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Post by quincannon on Sept 13, 2012 12:52:01 GMT -6
The point about the ford is a good one, but it is not only the ford. Where Reno crossed is not really a ford in the normally understood useage of the word. It was a place that they either used as a ford or DIPed (Died in Place). Were the Blue force commander to use the point on the bluffs to decend into the valley he would have to further delay trying to find a place to ford the river. This takes time, and there is no degree of certitude he would find what he is looking for, which would mean more time spent and to no avail. Remember we know what was down there. He does not. That makes all the difference. That water could have been ankle deep and crossable just about anywhere. How does he know that before going down from the bluffs on the most direct route to Reno? He does not.
If memory serves there are few places to decend from those bluffs in the vacinity of 3411.
Information does no one any good unless they possess it.
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Post by benteen on Sept 13, 2012 13:29:56 GMT -6
OK heres the gem Mr Rossi and I have come up with for RD#3
1...Capt Benteen would not be involved in my decision. I have no idea what his situation is, or exactly where he is, or when he will arrive. I have already commited Major Renos Battalion, they are engaged and I cant assume that Capt Benteen will show up in the nick of time to support him. I am going to base my decision with the thought in mind that I only have my understrength Battalion and Renos.
2..... This is not a sleepy village on the Washita, this is a small city. What is my risk reward in going North to attack it. Can I capture this village, not a chance. Can I destroy it, again not a chance. At best I can harm some women and children and turn over a few tepees. That is only IF I can find a place to cross the river. What is my risk. Having my entire command in this huge village with a river at my back. I will lose many soldiers if not all of them.
3.. I have already made a grave error in sending over 1/3 of my regiment away from my point of contact with the enemy, I am not going to compound it by some ego driven attack. Reno was OK when I left him, but by now he could be in serious trouble. I am going to go to Reno and consolidate my 2 Battalions
Be Well Dan
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Post by wild on Sept 13, 2012 15:20:53 GMT -6
Jag I'm grateful for a mention in your dispatch.
Rosebud I have already made that point myself.The LBH was a tactical obstacle not a physical one.It's no more than 40 yards across at it's widest. The significance of this is that Ford D was probably not a fixed geographical feature and Custer [in Fred's scenario]was searching for an unopposed crossing point.
Montrose et al The strategic environment into which Custer led his command was one of "outflankment".No such word but you know what I mean. Custer was outflanked from the getgo even if there was not a hostile to be seen.And if Custer did not realise that when he viewed the valley from Weir/3114 or wherever he did not know his arse from his elbow tactically. His first probe Reno was outflanked.Custer himself was outflanked at Ford B.Each and everyone of his troops were outflanked and over run. Even soldier Benteen was outflanked and forced to beat a hasty retreat. Reno hill with it's flankless formation saved the remnants of the command. Fred can send Custer to "ford D" but he will meet the same fate there.Even my own suggestion of having Custer charge into the village would sooner or later have to deal with flank attacks. To return to Ford B.Custer's objective was to kill hostiles.And I was thinking why did he not bring on a major engagement at Ford B.All that was required was a demonstration and the Indians would come in force to oppose a crossing.And there was your firefight which Custer should win handsdown.But the position was untenable because the Indians would ford the river on either flank. By splitting the command Custer presented his flanks on a plate to the enemy. And as regards the LBH and it being a tactical obstacle;it wasn't for the Indians who could and did put hundreds of warriors across in a matter of minutes while Custer's boys would have formed a mile long queue taking god only knows how long to cross. Cheers
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Post by quincannon on Sept 13, 2012 16:11:07 GMT -6
Richard in the TACTICAL environment that you describe (For God sake I don't want to go into and involved explanation of tactical vs. strategic again so just take my word for it) where the flanks of the flanks have flanks and the flankers are as lost as I am now, I think you are wrong, or at least not completely correct about the river. The river itself was neither a physical or tactical obstacle. It was a combination of the river and the bluffs that was the tactical, physical, and psychological obstacle.
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Post by wild on Sept 13, 2012 16:26:27 GMT -6
Colonel I used the term strategic intentionally because unlike tactics it was a permanent condition. There was no formation or location or maneuver that Custer could perform that would not end in him being outflanked.
The river itself was neither a physical or tactical obstacle. The Indians could ford the river individually in their hundreds.The 7th had to keep formation.This gave the Indians a tactical advantage.
