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Post by welshofficer on Nov 18, 2014 18:51:45 GMT -6
QC,
And what about the timing of the ultimatum and a summer campaign? Gen QC/Sheridan goes with Gen Crook to Washington DC in November 1875...
We know that the 1875-76 Platte Dept winter attack was limited (see Reynolds) and the Dakota Dept winter attack was non-existent.
What could/should have been different? Was a summer campaign the right thing to do? Should there have been a winter campaign, even if that meant delaying until 1876-77?
WO
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Post by quincannon on Nov 18, 2014 19:25:44 GMT -6
Winter up there is no time for campaigning, unless you are trained and more importantly equipped for such operations. Read "On The Border With Crook" to decide for yourself if such conditions exist. I try never to contemplate giving your enemy anything, but I would give them the winter/early spring of 1876 without reservation.
I cannot overemphasize enough that the sheer total numbers of Indians were a millstone. They hunkered together for mutual protection. That's a good thing, for while the village may be a moving roving entity, it still requires prodigious amounts of water, grass, wild growing foodstuffs, and game. While the warrior are mobile, they must constantly guard and cover their moving base. That too is a good thing, because it places severe limitations upon them.
This was an operational no brainer, and it was initially stalemated because of no great quantity of brains. You get some fighters in there and clean their clocks the old fashioned way, by killing and denial of options. Fighting talks and bullshit walks, or dies
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Post by Dark Cloud on Nov 18, 2014 19:45:07 GMT -6
I'm still an English major, WO,and what bugs me is when you use unit names rather than totals of men, it seems much more substantial than it was. With the civvies and scouts and all, Custer had only about 650 men. When companies went into firing line, they lost about 25% just to horse holders, truly a notional avocation when the arrows and bullets hit and arms were ripped from their sockets. But it can sound more impressive saying three companies with scouts and additional men if everyone is thinking these anywhere near full companies. A major directing 130-ish seems overqualified, and a Lt. Col. 650 more so IF you're used to the CW and units as they're supposed to be.
The 7th and the Army in general would have to be a LOT better overall to have made a difference worthy of note. Flash floods, a nighttime bison stampede because of lightening, a fire pushed by 50 knot winds, any number of horrors could wipe out large units superbly trained for years for this specific mission and the results might even be worse. I really don't think any huge difference would occur had MacKenzie been in charge or Grant or anyone. But then, I don't think Custer winning the battle would have changed things much either, overall. The Indians lost by being nomads and unable to sustain an armed group in the field. To me, that's the reality that drips down any of the alternate scenarios involved. No matter what, the army unit would be out of contact with the rest of its world for a week or more and in a huge, hazardous and dangerous land. I don't think the chances of battle success go up hugely.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 18, 2014 20:42:02 GMT -6
Perhaps your opinion DC is based upon never being exposed to what adult leadership can accomplish in an admittedly harsh and dangerous situation. You have never been exposed to it, have no basis with which to evaluate it., and while you have a decent civilian point of view on the situation, it is far from reality. Stuff happens, but good leadership either prevents the effects or mitigate the occurrence.
To listen to your expression of really uninformed opinion you would think that good men can accomplish nothing, nothing done makes a difference, and that we should all be content to let the inevitability of Plymouth Rock and Jamestown be sufficient. You sound like Thomas Jefferson.
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Post by welshofficer on Nov 19, 2014 4:57:59 GMT -6
DC,
We are talking about 2200 soldiers committed to the summer campaign, of which about 140 (under Reno) attacked the LBH village on 25 June 1876.
And then a few hundred more civilians/native allies.
WO
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Post by tubman13 on Nov 19, 2014 6:18:15 GMT -6
Chuck, your comment regarding giving the NA's the winter is understood, it was zero F just 60 miles north of the LBH yesterday 10AM, where I spent a day shooting prairie dogs, in June. Having said that, winter would have been truly the time to "catch them napping." They would not have been nearly as mobile and the numbers far less. I also understood the plan was originally to hit the roamers in March or early April before they gained numbers from the Rez. and before the grass was enough to get the horses to full strength.
Regards, Tom
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Post by AZ Ranger on Nov 19, 2014 6:29:16 GMT -6
I think numbers matter and especially if they are trained, equipped , and battle ready. That company C had less than 1/2 full strength seems important to me. What component was missing? Were there experienced soldiers missing creating the difference between half strength and full strength? What I do know is that time in service does not mean that you have become battle ready. Skirmishes where you out number the Indians may count but hardly seem adequate for the Big Village.
We hear a lot from the officer's side here and I appreciate their knowledge and expertise but how an enlisted man feels and reacts is in my arena. There is a fine line that an officer must draw to have regular enlisted men do something where the casualty rate is going to be high. The enlisted man has to believe he will be one of survivors and that the person he is following is making the best available decision. In Marine Corps boot camp one of the instructors told us that our bodies belong to the Corps but our lives belong to us. It was a good reason to train hard to survive CQB. It also is an insight to an enlisted man thought process.
