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Post by brenda56 on Feb 7, 2012 10:06:05 GMT -6
I’m new to this so…….
Just when I think I manage to have an idea as to what happened I then read something else and, apart from getting confused, I find myself with a memory block. But nevertheless I proceed.
However there are a couple of factors which I believe to be significant, to me anyway.
Did Bouyer inform Custer that the Reno attack was in jeopardy ?
Did Custer know that Benteen was on location, namely the Reno site ?
And Captain Weir. Why did he suggest to Custer’s wife that there were a few dark facts that never came to light ?
There at least seems a possibility that Bouyer was aware that the Reno attack had failed. Maybe he saw Reno and his command making for the bluffs. It is known that Bouyer joined Custer in or near to Cedar Coulee. He would have informed Custer that things were not exactly going to plan. Thereagain Custer could easily have replied that was exactly his expectation. The Indian Braves had been drawn from the village thereby allowing the hammer and anvil approach to continue.
Nevertheless the seeds of doubt may have been sown. Custer at this stage knew the village was big, the Indians were going to fight, his forces were split and he needed Benteen. That’s a lot of stuff to learn in a relatively short time. He must have known early on this was not going to be another Waschita.
Now it may have been his original plan to attack in force across the MTC ford in support of Reno. He was known to be direct. The distance he had to cover as he left the bluffs, after watching Reno, looks well chosen in order to coincide with his arrival at a vacant warrior village. But that didn’t happen.
I have always assumed that he had complete dictatorial control of his units however at this time his officers with him were his closest, family even. It is likely they offered advice or at least a view. In other words it is possible that Custer compromised his original battle plan.
So by this early stage his tactics, albeit sound, are becoming complex.
At this stage I believe the split in his forces had not occurred. In or around Cedar Coulee his battalion made for the high ground. They needed more information. Where was Benteen ? That may have been a request from his Officers prior to entering the dragon’s lair. Reno cannot be completely relied on and if we’re going to go down there we need positive backup. Things are getting to be a bit murky with the simple plan that may not have had much room for compromise.
Nevertheless part of his forces eventually approach the MTC ford with the remainder on high ground. At this stage Custer may have known Benteen was near or indeed it has been suggested that he could have seen his approach to the Reno site. This would suggest the game is still on. But only part of his force is sent down to MTC ford.
Was this a reconnaissance ? Maybe. If you get across we’ll join you.
Was this an attack ? Maybe.
Was this an attempt to draw the Braves away from Reno and now Benteen clearing a path for their approach and support. (Be quick - bring packs and so on). Maybe.
Was this a new hammer and anvil tactic on the east side of the river ? Maybe.
It could be argued that the MTC approach was multi function if not by intention certainly by its action. It may have been that the situation was now dependant on variables outwith Custer’s control and his actions were creating a multiple number of possible actions dependant on various outcomes of his orders.
So things are getting really complex now.
The MTC event ends. The battalion ends up on Calhoun Hill. Indian Braves are arriving. No doubt by now they know the original plan is no longer ‘satisfactory’.
So is Custer in attack or defensive mode at this stage ? Well it could be both. The defence of the Calhoun end of Battle ridge may have been his stake in the sand. They may have known or assumed that Benteen and the Reno remnants will be here soon. The Indians infiltrating through Deep Coulee could be caught in a trap from the north and south. Even the surprise of Benteen’s arrival could be that which discourages the Indians.
Nevertheless Custer heads north. Looking for another ford would suggest he still intended to capture the women and children. Again there seems to be two objectives, complex indeed or an indication of desperation.
There does not appear to be any attempt to be completely defensive. Neither is there direct aggressive action. The situation appears to be consequential.
His requests outwith his unit fruitless.
It could be said the battle was lost before it started.
And the only conclusion I can draw is ‘Keep your friends close but your enemies closer’.
Now Weir is said to have died from melancholia. That’s a nice way to put it and probably very apt. Here’s a man who wanted to ride towards the bugle calls at an early stage. He even disobeyed an order and set off to support Custer. Now that is the action of someone who knows his own mind. Yet there is no positive documented detail of his observations on the day of battle. I would have expected some sort of public statement within days from someone who could disobey an order. An action such as that would at least be required as a positive step in self defence when a court martial was a possibility.
