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Post by fred on Sept 11, 2012 18:48:11 GMT -6
Well, I guess in my hurrying through things I missed something and then mixed up threads. If I am not mistaken, this thread is the only one I posted on today, so if I have screwed up things, I do apologize to you, Rosebud, to you, "jag," and to you, "wild."
Now... let me try to clarify a couple of things, probably not even meant for me, but since I have screwed up everything I've touched today, what the hell, I might as well stay consistent.
Wild--
Advancing on the skirmish line...
Wallace, RCOI— Command halted about 150 yards from the river. It “advanced to where the creek made a quick bend and the right wing was resting on top of the cut bank with the creek below. The village was across the bend, 75 or 100 yards to the first tepee, but on the same side of the stream we were.” [25]
PVT S. Roy (A Company)— Hammer, Kenneth, ed., Custer in ’76: Walter Camp’s Notes on the Custer Fight, Brigham Young University Press, 1976, pp. 111 – 117. Dismounted about 200 yards in advance of timber and skirmish line advanced to point of timber. G on right, A next, and M on left.
Moylan, RCOI— The battalion deployed as skirmishers and the horse holders brought the horses into the woods. [216] The line advanced about 100 yards after initial deployment. [222]
PVT W. E. Morris (M Company)— 1908—From a letter dated November 1, 1908, to Walter Camp. Denver Public Library, Robert S. Ellison papers, WH131 File Folder, Papers – Diaries – Interviews – Comments. Donohue, Michael N., Drawing Battle Lines, El Segundo, CA: Upton and Sons, Publishers, 2008. After riding down the valley and dismounting, one company was formed up “as skirmishers facing down the bottom.” [130] “ ‘M’ Troop was deployed facing the bench land.” [130] M Company advanced toward the benchland and the Indians began coming at them from their right. [130]
Rosebud--
Looks like Venus crossed Mars and Pluto is the one with the rings tonight... plus, a black hole is about to swallow up a young sun and some gas... the latter, maybe mine. So here goes...
I agree with you totally about Custer on the bluffs... at least as I interpret what you wrote. To me, there isn't a snowball's chance in hell Custer watched Reno's line pull back to the timber nor did he see Reno's retreat. It is my opinion Custer arrived at 3,411 several minutes after Reno dismounted, stayed a few minutes longer, then left for Cedar Coulee with the impression Reno was doing just fine.
You are also correct in saying, "Fred does not know what Custer saw," yet the above and another post is what I believe he saw. Again, when you do the "math," you come up with answers. Is it all apodictic? Nope. I wasn't there. But common sense, plenty of fieldwork, and tearing apart account after account brings me to certain conclusions. I put percentages on all of them, some even at 100%. Does that mean I "know"? Nope, again. Does it mean I'm certain? Yep!
And again, again, again... wherever possible, I always give sources.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by rosebud on Sept 11, 2012 19:31:25 GMT -6
Rosebud--
Looks like Venus crossed Mars and Pluto is the one with the rings tonight... plus, a black hole is about to swallow up a young sun and some gas... the latter, maybe mine. So here goes...
I agree with you totally about Custer on the bluffs... at least as I interpret what you wrote. To me, there isn't a snowball's chance in hell Custer watched Reno's line pull back to the timber nor did he see Reno's retreat. It is my opinion Custer arrived at 3,411 several minutes after Reno dismounted, stayed a few minutes longer, then left for Cedar Coulee with the impression Reno was doing just fine.
You are also correct in saying, "Fred does not know what Custer saw," yet the above and another post is what I believe he saw. Again, when you do the "math," you come up with answers. Is it all apodictic? Nope. I wasn't there. But common sense, plenty of fieldwork, and tearing apart account after account brings me to certain conclusions. I put percentages on all of them, some even at 100%. Does that mean I "know"? Nope, again. Does it mean I'm certain? Yep!
And again, again, again... wherever possible, I always give sources.
