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Post by quincannon on Nov 3, 2014 9:33:13 GMT -6
And had he (Custer) been able to engage right there, right then, he would have been correct - He would have had them. He could not, therefore he did not.
Not having your book yet Fred, how long was it between 3411 and Custer at Ford B? It was at least 45 minutes I suspect, A lot can happen in 45 minutes.
So, if the comeback is that Custer did not think anything would change with that passage of time, the answer is half right - He didn't think. Battlefields are fluid, not static, so the answer to Beth's question is actually found within Custer's personality, meaning specifically, Custer's reality was only what Custer saw. Assuming away capabilities, just as he had always done.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Nov 3, 2014 10:58:56 GMT -6
Serves him right for trying to be too smart and over egg the pudding, what was called for was a simply act of support and not over reaching himself over bluffs and placing a river between him and the action.
What has always got me is the time, as Chuck has said it may be 45 minutes or even as long as an hour, now if he saw Reno advancing and looking as though he was in no trouble (and the possibility that Benteen follows him up the valley) then in an hours’ time the battle could be over with Reno and Benteen smiling and saying what took you so long George, or if he saw Reno in skirmish then in an hour the Majors men would have no ammo left.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 4, 2014 7:44:03 GMT -6
Usually errors are divided into those of commission and omission. This error is both. It takes some real brains to commit a tactical hat trick, or perhaps the absence of. I don't believe a more perfect storm could occur, and the more I think about it, it was all due to one man's personality.
I have started to watch more of these forensic shows since having that conversation with Beth a month or so ago. Last night was such a night, and I was particularly struck by a question that was asked of a defense attorney - Your client seemed to come off as arrogant on the witness stand. Attorney: That's because he is arrogant.
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Post by montrose on Nov 4, 2014 7:49:35 GMT -6
Fred wrote, "When he was on 3,411 and saw what was beginning to happen in the valley, I think he was euphoric: he had them!! The warriors-- mostly dismounted-- were coming to meet Reno, yet those already there were backing away; Reno was beginning to advance; and he knew the families were on the run. He had them right where he wanted them! Now all he had to do was bring Benteen to the party and head north to clean up the fleeing mess.
Fred paints a compelling picture of Custer's mindset. He let haste exceed reason.
1. 3411. The decisions made at 3411 were crucial to causing the defeat. LTC Custer now knew the size and dispositions of hostile forces. He knew MAJ Reno was fighting 15 to 1 odds in the valley. He could not reach Reno from 3411, he had two terrain obstacles blocking his route. To enter the valley fight, he would have to backtrack to Ford A, then move as fast as he could downriver for 2 miles. A riskier move is to head to the Thompson's ford, ford B area, and find a crossing there to allow him to reach Reno.
We know he picked none of the above. He left Reno to fight the battle alone and without support. His orders to the Benteen and McDougal battalions were such that they would follow LTC Custer, and never be in range to support Reno.
2. Valley fight. Notice there is no backup plan. If Reno is defeated there are no friendly forces to help him. LTC Custer must have believed Reno's small force were chasing fleeing Indians, and faced no serious threat. From 3411 he could see the size of the Indian force, and the beginning of the massive counteract down Reno's open flank. GAC saw bud did not see. He got overexcited at seeing the exposed village, and ignored what the enemy was doing.
a. Tactics. At 3411 the regiment was badly strung out. The decision to move north meant that Reno would be on his own for the rest of the day. The battle would be won in the north. The problem here is that he never assembled his force before moving north, even though he now knew the size of the enemy force. The pack train was slow, as he should have known this late in the campaign. Tying Benteen to the trains would cost time. By moving north he was delaying the assembly.
Further as DC has pointed out. The terrain east of the river was bad, and would slow any force moving through it. Moving down the Ash Creek valley to the LBH valley is a faster avenue of approach as well as optimizing US tactical advantages over the Indians. The terrain east of the river both slows US forces, and favors Indian tactics and ability.
b. Indian combat power. At LBH LTC Custer appears grossly ignorant of enemy tactics and capabilities. Now I understand GAC had very limited experience fighting Indians. So I understand that none of the other 34 regimental commanders would have made the errors that LTC Custer did.