But all I can see we are left with is a veiled letter to Custer’s wife stating something like - ‘if we were in a room at night and the curtains drawn there would be some truths………’.
Something like that !
I can only assume that by defending Custer his observations would have had a significant personal outcome for those acting in a questionable fashion during the day of battle. Sounds as if Weir was very powerfully silenced by one means or another.
Maybe Weir knew too much, he probably did.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Feb 7, 2012 10:30:42 GMT -6
In response:
1. Weir was a drunk, had been for a while, was close to the Custers, and may have felt guilty. Don't assume he rushed forth to save Custer early on; he just didn't want to not be involved in a victory and its honors.
2. Reno's attack had not 'failed' unless you or anyone seriously believes that amount of men could move that amount of Indians. He followed the book and absorbed enemy attention for the promised support. In any case the hammer wasn't big enough and the anvil wasn't either, but it never got into place or showed much ability to do so.
Custer could not see anything north of Weir Point till he surmounted Sharpshooter or Weir Point, so he had no information upon which to guesstimate arrival at a ford. He also had no clue if there were Indians on the east bank.
Officers are dictatorial, it's their job. It's hard to say his tactics were sound having sent 3 companies to attack without any idea of the village exact location, its size, its intentions.
He split his forces into four elements at the divide. Willingly splitting his paltry five companies later in the face of the enemy at their window is what puzzles. I, among others, don't think he or the 7th had any choice in the matter, and that once in contact the Indians drove him.
There was no particular reason to think Reno could not be relied upon. In fact, he did exactly what he was ordered to do.
The battle was lost when Custer divided the regiment. His portion was doomed when he crossed MTC.
Weir died of drink/pneumonia/tb. He was a nonentity at the battle for all his initial bravado and kind of weird previous. Whatever Weir saw, many others would have seen it as well.
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Post by fred on Feb 7, 2012 18:59:23 GMT -6
Did Bouyer inform Custer that the Reno attack was in jeopardy? No. Boyer never saw Reno in trouble. By the "Reno site," I assume you mean Reno Hill. No... would be your answer. See Dark Cloud's post. Not a chance. Those who say differently are guessing and regardless of their academic and/or literary credentials, can offer you not a single shred of proof otherwise. Not one. This is precisely why so much of this thing is shrouded in mystery. Too many assumptions have turned into "fact" over the years. See above... and I reiterate: not a chance!An outstanding pick-up and one that probably only a detailed-minded woman would notice. Where you are wrong is that it is not "known" this is where Boyer joined the command. That is why there is a bluff next to Ford B known as "Boyer's Bluff." That is why a great majority of writers assume Boyer joined Custer in MTC. They choose to believe this because it fits and "proves" their theories. If anyone informed George Custer of Reno's plight, it was brother Boston. There are some-- on these boards-- who doubt that and they have good arguments. It is my opinion, however, that Boston did inform George. Sentence one... no. Sentence two... that was the objective, but personally I doubt Custer ever intended anything even approaching a "hammer and anvil" operation. No. Too many assumptions; too contrived. No, it is not! Custer had no "battle plan." He winged it all the way through, though I believe he had a general idea of what he wanted to accomplish and how he wanted to do it. Custer's idea was flexible; he just stretched it way too far... and it snapped. Hardly. The final split came on Calhoun Hill; but by then-- as Dark Cloud said-- it was too late. His "battalion" headed for the low ground; Custer headed for the high ground, viz., "3,411"; not Weir Point; not Sharpshooters' Ridge. Not yet he didn't. Well... he did... but it was not any sort of emergency at this point. He was coming and Custer would soon learn of that. Why? At this stage of the event, Reno was doing exactly what he should have been doing, and doing it admirably. You are reading too many jerks who have not done their homework. "At this stage" Custer knew-- he had been told by Boston-- Benteen was on the main trail, on his way. Whoever made this suggestion was fantasizing. Yes. No... yes (above)!Not a chance. Since you are new here, let me make this point early on: no commander worth his weight in salt makes an attack across a (semi-) guarded stream with almost 60% of his force a