How do you know this? How do you know Boyer's opinions or advice were "condescendingly" dismissed?...It seems that way to me, what little we have to go on:-
Boyer: ''Well General, if you don't find more Indians in that valley than you ever saw together, you can hang me''
Custer: ''It would do a damn sight of good to hang you, wouldn't it?'' [Varnum]
Bloody Knife: ''will find enough Indians to keep us fighting two or three days''
Custer [laughingly]: ''we can get through them in one day'' [Godfrey]
Custer to White Man Runs Him: ''This camp has not seen our army, none of these scouts have seen us''....''I say again, we have not been seen, That camp has not seen us, I am going ahead to carry out what I think'' [according to Red Star].
just a few examples of Custer's condescending attitude to his scouts in General, not just to Boyer.
Well, I guess if you live in a world riddled with feminine insecurities, you might consider those comments condescending. I do not view them that way really. More like a stern, confident commander exercising his prerogatives of opinion and command. Some of them may have even been said jocularly.
Naturally.
I guess if this were a guessing game, that opinion would hold some water.
Well, according to Godfrey it appears everyone in uniform more or less rejected Boyer's plaint. Or certainly Godfrey did. And again, if Boyer half believed his own protestations, he could very easily have found his way out.
Another psychologist, I see. Strategy is hardly the word to use here, however. At this stage of the event, they were more into the tactical aspects of an attack. And numbers,
per se, would hardly have dictated Custer's tactical intentions since he seemed to believe they were irrelevant. It is actually very simple: Boyer did what he was supposed to do; Custer simply chose to ignore the obvious-- at least to Boyer... and me-- and plan his moves according to what
he saw. I-- personally-- find that rejection stupid, but again, it was Custer's decision, not Boyer's.
Hardly. You may speculate; I do not. At least not without the attendant caveats. Unless Boyer kept his mouth shut, he had plenty of time to give GAC a tally between Cedar Coulee and Luce Ridge. Trust me... I have the data.
Sure... does this suffice?
1. CPT Frederick William Benteen—In the July 4, 1876 letter to his wife, Benteen wrote that there were 3,000 warriors there [Graham,
The Custer Myth, p. 300]. “Captain Benteen stated later that there were ‘picnic parties’ of Indians as large as a regiment standing around the river bottom looking on, and that fully 2,000 hostiles were idling about, waiting for a place from which to shoot. He declared… there was not a foot of unoccupied land anywhere and that there were Indians everywhere… the command was surrounded by from eight to nine thousand hostiles” [Stewart,
Custer’s Luck, p. 422].
2. COL William S. Brackett—12,000 – 15,000 Indians, with about 1/3 of them (4,000 – 5,000) warriors [Contributions to the Historical Society of Montana, IV, p. 263].
3. LT James H. Bradley (7th Infantry; Gibbon’s Chief – of – Scouts)—Bradley never gave a specific amount, but from the comments he made in his memoirs, it appears he felt there were at least 2,000 or more warriors. “… [T]here were Indians enough in the timber [to Bradley’s front when Terry halted the command in the LBH valley on the evening of 26 June] and on the hills before them, in chosen positions of great strength, to have cut them all to pieces and driven them back in ruinous disorder. From subsequent examination of the ground I am convinced that there were not less than a thousand of these ambushed savages, with plenty more to co-operate with them, and not only would they have easily defeated the cavalry, but they would have given our whole command a desperate fight had we advanced that evening another mile” [Bradley,
The March of the Montana Column, p. 161].
4. CPT Philo Clark (Second Cavalry)—On June 17, the day of the Rosebud fight with Crook, the Indians had about 1,200 standing lodges and 400 wickiups, about 3,500 warriors [Graham,
The Custer Myth, p. 116].
5. Lewis Crawford—2,000 to 2,500, but the country could not have sustained that number if they stayed together for very long.
6. Crazy Horse—1,800 lodges and 400 wickiups. At least 7,000 warriors, plus any number of transients and hangers-on [South Dakota Historical
Collections, vol. VI, p. 227].
7. LT Carlo DeRudio—3,000 to 4,000 warriors, but he admitted that at the time of the battle he would have guessed at a higher number [RCOI].
8. Fred Dustin—10,000 to 12,000 people, of whom 3,000 to 3,500 were warriors. No more than 2,500 warriors, however, participated in the battle [
The Custer Tragedy, p. 106].
