|
Post by welshofficer on Nov 18, 2014 13:24:56 GMT -6
If we accept the US Government strategy (settler expansion onto the Plains, Manifest Destiny etc) for the purposes of this thread, what should the 1876 military operation have looked like? Was it an otherwise sound military operation that tactically fell apart in the LBH valley, or were events on 25 June 1876 in the LBH valley the culmination of a flawed military operation...?
|
|
|
Post by welshofficer on Nov 18, 2014 13:34:15 GMT -6
It just strikes me that we tend to focus almost exclusively from GAC crossing the divide, and overlook the wider issues such as overall timings, command structure, timings and synchronising columns, and communication issues...
|
|
|
Post by crzhrs on Nov 18, 2014 13:39:38 GMT -6
The campaign from Winter through the Summer was one failure after another by the military based on faulty intelligence of numbers and strength of Indians, not to mention the fighting mood of non-treaty Indians. Crook finding a Lakota camp in March and sending one of his officers to attack it failed because the commanding officer didn't follow up the capture of the village. Indians escaped and later recaptured all their horses and ended up finding Crazy Horse and warning him of soldiers out to get them. Crook was complacent at the Rosebud and ended up losing a tactical battle and falling back and ultimately completely out of the campaign without notifying anyone of what happened to him. We know what befell Custer. It wasn't until the government strengthened the military and reorganized with competent commanding officers that ultimately led to an attack on Dull Knife's village in November and the constant chasing and harassment of Indians that led many to eventually surrender (except for Sitting Bull). All in all the 1876 Campaign ended up being successful but at a terrible and humiliating cost to the US military prior to reorganization.
|
|
|
Post by welshofficer on Nov 18, 2014 14:00:00 GMT -6
The campaign from Winter through the Summer was one failure after another by the military based on faulty intelligence of numbers and strength of Indians, not to mention the fighting mood of non-treaty Indians. Crook finding a Lakota camp in March and sending one of his officers to attack it failed because the commanding officer didn't follow up the capture of the village. Indians escaped and later recaptured all their horses and ended up finding Crazy Horse and warning him of soldiers out to get them. Crook was complacent at the Rosebud and ended up losing a tactical battle and falling back and ultimately completely out of the campaign without notifying anyone of what happened to him. We know what befell Custer. It wasn't until the government strengthened the military and reorganized with competent commanding officers that ultimately led to an attack on Dull Knife's village in November and the constant chasing and harassment of Indians that led many to eventually surrender (except for Sitting Bull). All in all the 1876 Campaign ended up being successful but at a terrible and humiliating cost to the US military prior to reorganization. crzhrs,
If the margin for error had been whittled away, do you think there were still sufficient forces to obtain a victory in the LBH valley?
Do you primarily blame GAC or primarily others higher up the chain of command? Or should the blame be divided equally?
WO
|
|
|
Post by montrose on Nov 18, 2014 14:04:08 GMT -6
Your question covers strategy, operations and tactics.
1. Strategy. The US plan was to drive the Plains Indians into reservations under US control. Looking at the period 1865-76, it was a resounding success. The buffalo were nearly extinct, and the expansion of the railroads took away Indian mobility. The gathering of the clans in 1876 was an act of desperation. The Indians saw their defeat, so they gathered for one last act of defiance.
2. Operations. The campaign plan was for two departments to enter Indian territory to find and defeat the defiant tribes. Dent them the ability to gather resources for the coming winter and drive them onto the reservations.
Now here is the part I believe most people miss. This plan worked. Where were the Indians in the winter of 1876-7? The majority were on US reservations, without firearms or horses. Many of those still with weapons and mounts were doing so fighting for the US government. The 1877 campaign was a consolidation campaign. Forts were built in the former Indian territory, and stragglers were run down.
Welsh will likely point out weak management and execution by the US. Here is a term I learned from the Army War College: evaluate military organizations with respect to efficiency and effectiveness. The US Army was inefficient in 1976. The US constitution and US Code call for the military to be manned, trained, and equipped. The Army was deficient in all areas. But they achieved US strategic and operational goals.
One of our heroes in our first war against an evil tyrant and oppressive regime was Nathaniel Greene. He never won a battle. But his actions were a major contribution to winning the American Revolution.
3. Tactics. At this level US forces suffered severely from being both ineffective and inefficient. This Army had issues. The1870s Army and 1970s Army are the low point in US history. The first half of the year so 3 engagements: Powder River, Rosebud, and LBH. Two stalemates and a loss. There were half a dozen follow on engagements after LBH, all generally in the win column. ANy analysis of any single engagement will bring up a laundry list of shoulda, woulda, couldas.
Am I on target here?
Respectfully,
William
|
|
|
Post by welshofficer on Nov 18, 2014 14:16:07 GMT -6
Montrose,
My question is really focussed upon (2) operations.