mile to the rear. Period! Case closed! Anyone who tells you Custer went to Ford B to attack across the LBH River is... [from the Chinese menu, your choice my dear]... Column A: an idiot; or Column B: delusional. No. Custer left his altruism in Monroe. Stop with the hammer and anvil; that was never a consideration. No it cannot. At least not if you know what you are talking about. No. Things never got complex; things always remained simple. He was fighting a simple foe, a foe that dogged him and ran him down 'til he was dead. His plan was simple and everything got messed up because of two reasons: (1) too many Indians; (2) a complete misunderstanding of the Indians' intentions. Sounds like you are scripting this thing for a play! The "original plan," i. e., supporting Reno by way of a follow-up behind him in the valley, went by the boards a long time earlier. The "new" plan was to get below the fleeing Indians. The soiree atop Calhoun Hill was still part of Plan B. No, it can't. Custer was still on the offensive. Why else would a rational, experienced, trained commander further split his force? The only logical explanation is that he was confident in his plan and his success. It is my opinion-- less the Reno part of it-- that you are correct here. Incidental. I tend to doubt Custer was much interested in "discouragement." ... or slaughter them! Here is the altruism again. I doubt George Custer was too interested in capturing anyone. He would brook surrender, but only after he crushed all resistance. "Crushed" being the operative word here. Are you a psychologist? Another good pick-up. There wasn't... at least not until it was too late. He was never afforded the chance. There you go, falling back on old bromides. Booze, my dear; booze. And a few minutes later his feet chilled. An unsupportable assumption, again, fostered by those who prefer to fit facts into theory rather than the other way around. Correct, but we can work out reasonably reliable assumptions. In court, one would call it "circumstantial evidence." And there wasn't, was there? Therefore... what? A logical conclusion seems apparent, doesn't it? This is only valid if one seeks to shift the blame for an ignominious defeat off the shoulders of the responsible party. Then you need someone else to blame. It is this exercise that distorts facts and makes erroneous assumptions. And what, praytell, do you have in mind here? Yep. That Custer bungled the biggest battle of his career. Best wishes, Fred. |
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Post by quincannon on Feb 7, 2012 20:32:07 GMT -6
Brenda: Welcome to the NFL. You have just been raked and broadsided by two of the best in the business. One is a superb tactician, the other has the mind of a first class scholar and the bite of a rattlesnake. Listen to them and you will be well served in most instances.
You have already had your lunch eaten about this fantasy of a hammer and anvil, so I will just ask you questions:
Would you Brenda knowing that a major campaign is in the offing for the Spring, spend your Winter entertaining and being entertained, or would you spend it training your troops?
Assuming you have been to LBH or at least have a decent map of the place, would you Brenda, place two major terrain features between yourself and your supported/supporting elements with no reliable means of communication and/or coordination and think you could form a workable plan?
Looking only at what we know of Custer's actions what makes you think he had any kind of plan in mind? If you can discern such a plan by delving deep into this muck, was it in your opinion rational? Did it have a reasonable chance of success? Was it communicated to his subordinates in such detail that they would have absolutely no problem in doing their part in its execution? Was it communicated in such a manner to assure continuity should Custer become an early casualty?
If you do not have answers to my questions, or if the answers are no, then the only thing you may assume is that Custer had no plan, nor did he have the troops trained to execute it. Little Big Horn was a failure to exercise command responsibilty from start to finish. The commander is responsible, completely responsible for failure, and for the loss of life caused by that failure. He and he alone. Not Benteen, not Reno, not Joe Snuffy in the rear rank. The commander - George Custer.
Fred: What was the name of that booze Melan -what
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Post by bc on Feb 8, 2012 9:07:26 GMT -6
Hello Brenda. Welcome to the group conflab.
To discuss Custer's plan, we have to back up to the expectations when they left the Jellystone and what was said at the officer's call which most have been quiet about. What do you think their expectations were and what was planned at the officer's call halt?