9. Feather Earring—In response to the question from General Scott: “How many lodges were there?”
“A: There were very many; three or four young men in a lodge. We gave each man a willow stick in order to count them. I know we counted over 5,000, and they were not all there; many were over on Arrow Creek stealing horses from the Crows” [Graham,
The Custer Myth, p. 98].
10. LT Winfield Scott Edgerly—20,000 horses, 6 to 8 ponies per man = 2,500 to 3,300 warriors. On 18 Aug 1881, in a statement made at Fort Yates and carried in the Leavenworth Times, Edgerly said, based on knowing the size of and seeing Terry’s command coming up the valley—500 men—he estimated the size of the Indian force to be about 7,000 warriors. In a speech quoted in a New Hampshire newspaper around 1896 – 1897, Edgerly said the command had “proof positive” that there were no more than 600 Indians, but in his opinion there turned out to be “not less… than 3,000” [Clark,
Scalp Dance, p. 70].
11. Flat Iron—[the last surviving Cheyenne chief who took part in the battle] 14,000 Indians in the camp, of whom 8,000 were fighting men [Helena
Independent, October 15, 1915].
12. COL John Gibbon—1,200 – 2,500 warriors [Contributions to the Historical Society of Montana, IV, 1903, p. 285].
13. LT Edward Settle Godfrey—Godfrey’s estimate of the number of warriors was at least 3,000 to cover the ground he saw [Nichols,
RCOI, p. 494].
14. PVT Theodore W. Goldin—Estimated the warrior strength to be between 4,000 and 5,000 men [Graham,
The Custer Myth, p. 271].
15. George Bird Grinnell—at least 200 Cheyenne lodges. Two Moon claimed his band consisted of 50 lodges and it was only one of several Cheyenne bands at the battle [Thrall, “The Sioux War,” Kansas State Historical Collections, Vol. XVI, p. 573]. There were 6 Sioux villages, each as large or larger than the Cheyenne. The Cheyenne told Grinnell there would be as many as three to four fighting men per lodge. That would have meant between 4,500 to 6,000 warriors present [
The Fighting Cheyennes, pp. 343 – 344].
16. LT Luther Hare—counted where 40 tepees had stood and from that estimated there were about 1,500 lodges plus 400 wickiups. Based on that, a low estimate of the Indian fighting force would be around 4,000 [RCOI; Official Transcript, p. 389]. Estimated there were between 20,000 to 25,000 ponies.
17. George Herendeen—this was the largest camp he had ever seen, but he felt the Indians had moved the camp the morning the troops arrived (this is highly unlikely). Just after the battle, he estimated the village contained about 6,000 people, half of who were warriors (3,000) [Graham,
The Custer Myth, p. 260]. Later, at the RCOI, he told the court there were about 1,800 lodges and 3,500 fighting men [Official Transcript, p. 334;
Army & Navy Journal, July 15, 1876; RCOI]. In his 1911 interview with Walter Camp, Herendeen claimed there were 1,800 lodges and 3,500 warriors. Herendeen felt there were between 400 – 500 in the surrounding hills.
18. Orin Grant Libby—2,500 to 3,000 [
The Arikara Narrative, p.24].
19. Little Buck Elk (Hunkpapa) claimed there was so many Indians not all could participate in the fighting.
20. Dr. Thomas B. Marquis—Wooden Leg told Marquis that the Cheyenne circle was about 300 lodges—some 1,600 people—and that the Blackfeet was about the same. The Sans Arcs was larger; the Oglala and Minneconjou circles were larger than the Sans Arcs; the Hunkpapa circle about twice the size of the Cheyenne. Based on this, Marquis estimated a camp of some 12,000 people, which could easily have meant 3,000 or more warriors [Graham,
The Custer Myth, p. 106]. Most of the tepees were family lodges. Actually, the above is misleading. What Marquis wrote was, “At the Northern Cheyenne fair at Lame Deer in 1927, I estimated the encampment at about 1,100. Wooden Leg and some older men were asked to compare this camp with the one on the Little Big Horn… it was generally agreed that there must have been 1,600 or more Cheyennes in their camp when the Custer soldiers came” [Marquis,
Wooden Leg, p. 206, FN].
