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Post by Yan Taylor on Nov 22, 2014 7:18:35 GMT -6
Chuck, according to the lads who work with the “help for hero’s” the British army is still doing things on a shoe string, they are lacking in basic stuff and have to go borrowing equipment off your army.
The trouble with little fortlets like Smith and Fetterman are the way they are placed, with the area being so vast and no communications they were really isolated, so any determined attack would force the defenders to lock the gates and hunker down, because they only had a garrison of around a couple of companies (and only a portion of these were probably cavalry) there offensive capabilities would be severely restricted and any patrols could fall fowl of attack. So once you build these forts in enemy territory you are in fact a prisoner.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 22, 2014 9:48:46 GMT -6
Ian: I would be interested in what the folks consider the basic stuff the British Army is doing without. Not disputing, only a question.
I would also be interested in what they are borrowing from us. I know the Canadian reserve forces always loved our stuff when we trained with them, but it was not that they did not have. They just thought ours was of a better design.
Fetteman was not a little fortlet, but rather a permanent post. Smith, Reno, and Phil Kearny were. I know nothing of Smith for I have not been there. Reno was well placed along the Bozeman trail. I am not sure how it was constructed but I would assume story book stockade fence out of a western movie. There is nothing there now but an open prairie. Kearny was of that type construction too. It was big enough for about six mixed companies. It's downfall was where it was located, a horrible place, high ground all around. There was nothing wrong, other than what I mentioned about Kearny, that adequate garrisons and larger size to accommodate them would not cure. Given the times had they remained the railroad would have probably reached them by 70-71. This part of the discussion has been put to bed. Let it sleep.
A couple of points for clarification on my previous posts. Fetterman as said was considered a permanent post, although the term then had a different meaning (meaning then long term occupation anticipated). Today we differentiate in that Camp is the temporary term, while Fort is permanent. Many times camps evolve into forts, or a camp located on an established fort's reservation is incorporated into the fort itself. Example: Camp Travis, Texas was located on the Fort Sam Houston reservation and was later absorbed into it.
Fort McKinney is in Buffalo, Wyoming. It is a second location bearing that name. The earlier one was forty or so miles away. I think there is something still there, but not sure what.
Fort MacKenzie is in Sheridan and is the one that is now a vet hospital.
I would rather visit forts than battlefields. They hold more interest for me.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Nov 22, 2014 12:54:08 GMT -6
This part of the discussion has been put to bed. Let it sleep. By all-means Chuck. Yes forts and castles and even WW2 fortifications hold more interest then a simply field, but I would still like to visit the LBH though, mainly because it has places of interest along with landmarks, I once visited Colloden field in the 1970s and it was just that, a rain sodden field. Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 22, 2014 13:19:40 GMT -6
The really good ones are on our east and west coasts. Fort Howard outside Baltimore for instance is a pristine example of a coastal defense fortification. It too is a vet hospital. I am sure Tom has visited, and it is not all that far from North Point, the preview of the defense of Baltimore in 1814.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Nov 22, 2014 15:54:50 GMT -6
I think you get what you pay for. Not just in money but time investment also. If you're doing day labor and don't drill much in winter and don't have ammunition sufficient to detect problems in your weapon system then your battle plans have to be at the level that the officers observe the capabilities of the troops to be. Certainly there could have been better plans for a campaign but that might involve spending more money. Underestimating the Indians potential for one last battle where they don't run seems to me a given rather than training and battle ready for the potential of the Big Village and lots of Indians willing to fight. Regards AZ Ranger AZ,
It's posts like that which make this forum an absolute pleasure.
Now sorry to put you on the spot, but what would you have done differently with the resources available to Gen Sheridan...?
No additional spending allowed - Grant wants a 3rd term...
