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Post by montrose on Feb 13, 2012 14:13:04 GMT -6
Sound is a flaky and unreliable medium in combat. There are cases in large battles of sunds being heard 100 miles away, and of supporting units in close proximity hearing nothing.
Wind, heat, humidity, terrain all impact how sound carries. So if you hear a shot todayat noon from Calhoun Hill, you may not hear it at sunset, or the next day.
Sidebar on signalling. Vollies are also not reliable as a signalling device. The Indians used rush tactics, where they would get motivated, and rush forward. The natural response for US forces to this is a rapid fire. From a distance, this would appear to be a volley.
Want to fail a patrol in Ranger or SF school? Start an ambush with your rifle. Too easy for an accidental discharge, or a bad guy, or one of your own shooting early.
This was known for the post ACW Army. During the CivilWar, cannon wereused as signals, under controlled circumstances. Far easier to distinguish.
It is my opinion that the volley fire heard was from the Luce/Nye/Cartwright ridge area. Fire was at long range. You do not want your soldiers blasting away at long range, wasting ammo. A controlled long range fire increases the effectiveness of the fire, and prevents soldiers firing out of control.
Having said that, I think 7th Cav fired far too much at ranges where the fire was wasted. They lacked proper training in individual and collective firing procedures.
For example, we know they were supposed to have 50 rounds on their person and 50 in the saddlebags. Yet when Thompson dismounts, he only had 17 rounds on his body. This is not just a failure on his part, but of the officers and NCOs of his company.
If Thompson and his peerswere on a firing line, they would run out of ammunition withing minutes, endangering the survival ofthe unit. Note that A and M companies had ammunition problems in the valley.
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Post by El Crab on Feb 13, 2012 14:17:42 GMT -6
I remember writing a post a while back now; about Benteen meeting Reno whilst he was on his way to join up with Custer, Britt has just jolted my memory when he said that Custer would expect not only Benteen but also Reno to get involved in the battle again. I don’t know if Benteen bumping into Reno was the stroke of luck that may have saved his command or it was a stroke of bad luck for Custer, in that it denied him the three Company’s (plus Reno’s troops if Custer had no idea of their fate in the valley) he needed to take on the next phase of his plan, I wonder what decision he would have made knowing that no re-enforcement was forthcoming and he would be on his own. Ian. It was clearly a bit of bad luck for Custer and his command. I doubt he expected 7/12s of his regiment to be out of the battle so early. If he had known, I'm sure he would've either stopped moving north, would've kept his battalion together, sent couriers south to get their asses in gear, etc. And I bet he would've been PISSED. Whichever officer said something like "we oughta do something, or Custer will be after us with a sharp stick" was probably right on the money.
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Post by stevewilk on Feb 13, 2012 15:03:23 GMT -6
Montrose, offhand I don't know if this 50/50 distribution of ammo was per Custer's orders. Looking at homemade thimble cartridge belts in McChristian's book, none of them hold fifty rounds. They range from 29 to 45 or so depending on whether extra loops for Colt ammo were added or space for a hunting knife or holster. Pvt Thompson I believe stated he had the regulation cartridge box (the McKeever) which held a mere twenty rounds. So if he had 17 rds he basically had a full box. To carry 50 would have would have meant bulging pockets and likely sagging trousers.
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Post by benteen on Feb 13, 2012 15:40:54 GMT -6
It was clearly a bit of bad luck for Custer and his command. I doubt he expected 7/12s of his regiment to be out of the battle so early. If he had known, I'm sure he would've either stopped moving north, would've kept his battalion together, sent couriers south to get their asses in gear, etc. . ElCrab, Just to give another view on this, I don't think it was bad luck, it was bad planning (or lack of any plan). As to his doubt that 7/12 of his regiment would be out of action so soon, why would he doubt it, he put them out of action. He sent Benteen valley hunting with Cos DHK and McDugals B co, plus app 80 men with the pack detail, that's another two companies, that's 6 companies almost 1/2 his regiment Reno was getting his lunch handed to him. He knew very well that the majority of his command was out of immediate action but he headed North anyway. Yes he sent a messenger, but he had no way of knowing if that messenger even got through to Benteen,remember Martinis horse was hit, it could just as easily been Martini and Custer's message would be floating in the LBH River. Be Well Dan
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Post by fred on Feb 13, 2012 18:34:57 GMT -6
Britt,
Sorry, but I do not buy your idea of Keogh being pushed, forced, or intimidated into going anywhere. I am certain-- at least as certain as one can be with anything involving this fiasco-- that Custer directed him north to Calhoun Hill, prior to Custer traveling down to Ford B.
