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Post by Yan Taylor on Mar 29, 2022 13:09:04 GMT -6
Hi Montrose.
I remember when all of this north to south flow came to light. I was always concerned on why an aggressive commander like Custer would leave the rump of his men sat on their rumps as he and eighty men plus the rest of his regiment, where in a fight. But what did affect me too was when I read the Cheyenne accounts and read the JSIT narrative.
What was in those Cheyenne accounts was like a recuring theme and things like Soldiers on the high ground, soldiers came down a dry gulch and soldiers approach the river are mentioned time and time again.
Now let’s try and look at it through the eyes of a journalist and hearing these accounts given through an interpreter. When the journalist hears about soldiers being at these locations, he would actually and probably naturally think that these locations are Calhoun Hill, MTC and ford B as these where the most probably places mainly because of the early mappers.
As far as I know, did anyone check the far north? I know that nobody ever thought of checking for the trail which Godfrey found later, so Journalists maybe just stick with the obvious.
Going back to JSIT, now his step grandfather Wolftooth, followed the column as it crossed over deep coulee and “low and behold” he totally missed those 120 soldiers camped on that ridge line, do you think he could have missed them in his quest to follow the eight odd heading north?
The Cheyenne’s fought the soldiers in the north, the Sioux followed later and engaged those on battle ridge, who may have been returning south and ran smack into them as deep coulee by this time, could have been a death trap. On the JSIT map we have the soldiers moving down a ravine/gulch, past a building and onto the river. Tom and Steve went to this place on the map and the footings of that building are still there. That’s the beauty of the JSIT map, he uses modern locations as a guide.
By the way William, who is Reese?
Ian
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Post by Colt45 on Mar 29, 2022 19:09:31 GMT -6
backwater,
Maximum range is a lot different that maximum effective range. MEF is around 460 meters (about 500 yards), which is as far as the average shooter is able to hit anything. And hitting targets at MEF is a low percentage affair, as most shooters can't hit at that range. Also, bearing in mind that the 45/70 and 45/55 rounds, with that heavy 405 grain slug, are not flat trajectory rounds. They lob into the target, which means to hit anything at range, the shooter must be well-trained and experienced with the weapon. The 7th was neither well-trained nor experienced with the carbines issued to them. Probably 100 yards or so was the range limit for those soldiers firing when under fire themselves.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Mar 30, 2022 7:17:47 GMT -6
Hi Colt.
We are pondering over the idea of the range and effectiveness of the carbine, but if we look at how Custer was planning to attack this village, I think that we would have to take a reference to how he attacked at the Washita battle, there they rode into the village at multiply points and virtually shot up the place.
So, with this in mind we can now look at what the cavalry carried into battle, we know they had no sabres so that leaves us with a single shot carbine and a six-shooter revolver. So, would it be right to say that the carbine was mainly better used as a defensive weapon (in skirmish line) and the revolver better suited to firing from horse back at targets on the ground? I would say that in a village environment, you could call it close quarter fighting, so a six shooter would be their best weapon for this job.
As Colt points out, the 7th were not up to scratch, AZ has also pointed out in the past about how First Sergeant Ryan (Company M) stated that the men in his company could not shoot from horse back.
So, I reckon, the carbine would be second choice if Custer managed to penetrate the village defences and hit the centre of the camp circles.
Ian.
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Post by Colt45 on Mar 30, 2022 7:29:41 GMT -6
Hi Yan,
At Washita, the opposing force was much smaller and was less prepared for a fight than the force at LBH. Riding in firing as in a John Wayne movie would only serve as a hit and run type of attack. To be decisive, you need a longer engagement time. After 6 shots, the revolver is useless until reloaded, which takes considerable time if on horseback. I am not sure but didn't Custer have sabers at Washita? If so, you can ride in firing, and when the pistol is empty you can switch to the saber and still be effective for a while.
At LBH, the only way Custer could have been effective was to have crossed the river, and proceeded on foot with a skirmish line, which would give the soldiers time to aim and reload. That would also have kept most of the hostiles at his front. Even if he had crossed the river and setup a skirmish line assault, there were too many hostiles, and he didn't have the troops or the ammo to sustain such an assault. All that would have happened is the 7th would have died on the west side of the river instead of on LSH. Weapon-wise, he was not equipped to win a battle with the size of the force he faced.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Mar 30, 2022 14:00:23 GMT -6
Yes Colt, after a while, any dismounted actions would have been overwhelmed, that lends to the question of Custer leaving 120 men behind, if this was an offensive action by 80 troopers then why leave behind combat power. I think there was talk on the blue board concerning Custer leaving the 120 on cemetery ridge or BRE and E and F moved down the dry gulch onto the flats. The line on the JSIT map shows such a move and then being repulsed.
Leaving 120 on the high ground above the fording place does sound like what some say happened around ford B, which makes more sense around ford D because the distance from ford D was a lot closer then ford B to Nye-Cartwright ridge, thus the supporting companies are much more able to follow the advance when called.