WO
philosophical answer: I am not familiar with the discussion with Gen Sheridan et al. Someone needed to speak up on the current conditions of the troops. My Department tries to do things with the least amount of expenditure and if we cut something its fuel and filling empty positions. That has no effect on the public. The Forest Service receives cuts they shut down campgrounds which I think is brilliant. People show up to camp and its closed due to budget cuts. Guess who gets and earful for that. So you have a choice of doing nothing but you must chose where you do nothing so it has an impact. I would rather have fewer soldiers with full training and ammunition to maintain skills, the best tack available and so forth. Then when asked to do something you have a good idea of what you can do yet can state that you don't have enough troopers for the job that the public wants. Instead they had troops who weren't battle ready and not enough money to make them that way. I would like to know in what condition Sheridan thought the troops were and if he was given the truth so he could make an informed decision. I am all for the can do spirit but it also means that you can do it if given the chance. So bottom line if told to go anyway you can quit because you don't want to kill untrained troops or you can chose to do something reasonable with what you have. I don't think Sheridan laid out the specific plan rather that rested with Terry, I think Custer thought his command was more battle ready and the Indians weren't. He also relied on the officers thinking the same as he was yet had nothing from past experience in field actions with these same officers for at least two of the three battalions. I know I work with some officers that I know what they are going to do and others I have not clue. Your backup needs to from the former group and not from the group that you don't know. This was the first time for these officers against a Big Village and the command and HQ needed to be directing all the battalions so the understood his plan firsthand rather than second guessing. Regards AZ Ranger
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Post by quincannon on Nov 22, 2014 18:00:30 GMT -6
EXCELLEMT STEVE
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Post by welshofficer on Nov 22, 2014 19:07:17 GMT -6
Chuck, according to the lads who work with the “help for hero’s” the British army is still doing things on a shoe string, they are lacking in basic stuff and have to go borrowing equipment off your army. The trouble with little fortlets like Smith and Fetterman are the way they are placed, with the area being so vast and no communications they were really isolated, so any determined attack would force the defenders to lock the gates and hunker down, because they only had a garrison of around a couple of companies (and only a portion of these were probably cavalry) there offensive capabilities would be severely restricted and any patrols could fall fowl of attack. So once you build these forts in enemy territory you are in fact a prisoner. Ian. Ian,
"Beg, steal or borrow" has been unofficial British Army policy around the US Army for some time. It has become pretty much official in the last decade or so!
The British Army has always done things on the cheap. Look at the British Army order of battle in 1914, or at Singapore in 1941. Or how many troops garrisoned those uppity North American colonies in the 1770s...?!
But I share your concerns over a fortlet approach, at least with the 1865-1876 resourcing levels.
WO
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Post by quincannon on Nov 22, 2014 20:36:39 GMT -6
If we were smart WO, we, and the Commonwealth of Nations, would get our smartest people together, and solve issues of commonly used "gear".
I am not talking the big stuff so much, but the common use items. Once done that could cut procurement costs considerably I think.
Personnel costs are the biggest line item in any army's budget. They are indefinite long term.
I fully agree with Steve. I would rather see us cut two of our ten divisions, if the savings could be plowed back into readiness and training money for the remaining eight.
It is not the size of the force so much as it is the size of the fight in the force.
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Post by mac on Nov 23, 2014 5:57:18 GMT -6
I wish you guys were in government..then we might get some sensible budget cuts!!! Cheers
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Post by Yan Taylor on Nov 23, 2014 7:27:49 GMT -6
Mac the Tory’s are cutting us to the bone over here, so I wish too that a few on this board could give Cameron (spit) some sensible alternatives.
Thatcher did a good job on cutting the military budget too, I bet Justin would have a good idea on that score, seeing that he was serving at that time.
Chuck every time I see the letters WO, it reminds me of the rank of Warrant Officer, my dad was a WO class II, after 20 years’ service.