And the password is: ojay.
bc
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Post by Margaret on Feb 8, 2012 14:56:46 GMT -6
There at least seems a possibility that Bouyer was aware that the Reno attack had failed
...What surprises me here is that anyone could think that Boyer was not aware that Reno's attack had already failed or was about to, whether he had seen it with his own eyes or not. Did he need to see it? Are we to believe a man of his experience needed to stand on a hill and watch Reno capitulate against the Sioux before he could believe it himself? That's 1876 soldier talk.
He strikes me as a quiet and unassuming man, not one to project himself forcefully onto others. Already having suffered militarist condescension from Custer at the Crow's Nest, he was still prepared to commit suicide with the command when he could have saved himself before it was too late.
He must have had a strong sense of moral duty to Custer and the troops with him, besides I think wanting to get a few Sioux himself before he went down, I suspect on behalf of the tribe that adopted him.
He should have escaped - he had a wife and child to think of and should have put them first - he did not need to be there. I would like to think though that he gave Custer a piece of his mind [there is some evidence to suggest he did], at this late juncture, whilst I think not being predisposed to talk in such a way, was probably a difficult thing for him to do.
I sincerely hope so, he's one of the few amongst the cavalry I have any time for.
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Post by fred on Feb 8, 2012 15:58:48 GMT -6
...What surprises me here is that anyone could think that Boyer was not aware that Reno's attack had already failed or was about to, whether he had seen it with his own eyes or not. Well, if you want to go that route, you can say the same thing for the entire enterprise... and I think, to a degree, Boyer had already done so. That of course-- to a George Custer-- would be crystal ball gazing and therefore irrelevant. The point here is, Boyer did not actually see Reno retreat or his operation collapse. My opinion, of course. I do, however, support that opinion with rather substantial back-up, though-- along with virtually everything else here-- circumstantially, as opposed to hard and fast, empirical evidence. I find circumstances and the vast preponderance of accounts on my side and when you work out the timing and place everything within a flowing context, it fits rather nicely, and not as just some vignette designed by preconception. I agree with your opinion and description of Boyer. In fact, you have said it very well. Best wishes, Fred. |
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Post by quincannon on Feb 8, 2012 18:02:44 GMT -6
Helford: I sure would like to know what militarist condesention is, and how it may differ from plain old garden variety civilian condesention?
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Post by brenda56 on Feb 9, 2012 4:24:53 GMT -6
I think it's a bit like rain, something like that.
Now on the booze subject I'm a bit open minded. There is a point when things become blurred, grey I mean, but that's another subject.
Part of my family is Scots. So what ? Well I read an article on how my heroic Grandfather charged across the fields of LOOS and was one of the first in to the Hohenzollern Redoubt. Firing his revolver he took no prisoners. He organised and led his company attack on the second objective. Here he was wounded, legs amputated but later died of gangrene.
He was the author of the article. Quite a decent bloke by all who knew him. And he admitted too that a mug of rum consumed by each minutes before the attack was common. So he hic'd and tripped his way to battle. I suspect many did. If Weir was a drunk, or even Reno too, so what. But that's just a personal opinion. It's what they do on the day that is important.
Now back to this hammer and anvill stuff. The bottomline is Custer had a plan. Even if there was no plan it was his plan. Kanipe said that he thought Custer did not cross the river with Reno as he saw about fifty to a hundred Indians to the north on the bluffs. Suggestion being it was purely a reaction to the situation. There they go boys, after them.........something like that.
That sounds quite naive but it is possible, maybe even likely regarding Custer's condescending nature. Now Custer has a bit of explaining to do as they sight the village as a consequence of their pursuit. What we doin' up here boss ? Ummm, 'hammer and anvil boys' !
My suggestion in my original post was that Custer's actions were consequential to various events. He was not in control. By referring to a developing complex situation it was becoming impossible to manage, by anyone. There may have been desperation and indeed panic. Personally speaking had I come face to face with an Indian wearing one of those buffalo type horned head dress thingys I would have passed out there and then.