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Post by quincannon on Sept 13, 2012 17:07:13 GMT -6
No Richard it did not give them a tactical advantage, and it seems what I said was lost on you. Getting across the river does you no good unless you can either get up or down the bluffs. Getting up or down the bluff can only be accomplished in certain places, which are available theoretically to both. Tactics beyond the individual, is accomplished by tactical formations So getting a hundred indians over a river faster (and I am not stipulating that they could ) is not in and of itself a tactical advantage. Tactics here are the sum total of your ability to do. Getting is not doing.
If they get across the river faster than than the 7th Cavalry so what if they are picking their noses waiting to get up the bluff, or likewise waiting to be funneled into one of those draws that lead from the fords. You are trying to make a point, but for the life of me I don't see where it matters. Just because you theorize that a bazzilion indians got across the river an on to Custer faster than he could crap his pants does not mean that everyone buys into that theory. Try this on. What if everyone decided all at once to go buy popcorn and a Coke at a football game at the same time. Just because they all got to the refreshment stand at about the same time does not mean they all get their popcorn and Coke at the same time. Consider what two or three hundred people, or two or three thousand people each heading for the same place would be like.
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jag
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Post by jag on Sept 13, 2012 17:09:22 GMT -6
Richard in the TACTICAL environment that you describe (For God sake I don't want to go into and involved explanation of tactical vs. strategic again so just take my word for it) where the flanks of the flanks have flanks and the flankers are as lost as I am now, I think you are wrong, or at least not completely correct about the river. The river itself was neither a physical or tactical obstacle. It was a combination of the river and the bluffs that was the tactical, physical, and psychological obstacle.They wasn't to Reno.
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Post by quincannon on Sept 13, 2012 17:13:42 GMT -6
The hell they were not. He was running for his bloody life and just how many did he lose getting across that river? Do you think that is what he would have chosen to do? Do you think if there was any better option open to him he would not have taken it? Come on man. You know damned well what I meant. You also know damned well you are taking it out of context to make or score some perverted point. Grow up.
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Post by fred on Sept 13, 2012 18:29:59 GMT -6
Whew! This is getting more and more difficult, more and more frustrating. While I mentioned I was not going to debate my positions on this topic, I believe I also said I would attempt to correct misunderstandings and misquotings. It also appears old theories and old ideas are impossible to overcome. So... with a massive amount of frustration I submit the following... a) There was no need to assist, aid, or help Reno. He was doing fine and was not even a consideration. First of all, I never said "entire enemy strength." Never! Never used the words, never used the term. In addition, I know of no "evidence" existing of what GAC saw. Neither Kanipe-- who didn't see anything-- nor Martini-- who wasn't near the bluffs, and if he was, never said a word about the numbers George Custer saw... unless, of course, one is an acolyte of Martini's latter-year verbal perambulations-- say anything to support that claim of contradiction. The so-called "entire enemy strength" consisted of the following: Sergeant Culbertson could see one hundred to one hundred fifty Indians—sometimes more—riding back and forth in front of the dust cloud. Lieutenant DeRudio “could see the shadows of some Indians in that dust.” Indians were running around. When Reno halted, the Indians “seemed to be standing, waiting for the command to come up.” First Sergeant Ryan: the company moved through a prairie dog “town.” The Indians charged, about five hundred coming from the direction of their village. Lieutenant Hare saw the command stop near the timber, dismounting. When the skirmish line was set up, suddenly four to five hundred Indians moved out of a coulee in front of the command, firing as they came out. Lieutenant Wallace: when they neared the timber, the command halted and formed into a skirmish line. He could see a ravine a few hundred yards in front of an old loop in the river when they halted and Indians were coming out of this ravine. The Indians were thick in front of it, maybe two to three hundred Indians when they halted—“something over two hundred.” Dr. Porter: When the line was formed there may have been fifty Indians out front and now about seventy-five to a hundred fighting the troops. Captain Moylan felt as many as four hundred Indians were within five hundred yards of the command when Reno halted… maybe even as little as two hundred yards away. It seems the initial Indian force was not very great, maybe around fifty or so (Gerard, Doc Porter, Lieutenant Hare), but this grew as time went by: Culbertson, two hundred to two hundred fifty; Wallace, two to three