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Post by Yan Taylor on Jun 25, 2014 8:22:25 GMT -6
True enough Chuck, but I am sure that between the Lone Tepee and 3411, Reno's men spotted Custer's Troops on a couple places along the bluffs, so GAC may have done likewise.
Ian.
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Post by Colt45 on Jun 25, 2014 9:41:21 GMT -6
The problem still lies with what was communicated to Reno. As far as I remember from the RCOI, Reno's orders were to cross the river, attack the village, and he would be supported by the regiment. What did "supported by the regiment" mean to Reno? Was he expecting Custer to cross ford A and be behind him or to his left? Was he expecting Custer to go up the eastern bluffs and try to envelop or flank attack? What was Reno expecting?
As Ian mentioned, it is quite possible some of Reno's men saw Custer's men prior to 3411, but I don't recall anywhere Reno mentioning he personally saw Custer's wing after the crossing at Ford A. If he did see Custer, he would certainly wonder how he was to be supported by the regiment, with hills and a river between the two forces.
Since we don't know what Custer communicated while they were together on Reno Creek, we have only what Reno said were his orders to go by. From the crow's nest onward, it appears Custer did a lousy job of communicating orders and intentions to his subordinate commanders. My personal opinion is that Reno expected Custer to cross at ford A and be behind him or to his left. His move to the timber and subsequent retreat to the bluffs was a predictable move when the expected support didn't materialize, given the hostile force he faced. He probably had an "oh, crap, there's no support" moment when he realized his left flank was being turned, causing the move to the timber and subsequent retreat back across the river.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 25, 2014 10:01:10 GMT -6
Support from the rear would be the logical assumption. If support was to be rendered by any other means and from another direction, that information should have been clearly stated in Reno's orders. Reno giving no such testimony, or anyone saying anything that would remotely differ from what Reno testified to, any and all responsibility must return to Custer, regardless of who is to blame in not clearly transmitting orders, if omission in that transmission is indeed fact.
I think we have all worked for someone like Custer in the past regardless of our individual fields of endeavor. I certainly have. It is a very lonesome feeling knowing someone, regardless of reason has left you hung out to dry. We have all probably, in those circumstances, resolved to do two things, 1) Do what we must to extricate ourselves from the circumstance, and 2) Never let the bastard do it to us again. I think this was Reno's first time in that particular box, and while he did in no way cover himself in the laurel of victory, no one could have extricated those people from that situation any better, and most would have done it worse.
Break out, not retreat. You retreat from the enemy. You break out through the enemy.
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Post by welshofficer on Jun 25, 2014 11:23:48 GMT -6
What troubles me is that GAC and Reno were not communicating directly, preferably with Cooke/TWC also in attendance. And ideally also with the other two battalion commanders present - Yates and Keogh. All the signs of a dysfunctional regimental officer corps.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 25, 2014 12:27:09 GMT -6
WO: Getting back to what we were discussing the other day, I wonder if this behaviour on this campaign, differed from what was previous. There is that odd response to Gibbon, when he left the PRD, the quiet and seemingly withdrawn officers call of a day or so previously. Perhaps these things were commented upon after the fact in light of what happened, omens and all that other Victorian nonsense, but I sure would like to know what Custer's "normal" was, so there is a better basis of commentary for judgments to be made. I have no doubt he was under pressure, but just how much of it did he feel, and what effect did it have on decisions made, and the manner in which he made them? Maybe Fred will comment.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jun 25, 2014 12:27:27 GMT -6
I also wanted to add that the two groups (or Battalions) commanded by Custer and Reno, never had any intention of fighting together, they may have supported each other with attacks from different directions but not as whole, for one if we look at the advance up Ash Creek, Custer had a river separating him from Reno, now what if one of them got attacked and there was no ford in that stretch of water, what then. When we speak of Terry, Gibbon and Crook not operating together but as three separate entities, the same could be said of Custer, Reno and Benteen, Custer could be attacking out of sight beyond the bluffs separated by a river, Reno was going to fight in the valley and Benteen could have be engaged miles away.
Ian.
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Post by welshofficer on Jun 25, 2014 12:45:29 GMT -6
QC/Yan,
There is just a blatant absence of recorded meaningful communication over basic aspects of what GAC as the CO intended to happen. Even allowing for no fall back scenarios, because the hostiles were "obviously going to run".
WO
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Post by quincannon on Jun 25, 2014 12:52:28 GMT -6
Ian there is absolutely nothing wrong with different elements of an army being spread out while on campaign, even in those days of poor to non-existent means of rapid communications. All it really takes is clear concise orders as to what part in achieving the overall objectives each will play AND that each of those elements be largely self sufficient unto themselves. In other words they should be able to both handle whatever they may meet, and be able to subsist on their own. Thus Terry, Crook, and Custer, meet that criteria.