But still, even within his own experience, GAC had shown better awareness of Indian capabilities at Washita and in 1873. Remember at Washita he hit a small outlying village. When Indians from the other villages formed up to block his approach to the main camps, GAC blinked. He didn't have the combat power to defeat the Indian main body, and he knew it. He used deception to delay enemy response, and withdrew. A sound decision. On 11 Aug 73 he was under orders to attack a enemy village. The village had crossed the river, and the Indians sent out a delaying force. In the resulting skirmish, GAC had also let his forces scatter, but he waited til they closed up.
LTC Custer faced a larger force than he had before. They also were better armed than before, something GAC had repeatedly written about in his articles and letters. It is hard to understand why GAC seemed ignorant of his own writings. I can only conclude that his judgment was badly off at LBH.
c. Command climate. LTC Custer was no believer in staff and military decision making. He made decisions like a platoon leader, entirely by himself, with no inputs from anyone else. He surrounded himself with yes man, who blindly obeyed orders. This does allow for rapid decision making. The "Come On, You Wolverines" method had won him some victories in the ACW. But it was not a tool that fit all situations. He was a one trick pony, on a day when he needed a second trick.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 4, 2014 10:33:35 GMT -6
None of the above, both mine and Will's disputes anything that Fred said. Fred was correct in that is probably exactly what Custer thought, and that is the pity of this whole thing
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Post by Dark Cloud on Nov 4, 2014 11:06:50 GMT -6
Montrose,
1. From 3411, he could NOT see all he needed to see. A great deal of the village was around the bend and visually blocked by Weir Pt. He did NOT know "the size and dispositions of hostile forces" beyond 'way more than I have.' And I take issue with use of the term 'disposition' in that it implies an ordered position of units. IF he was told there was a crossing point downriver, he was misinformed as to location and time to get there PLUS it could be full of Indians. For all he knew, all north of the Sharpshooter/Weir Pt. area was a camp as well. He couldn't see further.
2. I take issue that his orders were specific to bringing the trains to him alone.
3. I don't see why Custer was relegated to believing or assuming squat about Reno when accurate info could be obtained by peering into the valley. If he previously saw negative odds of 15-1 it's odd he would think Reno was chasing them.
4. Except Crook, few commanders had much experience fighting Indians, and that mostly involving less than 50 enemy in small actions.
5. What I've read about the Washita is that he was after Cheyenne alone, specifically Black Kettle's band, and Elliot found a trail of warriors to follow in. Custer was not aware of the other villages but he wasn't about to attack those not at war yet. When they showed indication of girding up to support the Cheyenne after the battle, he bluffed them back, but there was no intention to involve them as well if avoidable.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Nov 4, 2014 11:21:03 GMT -6
You could say the terrain favoured the Indians in more ways than one, not only did it aid in providing cover and avenues of approach for warriors to infiltrate but it forced Custer to keep moving forward thus stringing him out. I could be wrong here but was there a point along those ridges and bluffs that he could see all of the village?
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 4, 2014 14:13:03 GMT -6
Ian: I think you can see the extent of the village(s) from Weir Point. The foliage along the river would have still concealed some of them, but I suspect that from Weir he could have seen what was necessary - i.e. A lot bigger than he thought at 3411. He should have gone there. I don't believe he did in that his movements from 3411 suggest that he anticipated conducting an assault at what became known as Ford B.
Further speculation on my part is that once at the northern extension of the L-N-C ridge complex Custer became aware that the village(s) extended past Ford B, thus the need in his mind to reconnoiter Ford B to find out just how far. Had he gone to Weir, I believe there would have been no excursion to Ford B.
He is still strung out of course. He is still moving away from those who might support him. A string of bad decisions.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Nov 5, 2014 8:03:11 GMT -6
Hi Chuck, yes I can go along with what you said, if he had no idea on were the place actually ended then would it make military sense to still attack? Was he really doing such a bad job in halting supposedly out of harm’s way and find the northern perimeter of his objective.
