Post by jag on Sept 12, 2012 23:56:47 GMT -6
I will start with the caveat that I can support almost everything I have written below, either from direct participant accounts or from my own personal experience as a military officer, knowing what I would do in a particular situation. Before I launch into this, one must realize I approach the entire battle as a military operation more than some historical event. Knowing what I do of George Custer, I think my modus operandi is valid. Its primary factors are simplicity and speed.
It is my belief that by the time GAC reached the lone tepee—less than two miles from the river—he was reasonably certain where the “main” village was located. Benteen was not recalled at that time because there was still no certainty satellites did not lie farther upstream.
Certain circumstances that followed Custer’s issuance of orders to Reno lead me to believe—with a very strong element of certainty—Custer intended fully to support Reno by a direct attack through Reno’s command in the valley.
Gerard’s report about Indians coming up the valley told Custer he had lost the element of surprise, that the Indians were forming a very strong screen to protect the village as it was breaking up and scattering. To prevent this Custer chose to make and “end-run” across the hills. He was still armed with the belief he was facing only 800 – 1,500 warriors, a figure he felt he could handle.
There are two issues to consider at this point. Based on several accounts, the number of Indians confronting Reno was not “everything” before him—as was claimed—but in all likelihood the fifty or so warriors Hare, Gerard, Herendeen, and Davern spotted as they were near the lone tepee, augmented by a handful of pony drovers. The second issue is the Kanipe red herring, to me a fable of whimsy almost thrown into the whole thing as a diversion we pay too much attention to. I discount totally Kanipe’s mission, and even if I am wrong, TWC’s sending him back was ancillary, with no meaning or import at all. It is a red herring… nothing more, but it sullies everyone’s thinking, sending people on wild goose chases, and intimating more trouble than actuality. Again, I discount the entire Kanipe business as a fable.
Reno’s move down the valley was done with a modicum of caution. He never ordered a charge; he followed the general course of the river rather than a straight-ahead, pell-mell run; and without the trumpets blaring, his speed—while considerable—was moderated.
The ravine which precipitated Reno’s halt is also something of a red herring and in my mind greatly misunderstood, but primarily because most people and writers do not have the military experience to understand its full implications. Yes, the ravine existed—it still does—and not where most of you think; no, it didn’t belch “hundreds” of Indians—they didn’t have the time to get there; and yes, Reno should have stopped because of the uncertainty of its contents, its configuration, and the dust and smoke affecting Reno’s ability to assess his situation.
By dismounting and forming a skirmish line, as well, Reno and his officers were able to exercise greater control over the troops.
In all likelihood Custer did not witness the dismounting itself (see Varnum), but when he arrived at 3,411, he watched Reno’s men deploying and moving. (Of course the issue of Sharpshooters’ Ridge and Weir Point arises here, but – and please excuse my disdain—I find any continued belief in either of these locales being the point where Custer overlooked the valley as nothing short of silly, especially in light of the various participant accounts and the pictures I posted previously.)
From 3,411, Custer could see two things of major import (he needed to see three!). First—as I have said many times before—he was pleased with what he saw of Reno’s actions and what they were accomplishing. His hat-waving and the comments of Kanipe and Martini attest to that. (Reno spent more than 30 minutes on the valley floor and Custer was viewing several of the earlier moments.) Secondly, from 3,411, Custer could see the upper valley was free of threats/camps, thereby freeing Benteen from continuing his scout. That observation precipitated the sending back of Martini.
Over the years, Martini’s comments become very disingenuous, especially concerning where he was handed the note and the business about sleeping dogs, women and children, and viewing the action with GAC. That latter claim has caused more confusion than almost any other single observation coming out of the entire event. The bottom line with Martini’s comments is they are contrived and he falsely elaborated on the Custer comment about catching them “napping”—intentionally or not, it is irrelevant. As for sleeping dogs, that could have easily been an allusion to the quickly abandoned east bank village, but his reference to not seeing any dust relegates to ludicrous anything he claimed regarding being with Custer. If Martini noticed no dust, he was too far back from the bluffs to see anything in the valley until his return trip.
