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Post by quincannon on Nov 19, 2014 16:02:11 GMT -6
Sheridan was a Custer enabler, in the same manner that you don't give money to a known alcoholic.
That is another reason I don't want Sheridan anywhere near Custer on a tactical basis. He is liable to remember the good old days in the Shenandoah and put his good judgment in his back pocket. Sheridan is the reason he was out there in the first place, as proof of what I said above. There is a time for friendships to cease and soldiering and all that entails to start.
I am not convinced of couriers either, that's why I want the tight control of very explicit orders. You have to let commanders command, and commander's commanders command them.
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Post by welshofficer on Nov 20, 2014 6:27:31 GMT -6
QC,
I shall have to do some more thinking - I was hoping the close presence of Sheridan would have the opposite effect upon GAC...
WO
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Post by tubman13 on Nov 20, 2014 6:42:39 GMT -6
WO, interesting side note here. Sheridan, never mentions this campaign or action in his memoirs. He mentions Wahsita and then goes in depth regarding his time in Europe s an observer. I found that interesting. Nor does Sherman mention, but he goes so far as to insert his letters to Todd Lincoln regarding his feelings regarding Belknap. Embarrassed, maybe? The Sheridan work is a 1st edition.
Regards, Tom
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Post by crzhrs on Nov 20, 2014 8:39:05 GMT -6
One question would have been: How seriously did the US government take this "war" with the Sioux/Cheyenne. They were not a threat to the US government, they were not a threat to the national economy (possibly local economy), they were not about to storm the White House . . . in fact they were really more of a nuisance than anything else. The determining factor in how to deal with the problem was only realized after the Custer Debacle (like most disasters really). It was time once and for all to end the "wars" with Indians and get on to more important things. The military reorganized, more men were added to fight, and more money authorized. In the end the US government never really considered Indians a major threat and that's how they dealt with them, half-hardily with an inefficient military and low funding and a wavering policy. The only time the government/military responded as they should is when the Indians won an "unexpected" victory (Grattan, Fetterman, Custer, etc.) It seems then, like now the only time we respond the right way is when something terrible happens.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 20, 2014 9:05:31 GMT -6
CH: I would say yours above is about 90% on target.
No they were not a military threat to the U S Government, what the Indians represented was a threat to national interest. Now it can be argued, very much like we do today, what constitutes such a threat. In this instance the Indians were a threat to westward expansion, a national policy. I am not going to try and justify the morality of national interest, only the perception of it. That perception was we owned the land and they trespassed upon it.
How seriously they were taken is not really the point either. You take any man armed seriously. You take groups of armed men even more so. You judge them on their potential to harm. In such situations you use maximum force, until the need for that maximum force subsides. I think Steve would say that you assemble maximum force to serve a warrant on a subject considered armed and dangerous. Few police officers get killed or injured in such situations. Where most get killed or injured is in the random stop or the answering of an emergency call. Steve can comment further.
Therefore if you are in the military force and your government orders you to take action, you had better be prepared for what confronts you or may confront you. These people did not. They are a nuisance, we will go out there, kill a few, and be home by mid July. Regardless of resources, funding, training and the rest, these people were supposed to be professionals in their craft. Professionalism starts with a professional attitude.
For those who might think I really advocate a standing a misbehaving Custer before a firing squad, I don't, although the thought tempts me. What he needed to fully understand is that I would not stand for any of his nonsense. Should he misbehave, the appropriate punishment would be remove most what he wants in life, and have him spend the rest of his life in disgrace. To a Custer that is far worse than death.
Always keep in mind that threats to national security are always threats to national interest, while threats to national interest are not always threats to national security. They are not the same.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 20, 2014 9:32:29 GMT -6
WO: The close presence of Sheridan may very well have helped Custer's behavioral issues. It largely depends upon Sheridan though and not Custer.
