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Post by welshofficer on Nov 20, 2014 15:22:30 GMT -6
QC,
I think there has to be a balance, at least for the purpose of this thread. The fear of the US Army HQ would be frittering forces away on mishandled localised skirmishes (Gratton/Fetterman), not defeat in a pitched battle like at the Little Bighorn.
WO
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Post by quincannon on Nov 20, 2014 15:40:27 GMT -6
Who was it that said never take council in your fears?
I am not under any illusion that there would not be set backs. They are to be expected. Setbacks can be mitigated though by professionalism. Again it is a moot point, because professionalism was a rare commodity in those days. Being professional means more that drawing pay for deeds done. It must be built, it must be watered and fertilized.
Any dumb ass can win a pitched battle. Winning battles are more determined by circumstance than anything else. Avoiding battle and still achieving goals takes thinking not fighting. There will be plenty of opportunities for fighting once the thinking is done and in spite of it.
The more time spent shaping the battle space by strategy, and operationally, keeps the tactics sitting on its behind. until, and only if it is needed.
If the U S Army was so afraid of the frittering and mishandling, there is nothing that would prevent that more than a professional education system, then springing up, or in some instances well established elsewhere in the world, and not being limited to fighting big battles for fear we can's win the small ones.
I detest war, and all it involves. If there is an alternative, if should be pursued with vigor, before you are out of options.
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Post by welshofficer on Nov 20, 2014 16:10:01 GMT -6
QC,
I just think we have to focus this thread on what the US Army might have done differently in 1876, with the forces/forts available?
A different approach between 1865-1880 might be our next thread in a few months!!!
WO
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Post by quincannon on Nov 20, 2014 16:42:08 GMT -6
Well the answer that comes instantly to mind is everything. I am not under any illusion that what has been presented today was far beyond their professional capacity in 1876.
First off they did have bases around the perimeter of the area. Fetterman and D A Russell in the south. Lincoln and Rice and a few more to the east. Those were essential for operational staging. Ellis smack in the middle probably not so much.
The second step is the allocation of resources. Unless adequate resources were allocated, it was a fool's errand. Those resources were available as post LBH events showed. So what must be determined is why they were not allocated.
We have discussed the unity of command issues, that must be solved if success is to be achieved.
The supply situation was not ideal, but probably as good as could be expected, using rivers vice roads and railroads, both of which were non-existent.
Operationally the two column approach was OK. Three would have been better.
So we are down to tactics and personalities, and I don't see anything done differently in the cards, given the players.
To make any substantial change of outcome, and I think that is what we are all driving at here, everything listed above must be changed, modified, tweaked, or it is an exercise in collective frustration with no suitable outcome or answer.
Now it's my turn. What effect would Forts Phil Kearny, Smith, and Reno had on this campaign had they not been foolishly surrendered in 68? Massive I think, and their presence and continued and increasing viability may have changed the complexion of the entire situation.
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Post by welshofficer on Nov 20, 2014 19:36:44 GMT -6
Now it's my turn. What effect would Forts Phil Kearny, Smith, and Reno had on this campaign had they not been foolishly surrendered in 68? Massive I think, and their presence and continued and increasing viability may have changed the complexion of the entire situation. QC,
No dissent from this quarter, but they had been surrendered in 1868.
WO
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Post by quincannon on Nov 20, 2014 21:36:24 GMT -6
Yes they had, and crying over spilled milk is a waste of time. The point is that their presence was indicative of a operational vision somewhat akin to what I proposed above. The shift in that operational vision in favor of an unengaged pullback, led to fighting two wars with the same people eight years apart. I have real heartburn with fighting for the same ground twice, a view I am sure you share.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Nov 21, 2014 6:58:56 GMT -6
I think you get what you pay for. Not just in money but time investment also. If you're doing day labor and don't drill much in winter and don't have ammunition sufficient to detect problems in your weapon system then your battle plans have to be at the level that the officers observe the capabilities of the troops to be. Certainly there could have been better plans for a campaign but that might involve spending more money.
Underestimating the Indians potential for one last battle where they don't run seems to me a given rather than training and battle ready for the potential of the Big Village and lots of Indians willing to fight.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by Yan Taylor on Nov 21, 2014 7:06:17 GMT -6
Good morning gentlemen, and I hope you good people over on the other side of the pond are safe and warm, giving the fact that you are under a mountain of snow.
I bet if you would have asked Sherman, Terry, Gibbon and Crook that they had a chance to fight a pitched battle with the Indians, they would rub their hands with glee as this is what happened in the case of Crook, his force drew out the Indians and because of lack of troops, leadership and probably training, they were lucky to get away with a draw, mainly down to their Crow scouts. If they had fielded a larger force with the complete 2nd and 3rd cavalry regiments and double the amount of Infantry companies (Crook had 5 Companies all from the 4th and 9th Infantry) then this force could have fought the Indians to a standstill and if they broke the two regiments of cavalry could have pursued them off the field.
One thing of note; I think out of the three columns only Crooks had no Gatling guns, what difference a couple of these would have made I don’t know, maybe minimal but it could have been a stroke of luck to the Sioux and Cheyenne as Terry and Gibbon had a brace each.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 21, 2014 8:02:51 GMT -6
Steve: No truer words were ever spoken. You do get what you pay for.
Pitched battles Ian are rarely decisive, in that one side may win, but usually the loser moves away to fight another day. Battles like Cannae are few and far between. In the mid phase (Rosebud/LBH/Summer 76), Indians fought two, winning one outright and ended up with a tactical draw and operational victory from the other. Winning a battle then is not the object. Winning a campaign is the issue, it is always the issue, and the Indians were completely incapable of campaign winning.