He had only one way out in his mind. Maybe when command and control has been lost it becomes easy to hand over responsibility to another in whatever shape that may be. And in Custer's case that was Benteen.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Feb 9, 2012 4:46:36 GMT -6
Hi Brenda and welcome. Just a few points over your very interesting posts, if Custer was waiting for Benteen, why did he split up his command, the only two theories I can think off is, send Yates and the HQ to find a better defensive ground to (maybe close to water) hunker down and wait for reinforcements or to use Keogh and his three Company’s as a jump off point for Benteen to join up with Custer and attack the village form the north.
Your Grandfather must have been a brave man, WW1 was a nightmare and my hat goes off to all who participated.
Ian.
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Post by fred on Feb 9, 2012 6:39:27 GMT -6
... on the booze subject I'm a bit open minded. There is a point when things become blurred, grey I mean, but that's another subject. Brenda, This is not meant to be condescending so please do not take it that way, but I enjoy your guts, your spunk. I am fascinated by women who enjoy this bunkum as much as us "guys"; it gives me hope because I think you bring a clarity and honesty lacking in so many men. Now, for your daily "whipping"... I would agree here, with the caveat that he was developing it on the fly, as he went, and it would change with circumstances. Daniel Kanipe was a gasbag who thought too much of himself and who liked to believe he played a more prominent role than he really did. There is not a single shred of evidence-- anywhere, from anyone-- that supports Kanipe's contention about 50-100 Indians on the hilltops. None... zip, nada! No other soldier or scout ever reported such a thing (Martini alluded to it, but never saw them himself, thereby hearsay) and no Indian account ever mentioned it. Furthermore, yank this out of the vignette stage and dump it into the full context of the event: if there were Indians on the hilltops, where did they go? It certainly was not the Wolf Tooth/Big Foot band... they were still too far east and north... so what happened to these guys? This is sort of like the utter stupidity of a satellite village along Reno Creek... fine... but where did it go? Why are there no Indian accounts of it? Why did no Indians ever speak of a satellite rushing into camp as the attack began? See what I mean? Custer's original plan was to follow-up behind Reno. Everyone "assumed" that was the idea, and they assumed that because that was what was generally done, had been done, was generally meant. And the lack of any further detail was a titular confirmation. Custer changed this plan and moved-- fatefully-- to the right and up the bluffs because of Fred Gerard's report that the Indians were no longer running and were coming out to meet Reno's advance. That meant only one thing: a protective screen to allow the non-combatants to run, escape, scatter. That would ruin the entire objective of the campaign, already 40 days old. So there was no anticipation-- ever-- of any hammer and anvil business. Yes, he was. At least in his own mind. Plus, no control had been relinquished, as yet, anywhere. Custer was in full control of his actions up to the moment he turned south from Ford D. That does not mean he hadn't already sacrificed the Keogh battalion. As Dark Cloud said earlier, once across MTC the game was lost. This is true because he has now fallen away from any mutual support, plus the separation distance was so great the void was filling with Indians permanently separating Custer's forces. You have to be more clear here. From what point forward... from "when" to "when"? There was. Tell me, however, when you believe this began. Again... when? And how? How does Custer turn over anything to Benteen? "Command and control" in 1876 was a whole different issue than it is today, or even in the 1960s and early 1970s when I was in the service. Radios-- and today, cell phones-- have changed everything. Messengers, notes, hand signaling were the only methods available to George Custer. That is why the "separation" issue was so important. Where today we control with a "steel cable," back then it was a "woolen string." Phil Sheridan was adamant about it; there was little or no coordination between commands, and so Custer violated an elementary syllogism in military procedures of the times when he allowed so much space to intervene. He was OK until he moved down Cedar Coulee and entered MTC. His decision to mount Luce Ridge, then proceed farther north doomed him. Benteen had nothing to do with it. Best wishes, Fred. |
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Post by bc on Feb 9, 2012 10:52:31 GMT -6