There is simply no evidence of the presence of any large number of Indians east of the river, and we know from some of the commentary that Smith chased at least five warriors down MTC. In fact, the evidence we do have-- various accounts-- tells us just the opposite. Besides, leaving Keogh that far back would have made no sense and Custer's trail would have directed Benteen anywhere he needed to go. The shod tracks led right up to Luce and from that point Benteen could not have missed Keogh atop Calhoun Hill, a far better defensive position (not that that was anything of a consideration at that point).
In addition, leaving Keogh there would have made less sense than leaving him at Calhoun Hill. Custer had to have known he was running his forces thin and a crossing point was entirely too far away. Nye-Cartwright Ridge would have added another 1,500 yards separation, and across a wide-open field he would have to travel with more Indians entering the area every minute. Custer would know this.
It was also a tactically poor position. With Indians moving across Ford B, they could have evened the ground by moving up the bluffs near the ford. Then they could have boxed Keogh in by using the coulees (Deep and MT) on either side of him, and Wolf Tooth to his rear would have completed the surround. Too risky, even at that stage of the fight and an experienced group of officers would have realized it early on, just as Benteen realized Weir Peaks was not defensible.
By moving and uniting at Calhoun Hill, the troops held the highest ground in the area; they had a place for "protect" their horses; they could be easily seen by Benteen; they would not have far to travel to re-link with Custer; they had far better fields of fire; and they could see much better in all directions. Those intermediate ridges, i. e., Luce and Nye, were blind on the coulee sides, and too approachable front and rear.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by bc on Feb 13, 2012 21:33:50 GMT -6
Montrose, offhand I don't know if this 50/50 distribution of ammo was per Custer's orders. Looking at homemade thimble cartridge belts in McChristian's book, none of them hold fifty rounds. They range from 29 to 45 or so depending on whether extra loops for Colt ammo were added or space for a hunting knife or holster. Pvt Thompson I believe stated he had the regulation cartridge box (the McKeever) which held a mere twenty rounds. So if he had 17 rds he basically had a full box. To carry 50 would have would have meant bulging pockets and likely sagging trousers. You might be on to something here Steve. Definitely something to look at further. Standard assumption is that they carried 50 rifle rounds on horse, 50 rifle rounds on person, and 24 pistol rounds on person. What else were they carrying on their person or horse to carry ammo? I believe the typical ammo pouch on the horse held 50 rounds in their boxes. Fred, you are probably right. I've just been experimenting with the Butler/Luce/NC ridges as a better defensive position since it is perpendicular to the camp and they can control the approaches up MTC and Deep Ravine with fire from that position. Downside is protecting the rear but that is a long ways to go for NAs to get in behind it. Any NAs in MTC could be put in a cross fire from troops up on the Weir point bluffs which is a plus. bc
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Post by El Crab on Feb 14, 2012 0:37:12 GMT -6
It was clearly a bit of bad luck for Custer and his command. I doubt he expected 7/12s of his regiment to be out of the battle so early. If he had known, I'm sure he would've either stopped moving north, would've kept his battalion together, sent couriers south to get their asses in gear, etc. . ElCrab, Just to give another view on this, I don't think it was bad luck, it was bad planning (or lack of any plan). As to his doubt that 7/12 of his regiment would be out of action so soon, why would he doubt it, he put them out of action. He sent Benteen valley hunting with Cos DHK and McDugals B co, plus app 80 men with the pack detail, that's another two companies, that's 6 companies almost 1/2 his regiment Reno was getting his lunch handed to him. He knew very well that the majority of his command was out of immediate action but he headed North anyway. Yes he sent a messenger, but he had no way of knowing if that messenger even got through to Benteen,remember Martinis horse was hit, it could just as easily been Martini and Custer's message would be floating in the LBH River. Be Well Dan I can appreciate this counter to my points. But what I am saying is if you told Custer that Benteen would run into Reno, and they wouldn't really do much of anything in terms of participation in the battle for at least an hour, I bet Custer would be angry. Custer's regiment had been engaged for what, an hour? Sure, Reno took losses but there was 3 companies without any casualties and virtually no Indians to be seen. There was firing to the north, all of the Indians that were seen headed in that direction, Trumpeter Martini was available to be asked as to where he last was with the Custer battalion. I find it laughable that no one knew where Custer was. True, no