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Post by Deleted on Jun 22, 2014 12:04:57 GMT -6
Ian, We can ask when he returns. I've tried two browsers using the "quote" function and can't make it work. Sorry for the bumps. c.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 22, 2014 15:21:18 GMT -6
"Cross the river in preparation to support" Mac has asked this question before. The words I quoted seem clearly that Mac is referring to a crossing behind Reno at Ford A. That is the only way Mac's question makes and sense, when coupled with " I keep wondering if his plan was always around the option he took?
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Post by tubman13 on Jun 23, 2014 5:25:15 GMT -6
Ian, I'm wondering if mac is referring to Custer crossing the LBH river behind Reno at Ford A - in support. Best, c. Chris, I think Mac was, and Custer could have. Regards, Tom
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jun 23, 2014 6:49:42 GMT -6
To try and determine this, we should back track to when they separated along Ash/Reno Creek (some say at the Lone Tepee), the command halted and received word from Girard that Indians were riding away up the valley, and after this Custer made the decision again to move in two separate columns.
It looks like they both took northerly course, with Reno going along the flats and Custer heading for the high ground, now this to me is a two pronged attack, a badly thought out one, but still a two pronged attack. So Custer must have had an idea that the valley was where the action was, and he still split and distanced himself by going up the bluffs.
When you think about it, just by Looking at the terrain, why would Reno would expect Custer to come from anywhere but his rear, they saw him veer off to the right along Ash/Reno Creek, so he knew that he was on his right flank, now when that flank got bordered by the river and tree line, it narrows down the options. For GAC to visually support Reno he would have to find a crossing point and then move through a line of timber to join him, Reno also knew he wouldn’t appear to his left because he would have seen him, plus the fact that Custer’s men were spotted on the bluffs verified his position, by this time he should have gathered that GAC wouldn't be turning up as promised.
Ian.
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Post by fred on Jun 23, 2014 7:37:12 GMT -6
Was that the position in relation to 1st Lt DeRudio? Justin, I am not sure what you mean with that question. DeRudio's physical position at various times, or his position relative to others as to DOR, unit assignments, etc.? This may clarify things relative to the latter circumstance: Camp at Fort A. Lincoln, D. T. May 14th 1876 To the Adjutant General of the Army Washington, D. C. Sir Feeling that the manner in which I have been treated by the present Regimental Commander is unjust and such action having been sanctioned by the Department Commander after the hereto appended request (and to which I have not even received a reply), I would respectfully request that action may be taken on my request to the General of the Army of last April. During a personal interview with the General Commanding of the Department granted me at my request, the General told me that “he would not answer my communication at present.” I have the honor to inform the General that in order to deprive me of my right, another 1st Lieutenant (Smith) has been temporarily assigned to command my own company (“E”) and I have been assigned to Company “A” to which he (Smith) properly belongs. Hoping that the General of the Army will adjust my lawful claim, by ordering me to assume the command of my own company, I have the honor to be Very Respectfully Your Obt Servant Charles C. DeRudio 1st Lieut 7th Cavalry Through Regimental Head Quarters 1st Endorsement Headqrs. 7th Cavalry Fort A. Lincoln, D.T. May 14, 1876 Respectfully forwarded. Lieut. DeRudio is the junior 1st Lieut of this Regiment, having only been promoted to that grade within the past few months. Lieut. Smith, the officer assigned to command the company to which Lieut. DeRudio belongs, has held the grade of 1st Lieut. For several years and is an officer of extensive experience, not only as a company commander but in service against hostile Indians. Lieut. DeRudio possesses neither the experience nor the ability which can be claimed for Lieut. Smith, nor is he a fit person in my opinion to exercise not only the command of, but to be the only officer present with, a cavalry company, liable to be called upon at any moment to engage in important service against hostile Indians. He is a confirmed grumbler, and asserting to his own confession is a natural conspirator, having once barely averted suffering the death penalty for conspiracy against the life of the sovereign of the land in which he formerly resided. He is, all things considered, the inferior of every first lieutenant in this Regt. As an efficient and sub-ordinate officer. The transfer of Lieut. DeRudio to “A” Company was