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Post by Bill_S on Oct 12, 2021 16:11:47 GMT -6
Montrose,
You might not consider my question a "meaningful conversation", but I would like to ask you a question which has been in my mind for some time.
It is regarding the North/South flow issue.
I remember reading posts which stated that generally a combat unit will retreat using the same path it advanced. Which seems logical.
I also remember you and Fred commenting that the North/South flow did not seem logical, in that the retreat would have been to the East and not to the South. Which also seems logical.
Is that contradiction caused by the Indians already being in possession or having infiltrated the Southern path, thus leaving the East as the best direction for a retreat? Or is there another explanation.
Apologize if the question is too elementary; I am not knowledgeable about battle tactics, but this seeming contradiction was odd to me at the time and I have wondered about it.
I have not posted here often, but have been reading posts on this site for many years. I am not a serious student of the LBH battle, but have read more about other aspects and battles of the Indian Frontier Wars. Just a curious reader.
Cheers
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Post by Colt45 on Oct 12, 2021 16:56:04 GMT -6
Bill, Retreat to the east, while logical, may not have been possible. Wolftooth reported that when the troops were below LSH and in the vicinity of the flats and Cemetery ridge, his band was firing down on them from the vicinity of LSH. Things were happening very rapidly, and with 5 companies spread out, Custer probably could not communicate effectively with the 5 company commanders. This would leave each company commander having to make decisions that would best help his company out of a bad situation. The natural reaction is to move back over terrain you have previously traversed since you have knowledge of it and might believe it is free of hostiles. We know that the area was not free of hostiles as L company ran into hostiles via a meeting engagement below Calhoun hill in the lower part of deep coulee and had more than one skirmish line on their way back up to their final positions.
Also remember that Reno was known to be to their south, and assumedly, so was Benteen. Moving south toward the rest of the regiment would be the most likely choice if they had been given time to effect a withdrawal, which they might have begun, but were overrun before they could make good on the withdrawal, regardless of direction.
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Post by montrose on Oct 12, 2021 19:33:28 GMT -6
Bill,
If you directly approach an enemy, it is natural to fall back directly to the rear. The problem is he Custer detachment was not approaching the enemy. They moved past the village. This means when they turned around, they were not moving away from the enemy, they were moving towards them.
In the valley fight, the Reno detachment could not follow their backtrail, as 800 Indians cut around their open flank and cut them off from Ford A. They were forced to attack a superior force while also conducting a reconnaissance for a way to cross the river.
The North to South theory states that all 5 companies went to Ford D, and then tried to follow their own backtrail down Battle Ridge towards Weir point. Even though there were a few Indians east of Battle Ridge, the vast majority were west, coming from Fords B, C, and D. It would be natural for the NS units to move east as they try to get back towards the south. It is insanity that they would move even closer to Ford B, like the C Company move from Calhoun Hill to Finley/Finkle Ridge. The large amount of bodies west of Battle Ridge casts doubt on the NS theory.
The NS theory has to explain how the companies became so badly scattered. L Company made it to Calhoun Hill, and fought in skirmish lines for an extended period. So why was the Regimental HQ (really an HHD) on the north end of Battle Ridge, far to the rear? Was LTC Custer some Colonel Blimp, waiting in a dugout far to the rear? That is not his nature.
Why did E company head towards the river, rather than south? Because Indian forces held the ground between them and companies C, I, L who had never gone north. The southern companies were being overrun. The Indian elements to the east were enough to deter E Company from moving that way, but if all 5 companies were in the north, they would have been swept aside.
The fact that the 5 companies were destroyed, all out of supporting range of one another, can not be explained by the NS theory. It is a null hypothesis fail.
Respectfully,
William
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Post by Bill_S on Oct 13, 2021 11:06:03 GMT -6
Colt45 and Montrose, I appreciate your comments and find much in both to consider. Honestly I never was intrigued by the specifics of Custer’s battalion. For me (I know for many of you it is great fun to try to resolve this mystery, and that is cool, different things for different folks) it is enough to know he separated his command, took his battalion into the hills east of the river and was decisively defeated by the Sioux and Northern Cheyenne, while never succeeding in developing an attack.