Best wishes, Fred
I appreciate the time and effort you took to make this post. It is a post I agree with 100% Like you, I'm certain too. How we get so far off is beyond me. Especially when we are in agreement. Oh well, I'm sure we will mess it up again. Never on purpose...... but we will .... you know we will.
Best wishes to you too Justin
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jag
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Post by jag on Sept 12, 2012 4:56:21 GMT -6
Jag, After going over some of today's posts and checking who wrote what, it appears I insulted you regarding your comments on 3,411. Please accept my apologies; my post was not meant to offend you and my language was inadvertently harsh. Here is my reasoning for claiming Custer went to 3,411 and not Weir Peaks or Sharpshooters' Ridge. My position relies on the testimony and accounts of Varnum, DeRudio, Herendeen, Martini, and Curley. The RCOI testimony of the first four is pretty specific, at least to me, and when one begins the measuring with ruler and map, 3,411 is the only answer. DeRudio, himself, specifically ruled out Weir Peaks when he was asked the question by the Recorder. My own reasoning is that a commander in a rush-- or any other mode of travel for that matter-- would seek to get as good a view and as close a view of the valley as possible. I would. Martini even described the specific route Custer took. While some claim Custer went to Sharpshooters', that is also out of the question, for it is entirely too far away for DeRudio to make any identification, regardless of the sky and the weather conditions. It adds some 300 yards to the distance he claimed. The pictures I have posted on this post and the next will give you a good idea of what can be seen from atop SSR. I hope this clears things up somewhat, and again, if I offended you, I render my sincerest apologies. Best wishes, Fred. Fred, I appreciate what you tried to do, I really do. But I think we all tend to go out on a limb that's bound to crack, break and fall due to the sheer weight, if for nothing else. We've all been there a time or two, and this is one of those times for me as well. And when it comes to discussing this particular topic, things can and will be said because we disagree with it. No harm, no foul ever, concerning that aspect as far as I'm concerned, and likewise, no apology needed. Now for the rest of your post. Which should not be misconstrued as anything more or less than a few opinionated words on a web page that happens to disagree with your take on things. And absolutely contains nothing personal. What was or wasn't known might be better to determine what happened. When Custer sent Reno into the valley the only thing at the time even viable was to send Reno after was some fleeing Indians. It wouldn't have been anything else at the time, with the exception of Girards sighting of a village. Keep in mind here not the big village Custer would later report, this is a must, because if Custer had known of the big village when he sent Reno away, he might as well have sent Martin back right then and there for Benteen and the packs. This should tell us of some kind of reaction to finding the village being larger to his knowledge and sending Reno off on a presumed single village with Indians fleeing to it and afterward finding it one big one. There doesn't appear in the written record anything that would have given that type of alarm, at least not Martin, Kanipe or any of the others that survived that ride. The only thing that seems to indicate that all was not well with finding the situation different than what was thought, was Kanipe's message back to the Pack Train. But the where he indicated he was sent from doesn't seem to match up with the nonchalant attitude, kind of a leize fair, pardon my pitiful french, attitude that simply stated was, 'We've caught them napping, we'll go down and make a crossing, finish up here and go home to our station.' This doesn't fit with the message Kanipe sent back. What also doesn't fit is Martin's record of what was observed from that position. Ohhh... there were, women, old men, children playing, ponies a dogs all just waiting there for us to come and escort them away. Yup, lets just toodle on down there and do that Custer says. Now for the real rock'm'sock it to me thing that seems to be all out of whack from the other observations, uhhh... supposedly from up there. The message to the pack train, no not Benteen, the pack train, to send the packs straightway across country and then don't bother with anything that falls off [even ammo!?] and get there pronto as in, on the double. This urgency and expected and timely arrival of their ammo doesn't go down well with the other digested facts surrounding what Custer should have observed. Its just not cutting it, and does give anyone trying to give rationale to it extreme heartburn. So then the need arises that instead of paying attention to Kanipe, and because its such an annoying a thing to try to figure out with him in there sticking his nose where it didn't belong, we'll just discredit that source and move on. Wait