21. 1LT John F. McBlain (Ninth Cavalry)—“With Gibbon’s command was an odometer cart, and the instrument registered the camp as four and three-quarters miles long; now let anyone familiar with Indian ways of camping picture to himself the fighting strength of that camp. I never did and do not now believe that there was a soul less than 6,000 fighting men” [McBlain, “With Gibbon on the Sioux Campaign of 1876”].
22. “Major” James McLaughlin—the Hunkpapa circle did not contain over 400 lodges [
My Friend, the Indian, pp. 136 – 137]. McLaughlin was the U. S. Indian Agent at Devil’s Lake Agency, D. T., from 1870 – 1881. The title “Major” is courtesy and custom for Indian agents. From 1881 to 1892, McLaughlin made a great effort to determine the number of Indians at the LBH. Edward Godfrey wrote, “… about one-third of the whole Sioux nation, including the northern Cheyennes and Arapahoes, were present at the battle; he estimates the number present as between twelve and fifteen thousand; that one out of four is a low estimate in determining the number of warriors present; every male over fourteen years of age may be considered a warrior in a general fight… considering the extra hazards of the hunt and expected battle, fewer squaws would accompany the recruits from the agencies. The minimum strength of their fighting men may then be put down as between 2,500 and 3,000. Information was dispatched from General Sheridan that from one agency alone about 1,800 lodges had set out to join the hostile camp; but that information did not reach General Terry until several days after the battle” ["Custer’s Last Battle 1876," p. 14].
23. CPT Anson Mills (CO, M/3C, with Crook’s command)—Custer attacked a village of some 15,000 – 20,000 people, with 4,000 – 5,000 warriors. About half that number had been in the Rosebud fight against Crook [
My Story, p. 409].
24. CPT Myles Moylan—3,500 – 4,000 warriors. There was a separate and distinct camp of wickiups [RCOI; Official Transcript, p. 308]. Moylan put the number at 900 – 1,000 around the command [Stewart,
Custer’s Luck, pp. 422 – 423].
25. CPT J. S. Payne (5th Cavalry)—Payne felt—based on speaking to various sources—that there were about 2,500 warriors in the battle [Nichols,
RCOI, p.275].
26. CPT John Scroggs Poland (bvt LTC; Sixth Infantry; Post Commanding Officer at Standing Rock)—Some time after the battle he wrote that at the Standing Rock Agency there averaged about seven Indians per lodge and four per wickiup [Smalley,
Little Bighorn Mysteries, p. 6 – 4]. If there were 1,900 lodges, that would mean 13,300 Indians + 1,600 for the wickiups, or close to 15,000 total. He also said not all the Indians in the village were engaged at any one time [CPT J. S. Poland’s report; Graham,
The Custer Myth, p. 46].
27. MAJ Marcus A. Reno—“The lowest computation puts the Indian strength at about 2,500, and some think there were 5,000 warriors present” [Graham,
The Custer Myth, p. 229; quoting from Reno’s statement to the
New York Herald].
28. Nicholas Ruleau—(a fur trader who had lived at the Pine Ridge Agency since 1879 and who spoke the Sioux tongue and knew a number of Indians who fought at the Little Big Horn: [Hardorff,
Lakota Recollections, p. 38; in a 1906 interview with Judge Eli S. Ricker]
• Oglala: 350 warriors, led by Crazy Horse.
• Hunkpapa: 1,000 warriors, led by Sitting Bull.
• Minneconjou: 700 warriors, led by Buffalo Bull.
• Sans Arc: 300 warriors, led by Spotted Eagle.
• Brulé (also called Rosebud Sioux): 80 warriors, led by Flying Chaser.
• Santee: 40 warriors, led by Red Top.
• Yankton Sioux: 40 warriors.
• Cheyenne: 45 warriors, led by Little Coyote.
• Total Indians: about 6,000 in camp. Ruleau said about one-third of the total number were single men, accounting for the lower total as compared to the number of warriors.
• Total warriors: 2,555.
29. 1SG John Ryan (Company M, Seventh Cavalry)—In his book, Ryan claims there were usually five or six warriors to a lodge: “… the ordinary rate….” [Barnard,
Ten Years With Custer, p. 252] (seems a bit excessive). Ryan estimated the Indian strength at the Pompey’s Pillar fight during the Stanley Expedition of 1873 at 1,500 warriors [p. 270]. Ryan also makes the point that in 1873, “… Sitting Bull was not at that time joined by any very formidable force of agency Indians” [p. 271]. “… I have seen the Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas, Apaches and Comanches move together in the Indian Territory and in Kansas years before, while campaigning there under General Custer, and I should say there was double the amount move out from this camp” [p. 301].