hundred; Hare, four to five hundred rising from the coulee; Moylan, four hundred; Reno, five to six hundred; Ryan, five hundred; all fairly consistent, especially considering the circumstances and the locations of the witnesses. So as Varnum saw the Gray Horse Troop go by as the line was dismounting and beginning to deploy-- let's say some seven minutes from when Reno ordered the halt-- and DeRudio spotted Custer about eleven minutes later, we can say Custer saw almost precisely those numbers quoted above. That means Reno was 18 minutes into his fight in the valley and the lines were continuing to advance, still very few Indians mounted; still, Indians mainly pulling back, the skirmish lines nowhere near their farthest advance. Where in all of this do we see this inordinate fear? Where is there any hint of retreat or pullback? The lines are advancing... so where is all this trepidation? Where is all this "evidence" that says Custer now had to hurry downstream in order to bail out his major? I go on... I am confused. Where, Will, do I say you "do not understand battlefield awareness"? Really? Are you sure you have the right guy? Let me make this as clear as I am able: I have never stated "Custer needed to intervene in the battle as soon as possible." Never! And especially not for Reno's sake... as that comment intimates. No it wouldn't... unless you believe your own fictional interpretation of my ideas. And you are correct... he didn't... at least not with any intention of crossing. Here we agree. He didn't. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Sept 13, 2012 18:37:21 GMT -6
From 3411 there are many shorter routes Custer could have used to get to Reno. Why would he? Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Sept 13, 2012 18:47:38 GMT -6
Would it have taken 35 minutes to have arrived at Reno from where you had him observe in time to have aided him? Again... here is this assumption Reno needed help, further implying-- whether it is you, Jag, or Wild or Montrose or Rosebud... I don't know-- Custer saw Reno in trouble from atop 3,411. That whole thesis, the whole idea is bunk. If you guys want to believe it, fine. Be my guest. There is no need to go on... at least not for me. I will say this, however... I have seldom seen more unsupported theory, especially couched as apodictic truth; seldom seen more disdain for what participants had to say; seldom seen so much unrealistic and misunderstandings, than some of the stuff I have read here. And Jag, this doesn't necessarily apply to you... I just used your post to step on my soapbox. To me it is simply no longer worth discussing because almost the entire thread has been hijacked by fiction. Just silly, that's all. Best wishes, Fred.
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jag
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Post by jag on Sept 13, 2012 18:49:38 GMT -6
Jag I'm grateful for a mention in your dispatch. Cheers Wild it was my privilige. Anyone's fragile interpretation is usually dependent upon one mans statement or testimony, as has been and is continually verbally addressed and demonstrated here. It was Benteen who made the claim in a statement to the Court that he could cross that river anywhere. So as for it being a tactical impediment, it wasn't. And just as apparent neither were those bluffs. Your oppositions opinions, as strong as they impart their belief in them, is also dependent upon one position and only one for Custer to have been where they want him to be, it too is dependent upon one mans timid ears, as he might well have included in his eye sighting there the firm belief that he also heard the great man atop that mountain say, "L'audace, l'audace, toujours l'audace" as he then rode off in a different direction to prove the same in spite of alleged words to the contrary, this just minutes prior conveyed to Reno. They know as well as anyone else here that the fragile mechanical work that they rely upon to place the great man there is like the proverbial deck of cards stacked edgewise on an already tilted table, just waiting for someone to slightly bump it, and it all tumbles into oblivion. Just one error, one, is all it took to make John Gray's own similiar work what it is today. Get it wrong, timing, position or even wrong interpretation and that person who just walked by and gave a slight breeze to its collapse, whether intentional or not, can't be held responsible for something they might not have observed or have known. And irregardless of that breezy persons intent, whether observant to their hard effort and talent, or not, the result is still the same. What we all realize is that those deck of edgewise stacked cards aren't glued together and can't ever be, no matter how much someone cry's havoc. And even then, the nature of the card itself, like humanity, naturally resists the bonding agent that eventually let slips the surly bond as if it never existed, and unleashes again the hounds of mankinds natural, unabated curiosity and uncaged freedom of thought.
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Post by montrose on Sept 13, 2012 19:07:41 GMT -6
Fred,
My views on the valley fight is based on your own arguments.
I am staying away from minutes until you publish book 2.
But do you agree that the Reno Bn had to react to a flanking move to the west? That the original line facing north, had to swing around to face west?