a cotton picking minute there, hold the horses, since when did that massacre ever elicit the dire need for something so critical to be so abandoned and overlooked? And where since and in perpetuity that should have been, could have been, in fact was and still is the very thing everyone keeps being sought after as part of the solution? There had to have been some kind of message from Custer like that, yet, here it is and we keep throwing it out with the dirty laundry? Since when would a message like this have ever been dismissed with such wild abandon and ignorance, ""Benteen Be Quick Big village I am in trouble and need your assistance pronto, like yesterday man so get the lead out, oh and by the way bring the pacs, ps BRING THE DAMN PACS" And he's giving that message from where and when? Yet this, this is supposedly the last messenger from Custer? What could or rather did Custer see down there in order for him to call the packs forward at that time, and he didn't just do it once, with one messenger, but supposedly twice within about 10 to 15 minutes of each other. And supposedly it was called for, ahem... up there, you know, that 3411 area or any other nearby proboscis fitting a worthy description up there. Think about this. 'We've caught them napping, we'll go down and make a crossing, finish up here and go home to our station.' This doesn't fit with the message Kanipe sent back, or for that matter Martin's same clarion call for the packs, not just once, but once again twice. What also doesn't fit is Martin's record of what was observed from that position. Ohhh... there were, women, old men, children playing, ponies a dogs all just waiting there for us to come and escort them away. Yup, lets just toodle on down there and do that Custer says. Reno at that point hadn't even fired a single shot from a skirmish line, not one, yet here's Custer up there toodling and noodling around saying were going to need the packs because he caught them napping? We need the packs because its going to be a walk in the park rounding up all the little kiddies, old men and women and then we can go home to our station? Was it because here was Custer's oops moment with sending poor Reno into the buzz saw of not one assumed single village but more like 10? Yeah that's the ticket, he realized he F*&k(d up and Reno would be needing the ammo, but wait, lo how was those notes written or verbal order stated? Reno hadn't even dismounted during the time Custer supposedly noodled around up there. How is this known, because the exact moment in time was recorded for posterity by none other than Lt. Varnum. This when he told the court, that he pointing to a map, said that he saw a glimpse of the white horse troop in the immediate vicinity below Weir Peak just as Reno's skirmish line was being formed. When further questioned about that sighting possibly being the whole outfit, he said he didn't know, he just looked up there and glimpsed them there at that time, it might have only been 5 or 6 he glimpsed, that's all that was known. But suddenly as if by magic 5 or 6 became the whole battalion and Custer was still fooling around back there in the rear, far of the van and not tending to the immediate need of what lay beyond the point on which he stood fascinated by what wasn't happening. And during the time it took for Custer's supposed battalion to ride from where they had left Custer to look at nothing, to where Reno Set up that skirmish line being past Weir peak, the only way to have Custer observe that, was to have left him behind on that ridge intently gazing upon an advancing Reno until he did see him dismount. The cause of which Reno claimed was some Indians hidden in a ditch. OH, so that's what all that waving was about up there. Watch it bub your about to be bushwhacked, you'd better dismount, like pronto or you're toast. If Custer stayed atop that ridge instead of being at the front of his own column, where never a once did those who rode with him say he never did depart it, and they should have known, then how come he just had to have not been where they said he wasn't? And if he was, according to Varnum's testimony concerning that sighting below Weir, had he, Custer, been where he was supposed to have been in that battalion lineup, according to those who rode with him, he wouldn't have seen, couldn't have seen Reno dismounting. Yet he called for the packs not once, but twice, supposedly from there, up there because? Lets be clear here about what Custer did see up there, that is if he was ever up there, that I highly doubt. Varnums statement to the court places a definite time limit on things up there. And from all that can be discerned by it the Indians while Custer's battalion traversed that open sky-way saw only Reno advancing the same as him. The Indians out if front of Reno still in the process of moving to and fro, around and about kicking up a little dust, but still none the less fleeing. There wasn't a need at that time to dismount, and there still wasn't any need for Custer to ride to his rescue. And there still wasn't hordes of onrushing Indians going to flank Reno or for that matter meet