Going back to when we were talking about the whole battalion moving along the L-N-C ridge complex, would it make sense for the whole battalion to move off together, with Keogh under orders to occupy the southern end of Custer ridge and Smith moving to the ford, that would leave Yates with GAC and the HQ to halt some place in between, that would leave out any possibility of GAC having to back track up hill to relay any new orders to Keogh, it would be as simply as breaking off contact at the ford, re-joining E/F & HQ and moving northeast along the high ground, that’s how I would have planned it given the need for speed and time, no need to keep moving up hill on tired horses to deliver a fresh order to a commander who is over a mile away on the ridge line.
Ian.
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Post by mac on Nov 5, 2014 10:59:40 GMT -6
As always I am Enjoying the discussion and all contributions. To return to Fred's post earlier I think we see the importance of the sequence and timing of events. I agree Custer is wrong in his actions but when you consider what he sees and when he sees it then superimpose his assumption that he must be quick; then one can see some sense of purpose to movements that otherwise are hard to credibly explain. His movements, to me, show an urgency to get north to exploit something he has seen there. He is so focussed on this that he makes some terrible errors. Cheers
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Post by Colt45 on Nov 5, 2014 11:14:08 GMT -6
Mac, I think you nailed it. I am in the middle of Fred's new book and it is becoming very apparent that the timing of what was going on at the time some of his decisions were made makes the decision seem correct, even though it was very wrong. I totally agree that he became so focused on what he thought he knew at the time of the decision (or decisions) that he ignored other signs that would have led him to alter his course of action.
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Post by tubman13 on Nov 5, 2014 15:04:35 GMT -6
Tom: I do not share your view that there was plenty of room at B for an assault. Let's leave that for a moment because you have stated, either on purpose or by accident, a summation of everything Custer did from his turn to the right onto the bluffs to the very end - Followed by what. There was no good follow by what, no matter what he could try offensively. Chuck, I did not say it would be wise to attack at B only that it was doable. I also don't know what he really saw at 3411, nor how he interpreted what he saw. What I do know he had the room for attack against a limited force, at the time he arrived at the ford, as NA focus was to the south. I think we know now how that would have played out, and Custer may well have felt it would have played to his detriment. What I must assume ( I know that word can make an a$$ of me)is that Reno, in his mind was a command he could afford to lose in it's entirety, to buy him time, if he was to continue north, even as early as 3411. They, in Custer's mind must have been expendable.
I would ask AZ as well as others, their opinion as to whether a proper number horses could have crossed in attack formation with enough force to cut through the village at that point.
Regards, Tom
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Post by fred on Nov 5, 2014 15:10:26 GMT -6
I am in the middle of Fred's new book and it is becoming very apparent that the timing of what was going on at the time some of his decisions were made makes the decision seem correct, even though it was very wrong. I totally agree that he became so focused on what he thought he knew at the time of the decision (or decisions) that he ignored other signs that would have led him to alter his course of action. Colt, This post of yours is exactly what I am looking. This is precisely what I want people to get out of this book. It changes condemnation into understanding and that is what the whole damn thing is about. For my money you are approaching this thing from exactly the right viewpoint. With your permission, I would like to copy-and-paste your quote above onto a Facebook thread I have gotten involved in with this book. I won't do anything until I hear from you. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Colt45 on Nov 5, 2014 16:23:54 GMT -6
Fred, by all means, feel free to use that post, even though I don't think it is a very good post as far as fully explaining what I am getting from the book, as I am not done yet. But, man, am I enjoying the book.
Like you, I have always felt one had to know what everyone was doing at time x, and where they were, to understand what happened at time x+1, and why/how they moved as they did, reacted as they did, etc.
As an old armor officer, timing was everything with respect to positioning the big iron cars where you wanted them, when you wanted them there, against what enemy, etc. In armor, the main things you had to do was move, shoot, communicate, pretty much in that order. Many decisions regarding asset deployment/disposition depended on what you saw/knew at the time you made the decision. Not unlike what Custer faced, but unlike Custer, I never fixated or stayed with a given decision when faced with changing events that indicated the actions of that decision were going to go south on me.
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Post by fred on Nov 5, 2014 16:49:31 GMT -6
Colt,
Thank you. I am going to post it now and I will let you know what people say. I think your posts are excellent and you are getting the point extremely well. That is all I could ever ask.
Thanks again.
Best wishes, Fred.
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