30. GEN Hugh Scott—a year after the battle he attempted to count the rings and reached 1,500 without counting them all. From this, he estimated closer to 7,000 Indians were in the camp [
Some Memories of a Soldier, p. 49].
31. LTC Michael V. Sheridan— On 6 Jun 1876, Col. Michael V. Sheridan—LG Philip Sheridan’s brother—dispatched a message to Terry: “‘Courier from Red Cloud Agency reported… [on 5 Jun 1876] that Yellow Robe… says that 1,800 lodges were on the Rosebud and about to leave for Powder River… and says they will fight and have about 3,000 warriors.’” This now clearly indicated the military expected a large number of Indians, willing to fight. Terry received this message after the LBH fight [Willert,
Little Big Horn Diary, p. 97].
32. LG P. H. Sheridan—At least 2,000 Indians from the Missouri River agencies—men, women, and children—surrendered to Nelson Miles on 27 Oct 1876. This did not count either Sitting Bull’s band or Crazy Horse’s and it also did not include any of the Northern Cheyenne. It also did not include any of those taken in by Mackenzie. There were still more Indians out and being hunted down by Crook, Merritt, and Mackenzie [Sheridan’s report, dated 25 Nov 1876; Carroll, …
The Federal View, p. 78].
33. Vern Smalley—Estimates of 1,000 warriors attacking Reno is reasonable [
Little Bighorn Mysteries, p. 6 – 5]. “After the fact, we know there were roughly 3,500 warriors who would have slaughtered [Reno] just as they did Custer” [
More Little Bighorn Mysteries, p. 13 – 5].
34. Spotted Horn Bull—In an 1883 interview—with his wife, Pretty White Buffalo, telling most of the story—he said 5,000 would cover the warriors and chiefs [Graham,
The Custer Myth, p. 84].
35. Edgar I. Stewart wrote that if Vestal, Grinnell, and McLaughlin are in general agreement, the matter should be settled. They were [
Custer’s Luck, FN 15, pp. 311 – 312]. After the battle, Terry learned from General Sheridan that about 1,800 additional lodges had set out to join the hostiles. Stewart believed about 3,000 warriors were there and they were in a generally higher proportion than would be the case. Stewart felt there might have been “thousands” of Indians in the vicinity this day.
36. BG Alfred H. Terry—In his 27 June 1876 battle dispatch, said both Benteen and Reno estimated not less than 2,500 warriors, but other officers thought the number of Indians engaged was much more [O’Neil, …
Official Report… Terry, p. 15].
37. PVT Peter Thompson—2,800 warriors [“The Experience of a Private Soldier in the Custer Massacre,” p. 79].
38. LT Charles Varnum—the wickiups were very thick along the edge of the timber, along the stream, and at the south end of the village [RCOI]. LT Charles Varnum—Four thousand [Graham,
The Custer Myth, p. 343]. Varnum felt there were as many as 4,000 Indians, many of whom were never engaged. The men on the hill could see large masses of them a good ways off.
39. Stanley Vestal [aka, Walter Campbell]—quotes White Bull, saying there were about 2,500 warriors “fit to bear arms.” He put the number of lodges at over 2,000 with from one to three warriors per lodge, more than half of them seasoned warriors. Vestal also said, “the top estimate of the effective manpower of the Western Sioux when all together” was 3,000 [
Sitting Bull, p. 157, also p. 147;
Warpath: True Story of the Fighting Sioux, p. 80;
Warpath and Council Fire, p. 235]. Vestal agreed with Grinnell, though Grinnell’s numbers appear considerably higher than Vestal’s.
40. White Man Runs Him—4,000 to 5,000 warriors [Graham,
The Custer Myth, p. 16].
41. PVT Charles A. Windolph—“Altogether there may have been as many as one third of all the Sioux tribesmen here—possibly close to 10,000 out of 30,000. That would figure out somewhere between 2,000 to 3,000 warriors.” [Windolph,
I Fought With Custer, pp. 91 – 92.]