him head on. Where oh where could they have been? I agree with Fred here, its all about the timing. But you have to get it right, and by all indicators we have, there was no reason to have called for support from either Benteen or for the packs at that time. Custer's subsequent moves demonstrated what as concerned Reno and his motley crew? There he was up there all that time and then nothing, nada, zip of concern after departing that ridge, yet he, Custer, was expected to have supported Reno after supposedly seeing him dismount and being flanked and... oh the horrors... overran? One would surely lead to the other, no? But he callously walked or was it galloped on downstream without the slightest of concern, sniff, sniff, sniggle, sniggle, wipe the tears from our eyes. He, that meany weenie, expected them to hold out for hours and then not tell anyone about us being there. Oh Boo hoo, shame, oh the deplorable shame of it all!!! How could he? Just how could he have done that to us? After all his view from up there should have told him everything he needed to have heeded in regard to his own and our welfare as well, but apparently didn't and yet he that callous bastard completely and incompetently misjudged everything he saw from up there. Yes bring the pac's, hell yes tell Benteen to come on, be quick, there's a big village here, but be sure to bring the pacs as if that would have saved our sorry behinds. All that being to late or not enough quickly, yet Custer saw it all from his own crows nest atop that bluff and did absolutely nothing constructive to save our sorry butts, oh boo hoo, guess I'll have to do something for myself, just this once and try to save my sorry arse and go back up there where that bastard stood and see what he saw and then royally rub it in, the bastard.
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Post by montrose on Sept 12, 2012 6:45:49 GMT -6
Sarcasm aside: your judgment on Custer's assessment and behavior is spot on. Concur.
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Post by wild on Sept 12, 2012 7:09:54 GMT -6
Hi Fred,No need for apologies,water off a duck's back. And I conceed the point.Well on a technicality----In the forming,adjusting and positioning of the skirmish line an advance took place. Best Regards Richard
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Post by Yan Taylor on Sept 12, 2012 8:07:55 GMT -6
Will; that creek bed you are referring to, otter creek you say, I remember asking Fred about this (I also asked Keogh a while back, but I can’t remember his reply but I don’t think it was helpful) and he gave me some info on its location but I didn’t save it, I was wondering how far ahead of the Reno skirmish line is this creek, and how near to the village is it, sorry for all the questions, it’s just that in rock drill 1, I was think of ordering Reno to use this creek for a base of fire.
Richard, Sgt Ryan (this is from the site astonisher so if it’s wrong I am sorry) mentioned about riding down an embankment, dismounting and moving up (on foot by the sounds of it) on to higher ground, and then forming a skirmish line
Ian.
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Post by rosebud on Sept 12, 2012 8:59:41 GMT -6
Rock Drill III has now ended.
As I expected, few...darn few will let Custer go beyond 3411 without prejudice. He is an idiot.....He is a glory hound.....he is abandoning Reno....He is watching Reno get his ass kicked and doesn't give a damn. The list goes on
Few......DARN few have Custer leaving 3411 with the assumption that things are still going OK .....Not GREAT....But OK.
The message back to Benteen shows the concern he did have.
Montrose asked the question about.....When will Custer get to re-evaluate the situation? Well, in Rock Drill III, it would be when he gets the information that Reno is in trouble and has left the valley.
In MY view, this would be when Bouyer, who has been on the ridge watching the fight. Brings the news that Reno has gone to the hills and there is a hell of a bunch of Indians headed your way.
It is my personal belief that Custer did not receive word of this until he was in the vicinity of Custer hill and ford D.....That is the reason he is now starting back to try and set up a defense......To late.
I also think there is a CHANCE....that Bouyer let the other soldiers in the Ford B area know this and it MIGHT have helped cause panic knowing they were next.
Go ahead and jump up and down on me.....I can take it.
Justin
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Post by Yan Taylor on Sept 12, 2012 9:13:09 GMT -6
Justin, until we can come to some agreement over what Custer knew concerning Reno in the valley then rock drill III has hit a brick wall, your thoughts on Bouyer delivering news to Custer (on Custer hill) are new to me, Mitch would have had to ride through Yates to get to Custer, if he told the Troopers near Ford B, and I thought that Yates was with Custer on Custer hill, but I may be wrong, so it maybe me who gets jumped up and down on, never mind your opinions are your own and I have no right to try and change them, thanks for starting RD III.