There is nothing wrong with the way Custer split his organic elements either, in time and space. What was wrong was that each of those sub-elements was insufficient to the task given,in terms of both numbers and self sufficiency. This is the part that delusional idiot Keogh does not understand, and the real underpinning of that Infantry minded nonsense we have all been subject to. Maneuver can only be accomplished if you have sufficiency of both men and material to accomplish it. Less than that and it fails. Sufficiency just means sufficient, not overwhelming.
WO: Then there is just a blatant absence of competence.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jun 25, 2014 13:05:56 GMT -6
Chuck, I am neither Infantry or Cavalry (having never served), but even I can make sense out of what you are trying to say, Billy Keogh try's to condense this battle and make it more like a John Ford Movie.
Yes you are correct, each one of the three battle groups had neither the size or power to achieve any major goals or objectives, they could be good for nuisance value, but carving up a village this size, I don't think so.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 25, 2014 13:19:15 GMT -6
I said he was delusional. For him life IS a John Ford movie.
Three battalions of 400 men along with some extra ammunition could have executed that same scheme of maneuver with some degree of success, exactly as it was, save that idiotic walk down the Primrose Path to D, and the millstone of the packs out of the way and relatively safe. Two 150 man, and a 200 man battalions not so much.
Consider this:
Reno moves down the valley and draws the exact same opposition he did in reality. Instead of a paltry force he has a full four hundred, and extra ammo. He may very well have held his skirmish line, but in the event he did not and was forced into the timber, he would have sufficiency to hold that position for an extended period of time, and it was unlikely the hostiles could have brought enough force to bear to drive him out.
Custer with his four hundred goes to B posing a real threat in the near rear. He need not cross over, but the threat of him doing so is ever present putting him in the rear of the force confronting Reno. He too has sufficiency of force to hold, and the only real threat he faces is being flanked by those crossing at C and D and descending upon him. That though would take time. The Indians facing Reno could not withdraw for Reno is much too close to the southern end of the village.
A timely message is sent to Benteen (by timely I mean from 3411) where Custer directs Benteen to either come up behind Reno, and they together continue the attack into the village, driving the hostiles past Custer, OR join Custer and force a crossing at B. Custer has sufficiency of combat power until one or the other of these things happen to prevent a hostile crossing at B. This time the terrain is on Custer's side
Not a complete victory but good enough. Cannae happens only once every four thousand years or so. Then pursue, pursue, pursue
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Post by welshofficer on Jun 25, 2014 14:45:52 GMT -6
I just see an absence of basic competent communication. From GAC to Reno/Benteen undoubtedly. Within GAC's wing, possibly? Did GAC give Keogh sufficient orders or poor orders? We are all to a certain extent assuming that Keogh got himself into trouble, either directly or by Harrington "going rogue". We actually have no idea what orders were given by GAC to Keogh at Calhoun Hill, although we presume to fend and cover his rear and possibly to facilitate a link-up with Benteen.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 25, 2014 15:04:07 GMT -6
He may very well have said you stay here, I am going there. Right up there with pitch in and you will be supported. Gutter trash trying to dine at the Waldorf. The Beverly Hillbillies on Rodeo Drive.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jun 25, 2014 16:54:40 GMT -6
Taking things on to the Custer sector, Benteen must have been adamant that the Custer battalion(s) moved in two groups, he must have noticed that there was two lines of tracks made by shod horses, I know that he could have simply followed the line of dead troopers, but one of the trails (this went from MTC to LSH) has a lot less dead than the other (through the Calhoun position and along CR), these lines are clearly drawn on his map.
So there could be a case that GAC and Keogh never met, if you look at the distance from were Custer and Yates arrived at Ford B and were Keogh could be waiting, you are looking at around a mile if Keogh was on Calhoun Hill and about 1.500 yards if he was on the Nye-Cartwright complex, so if GAC was thinking on the hoof he could have easily sent word of what he was up to next, and Keogh could be working with scant info, maybe just an order to sit and wait and set up a basic defence till Benteen arrives.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 25, 2014 17:22:58 GMT -6
Possible, but not an excuse. It goes back to who is responsible for everything a unit does or fails to do, and there is only one correct answer.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jun 25, 2014 17:30:06 GMT -6
Well Chuck if we go on what know about how Custer and Cook dished out orders and notes that day, then these are two likely suspects for any failure in communication.
Ian.
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