at this point that he had any thoughts on splitting his own group into smaller battalions, now he reaches point 3411 and then proceeds to move down Cedar followed by MTC, now after he leaves 3411 he may have had a change of plan, and then he decides to split not only into two but maybe into three, and out of the three groups only one may have gone close to the objective, so now the choice of attack may have gone out of the window.
So what changed this battle plan; the size of the village? Well if the place was too big and he needed Benteen then why split into smaller groups. Or he may have decided to split whilst moving down MTC, because this could have been the area that any split took place, so did he feel threatened and decided to spread the command out? I just get the feeling that the whole bunch was moving down MTC and Custer yells halt, then orders the battalion to split, and I bet that went down well with the other Officers and EMs.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 2, 2014 12:28:53 GMT -6
I don't believe even Custer was foolish enough to move down Medicine Tail Coulee. I think he moved on the high ground to the east of the coulee. The coulee was a death trap had he been caught there. I believe he moved off that high ground down to the ford, leaving three companies behind.
Ian it may be hard to tell from the maps and photos but that coulee sucks as a tactical avenue of approach. It is fairly easy to move within it, but the easy path leads to an early grave.
All that said I think he was just short of board certified bonkers to use Cedar Coulee too, and for the same reasons, save ease of movement.
You get caught in low ground, you die in low ground.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Nov 2, 2014 13:36:32 GMT -6
Hi Chuck, yes a narrow pathway with steep sides is a bad place to be, depends on how much of a hurry he was but taking you post into account, if he did move to his right and stuck to the ridge line then that could mean that GAC and the RHQ were on top of Nye-Cartwright-Luce looking down at the village and ford, that would be around a mile away down below them. From such a vantage point he would have a great view, a bit far I suppose but still a clear LOS. Wouldn’t it be better if the whole lot moved down to Calhoun or Battle Ridge before Custer and E/F moved on to the ford? He could then stop on the rise just short and one company could have done a scan close to the river, but then this would mean that his mission had changed and the assault plan had been dropped. So I suppose we can rule this out, unless he was bonkers; Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 2, 2014 17:30:04 GMT -6
Ian: My impression is that Custer realized he had made a mistake at 3411 and the rest of the afternoon was an attempt to salvage something from it. He made a series of very poor choices. There seems no rhyme or reason for these choices PRIMARILY BECAUSE there was no rhyme or reason.
Not one Atta Boy in a long series of Oh Craps. Not one.
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Post by Beth on Nov 2, 2014 18:26:32 GMT -6
Do you think with Custer's personality that it was possible he kept moving on because he believed Custer Luck would save him? Would saying put in the area of 3411 in order to regroup before moving forward change much or was it once he made himself and his forces visible to the NA the die was cast? (I know its pretty much unanswwerable but I would be interested in opinions)
Beth
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Post by quincannon on Nov 2, 2014 20:22:23 GMT -6
If Custer's personality was a factor in any success he achieved, it must also be considered a factor in his failures.
Staying put at 3411 was not an option. He must do something. I believe the right course of action, in hindsight mind you, was to retrace his movements, consolidate somewhere near Ford A with Benteen and proceed northward toward Reno. Moving ahead of Benteen toward Reno would have been OK too. The promised support would be late, but it would be coming. It would also insure that the packs were screened. This is not a recipe for victory of course, but one that could stave off defeat, and insure that something would remain to fight another day.
Battles are not fought with the benefit of hindsight. He chose, and chose badly. I truly believe he had no understanding of the operational concept. The tactical mistakes he made show this. There was no need to move east then north. North is where he wanted the other guys to go. He must have known at 3411, or giving him the benefit of the doubt at Ford B, that he was not going to be able to handle what confronted him. Yet he continued.
Custer's task was fairly simple. He did not have to obtain an outright win. All he really had to do was avoid catastrophic loss, and maintain a presence to the south with a force in being, that could block any Indian movement southward, and pounce on the rear of anything moving to the west.
Custer did not think operationally. All operational thinking previously had been done for him. The boy was none too bright, when bright would have trumped the overriding need to fight.
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Post by Beth on Nov 2, 2014 20:58:32 GMT -6
Just curious, who would have been a better choice to lead the 7th that day or since the wheel was set in motion several days before at least, for that campaign? (I don't military experience so basically I'm looking for a historic example of an operational commander)
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Post by montrose on Nov 2, 2014 21:03:02 GMT -6
Old Barnum.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 2, 2014 22:26:08 GMT -6
If I could have anyone it would be Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain.
If I must select from those officers currently on active duty at the time it would be McKenzie.
If I am restricted to only what was available, it would be any old shave tail Army mule
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Post by fred on Nov 3, 2014 7:46:31 GMT -6
Do you think with Custer's personality that it was possible he kept moving on because he believed Custer Luck would save him? I don't think he thought one bit about "Custer's Luck." When he was on 3,411 and saw what was beginning to happen in the valley, I think he was euphoric: he had them!! The warriors-- mostly dismounted-- were coming to meet Reno, yet those already there were backing away; Reno was beginning to advance; and he knew the families were on the run. He had them right where he wanted them! Now all he had to do was bring Benteen to the party and head north to clean up the fleeing mess. Simple as that. Best wishes, Fred.
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