Nevertheless part of his forces eventually approach the MTC ford with the remainder on high ground. At this stage Custer may have known Benteen was near or indeed it has been suggested that he could have seen his approach to the Reno site. This would suggest the game is still on. But only part of his force is sent down to MTC ford. Was this a reconnaissance ? Maybe. If you get across we’ll join you. Was this an attack ? Maybe. Was this an attempt to draw the Braves away from Reno and now Benteen clearing a path for their approach and support. (Be quick - bring packs and so on). Maybe. Was this a new hammer and anvil tactic on the east side of the river ? Maybe. It could be argued that the MTC approach was multi function if not by intention certainly by its action. It may have been that the situation was now dependant on variables outwith Custer’s control and his actions were creating a multiple number of possible actions dependant on various outcomes of his orders. So things are getting really complex now. The MTC event ends. The battalion ends up on Calhoun Hill. Indian Braves are arriving. No doubt by now they know the original plan is no longer ‘satisfactory’. Hi Brenda. Hope things are well across the pond. Over here we are having a mild winter. I see the the battle of the Loos was the first battle where the British used poison chlorine gas after the Germans had used it earlier in the war. Apparently your grandfather wasn't in a place where the gas blew back into British lines killing some of their own. Sounds like he was a brave guy. I concur that Custer had a plan and that it changed perhaps more than a couple times. I'm curious as to how you think Custer divided his forces at MTC and what his plan was at that time? I'm also curious as to how you think Custer's forces arrived at Calhoun Hill? bc |
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Post by Margaret on Feb 9, 2012 15:48:06 GMT -6
Helford: I sure would like to know what militarist condesention is, and how it may differ from plain old garden variety civilian condesention? Boyer dared to offer opinions or advice that were condescendingly dismissed by the military leader. It seems Mitch was only required as an interpreter or route advisor, and nothing more. After all, Custer and the others knew more about Indians and their mode of warfare than Mitch did, or so they thought. His life experiences do not appear to have been appreciated greatly - so perhaps he should have left them to it. |
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Post by Margaret on Feb 9, 2012 15:53:26 GMT -6
Part of my family is Scots. So what ? Well I read an article on how my heroic Grandfather charged across the fields of LOOS and was one of the first in to the Hohenzollern Redoubt. Firing his revolver he took no prisoners. He organised and led his company attack on the second objective. Here he was wounded, legs amputated but later died of gangrene. He was the author of the article. Quite a decent bloke by all who knew him. And he admitted too that a mug of rum consumed by each minutes before the attack was common. So he hic'd and tripped his way to battle. I suspect many did. If Weir was a drunk, or even Reno too, so what. But that's just a personal opinion. It's what they do on the day that is important. ... interesting and very personal although I'm sorry to read of your Grandfather's misfortunes. We only have a little information to go on here, but I think he should have been awarded a posthumous VC for that. Surely that is above common occurrence. ...I quite agree that drinking must have been widespread and I don't take seriously attempts to denigrate individuals because they enjoyed a tipple whilst going into battle in those times. I often wonder how many of the Indians in camp swigged a drop of whisky before mounting up....? ...Incidentally, my Grandfather also liked a drop, and was much inclined towards it later in life, unfortunately, and rarely spoke of his war exploits. He too was a WW1 veteran, one of the original BEF [an 'old contemptible'] that were virtually wiped out after 1st Battle of Ypres. He was in the Army for nearly 25 years, going back to the North West Frontier [Tirah Campaign] fighting Pashtuns. For all this, I have found that his war pension, as at 1948 amounted to 1 pound, 2 shillings and 6d [sixpence] per week. Perhaps if Western leaders had a greater regard for history they might have realised that the Pashtun's are not a people to be trifled with, no more than the Sioux were, yet the recent attitude seems much the same, barge in, take over and expect everyone to do their bidding. It'll never work. |
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Post by quincannon on Feb 9, 2012 16:16:36 GMT -6
Helford: I have no doubt what you say is true, but that was not the reason I posed the question. I wondered only if the word militarist further defined or was some special catagory of cendesation. Seeing as though you avoided answering my question let me answer it for you. It does not. You can be just as big a horse's ass in or out of uniform. If you wish to say that George Custer was a horse's ass, just say George Custer was a horse's ass, and not phrase it is such a manner that catagorizes all who wear a uniform as members of greater horse's-assdom.
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