one knew his exact whereabouts, but he certainly wasn't south, east or west of their position. And there was a lot of reasonable evidence to conclude which direction the regiment should proceed to find Custer. I think it was McDougall who said, when he saw what was happening on the hill when his command arrived, it looked like more like a picnic than a command that had saw combat. Ultimately, you are correct. Custer made his bed. He sent Benteen to the south. He sent Reno to charge down the valley. But can you blame him for the combined force of Reno and Benteen, of which half saw action and while they had a few wounded men, they had no Indians to worry about except to the north. As a regimental commander in Custer's situation, would you expect the remaining portion of your regiment to sit out the fight for several hours, even with the losses Reno took? If anything, Reno was "lucky" that the vast majority of his casualties were dead, not wounded. And those who were short on ammunition got some from Benteen's command. Let's be honest: Custer was unlucky that Benteen ran into Reno. Because it seems Benteen then relinquished his battalion's command to Reno, while Reno decided looking for Hodgson's body and waiting for the pack train's ammunition mules to arrive was more important than reforming his own command and getting back into the fight. Again, his command had just been given some ammo from Benteen's men, so while they weren't fully resupplied, they weren't low either. Meanwhile, the battle that began JUST a little while ago was still going on, and Custer was likely assuming that the rest of his regiment was going to continue to fight. I find it hard to believe that any regimental commander would assume, if in Custer's position, that the rest of his regiment wouldn't find a way to get back into the battle. Is it not a fair assumption? The same goes for Custer assuming that Reno and Benteen would be successful in their missions. Ultimately, Custer is to blame because he is the commander and he made the choices and he made the decisions. And if he was more forthcoming with his plans, perhaps he would've had more success. If I recall correctly, an officer asked Moylan (who had previously served as adjutant under Custer) if he ever divulged his plans when issuing orders, and Moylan replied in the negative. So you do have some blame there, as it seems Reno and Benteen might not really know what to do next. But Weir seemed to know what to do next, and that was head in the direction of the firing. Or even just in the direction that the Indians had all headed.
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Post by fred on Feb 14, 2012 6:22:24 GMT -6
I've just been experimenting with the Butler/Luce/NC ridges as a better defensive position since it is perpendicular to the camp and they can control the approaches up MTC and Deep Ravine with fire from that position. You know, Britt, this is what I have always liked about you. You are always thinking, always figuring new ideas, always open-minded, always willing to discard. You must be one very fine attorney. The problem I have with those ridges is like I said. With Keogh back from the ford by about a mile, the warriors have an easy way to get up to the same level and there are even more ridges and gullies to hide behind than in the approaches to Calhoun Hill. Then you have to consider the ridges' width-- side to side, Deep Coulee to MTC-- and I don't know how steep some of those slopes are. The steepness benefits the Indians rather than the defenders, especially because of numbers and area to defend. Then in addition, there is that easy slope onto Luce and the length of the ridge to the east, also leveling the ground for the Indians. Another thing... Keogh's volleys were meant to be more declarative than anything else, unless they were directed at Wolf Tooth. It is like "montrose" (or was it Queenie?) said, you don't use volleys for signaling long-range firing is not very effective as anything other than a warning. We have absolutely no indication warriors were in MTC, at least that far west. I suspect those volleys were directed at a smaller group coming down West or Middle coulees, and probably Wolf Tooth, more to the east. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by quincannon on Feb 14, 2012 7:42:25 GMT -6
Fred: I think Luce/NC is a good defensive position also, but not for Keogh alone. For the very reasons you point to it would be very hard to hold with just three companies. Five or six though and I think it would offer certain advantages that CH and parts of Battle Ridge do not, and do not even with the same grouping of five or six companies. Of course it has some significant disadvantages also but what position does not.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Feb 14, 2012 11:31:28 GMT -6
Crab,
You're generous with your estimate of how many of Reno's men were unhurt, armed, able to be mounted at the time of Benteen's arrival. Of those still mounted, after charge and retreat and heave up the hill, how many of those horses they still had were remotely fit for anything approaching action in the time at issue? How long do horses take to recover from that?