Edgerly, W. S., LT-- “I wish you could see your way to state that Custer found the trail of the village told of by Bradley, that it was approximately about the size estimated by him, that we had no means of knowing or reason for suspecting that it had been reinforced by thousands and finally that upon nearing the village he had every reason to believe the Indians were running away.” Letter to Graham, 16Apr1925;
The Custer Myth, 317.
Windolph, C., PVT-- H-- “Apparently the Indian scouts and experienced old guides knew that there were several thousand of the hostiles, but it is my belief that Custer and most of our officers thought they’d have to whip somewhere between a thousand and fifteen hundred. And they expected most of these to be poorly armed and poorly led. From experience they figured the Indians would fight only a rear-guard action, while the women, children, old men and pony herds got away. But in place of a maximum of 1,500 Indian warriors, it developed that there were possibly twice that number….” Windolph's memoirs, 1946;
I Fought With Custer, 79.
Gerard, F.-- Told Terry he would meet 4,000 warriors. Camp interviews, 22Jan and 3 Apr1909;
Custer in '76, 229.
McDougall, T., CPT-- McDougall thought there were over 3,000 fighting men and he based it on the size of the pony herd. He did not think there were many children. Again, he said between 3,000 and 4,000 warriors and 1,000 women. There was an immense city of tepees. RCOI, 1879;
RCOI, 535.
Payne, J. S., CPT-- 5 Cavalry-- Payne felt—based on speaking to various sources—that there were about 2,500 warriors in the battle. RCOI, 1879;
RCOI, 275.
Varnum, C. A., LT-- “From the estimate of other persons and of Indians and of all I can pick up, I don’t believe there were less than 4,000 warriors in that fight.” RCOI, 1879;
RCOI, 178.
Varnum, C. A., LT-- The normal population with 4,000 warriors would be around 15,000. Varnum felt this was not the case here because he saw many wickiups. He saw many of them at the lower end of the village. RCOI, 1879;
RCOI, 186.
Rosser, Thomas L.-- Civ. Eng.-- Rosser agreed both Reno and Custer were “deceived” as to the strength of the warrior force, then added that he felt Custer “estimated the Indians to be but few….” He based this opinion on a map of the terrain. Rosser related his thoughts that the village went well beyond what eventually was named Ford B, that Custer struck the middle, the Indians were waiting for him, hiding behind the hills as he advanced in the ravines. Response to Reno letter,
NY Herald, 22Aug1876;
The Custer Myth, 230-231.
Godfrey, E. S., LT-- The “sundance” camp was much larger than the others and Godfrey remarked, “It was whilst here that the Indians from the agencies had joined the hostiles’ camp.” Article in
Century Magazine, 1892; "Custer's Last Battle 1876," 18.
Wooden Leg-- Cheyenne-- “Our trail… was from a quarter to half a mile wide at all places where the form of the land allowed that width. Indians regularly made a broad trail when traveling in bands using travois. People behind often kept in the tracks of people in front, but when the party of travelers was a large one there were many of such tracks side by side.” Marquis interviews, 1922-1931;
Wooden Leg, 207.
Herendeen, G.-- The command began again, the trail becoming fresher and fresher. “We passed over places where a number of camps had been quite close together, showing that the Indians were traveling very slowly, and only moving for grass.”
NY Herald, 4Jan1878;
The Custer Myth, 262.
Varnum, C. A., LT-- They went another 8 miles, then camped in an abandoned Indian campsite about two days old. “The signs indicated an immense force, and we were in a hurry to take them by surprise.” Letter to his father, 4Jul1876;
The Custer Myth, 342.
Varnum, C. A., LT-- “We struck not only the trail of the Indians but the entire valley of the Rosebud appeared to have been a camp, where they had moved along as the grass was grazed off.” Memoirs, probably early 1930's;
I, Varnum, 85.