If you were Sherman or Sheridan, what would you have done differently at the operational level (if anything) or do you think that 2 stalemates and 1 defeat were simply inevitable at the tactical level and nothing could have been done differently at the operational level?
The operational goals were achieved, but were they achieved at minimal cost?
WO
|
|
|
Post by crzhrs on Nov 18, 2014 14:40:22 GMT -6
Crook & Custer were considered the most able Indian fighters (that's not saying a whole lot!) Crook's major success fighting Indians was in the Northwest & Southwest against smaller numbers and in terrain vastly different than the Plains. Custer's main success was at the Washita (and even that was controversial) I think it ended up being the wrong people for the job. Not sure who else was available at the time but both Crook & Custer's campaign's failed . . . both were surprised by the ferocity of the Indians and the only reason Crook didn't suffer more was that his whole command was intact whereas Custer divided his command into smaller units without ample lines of communication and unable to support one another at the most critical of times. Keeping the command together appears to have been a major reason for success by competent commanders a la McKenzie attacking the Cheyenne (and by the way also at the Palo Duro Canyon in 1874 against the Commanche) Where was he during the 1876 compaign?
Montrose: Yes the plan worked . . . it was only a matter of time before the Indians gave up but for a short period that summer there was some concern that the job would take far more time and resources, which it did in the end . . . against people that were far less advanced technologically in weapons, tactics, resources and man power. In my mind it was a humiliating summer campaign for the military and the huge losses to the military/government in money and loss of life was the result of faulty intelligence, lack of regard for the fighting ability of Indians and severely under-estimating what it would take to defeat and/or force a relatively small group of Indians to give up.
|
|
|
Post by welshofficer on Nov 18, 2014 14:50:24 GMT -6
crzhrs
I believe Colonel Ranald McKenzie and his 4th Cavalry were transferred to the Department of the Platte after the LBH defeat and joined the war.
WO
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Nov 18, 2014 15:29:37 GMT -6
First off as far as the U S Army is concerned there was only one campaign. It has been labeled by the Army as "The Little Big Horn Campaign". That is probably a misnomer, but what the hell, everyone recognizes the name, and the historians that named it didn't have to fight it. It can be generaly divided into three phases, the Powder river phase, the Rosebud/LBH/Summer phase, and finally the Fall-Winter 76-77 phase. That bit of knowledge just keeps everyone honest.
The strategic objectives of the campaign were well laid out. No further comment required.
Operationally, the campaign plan violated most if not all of the Principles of War throughout its entire duration.
Tactically, the United States Army was in no shape to operate within the operational parameters required, due to training at all levels including that of officers, as well as individual and unit level (company, through regiment, to what passed for brigades).
The fact they adapted and succeeded under Miles and McKenzie is all that is required to point out the deficiencies of Reynolds, Terry, and Custer, and only slightly less so for Crook. I give Crook somewhat of a pass, along with a swift kick in the ass, for being slow to adapt from the true unconventional war with the Apache, to the little more conventional style of the Sioux/Cheyenne. There is not that much difference, but the difference is significant when you develop and apply the tactical solution.
Nathanial Greene was the best operational commander on the American Side in the Revolutionary War.
Now I would like you all to think long and hard about this one. It took the U S Army longer to defeat the Sioux/Cheyenne Confederation than it took to defeat the German Army in Western Europe. February 76 to April 77, as opposed to June 44 to May 45.
|
|
|
Post by welshofficer on Nov 18, 2014 15:57:26 GMT -6
QC,
What would you have done differently, if you were the Commanding General in Washington DC or the Divisional commander in Chicago (take your pick!)...?
IMHO - Greene was the best operational commander on either side, a century earlier. The British commanders in North America got their strategy and operations badly wrong in 1776-77. The British Army had been deliberately kept small in peacetime between 1689-1776 (we have a Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, but not a Royal Army - Naseby and the power of the crown and all that). The local commanders looked with envy on the new troops that would be recruited in Britain and Germany, without thinking through the consequences of the rebellion becoming established and how other European countries would react. If ever there was a rebellion that needed "nipping in the bud".
WO
|
|
|
Post by Dark Cloud on Nov 18, 2014 17:45:31 GMT -6
Winning battles was, overall, actually unimportant for the Indians in 1876. Just by putting in the time fighting, the Indians lost, because they had to essentially devote everything to war, or husbandry and/or hunting. They could not win a war worthy of the name except when it lost the attention of the Army, as when the northern railroad removed the need for fighting Red Cloud's guys whatever.
Unless you're going to imagine an army with accurate maps, and a motivated population providing good soldiers and money and the best of all possible test weaponry, and actually training the soldiers for the enemy they were to fight, it's difficult to imagine things going much better given what they had in the campaign. Surely, Reynolds made errors, but if he had not, not much would have changed for the Indians. If Custer had won a modest victory, not much worse for the Indians, although perhaps sooner, and it's hard to imagine the 7th doing much better than a modest victory. It's fantasy to imagine otherwise. Army tactics and strategy were fine for a small enemy that short of divine intervention couldn't really hurt the US at all. The campaign worked pretty much as predicted.