I am always wary of the old boys club. These guys had fought the greatest conflict in our history (at the time). They were all friends, although friendships do not preclude rivalries. Custer's track record, and especially his more recent escapades marked him as both friend and loose cannon on the gun deck. Strong leadership above and a short leash in handling were a must. He must fully understand he was far back to the rear of the dog house, and only by strict obedience and sterling conduct could he ever hope to pass under the exit sign. I am just not sure that the clubby attitudes of that day were the proper laxative for his mental constipation.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 20, 2014 10:22:26 GMT -6
Tom: If when you were a little boy, you were bested, indeed thrashed by two little girls down the street, I doubt very much if you would see fit to mention it in your memoirs either.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Nov 20, 2014 10:27:40 GMT -6
The British had the same problem in the old empire days, they would leave a small garrison probably manned by a small force bolstered by auxiliaries and these would try their best to keep the peace or keep the locals quite, but it probably took the whole lot to be wiped out for the top brass to send in the real deal and put down the up-rising, but that’s the down side of having such a large empire being ruled from a relatively small nation. You can’t have your best troops available in every area, especially if other European nations are trying their best to wipe you out, but was the US under any other direct threat at this time? Everything was well with the Canadians and I suppose the Mexicans were ok around that time, that’s why I mentioned about using more of the cavalry divisions.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 20, 2014 11:59:56 GMT -6
Ian: The Mexican border always need watching, then and now. Unpopular and ineffective governments on your border always present the possibility of spill over.
Consider this: What if the US Forces had moved in strength into Montana. I think Ellis was the only garrison in Montana at the time. Then they just sit down, build and start patrolling. That is essentially what we did in 77 and beyond. The process is called area denial. Would it have worked as an alternative to a campaign? I don't know, but I believe the concept deserves exploration. The essence of winning is not having to fight by displayed strength. It would have taken longer, but I think the possibility exists for better and longer lasting results.
The first duty of a soldier is not to fight, but preventing a fight. That is not original, in fact Sun Tzu, but I doubt that the Clodhoppers of the Army and of the time, ever bothered with the wisdom of the ancients.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Nov 20, 2014 13:08:02 GMT -6
I would have kept it simply with a few tweaks that could have been done with planning and hindsight, for one what was wrong with merging three full regiments of cavalry with three of infantry and have bases or camps set up and managed by troops from different units then the ones that were on campaign, that would eliminate the need for detaching fighting men from their units and give them roles as labourers and guards.
The US Army showed in 1900s that it could train, feed and manage vast numbers of troops virtually anywhere in the world, and this campaign was on its door step.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 20, 2014 13:28:34 GMT -6
The U S Army of 1876 was not the Army of 45-91 or 2014. The 1876 Army did not even contemplate foreign operations.
If you keep those bases at regimental (actually brigade) level you cede far to much territory to those hostile to your intent. It's a big area and I think it would be much more profitable, to build smaller posts, garrisoned by six to eight companies mixed, spread them out more geographically, with the intention of eventually connecting them by railroad. That technique would accomplish both the military area security goal, and foster the national policy of westward expansion.
Fort Custer, near Hardin is one such example. There would be no more hostiles in strength in the LBH Valley once that installation was complete, garrisoned and functioning, and the railroad found its way to Hardin shortly after. Another was the fort established in Sheridan near where Crook's supply base was located. I forget its name (McKinney or McKenzie I think). Same railroad runs past. The place is a must see by the way for those in the LBH area. It is now a hospital for vets, a perfectly preserved example of period construction, designed for two battalions. Another is down Steve's way, Fort Whipple in Prescott, again a vet hospital and perfectly preserved. Francis Warren AFB in Cheyenne, and Offutt AFB in Nebraska are other examples of period construction under the guise of Fort D A Russell and Fort Crook.
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Post by welshofficer on Nov 20, 2014 13:51:01 GMT -6
The British had the same problem in the old empire days, they would leave a small garrison probably manned by a small force bolstered by auxiliaries and these would try their best to keep the peace or keep the locals quite, but it probably took the whole lot to be wiped out for the top brass to send in the real deal and put down the up-rising, but that’s the down side of having such a large empire being ruled from a relatively small nation. You can’t have your best troops available in every area, especially if other European nations are trying their best to wipe you out, but was the US under any other direct threat at this time? Everything was well with the Canadians and I suppose the Mexicans were ok around that time, that’s why I mentioned about using more of the cavalry divisions. Ian. Ian,
That's about right. Take Isandlwana. Chelmsford didn't have a single cavalryman in Cape Province/Natal for that battle, meaning total reliance upon local auxiliaries for scouting. Two entire cavalry regiments, plus six extra battalions of infantry, were immediately despatched to southern Africa on news of the debacle.