made partially at his request and to give two officers to each company. No better commentary could probably be made upon the value of Lieut. DeRudio’s services as a company officer than to state that the Captain of the company to which Lieut. DeRudio has been assigned, protesting in respectful terms against having Lieut. DeRudio in the company, preferring to perform the entire duty alone. I would further add that while I regard Lieut. Smith as a most excellent company commander, he was not designated by me to command Lieut. DeRudio’s company. G. A. Custer Lieut. Colonel 7th Cavalry Brev. Major Genl. U.S.A. Comdg. Regiment Varnum did re-join A Company. In fact, his testimony at the RCOI is quite clear about it and he performed all the duties he should have, constantly reported to his commander. If I am not mistaken, there isn’t a single reference by anyone—including DeRudio—where Moylan and DeRudio collaborated on anything. By reading DeRudio’s accounts one would get the impression he was an extra officer with no practical functions. One of the primary reasons I feel he lied about his role was the business of his taking G Company troops off the line to go into the timber, ostensibly—according to DeRudio—to ward off encroaching warriors. Reno had already done that. Once DeRudio made that claim, there is never another word said about those troops or why he went into the woods, not from DeRudio or anyone else. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 23, 2014 7:42:38 GMT -6
I does take on the trappings of a fox hunt, more than a deliberate military maneuver doesn't it? One second thought it's more like Wiley Coyote and the Road Runner. Then again it does have certain similarities to Elmer Fudd and Yosemite Sam combining efforts against Bugs Bunny.
Fault in maneuver usually lies in one of two extremes. nonexistent or lack of sufficiently deliberate planning, or overcomplicated planning. Both result in poor to miserable execution.
Fred: I expect that means "Promote ahead of contemporaries" would not be mentioned in DeRudio's next OER.
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Post by fred on Jun 23, 2014 9:26:32 GMT -6
Fred: I expect that means "Promote ahead of contemporaries" would not be mentioned in DeRudio's next OER. < g >
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Post by welshofficer on Jun 23, 2014 19:20:17 GMT -6
Fred,
Thanks for the clarification.
I guess Cpt Moylan may have preferred his 1st Sgt to take over, if he had been KIA/WIA and 2nd Lt Varnum had not re-joined A Company or he had also been KIA/WIA!
It's still an odd situation.
That Maj Reno battalion was pitifully short of officers. Cpt French was sole officer of M Company. 2 Lts in G Company. And Cpt McDougall's 2nd Lt as his adjutant.
8 officers, including the officer Cpt Moylan didn't want and his other officer acting as Chief of Scouts.
So by the time Cpt Benteen arrived at Reno Hill, Maj Reno was not in a good condition and Lts Hodgson, McIntosh and DeRudio were missing.
So if he ever entertained the thought of "battling through" to GAC, Cpt Benteen would effectively be abandoning a beaten command under two junior Cpts and two 2nd Lts. Never happening.
WO
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Post by quincannon on Jun 23, 2014 23:02:15 GMT -6
The whole notion of Reno or Benteen, or both breaking through to Custer in a timely manner has been the subject of heated discussion on this board and others, probably as long as these boards have existed. I believe those that think it could have been done in such a fashion are simply delusional, and have absolutely no idea of the various problems that would confront such a force attempting it.
Linking up with Custer, which I believe was the intention of the movement to Weir Point is an entirely different matter. Linking up was possible had Custer been lightly engaged. Breaking through not so much.
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Post by mac on Jun 25, 2014 5:52:39 GMT -6
Ian Sadly I have been working and not on holiday but they will be here soon! My question does relate to Ford A. In short I wonder if it is unusual/ surprising (from a military perspective) that Custer would not even cross the river to position himself to be easily able to support Reno. Would any of you do that as a standard practice? Cheers
More to come perhaps, depending on the answer.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 25, 2014 6:33:37 GMT -6
Mac: I commented earlier that upon first contact it is automatic to the point of being axiomatic for the advancing to contact force to seek at least one, and ideally both flanks of the defending force, if for no other reason than to define the limits of the defended area. Upon first contact are the operative words.At the point where Custer moved to the east, and declined to cross over the river, that contact had not yet been made, although it would come within minutes thereafter. So yes, I believe Custer's move preliminary to contact was not what would normally be expected.