The main problem concerning these little bases or forts is that they are usually situated deep in the heart of enemy territory which allows your enemy to keep an eye on your every move, if you are fighting an unconventional foe then he will have no uniform, so he will blend in with the locals and strike on his terms. The Romans built loads of these Fortlets over here, and we must have developed the concept even further, as we used them all over the world for the last couple of hundred years of so, the box system used in the western desert in ww2 was along these lines, and Rommel knew just how to deal with them, he simply by-passed them.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 23, 2014 9:21:18 GMT -6
Our big problem is long term personnel salary, and retirement cost. People are living longer, and that cost increases, so the raw amount of money, and the percentage of the whole keeps growing. This is to be expected when you go from a mobilization based forced to a profession force.
Commonality has to be watched very carefully. The Virginia class submarine meets our requirements quite well, where it would be gross overkill in the RN or RAN, where the Astute and Collins classes do quite well. Same goes for aircraft, MBT's and a lot of the high end items.
Budgets should be threat based, and they are many times job based. The result many times is you have more of or less of what you need.
Training, operations and maintenance money for us seems to be the first resort of the budget cutter, and we end up much like Steve describes, with perhaps a full force but one that is hollow in training. Bad, very bad move.
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Post by welshofficer on Nov 23, 2014 9:25:33 GMT -6
Ian,
I like the idea of fortlets, but not sure the US Army was equipped for that strategy either in the 1870s. Re-supply vulnerability and all that.
Thatcher did not cut the military budget by much. She was planning to, especially the RN, but Gen Galtieri forced a re-think. Major, Blair, Brown and Cameron have successively cut deep into the bones. The illusory "peace dividend". Army and RAF in trouble, the RN in crisis.
WO
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Post by welshofficer on Nov 23, 2014 9:34:16 GMT -6
Our big problem is long term personnel salary, and retirement cost. People are living longer, and that cost increases, so the raw amount of money, and the percentage of the whole keeps growing. This is to be expected when you go from a mobilization based forced to a profession force. Commonality has to be watched very carefully. The Virginia class submarine meets our requirements quite well, where it would be gross overkill in the RN or RAN, where the Astute and Collins classes do quite well. Same goes for aircraft, MBT's and a lot of the high end items. Budgets should be threat based, and they are many times job based. The result many times is you have more of or less of what you need. Training, operations and maintenance money for us seems to be the first resort of the budget cutter, and we end up much like Steve describes, with perhaps a full force but one that is hollow in training. Bad, very bad move. QC,
If you buy an Astute SSN, you won't have much change left over for a Virginia SSN. Even if the latter are a poor man's Seawolf SSN. Most RN submariners of my acquaintance really regret the RN relinquishing its diesel submarine capability as part of the post-Cold War "peace dividend". British defence procurement is now as much committed to keeping BAe afloat as UK national defence.
WO
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Post by quincannon on Nov 23, 2014 9:44:30 GMT -6
For us, I think a relatively small force of eight to ten active division, and their immediate supporting slices are sufficient. Internally, within those divisions there must be more teeth than tail. You can increase tail by putting a lot more ot that is required in a long term fight from an operational level of readiness reserve and Guard. The reserves and Guard are on the order of one third as expensive to train and maintain than the active force. To really accomplish this though an iron bound commitment must be made at the political and upper echelon military levels that training, maintenance, and operational funds must be both sufficient to requirement and untouchable. That will not happen in my lifetime.
WO: Agree with your last. Was not really talking about the money as I was the configuration.
Best was to assure long term viability of a weapons system here in the US is to spread the component procurement over the fifty states. It is also the worst way to limit or halt production of a system you either no longer need or have enough of to meets your needs.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Nov 23, 2014 11:09:18 GMT -6
I know the navy had a hard time in the early 1980s, Thatcher withdrew HMS Endurance due to budget cuts and Galtieri may have saw this as a weakness and decided to take action, so I don’t know if Endurance would have made much difference as we only had around 30 RMs on South Georgia, but if this was saw a chance by the Argies then Thatcher’s way of saving money cost a lot more in men’s lives as Maggie took the adulations in what was a political war as both leaders were in trouble.
Ian.
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