I don't think the US army had any other real pull on its resources in 1876, other than hostiles crossing the Mexican border and general policing of the hostile territories.
WO
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Post by Yan Taylor on Nov 20, 2014 13:53:47 GMT -6
Chuck to coral the Indians with a ring of forts is great way of taking the sting out of them, if they try anything then the troops would be nearby and in force to deal with them, but I was dealing with defeating them in the field, not allowing them to overrun and isolate small columns but being forced by weight of numbers and fire power to lay down their arms and go back to the rez, then you can build your railways and forts.
I am talking about four or five regiments of cavalry along with the same of Infantry should not be that difficult to assemble and with direct orders to try and work out a plan that allows them to work together.
Ian.
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Post by welshofficer on Nov 20, 2014 13:57:24 GMT -6
The U S Army of 1876 was not the Army of 45-91 or 2014. The 1876 Army did not even contemplate foreign operations. If you keep those bases at regimental (actually brigade) level you cede far to much territory to those hostile to your intent. It's a big area and I think it would be much more profitable, to build smaller posts, garrisoned by six to eight companies mixed, spread them out more geographically, with the intention of eventually connecting them by railroad. That technique would accomplish both the military area security goal, and foster the national policy of westward expansion. Fort Custer, near Hardin is one such example. There would be no more hostiles in strength in the LBH Valley once that installation was complete, garrisoned and functioning, and the railroad found its way to Hardin shortly after. Another was the fort established in Sheridan near where Crook's supply base was located. I forget its name (McKinney or McKenzie I think). Same railroad runs past. The place is a must see by the way for those in the LBH area. It is now a hospital for vets, a perfectly preserved example of period construction, designed for two battalions. Another is down Steve's way, Fort Whipple in Prescott, again a vet hospital and perfectly preserved. Francis Warren AFB in Cheyenne, and Offutt AFB in Nebraska are other examples of period construction under the guise of Fort D A Russell and Fort Crook. QC,
That strategy takes time, and you can understand a certain reluctance post-Gratton and post-Fetterman to disperse too widely.
WO
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Post by quincannon on Nov 20, 2014 14:07:43 GMT -6
I understand the time involved. What I seek is a solution for doing it right, not fast. So while I understand what you say, the people in charge are supposed to be adults and professional (both military and political), and emotional knee jerks are never the right answer.
There was no compelling interest at the time to tie down any bulk of force east of the Missouri River. Having an Infantry Regiment at Governor's Island, New York or Fort Swampy. Pennsylvania served no useful purpose other than 4th of July parades. When you have limited resources you set priorities based upon national interest.
Ian: Violence as a first step is never an answer especially with a problem so complex as this was. Try thinking beyond the immediate, and focus on long term. I don't give a rat's behind if they go to the reservation or not. Let me eat away at the pie a slice at a time. Once done the same ends are accomplished, and the bloodshed, on both sides kept to the minimal. Once that area looks like a spider's web of forts, linked by railroads, villages and towns will spring up. At that point you win and the Indians will have the hostile driven from them, in favor of a warm bed and three squares. Possibly, just possibly, such a strategic vision may foster much better long term relationships than you ever achieve with bullet and bayonet. Make no mistake some measure of violence would be present. Change is rarely effected without it.
Now I know this is about as useful as peeing up a rope, for those of the time did not think this way. I am not sure if folks in our time do either. Grab you gun and fix their wagon are always initial reactions. That is also and always stupid and wrong. A strategist out thinks before the operators should ever practice his trade.
The military is nothing more than a tool of national policy. Don't put the military wagon before the political horse that propels it. There are other, and sometimes better solutions, and when we don't at least examine ALL of the alternatives available, regardless of time, we fail.
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