Worth noting that the British army had some excellent officers who told Parliament and superiors to get bent, they would not fight the Americans they'd fought with against the French and Indians two decades previous. There was remarkable support for the US cause all through the Revolution. The Brits who had been to the colonies were never as enthused as a group for war as the literal drunks in Parliament taxing everything. Much of the British military didn't believe for a second the British could ever win, given the huge coastline (Chesapeake Bay alone has more coastline than England and our west coast), especially being fought as a lesser front given the war with France - always pending when not active.
It's possible the shorter time spent fighting Germany was due to the Soviets absorbing the vast majority of German attention, as it's now said the US and British only faced somewhere between 3 and 15% of German forces, yet even then the government and population were focused. The Indian Wars might not ever have occurred at all so far as the public knew, given how little attention the government gave it compared to its other activities. Nobody took an Indian 'threat' at all seriously, given the tribes weren't about to even move on Denver, much less threaten most of the nation. The Army could likely have been MUCH better, but not accomplishing much more than it did. Big land, small units, so much could go wrong. A flash flood could wipe out a regiment and headquarters might never really know what happened.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Nov 18, 2014 17:49:56 GMT -6
Congress under the Constitution is charged with the raising and maintaining of an Army. They did not do an adequate job in fulfilling their responsibilities. Everything subsequently done was a leaky Band-Aid on a sucking chest wound. Under those conditions though I would have as a divisional commander:
Modified the department boundaries, removing the boundary between Wyoming and Montana. It would not effect me as the division commander, BUT it would remove the "not my job" attitude or potential attitude between the department commanders.
I would move to some closer location that would facilitate C&C, knowing full well that whatever I did it would still be hard and imperfect, just not as hard and imperfect.
I would have requested and thrown a monumental hissy fit until I got at least a brigades more resources, mixed cavalry and infantry. This would allow me to form three combined arms brigades, so a "real" three pronged action could be formed.
I would then give these brigade commanders orders along the lines of you come from here, you come from there, and you come from the other place, and squeeze, and be prepared to stay out there until you finish the job, no excuses, get it done. If you don't, Don't come home, the Army or the country do not need you. If I find you screwing off or screwing up kiss you retirement and your butt so long. Is that clear?
DC: Don't try to cloud the issue with facts. What I was getting at is that it took less time to beat a much more numerous and certainly more well equipped, disciplined force, than it took to overcome savages one step removed from the stone age. The reason is that we took the Germans seriously, and the other guys, not so much. When you go to war, you take the enemy seriously, regardless of who that enemy is.
|
|
|
Post by welshofficer on Nov 18, 2014 18:17:23 GMT -6
QC,
(1) How would you modify your 4 sub-divisions/"departments" (Dakota, Platte, Missouri, Texas)...?
(2) How close would you move from Chicago to exercise C+C? Would you accompany one column?
WO
p.s. DC, German Army committed 75-80% of its forces to the Eastern Front. It never really varied much. Bagration hit them a few weeks after Overlord in June 1944.
|
|
|
Post by welshofficer on Nov 18, 2014 18:33:40 GMT -6
DC,
It was still a not insubstantial force deployed?
Gen Crook (Platte) committed 15 companies/troops of cavalry and 5 companies of infantry.
Gen Terry (Dakota) committed 16 companies/troops of cavalry and 6 companies of infantry.
The "convergence" engagement on 25 June 1876 was fought by 12 companies/troops of cavalry, of which only 3 companies/troops ever actually mounted an attack on the village.
Do you believe all the problems were at the 7th cavalry tactical level and the operational level could not have been improved with radically different results?
WO
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Nov 18, 2014 18:34:36 GMT -6
WO: Just temporarily eliminate the one boundary (Dakota-Platte) They were put there for administrative purposes not operational. No need to further modify, or modify the others.
Don't know exactly. I would have to take a good hard look at a map. It would most likely be near a river, or where some rudimentary form of communications could be maintained. No I would not go with one of the columns, but I would have at hand sufficient resources to facilitate any such movement if it became necessary. My job is commanding, not treating saddle sores
The three prongs, again combined arms brigades under a brigadier or very senior Colonel, Miles would be my choice for the third, one coming from the north, one from the south, and a third (Terry) hanging back on the east. Crows and other natural enemies are in the west. As I see it this is an exercise in clearing the river valleys. They are in there, you know not where, but you can bet your last farthing they are along a river, or on their way to one. This is an exercise in using their numbers against them. The more numerous they are, the more immobile they are, and I intend to make use of their terminal case of the slows and the needs.
|
|