Now I know you have opinions on exactly when the MAG companies moved. My point is they were responding to enemy actions. So walk the dog backwards, to determine how the enemy got there, and what indicators told the US commanders what was going on.
And the indicators of enemy response were visible, based on your own analysis of when and where GAC reached the bluffs.
He made assumptions that led him to discount enemy combat power and ability. Happy to discuss the 5 Ws on this.
Respectfully,
William
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Post by bc on Sept 13, 2012 23:06:59 GMT -6
Actually, I believe Custer left 3,411 thinking things were pretty good… otherwise I do not believe he would have continued north. At most, he would have crossed at Ford B with all five companies. Furthermore, I believe GAC was too good a soldier to have made such an egregious error, separating commands at such distances… unless he believed he had matters well enough in hand. FredCouldn't have said it better myself. That same reasoning is why I dismiss Boston Custer as the one who informs GAC of Reno's demise. You are 100% on target. That only leaves Bouyer to inform Custer LATER not sooner. Any movement to the north after he has knowledge that Reno has left the valley can only mean that Custer is going to end up turning the fleeing village to the south. Directly AWAY from Terry. This goes against every thing that Custer has said or done since he left the divide. One example and there are MANY more. "we will drive them to the Yellowstone if we have to" Rosebud Excellent point Justin. I never thought of that before. I've never been a big believer in the recon to ford D when you can see everything from LSH anyway. I've never thought they met much resistance down there either. That does make a better reason to pull back to Cemetery Ridge and LSH. We know Keogh wasn't under great pressure yet either because Custer pulled back from ford D and stopped for about 20 minutes according to Two Moon. That would also make sense to maintain a broad front all along Battle Ridge instead of consolidating in one place for a defense. Even assuming Custer knew/learned that Reno retreated, he still knew Benteen was coming up at a "Be Quick" pace and could reinforce Reno and still prevent the NAs from escaping to the south. That also fits with what I believe was a change of plan at or prior to ford B. Instead of a direct attack at ford B to cross and enter the camp he realized there was more to the north along with the NAs and it was best hold the ford to keep the hostiles from crossing while moving north to cut off the escaping noncoms and the Cheyenne end of the vill. Then learning that Reno crossed the river he pulled back from ford D to the ridge and waited maintaining a broad front in hopes of his skirmish lines causing the NAs to break off and move north. Unfortunately they didn't break off and instead quickly surrounded them flanking both ends. Then they charged and split up Keogh and defeated them all. It also doesn't rule out the original Bill Boyes theory that Co. E did cross at D and moved south aways before recrossing around Deep Ravine except instead of being forced back they were recalled. We still have a number of NA accounts about troops crossing the river and I'm not to sure it was ford B except for a lead element of skirmishers to scope things out and also cover the withdrawal of E & F back from the river. Fred, You have posted some things and I think I'm beginning to visualize the point of timber where the Reno fight was. Reno was generally following the course of the river and when the Garryowen loop turned west, then Reno turned west as well. The missing link is that the "point" of timber was really part of Otter Creek and more on the creek itself than the actual LBH river. Although most of the creek remnants have been obliterated by the railroad, interstate, and canal building, there is still enough of it going out in a southwesterly direction from the river towards the bluffs. Realizing now that the point of timber was really part of the creek coming into the LBH now makes all the accounts from Reno, Wallace, Varnum, DeRudio, Ryan and others start to mesh and accounts where M ended up where it did. Before when those accounts mentioned "creek" I assumed that was just what they were calling the river at the time but they actually meant Otter Creek which did meander a little to its actual mouth opening at the river. Will's Rock Drills have actually help sort things out. Thanks guys. bc
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Post by wild on Sept 14, 2012 0:14:13 GMT -6
Getting across the river does you no good unless you can either get up or down the bluffs There are no bluffs beyond Ford B.
No Richard it did not give them a tactical advantage, The 7th had to keep formation,had to remain organised,had to keep troop seperation,had to follow my leader.All this and facing opposition rendered the crossing a slow business. The Indians did not face such restrictions.Nor did they have to confront opposition on the opposite bank.They also had the advantage of local knowledge. So both in defence and attack the river favoured the Indians.
Try this on. What if everyone decided all at once to go buy popcorn and a Coke at a football game at the same time. Just because they all got to the refreshment stand at about the same time does not mean they all get their popcorn The purpose was to wreck the popcorn stand. Best Wishes
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