One of many areas I find fault with U S Army thinking in the early part of the 76-77 campaign is that the U S Army maneuvered for the once and done battle, where they should have prepared for the long haul of campaign fighting. Does a boxer enter the ring thinking that only one punch will do the job on his opponent? They were planning for a move through, when they should have looked more to move in and stay. The second half of the campaign, the part that worked, was move in and stay.
In the practice of the operational arts, the key factor is planning to leverage your strengths against known enemy weakness, not play the game you enemy wishes to play.
WO mentioned that it was hard to understand why Sherman and Sheridan, two stellar practitioners of total all encompassing war, were the very people who tried to maneuver and fight on the cheap. It is a wonder.
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Post by welshofficer on Nov 21, 2014 10:59:46 GMT -6
WO mentioned that it was hard to understand why Sherman and Sheridan, two stellar practitioners of total all encompassing war, were the very people who tried to maneuver and fight on the cheap. It is a wonder. QC,
Also don't forget Ulysses on Pennsylvania Avenue....
WO
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Post by welshofficer on Nov 21, 2014 11:01:58 GMT -6
I think you get what you pay for. Not just in money but time investment also. If you're doing day labor and don't drill much in winter and don't have ammunition sufficient to detect problems in your weapon system then your battle plans have to be at the level that the officers observe the capabilities of the troops to be. Certainly there could have been better plans for a campaign but that might involve spending more money. Underestimating the Indians potential for one last battle where they don't run seems to me a given rather than training and battle ready for the potential of the Big Village and lots of Indians willing to fight. Regards AZ Ranger AZ,
It's posts like that which make this forum an absolute pleasure.
Now sorry to put you on the spot, but what would you have done differently with the resources available to Gen Sheridan...?
No additional spending allowed - Grant wants a 3rd term...
WO
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Post by crzhrs on Nov 21, 2014 12:35:42 GMT -6
Quinncannon: If you look back at when those forts were built you would see they were basically isolated from each other. The military did not allow settlers to go through that part of the country unless they were heavily armed and inspected. Indians constantly sniped and harassed the forts, especially Fort Kearney (Fetterman). The lines of communication were terrible at best and the winter weather was horrendous. The majority of the time soldiers were bored and there was a lack of discipline at times. Firewood was at a premium and would soon run out just to keep warm, never mind build anything. Huge amounts of money would have to have been spent to supply the forts. Not sure what would have happened if the military kept them open but they were part of the agreement Red Cloud demanded before signing any treaty with Sherman (Sheridan?) stating it would only be a matter of time before the railroad came through and it would be easier to deal with Indians then.
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Post by crzhrs on Nov 21, 2014 12:55:20 GMT -6
<"WO mentioned that it was hard to understand why Sherman and Sheridan, two stellar practitioners of total all encompassing war, were the very people who tried to maneuver and fight on the cheap. It is a wonder.">
There must have been some budget restraints for the military. I'm sure Sherman/Sheridan would have loved to have as much money as possible to deal with Indians once and for all, but after the Civil War the budget was spent and people (back East) were not in the mood for more fighting, especially against Indians who were not a real threat to national security and as I stated earlier more of a nuisance. Supporting the military and funding reservations was done on a shoestring and the end results were terrible for the military and more so for the Indians.
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Post by crzhrs on Nov 21, 2014 13:02:45 GMT -6
Yan: "Crook drew out the Indians"
I don't think that was his intentions because he was surprised by the warriors aggressive and totally unexpected behavior. I believe his command had 1,300 soldiers and Indian scouts . . . twice as many as Custer and the only reason he didn't suffer heavier casualties was because of the Crow scouts who blunted the Sioux/Cheyenne's initial assault and the entire command was together. No matter what the military tried late-winter-late summer they could not inflict any major losses to the Indians. It wasn't until the Indians split up and the government increased money and added more soldiers was the military able to defeat Indians and that was mostly Dull Knife's village who was caught off-guard, not in any open battle. In the end it was the constant chasing down of groups of Indians who could not hunt or re-supply themselves that ended the Sioux War of 1876. Maybe that should have been the strategy all along rather than large, slow-moving commands weighed down by even slower-moving supply wagons who's commanders were more interested in winning honors rather than ending a war.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 21, 2014 18:08:54 GMT -6
Perhaps it is time we all take a collective deep breath, and realize that the title of the thread - What should it have looked like - is rather easily answered. It should have looked like exactly what it did look like or some minor variation of it. It was going to look that way because no matter how much we theorize, war game, of whiff it, nothing material could have changed because of the attitude of the times. War weary public, spend thrift Congress, big war generals (that continues today), an officer corps stale and stagnate - the military version of a circus clown car - with notable exceptions, NCO's who were far from the rough hewn professional of the John Ford movie, and enlisted personnel found under the dregs in the bottom of the barrel - again with exceptions, all contributed to both malady and malaise.
I don't know if those of you that have never been exposed can ever understand how galling this picture is to a professional. It really sucks is not adequate to convey the message. The problem for us is we know what should have been done. We may differ in outlook somewhat, one preferring this solution, and one another, but we all agree I think that whatever solution we could come up would work, given what we would ask for.
So I suppose I have taken two paragraphs to say what could have been said in one sentence --- Change the prevailing attitudes is the prerequisite, and that was not about to happen. The reasons don't matter.
As an example anyone that would locate Fort Phil Kearny in a Dien Bien Phu like bowl is an idiot. You can over time change ignorance, stupid has no cure.
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