Ian.
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Post by rosebud on Sept 12, 2012 11:36:45 GMT -6
Rock Drill III was clear as to what Custer knew.....Everyone understands that.....They might not want to play, but the rules were clear.
Reno is safe and doing fine.....Custer is leaving. How much clearer does it need to be?
Where does E company end up at the END of the battle?.....Where does Bouyer end up at the END of the battle?
Where do most of the scholars place E company at very first of the battle? Or as some might say....before the Custer battle really started. Either way is OK with me. Where was Bouyer at the first of the battle? That is one we know.....ON THE HILL WATCHING.
Justin
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Post by benteen on Sept 12, 2012 12:41:30 GMT -6
Rock Drill III was clear as to what Custer knew.....Everyone understands that.....They might not want to play, but the rules were clear. Reno is safe and doing fine.....Custer is leaving. How much clearer does it need to be? Justin Justin, My compliments and thanks for another interesting excercise, but I disagree with this statement. It was not clear to me what Custer knew. There were 4 people who I consider experts on this engagement having different opinions on Reno. Colonel Montrose and Wild (Richard) believing that Reno was stopped and going to be in serious trouble, and Capt Fred and yourself believing that Reno was moving forward and was in no trouble. This to me was the most important factor in making any plan of action, and I didnt know which theory to accept and move on with a plan. Be Well Dan
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Post by quincannon on Sept 12, 2012 14:51:53 GMT -6
I agree with Rosebud here. If you look carefully at how the initial instructions for Rock Drill #2 were laid out, there was no doubt that what the Blue force commander saw from 3411 is Reno about to get in a lot of trouble. That leaves but one rational option, - go to Reno's aid.
It does not matter what Custer actually saw from 3411. We really will never know what he saw. We know, I think, probably, maybe, perhaps what we think he saw. Also keep in mind what Custer saw might be far different from what Reno saw at that moment in time. He had the height advantage and could very well have seen forces gathering that Reno could not see, even though Reno might still be doing well. Those hostiles that Will speaks about working the left flank for instance. Then again he may have seen just what Fred says - Reno dismounted and moving forward. Unless we can see through Custer's eyes at that very moment we will never know.
In Rock Drill #3 Justin has changed the timing perhaps by only a moment or so, and the RD is based upon what Custer might have seen - Reno still doing fairly well and in no discernable danger at that moment of observation.
I assume he did it to completely change the set of options for the Blue force commander, and in fact he did
In this RD you can be justified in going north IF you decide that Benteen can get up to support Reno, and that Reno continues to make some headway, against the hostiles. Reno does not have to take the village. The Reno/Benteen combined battle group do not have to take or even enter the village. All they MUST do is fight to a tactical draw, which forces the hostiles to abandon the village forcing them to go north or west. You can with the Blue force commander on the bluff with five companies,raise enough hell on the east side to persuade them to stay away from that direction. Can't stop all of them of course. There will be some leakers, but logicly why fight to escape when you have two directions wide open.