These conclusions that half the command or more was available for combat strikes me as nonsense. Further, those physically able to play that role must protect, at the village window, those who cannot.
We hear of anywhere from four to eight men needed, and on foot, to carry one wounded in a blanket. How many of those were there on the heave north to Weir Pt? Seemed to be sufficient available for how many wounded again? Do we have a clue?
"Waiting for The Train" is not a rewrite of Godot. If the train was in any large measure lost, they were simply toast. In any event, the train was Benteen's responsibility, and it was past the time when Indians had to go past him to get to it, as he had seen the issue earlier. They now had to kill him to get to it.
Many of the accounts about firing 'up north', by which they clearly mean down river, mean firing from what they thought was the village itself or near it. If you stand on Reno Hill and look at Weir Point, you are looking almost directly northwest. Continue that line, you nearly hit the monument on LSH. In a way, Custer was nearly as west as north of them.
Accounts from the river and bluff face that hear Custer firing somehow don't hear the firing of Godfrey in the retreat, despite the near impossibility of them hearing the former and not hearing the latter.
From Reno Hill you have stunning views of both Weir Point and Sharpshooter Ridge and exactly nothing else in that direction, the one with the firing. Looking north means you are staring at a point to the right, east, of Sharpshooter, Gray's Separation Halt, bisects the middle of Luce Ridge, and to the east of all of Nye Cartwright and even the point from which Curley is said to have viewed the battle briefly on his way out. Sound, as we read and Montrose, AZ, and QC attest, is a weird thing on a battlefield.
We disagree that 'getting back into the battle' or 'heading for the sound of the guns' or 'Saving General Custer' was the sole point to Reno and Benteen's existence. I would contend that their duty was to the preservation of those under their command and keep their force in being. It was not necessary for the point of the mission that a battle be fought, much less won, but to keep the nomads nomadic, after all.
And Custer could take care of himself.
This blanket assertion that everything Custer did after crossing MTC was on the offensive and a pro-active decision I find weak, contradictory to the accounts of the Army on the field, and reflective of a command trained and led and thinking quite different from the one we read existed. I don't believe a military man with cavalry, having seen the ground from Weir Point or thereabouts, would willingly choose to go there across the dangerous ground and risk being caught and needing to fight there.
And I don't think Custer or whoever did.
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Post by wild on Feb 15, 2012 3:13:34 GMT -6
"Waiting for The Train" is not a rewrite of Godot. If the train was in any large measure lost, they were simply toast. In any event, the train was Benteen's responsibility, and it was past the time when Indians had to go past him to get to it, as he had seen the issue earlier. They now had to kill him to get to it. The regiment from Custer on down to the rearmost mule was configured for nothing more than a chase of Indians who would run at first sight of the soldiers and offer no defense or threat. The packs were just the rearward detachment of that shambles.It bore all the same faults of the van arrangement. The packs were defenceless while in motion and if caught moving in line astern would be mince meat. The packs should have been closed up in a defence position not unlike Reno Hill. The reserve ammo should have been distributed to the attacking units.That's just over 30 rounds extra per man..no handicap. And as for Benteen being a blocking force preventing the Indians getting to the packs this ranks along side the Indians will run. No unit prevented the Indians doing precisely what they wanted to do that day.Custer and his 5 troops could not save themselves what chance Benteen and the "blocking" force?