Ian
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Post by backwater on Mar 30, 2022 14:06:59 GMT -6
No sabers at LBH. A lot of the 7th walked in to battle at the washita, Captain Barnitz of G Co. had most men go in as skirmishers. PVT J.C. Pickens (not sure of unit) said "I do not know if we were the only troop that was dismounted during the onslaught, but I have often recalled my impression as to the very narrow escape we horse-holders had on that morning, for by the time we were in camp the Indians were swarming on the bluffs around us, and if we hadn't become restless our corporal might have kept us there just a little too long..."
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Post by crzhrs on Mar 30, 2022 14:44:04 GMT -6
Hi Yan, At Washita, the opposing force was much smaller and was less prepared for a fight than the force at LBH. Riding in firing as in a John Wayne movie would only serve as a hit and run type of attack. To be decisive, you need a longer engagement time. After 6 shots, the revolver is useless until reloaded, which takes considerable time if on horseback. I am not sure but didn't Custer have sabers at Washita? If so, you can ride in firing, and when the pistol is empty you can switch to the saber and still be effective for a while. At LBH, the only way Custer could have been effective was to have crossed the river, and proceeded on foot with a skirmish line, which would give the soldiers time to aim and reload. That would also have kept most of the hostiles at his front. Even if he had crossed the river and setup a skirmish line assault, there were too many hostiles, and he didn't have the troops or the ammo to sustain such an assault. All that would have happened is the 7th would have died on the west side of the river instead of on LSH. Weapon-wise, he was not equipped to win a battle with the size of the force he faced. The Washita and LBH were two completely different battles. The main differences with Washita was it was a winter attack which took place at sunrise which caught the Indians by complete surprise. In addition it wasn't really that small of a opposing force. In fact, it was a serious of Indian villages with maybe far more warriors than one would think. It was a dawn attack that gave Custer the edge. The main difference with LBH was it was a summer attack during the middle of the day and it wasn't against the hapless Black Kettle but against Crazy Horse, Sitting Bull, Low Dog and other hardcore warriors who wanted nothing to do with the White Man. Bad time to attack at the LBH, phobia of Indians running rather than making a stand and dividing the command without full knowledge of where the village exactly was and how large it was. Throw in the most fierce warriors Custer ever faced and the result was obious!
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Post by backwater on Mar 31, 2022 1:25:34 GMT -6
Washita seems far from decisive. Fought all day, left people behind and 2 companies lost their coats and gear to the enemy.
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Post by tubman13 on Mar 31, 2022 6:15:38 GMT -6
Ian, I may have misunderstood your post, regarding the Washita. So disregard this if I am incorrect. The long rifle at the Washita was the Spencer Carbine, a repeater, not a single shot. The cavalry had been using it since the ACW. The 7th deployed a company of sharpshooters, under Cooke for suppressive fire.
I have shot both weapons, the Spencer can put much more lead down range much faster. It has excellent balance.
Regards, Tom
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 1, 2022 1:41:57 GMT -6
Hi Tom, you and rest are correct about the washita battle. I have not read up on it for years, so I have forgotten most of it. I must have had the end scene of "soldier blue" in my head.
I should have stayed on topic about the north/south flow.
Ian
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Post by backwater on Apr 2, 2022 14:23:54 GMT -6
It always was surprising to me Custer used the same basic plan without knowing the length of the village. At Wasita he had darkness as an excuse when reconnoitering , attack was just about dawn. LBH was later and surprise thought to be lost. But right now i am thinking about this. No good way to attack both ends and keep in supporting range. Maybe ford B lost it's charm and Custer decided he could get north find good crossing and get word back before it got out of control. But it did, repulsed at D and held at LSH.
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Post by tubman13 on Apr 2, 2022 16:08:33 GMT -6
Custer had no knowledge of the length or the village circles along the Washita either. No risk it, no biscuit! However, if he had no hostages he may not have eight more years and the ability take 260 more souls with him when he cashed in his chips after his last hand. Not unlike his losing business ventures.
Regards, Tom
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Post by backwater on Apr 2, 2022 18:24:28 GMT -6
Great point!! Not capturing hostages = all out battle. Pease bottom the Sioux attacked, fell back but were impressive. He "bucked the house" once too often.
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Post by tubman13 on May 29, 2022 5:15:47 GMT -6
Questions regarding North//South battle flow, a line of retreat, or did C,I,L, just sit along Battle Ridge?
Did Calhoun's command sit on a hill and allow Henryville to build up?
Did Keogh's command sit in a swale or on a ridge and get hit?
Where was C company sitting?
Or, did these companies proceed north on Battle Ridge to cover Custer's rear for his advance to find the northern crossing?
Could these companies have been hit on a return south?
Why were bodies found north of what is now US Highway 212?
Just asking. Regards, Tom
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Post by Yan Taylor on May 29, 2022 12:41:12 GMT -6
You have gave the good folks on this board plenty to think about Tom Ian
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