This is an exercise in timing, and a closing window of opportunity. Do it right and you're a hero. Do it wrong you're a bum
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Post by rosebud on Sept 12, 2012 15:20:38 GMT -6
Dan: Rock Drill is a game involving tactics and what you do under specific circumstances. Rock Drill 1 and 2 had specific rules that were followed....The problem is that these "games" lead to the impression that this is what took place at the LBH... In reality, these Rock Drill games are a back door way of promoting a point of view and eliminating other views. Changing the rules at 3411 sets up a totally different set of possibilities... Yet it is still just a game. So far Quincannon is the only one who was able to complete both games with what I would consider satisfactory results. 3411 is and always will be the separation point of those who study the Custer battle....It is all easy up to this point. What did Custer know when he left 3411? This is where the arguments start and they always will. The $64,000 dollar question. We only get to speculate WHY... One thing is a fact. He went North. Would he then drop off Keogh and Calhoun the way he did? Knowing Reno was getting whipped? That would be like dropping off meat to a bunch of mad Grizzly bears. It starts to look like Custer was feeding soldiers to the Indians....On purpose. That is what I come up with if Custer KNOWS Reno is in trouble. But luckily for you guys, I am an idiot. Justin
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Post by benteen on Sept 12, 2012 15:31:54 GMT -6
Colonel,
Thank you for the clear cut explanation where even I can understand it. Your right, in RD#2 you knew Reno was in trouble. For me that was a no brainer. I go to support Reno.The only question was how do I do it. In RD#3, Justin has put a very interesting twist in it. You dont know if Reno is in trouble, from the signs, he may or may not be. That is going to make it a much harder excercise, going to take a lot more thinking on the part of me and MR Rossi. May even have to call in MR Daniels on this one. In any event thanks again at least now I know what the perameters of this excercise are.
Be Well Dan
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Post by benteen on Sept 12, 2012 15:36:56 GMT -6
Justin, No your no idiot. In fact as I told the Colonel this is a very interesting twist to RD#2. Well done. Going to take more thinking about a plan. But at least now I know how to approach it.Not your fault I didnt get it the first time Takes me a little longer to understand things sometimes Be Well Dan
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Post by fred on Sept 12, 2012 19:15:24 GMT -6
I have read a number of the RDIII posts and I have seen my name mentioned several times, but I am not certain everyone understands my position on this first phase of the battle. So let me outline it again—one more time. I do not want to debate this and you all can fling it around as you will, but I have done an inordinate amount of work on this and my ideas are pretty well cemented in stone.
I will start with the caveat that I can support almost everything I have written below, either from direct participant accounts or from my own personal experience as a military officer, knowing what I would do in a particular situation. Before I launch into this, one must realize I approach the entire battle as a military operation more than some historical event. Knowing what I do of George Custer, I think my modus operandi is valid. Its primary factors are simplicity and speed.
It is my belief that by the time GAC reached the lone tepee—less than two miles from the river—he was reasonably certain where the “main” village was located. Benteen was not recalled at that time because there was still no certainty satellites did not lie farther upstream.
Certain circumstances that followed Custer’s issuance of orders to Reno lead me to believe—with a very strong element of certainty—Custer intended fully to support Reno by a direct attack through Reno’s command in the valley.
Gerard’s report about Indians coming up the valley told Custer he had lost the element of surprise, that the Indians were forming a very strong screen to protect the village as it was breaking up and scattering. To prevent this Custer chose to make and “end-run” across the hills. He was still armed with the belief he was facing only 800 – 1,500 warriors, a figure he felt he could handle.
There are two issues to consider at this point. Based on several accounts, the number of Indians confronting Reno was not “everything” before him—as was claimed—but in all likelihood the fifty or so warriors Hare, Gerard, Herendeen, and Davern spotted as they were near the lone tepee, augmented by a handful of pony drovers. The second issue is the Kanipe red herring, to me a fable of whimsy almost thrown into the whole thing as a diversion we pay too much attention to. I discount totally Kanipe’s mission, and even if I am wrong, TWC’s sending him back was ancillary, with no meaning or import at all. It is a red herring… nothing more, but it sullies everyone’s thinking, sending people on wild goose chases, and intimating more trouble than actuality. Again, I discount the entire Kanipe business as a fable.
Reno’s move down the valley was done with a modicum of caution. He never ordered a charge; he followed the general course of the river rather than a straight-ahead, pell-mell run; and without the trumpets blaring, his speed—while considerable—was moderated.
The ravine which precipitated Reno’s halt is also something of a red herring and in my mind greatly misunderstood, but primarily because most people and writers do not have the military experience to understand its full implications. Yes, the ravine existed—it still does—and not where most of you think; no, it didn’t belch “hundreds” of Indians—they didn’t have the time to get there; and yes, Reno should have stopped because of the uncertainty of its contents, its configuration, and the dust and smoke affecting Reno’s ability to assess his situation.