Rosebud—
Actually, I believe Custer left 3,411 thinking things were pretty good… otherwise I do not believe he would have continued north. At most, he would have crossed at Ford B with all five companies. Furthermore, I believe GAC was too good a soldier to have made such an egregious error, separating commands at such distances… unless he believed he had matters well enough in hand.
A good number of my “ideas” or “theories” or opinions are derived from my work on this time-line I have spent five years developing. It has not been easy work and I have insisted to myself that the lines be drawn not by me or my opinions, but by what the participants themselves have told us. Because I cannot be sure of having read everything everyone who was there had to say, I have supplemented the work with a very few respected historians and archaeologists and writers, but I have tried to keep their contributions to a minimum. In addition, I have added some “color commentary” to keep a proper, continuous flow, but those too are limited and I am continuously trying to find specific references to support those suppositions. An example of this latter type entry would be,
12:18 PM—SGM Sharrow leaves the column and heads to Benteen. (8 MPH — 10 MPH); .97 miles from divide separations.
There is no direct source reference for that entry, but based on what we know, the time appears reasonable, we know Sharrow departed the main column, and the distance and speed are also reasonable based on Benteen’s recollections of where Sharrow met him.
In all, there are 481 separate “time” entries, 89% of which are supported by direct particpant accounts, and if I were to add in the entries supported by the likes of Kingsley Bray, Richard Fox, John Stands In Timber, Tom Heski, and Greg Michno, that number increases to 94%. The remainder are the Sharrow-type entries, above, none of which affect materially any of the perceived action.
For everyone—
Again, I have no intention of debating any of this; it is simply what I believed happened. Use it or abuse it at your leisure. A couple of other points I noticed that may be skewing your ideas and causing confusion.
A lot of people—almost everyone, in fact—believe Boyer saw Reno retreat; Boyer went to Boyer's Bluff; Boyer told Custer. It is my opinion none of that ever happened and that Boyer joined back with Custer long before the latter left Cedar Coulee. Otherwise, why would Boyer have known Custer would go to Ford B and Boyer could join him there? Boyer obviously knew there was a crossing point there and that hostiles would be using it. Since he was well ahead of Custer as Custer reached 3,411, Boyer would have no idea Custer would be going to Ford B.
There are a couple of others, but I have said enough for one night.
Best wishes,
Fred.
Thanks Fred. I do respect the great amount of time and effort you have put into your work, but there are intangibles that neither of us can foresee or more properly soothsay. This battle will most assuredly be hotly debated for eons to come, not that your work won't contribute, it will, maybe not in the way you think it should right now, but it will. I understand that you think someone like me is trying to tear your work asunder, and that is the furthest from the truth on this matter and the only thing I'm aware of that you are wrong about. As I said before, I'm more than willing to admit my human errors and in that the possibility that what I write can be wrong, especially concerning this battle. I'm not that proud, malcontent or stupid (pms). I realize that those who fought this battle had those same innate qualities we all have today. And I also realize that they, each and every one of them brought those same human factors to that fight and long after, enough so that we can never know for sure whether they lied, stretched the truth to fit their idea of what they believed was the right thing to do, or told the truth. They brought to that fight the best and worst of their own human vanities, biases, prejudices, and egos. And none of them are worthy of our best efforts to understand what they refused to give up, whether it was something they personally felt embarrassed about, or whether they felt someone else was to fault and they didn't want to betray a friend, or colleague, or a nation that grieved because of something they failed to do, should have done, and a long list that every soldier in any war anywhere has gone through. Each possessed with a privacy that they'd rather die with than say to even their closest and dearest loved ones. And many have done just that, not just in this conflict but in each and every one, they did something they weren't proud of.
We might never know the full truth of this. And it isn't because no one tried or gave it their best, their all. We all here know better, and there is at least one person I know, that I can definitely say he has. And that should be enough for anyone, even those who died way back then and didn't deserve better.
jag