Keep in mind here that I am assuming such a move was not preplanned. Had it been a planned movement and that plan was formulated and executed without Reno's knowledge, it would be totally irresponsible, regardless of if it had worked or not. We know it did not work, but lots of plans don't work. It was the failure to communicate intention with the unit in need of support that was the irresponsible part.
Back in the day I used to play a card game called Pitch, where you sought High, Low, Jack, and Game was a way of scoring points. After each hand was dealt,you first bid, then you passed three cards to your neighbor, in hopes of either improving your hand or screwing up your neighbors. If you set up your own hand and bid, based upon what you think you would receive from your neighbor it was called "bidding on the come". Custer in moving eastward onto those bluffs, was bidding on the come, thinking what he might receive would obtain for him high,low, jack, and most importantly game. It did not.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jun 25, 2014 6:47:57 GMT -6
Hello Mac/Chuck, after they passed the Lone Tepee, they separated with Custer moving to the right just behind Reno, when they reached the north fork, Reno crossed over to the left bank of Ash Creek, but to some accounts say that both Battalions stopped to water their horses, GAC stopped at the north fork, and Reno did the same at Ford A. during this period of around 30 to 40 minutes, Cook may have been the only Officer to speak to Reno concerning any orders, as far as I can see Custer never spoke to Reno face to face so any orders would have come through Cook, and going on Cooks note to Benteen, any orders from GAC to Reno via Cook may have been pretty vague.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 25, 2014 7:04:05 GMT -6
Ian: You may be correct, and you do have a point about being vague and incomplete regarding that latter communication at Cooke's hands. Two points here:
Cooke must not have been a very good adjutant, for the meat and drink of the adjutant, as WO pointed out to DC some days ago, is brief written, or oral, communication, formulated with complete clarity of purpose. We see that he completely failed once and have written evidence of that failure.
Orders of that import, should ONLY be delivered by the commander himself if that was possible. It was in this instance. That is not saying that the commander can deliver those orders any better than the adjutant or someone else. What it does do is afford the commander the ability to look in the eye of the receiver, to insure himself of complete understanding of both order and intent on the part of the receiver. In other words determine if the lights are on and if anyone is at home. If the situation permits, and you fail to do this it is an irresponsible act on the commander's part.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jun 25, 2014 7:21:45 GMT -6
Hi Chuck, yes the best way to get your order across would be to deliver it personally, now I am sure that I read a while back that both Custer and Reno were on the same river bank, and this was around the Lone Tepee area, if this is correct then why didn’t GAC meet up with Reno and explain his orders.
I have also read that Cook actually accompanied Reno on his march down towards the north fork and maybe even further, that would give Cook a good grasp on Reno’s situation prior to his move down the valley, and he could relay this report to his commander once we rejoined Custer's Battalion(s)
This could be a shrewd move on Custer’s behalf, his adjutant had been by Reno’s side as he made his way to his river crossing and later Custer kept tabs on his progress from the bluffs, so GAC had a fair idea on what Reno was up to, shame he lost visual after 3411, if he saw Reno running he would have to amend his plans, or you would expect he would.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 25, 2014 7:42:28 GMT -6
Ian: You are making the assumption that Custer had already decided what he wanted done while at the Lone Tepee. I don't think we have any indication of that with regard to specific actions.
Again it is not so much the delivery. It is the assurance of understanding.
I am not sure Custer kept any tabs on Reno's progress until 3411. What he must have seen points to momentarily Reno doing fairly well at that time. Had it been otherwise, there would be no point at all in Custer continuing north, for the game would be up. Any further northward movement depends upon Reno holding his own or better. Had that not been the case and Custer finds Reno in a bad way or on the verge of retreat, I am not at all sure what he would have done. Although I hope I would have not gotten myself in that situation, I am not at all sure what I would have done either. Any commander who finds himself in such a fix, has only the option of finding the least bad of all bad choices.
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