By dismounting and forming a skirmish line, as well, Reno and his officers were able to exercise greater control over the troops.
In all likelihood Custer did not witness the dismounting itself (see Varnum), but when he arrived at 3,411, he watched Reno’s men deploying and moving. (Of course the issue of Sharpshooters’ Ridge and Weir Point arises here, but – and please excuse my disdain—I find any continued belief in either of these locales being the point where Custer overlooked the valley as nothing short of silly, especially in light of the various participant accounts and the pictures I posted previously.)
From 3,411, Custer could see two things of major import (he needed to see three!). First—as I have said many times before—he was pleased with what he saw of Reno’s actions and what they were accomplishing. His hat-waving and the comments of Kanipe and Martini attest to that. (Reno spent more than 30 minutes on the valley floor and Custer was viewing several of the earlier moments.) Secondly, from 3,411, Custer could see the upper valley was free of threats/camps, thereby freeing Benteen from continuing his scout. That observation precipitated the sending back of Martini.
Over the years, Martini’s comments become very disingenuous, especially concerning where he was handed the note and the business about sleeping dogs, women and children, and viewing the action with GAC. That latter claim has caused more confusion than almost any other single observation coming out of the entire event. The bottom line with Martini’s comments is they are contrived and he falsely elaborated on the Custer comment about catching them “napping”—intentionally or not, it is irrelevant. As for sleeping dogs, that could have easily been an allusion to the quickly abandoned east bank village, but his reference to not seeing any dust relegates to ludicrous anything he claimed regarding being with Custer. If Martini noticed no dust, he was too far back from the bluffs to see anything in the valley until his return trip.
Rosebud—
Actually, I believe Custer left 3,411 thinking things were pretty good… otherwise I do not believe he would have continued north. At most, he would have crossed at Ford B with all five companies. Furthermore, I believe GAC was too good a soldier to have made such an egregious error, separating commands at such distances… unless he believed he had matters well enough in hand.
A good number of my “ideas” or “theories” or opinions are derived from my work on this time-line I have spent five years developing. It has not been easy work and I have insisted to myself that the lines be drawn not by me or my opinions, but by what the participants themselves have told us. Because I cannot be sure of having read everything everyone who was there had to say, I have supplemented the work with a very few respected historians and archaeologists and writers, but I have tried to keep their contributions to a minimum. In addition, I have added some “color commentary” to keep a proper, continuous flow, but those too are limited and I am continuously trying to find specific references to support those suppositions. An example of this latter type entry would be,
12:18 PM—SGM Sharrow leaves the column and heads to Benteen. (8 MPH — 10 MPH); .97 miles from divide separations.
There is no direct source reference for that entry, but based on what we know, the time appears reasonable, we know Sharrow departed the main column, and the distance and speed are also reasonable based on Benteen’s recollections of where Sharrow met him.
In all, there are 481 separate “time” entries, 89% of which are supported by direct particpant accounts, and if I were to add in the entries supported by the likes of Kingsley Bray, Richard Fox, John Stands In Timber, Tom Heski, and Greg Michno, that number increases to 94%. The remainder are the Sharrow-type entries, above, none of which affect materially any of the perceived action.
For everyone—
Again, I have no intention of debating any of this; it is simply what I believed happened. Use it or abuse it at your leisure. A couple of other points I noticed that may be skewing your ideas and causing confusion.
A lot of people—almost everyone, in fact—believe Boyer saw Reno retreat; Boyer went to Boyer's Bluff; Boyer told Custer. It is my opinion none of that ever happened and that Boyer joined back with Custer long before the latter left Cedar Coulee. Otherwise, why would Boyer have known Custer would go to Ford B and Boyer could join him there? Boyer obviously knew there was a crossing point there and that hostiles would be using it. Since he was well ahead of Custer as Custer reached 3,411, Boyer would have no idea Custer would be going to Ford B.
There are a couple of others, but I have said enough for one night.
Best wishes, Fred.
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