Even though both of you have different theories, there is a common element. It is that Custer was reacting and not acting. His decisions were being driven by the offensive actions of the Indians.
In my view, the battle has limited offensive actions by the US troops. Of the 11 companies available for combat, only 3 ever commit an attack; which seems to have lasted for less then thirty minutes. It is an unusual situation compared to most other frontier Indian battles.
A quote from the book Great Sioux War Orders of Battle (by Paul Hedren), page 176, says it better then I can express:
"Seemingly missing in all retellings of Custer’s, Reno’s and Benteen’s actions at the LBH is how these commanders and their battalions never particularly influenced the battle beyond its initiation. Instead they were driven by the actions of the Sioux and Northern Cheyenne, who seized tactical advantage and put these companies on the defensive until they were neutralized or destroyed…...Ultimately Custer and his company commanders never controlled their fate."
Thanks for your comments!
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Post by shan on Oct 13, 2021 13:54:58 GMT -6
Montrose,
I'm truly sorry to hear about your predicament, if you have to leave, then I can assure you that will be sorely missed, as I've always found your input and comments to be both clear and extremely useful,
good luck, Shan ~ David
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Post by noggy on Oct 14, 2021 2:11:11 GMT -6
Bill_S
My take on the entire battle is that I have no personal investment in it, so it is easy for me to change my opinions about stuff and accept new things. I'll listen to any well-informed argument. I agree with those who say that it is very peculiar to split a 5 companies Battalion into 2+3 and leave 3, leaving them behind for Encirclement. But I find many LBH things strange, and truth be told; every single book or article I have read, at least I think so, either has a Ford D or stops the movement North around LSH, but they have a South-North flow. This does not mean I am not capable of thinking for myself, even though that at times would be nice, but obviously I find it easier to put stock in the theories backed with the most litterature.
I'll make my own theory, the dubious 2+1+2 Theory, were C and L are rearguarding, E and F goes North, and I went on a hike towards the North or something because they were bored, as a merge of the two theories. Stya tuned!
All the best, Noggy
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Post by herosrest on Oct 19, 2021 8:57:33 GMT -6
Bill, The fact that the 5 companies were destroyed, all out of supporting range of one another, can not be explained by the NS theory. It is a null hypothesis fail. Respectfully, William Regards, I wonder what your opinion is of Nelson A. Miles; both in general, and also his performance on the Plains after June 1876?
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Post by montrose on Oct 19, 2021 11:03:34 GMT -6
Hero,
You surprised me with an excellent question. I need a day to come up with an adequate response.
I will need to address logistics, lines of communication, supply trains, supply depots.
I need to address ability to wage conventional war, and/or unconventional war.
Miles a roller coaster of very good to very bad, based on situations.
Also, we need to be clear when comparing district commanders like Crook and Terry to task force commanders like Custer, Royall, Reynolds, Gibbon. These issues get badly confused on LBH boards.
And even more branches and sequels, a very intriguing question.
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Post by herosrest on Oct 27, 2021 12:15:05 GMT -6
I hope all is well, Montrose. I am interested in your opinion.
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Post by crzhrs on Nov 4, 2021 15:05:16 GMT -6
One aspect of this battle is the phobia of the military that Indians will escape before they can be found and attacked.
Custer's main decisions were based on the idea that the command had been discovered and he had to make decisions, hasty decisions based on Indians running rather than making a stand.
Sending Benteen off on "his scout" before exact knowledge of the location of the village is telling. Benteen had no scouts, no medical personal and was told to keep going.
Custer sent several messengers to Benteen to tell him to keep going.
Once Custer had some semblance of where the village "might" be he divided his command again with orders to Reno that the village/Indians were running and to attack them and he would be supported by the entire command. One curious aspect is why didn't he tell Benteen about this major decision!
Custer then headed down river for who knows exactly why and left Reno out on a limb.
Meanwhile, Benteen was off on his "wild goose chase" and putting stress on his men and horses. He decided to turn back and met up with Giovanni Martini (aka John Martin) who told him (according to Benteen) Indians were "skedaddling)
Too many questionable decisions by Custer, different accounts from Kanipe/Martini as to Custer ready to ride through the village,Reno's actions during his "attack" and Benteen left out of the picture leaves us with a major FU by the military.