When a private states that they had never ridden that fast before or fired his revolver horseback he is not just announcing his lack of skill. He probably thought he was battle ready when they were all cheering as they approached the Big Village. In a short period of time he gained a different view.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by mac on Nov 19, 2014 7:55:20 GMT -6
Bullseye Steve. I have never been in combat but anyone who has been in a fight knows it is not like sparring. How much harder to be in combat!! Cheers
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Post by mac on Nov 19, 2014 7:56:35 GMT -6
Interesting discussion all. Cheers
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Post by quincannon on Nov 19, 2014 9:30:24 GMT -6
As an enlisted soldier for four years, before OCS, I completely endorse everything AZ has said, everything. To illustrate.
In December 1944 on a hill overlooking the border town of Lanzerath the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon, 394th Infantry Regiment, 99th Infantry Division was dug in outposting the village. The platoon, all eighteen of them (full strength) was commanded by 1LT Lyle J. Bouch Jr. Like the rest of the 99th they were inexperienced in combat, but under Bouck's leadership were very well trained, and because of their unique mission employment much more so that the average rifleman or junior officer in the 99th. On the first day of the Bulge they were attacked by a battalion of German paratroopers. They held the entire day, and nearly destroyed the German battalion, until they were eventually overcome and captured. 1LT Bouck spent his 21st birthday fighting that platoon, and they fought because they had confidence in Bouck and his few NCO's. Training and leadership. A ingredient not found in overabundance at LBH.
Numbers do matter. More is better than less. But less trained and well led can do more than more badly trained and led.
Tom I am not against fighting in winter. It is not the cold, snow and harsh conditions. They are neutrals for both parties involved. What I object to, and therefore my comment based upon, is that you don't commit yourself to a winter fight when you are not trained and equipped for that fight, and are not hardened to those conditions. There is a reason the 1st Special Service Force selected Helena, Montana to train at. It replicated the environment they were to be employed in. You do have to practice to be miserable, despite the old army saying to the contrary.
Training is not an affair of once and done. Training is constant, in the same manner you must, if you are a golfer go to the driving range and putting green. If you are to be any good you must train, train, train, and when you just about think you are good enough, you are wrong and you train some more. Training is perishable.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 19, 2014 11:20:49 GMT -6
Permit me to elaborate on training.
The cavalryman of 76, should have been able to ride like a Cossack, shoot like Annie Oakley, endure cold like an Eskimo, and heat like a Bedouin. He should have the individual field craft skills of a tiger in heat, be able to exist on short rations for extended periods of time, and culminate all of this with the stealth of a sneak thief, and the discipline of a castrated monk. That is the standard to be attained. Once attained you have well trained soldiers. Still, upon attainment, you must never be satisfied, for when satisfaction sets in regression is not far behind.
Cavalry units must be trained to operate as units and with other units. Maneuver skills grow stale, especially with units that rarely operate together. Becoming used to the people who operate on you left, right, and rear, must be continually practiced, to overcome the fog and friction of the battlefield. Mutual confidence cannot be assumed, it too must be instilled by training. All this takes many weeks and months, before you march out the gate for battle. It cannot be learned on the fly.
Commanders and leaders must be trained too. There is no magic wand waved over those with bars, oak leaves, or eagles. Once away skills deteriorate, and that goes for the leaders every bit as much, and more, than it does for soldiers.
There is a common thread in what AZ calls "battle ready" units. They have trained and endured, and it is all salted and seasoned by the knowledge among the soldiers that their leaders care. They care more for them than for themselves. That training, and caring is what spells the difference between the successful, the also rans, and the failures.
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Post by welshofficer on Nov 19, 2014 11:31:54 GMT -6
QC,
I took your original comment to mean that a Winter campaign was out for you because of the Division's own shortcomings at the time, not that it was undesirable. For what it is worth, I agree. Terry's failure to mount a winter campaign supports. Besides, there was much to be said in having the "summer roamers" also.
WO
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Post by welshofficer on Nov 19, 2014 11:35:47 GMT -6
AZ,
We know the 7th was short of officers on campaign, particularly the 5 wiped out companies of the Keogh/Yates wing.
The situation was more varied in relation to NCOs.
Obviously quantity is only half the equation.
WO
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Post by quincannon on Nov 19, 2014 11:45:46 GMT -6
WO: When I play cards I want to hold all the aces I can, and I don't sit down with card sharps playing with stacked decks. Planning, training, and properly supplying and equipping allows you to collect more of those aces into your hand. Waiting your time, shaping and preparation, dispenses with the advantages of marked cards and sharps. Patience is a weapon.
A winter campaign is not going to stop the summer roamers. If you are successful in February and March you better be prepared to do it all again in June, July, and August, only in those later months it will be much harder, and a far more important probably less successful.
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Post by welshofficer on Nov 19, 2014 11:52:03 GMT -6
QC,
So give the 31 January 1876 deadline, safely in the knowledge that the winter roamers won't be in compliance, and start planning for a summer campaign? None of the half-hearted Platte Dept winter campaign, leading to the Reynolds incident, whilst the Dakota Dept does nothing?
What about the summer campaign? My recollection was that the Fort Ellis and Fort Abraham Lincoln departures by the Dakota Dept were not exactly beautifully synchronised...?
WO
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