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Post by bc on Feb 15, 2012 9:42:08 GMT -6
"Waiting for The Train" is not a rewrite of Godot. If the train was in any large measure lost, they were simply toast. In any event, the train was Benteen's responsibility, and it was past the time when Indians had to go past him to get to it, as he had seen the issue earlier. They now had to kill him to get to it.The regiment from Custer on down to the rearmost mule was configured for nothing more than a chase of Indians who would run at first sight of the soldiers and offer no defense or threat. The packs were just the rearward detachment of that shambles.It bore all the same faults of the van arrangement. The packs were defenceless while in motion and if caught moving in line astern would be mince meat. The packs should have been closed up in a defence position not unlike Reno Hill. The reserve ammo should have been distributed to the attacking units.That's just over 30 rounds extra per man..no handicap. And as for Benteen being a blocking force preventing the Indians getting to the packs this ranks along side the Indians will run. No unit prevented the Indians doing precisely what they wanted to do that day.Custer and his 5 troops could not save themselves what chance Benteen and the "blocking" force? Yep, the NAs were very efficient at raiding horses and mules. They have been doing that with success for years and years. A strung out pack train protected by 1 or 4 companies will not stop determined NAs from getting their animals. Even if the pack train was corralled, it would require an effort and position like Reno Hill to contain them. I don't know but suspect that Reno had all his mules hobbled as much as possible. bc
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Post by wild on Feb 15, 2012 10:19:22 GMT -6
What did Custer want with mules on a battle field? I know this is much discussed but I cannot think of one good reason for having, how many mules 50? hampering his movements. They would have been the equivalant of a loose cannon. Two messengers sent back with messages for the mules to be brought forward and not only that but the messengers were sent by different officers supposedly? A good command decision here would have been to have jettisoned the bloody mules.
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Post by brenda56 on Feb 15, 2012 10:32:29 GMT -6
I’ve been reading and no matter how I look at it there’s something about that which I’ve pasted above, from my post, which I find difficult to dismiss.
Well my times may be slightly out but they indicate a time window which seems to work. Whilst the above does not suggest that Custer was correct in every decision he made it does appear he was acting in a structured manner. When I suggested he lit the fuse I meant he was taking action by manoeuvring Keogh to position and Yates towards the village without Benteen on site, yet. He was sending out an invitation to fight with one arm tied behind his back. That may be considered unusual but indicates supreme confidence, supreme ability in battlefield timing and no doubt arrogance by the shedload as well. This particular period of constructive action, all by Custer, sealed his fate. (You might say he pulled the trigger in or around Cedar Coulee and the bullet entered his temple at Last Stand Hill).
However as much as I would like to visit the battlefield that is unlikely. So bearing in mind Custer was running short of time whilst in the heights (Benteen will be here soon) he had to choose a location for a fight. He placed his men on Calhoun Hill. Benteen would be arriving from a southerly(ish) direction. Is that area which Custer (maybe Keogh) chose one which can be justifiable in it’s choice for a fight ? May not be perfect but the best available in the timeframe ?
As an aside I spend most of my time walking through the D Day battlefields in Normandy. I learned the lesson that onsite observation is important after a visit to Pointe du Hoc and the Merville gun emplacements. Both of those sites reveal stunning acts of valour.
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Post by bc on Feb 15, 2012 10:42:26 GMT -6
What did Custer want with mules on a battle field? I know this is much discussed but I cannot think of one good reason for having, how many mules 50? hampering his movements. They would have been the equivalant of a loose cannon. Two messengers sent back with messages for the mules to be brought forward and not only that but the messengers were sent by different officers supposedly? A good command decision here would have been to have jettisoned the bloody mules. Still gots to have ammo. And some officers kept their whiskey casks on the mules. Plenty of reasons to have the pack train close to the battlefield. bc
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