On the other hand the Indians did what anyone would do when faced with someone ready to kill you . . . they fought back and left the 7th in shambles and here we are decades later trying to figure how nearly Stone Age "Savages" could take out the country's most famous (not the best) Indian fighter.
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Post by montrose on Mar 28, 2022 3:29:03 GMT -6
Bill,
Sorry for the late answer, had a health issue.
The north south flow is based on the belief that the effective range of 7th Cavalry units was 1200 meters. With this range, you can claim mutual support and logical decisions, without which the north south flow is impossible.
The 1873 carbine copied sights etc from the 1873 rifle, which had a bullet with more powder, and longer range, Not surprisingly, sights designed for one powerful cartridge were next to useless when used for less powerful cartridge with a weapon with shorter barrel.
And whatever the weapon could do, the 7th did not conduct the training required for long range shooting. Not once. Ever. The training they did conduct was mass volley fire at a target 50 yard long, 3 feet high. Things like zeroing a weapon, and multi range firing (Think Army qualification range targets at 50, 100, 150, 200, 250, 300 meters) were being developed in this time, but By Upton and Mackenzie, not Custer who spent more time in theaters in NYC than he did teaching his units to shoot.
For example, weapons have a trajectory, basically a lob. The M16 has a flat trajectory at 25 and 250 meters. This means if I aim at target, bullet goes there. Between 25 and 250 you have to aim differently, and above 250 in the opposite direction. Hmm, someone else can explain this better.
The 7th Cav trained using techniques for the Brown Bess musket. They were not trained properly to match their weapon systems. Yet greater failure is their officers and NCOs. If soldiers not trained at long range fire, do not waste ammo. AT LBH officers and NCOs ordered fire at targets 800 meters away. This is gross incompetence. Even if an officer ordered it, the sergeants should have refused. ( I have had a SSG tell me to go puck myself, in this situation...kinda mortars, long story).
This board has a lot of electrons on North SOuth, not sure where to begin.
Except to say, it has zero chance of being valid.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Mar 28, 2022 4:33:07 GMT -6
Hi William, glad you are back with us.
What does the effective range of the carbine have to do with a move past LSH, all of the battalions had the same weapons, but they went into action regardless. We all agree that the 7th was not trained very well and that some officers may have performed badly, but I can't see any reverlance to the carbine being used as an excuse to prevent all five companies moving north.
Glad to see you are well.
Ian
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Post by montrose on Mar 28, 2022 14:39:31 GMT -6
Hi William, glad you are back with us. What does the effective range of the carbine have to do with a move past LSH, all of the battalions had the same weapons, but they went into action regardless. We all agree that the 7th was not trained very well and that some officers may have performed badly, but I can't see any reverlance to the carbine being used as an excuse to prevent all five companies moving north. Glad to see you are well. Ian The north south theory is that 5 companies went north of south end Battle Ridge. Only E and F did so. Many of the theories to support this are that company clusters were able to support one another at ranges beyond 150 meters. This is not based on a post or two, between the various boards, some 10,000 to 50,000 posts. I guess we could go and discuss each post one at a time. Please note this would mean examining every single post posters Conz and Keough ever posted. One at a time. I am awaiting another blood clot scan, home for a week, go ahead. I would like to discuss this battle more based on evidence, logical decision making, than theories that defy facts. I do not have much time left, so bear with my impatience with clowns like Reese and the pedophile.
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Post by backwater on Mar 28, 2022 19:55:21 GMT -6
I forget where i got this and i think the seventh had infantry issue ammo (.45/70 = 70 grains black powder) so range would be longer. Anyhoo i don't think range was a factor.
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Post by noggy on Mar 29, 2022 3:13:10 GMT -6
I forget where i got this and i think the seventh had infantry issue ammo (.45/70 = 70 grains black powder) so range would be longer. Anyhoo i don't think range was a factor. <button disabled="" class="c-attachment-insert--linked o-btn--sm">Attachment Deleted</button> Had they been standing in some open field, and the Indians were forced to advence head-on, range could have been a factor. With the terrain being as it was and concentrated firepower not being an option either way, since the regiment was split up into weaker groups, it wasn't. All the best, Noggy
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