March 24, 1876—Terry telegram to Phil Sheridan: “The most trustworthy scout on the Missouri [viz., Charlie Reynolds] recently in hostile camp reports not less than 2,000 lodges & that the Indians are loaded down with ammunition.” [Connell,
Son of the Morning Star, p. 84]
“General Terry, not unaware of the growing strength of the Sioux, apparently planned to establish a secure base of supplies well up the Yellowstone River… Terry realized that if the hostiles who regularly passed the winter in the valleys of the Yellowstone and Powder rivers should be able to concentrate their warriors in one camp or in contiguous camps, they could not be attacked by a small force without great risk of defeat… the ordinary estimate was three fighting men to a lodge….” [Stewart,
Custer’s Luck, p. 84]
April 1, 1876—Custer telegram to Terry—Charlie Reynolds reports, “from 300 to 600 lodges under Sitting Bull are now en route to (Fort) Berthold.” [Willert,
LBH Diary, p. 219]
By mid-April the Indian camp had grown to somewhere around 400 – 500 lodges with 1,200 – 1,500 warriors. [Stewart,
Custer’s Luck, p. 189]
April 21, 1876, 10:40 AM—Gibbon receives dispatch from Terry—Sioux appear to be in much greater numbers than originally believed…” [Stewart,
Custer’s Luck, p. 114]
April 30, 1876—“The great majority of the warriors who were to overwhelm the Custer command several weeks later were still at the agencies on the Dakota reservation and were just beginning to leave there to join the hostile bands.” [Stewart,
Custer’s Luck, p. 117]
May 7, 1876—LT Egan of Crook’s command met a war party of 100 lodges and some 700 – 800 warriors on the Powder River trail, all heading north. [Stewart,
Custer’s Luck, p. 190]
May 14, 1876—Terry telegram to Sheridan—“It is represented that they have 1,500 lodges, are confident & intend making a stand.” [Connell,
Son of the Morning Star, p. 264] “From this message it is obvious that Terry appreciated the strength of the enemy and should, from an estimate based on the number of lodges, have expected to encounter a force of between 4,500 and 6,000 warriors.” [Stewart,
Custer’s Luck, p. 139]
Agency count shortly after the battle, July, 1876—
Spotted Tail Agency—Prior to the campaign the ration count was 9,610 souls; actual number: 2,315.
Red Cloud Agency—12,873 versus 4,760.
Cheyenne River Agency—7,586 versus 2,280.
Standing Rock Agency—7,322 versus 2,305.
Totals—Instead of the reported 37,391 there were only 11,660 Indians at the reservations just shortly after the battle. [Connell,
Son of the Morning Star, p. 264]
John Gray believed the winter roamers represented less than 20% of the Sioux nation.
From Mark Kellogg, May, 1876 dispatch to the Bismarck
Tribune—“The latest information brought in by scouts from the hostile camps report Sitting Bull as having concentrated his entire camp near the Little Missouri River… [h]is force is given at 1,500 lodges. This estimate would enable him to put at least 3,000 warriors into the field.” [Willert,
LBH Diary, p. 2]
May 24, 1876—
The Chicago Times—“In all there are Cheyennes, Sioux, and others, some 3,000 ready to fight…. They have numerous allies and people well-informed place the actual hostile Indian camp from 7,000 to 8,000 first class fighting men….” [Willert,
LBH Diary, p. 44]
Reuben B. Davenport, correspondent for the
New York Herald—“3,000 bucks have left the Cheyenne Agency on the Missouri to join Crazy Horse. Louis [Richaud] reports that of 42 lodges that went on the warpath from Red Cloud Agency, 17 returned….” [Willert,
LBH Diary, p. 44]
June 6, 1876—dispatch from LTC Michael V. Sheridan to Terry—“Courier from Red Cloud Agency reported… that Yellow Robe… says that 1,800 lodges were on the Rosebud and about to leave for Powder River… and says they will fight and have about 3,000 warriors.” [Willert,
LBH Diary, p. 97]
June 8, 1876—An Indian courier reported at Fort Laramie that there was a great throng of Indians at the mouth of the Tongue: 1,273 lodges under Crazy Horse set to be on its way to the Powder to fight Crook. [Stewart,
Custer’s Luck, p. 190]
Edgar Stewart claimed the Indians used only half their force of warriors to attack Crook, the rest staying back to protect the camp. The camp was said to have contained 12,000 inhabitants. [
Custer’s Luck, pp. 192 and 199, citing the Billings
Gazette, footnote 66] He estimated the Indian force at between 1,000 and 1,500 warriors. [
Custer’s Luck, p. 200] Willert estimated 2,000 warriors. [
LBH Diary, p. 174]
Stewart—Reno reported finding, “a great Indian trail more than half a mile wide made by thousands of trailing lodgepoles.” [
Custer’s Luck, p.234]
Connell—the Indian trail was, “more than a mile wide, the earth so furrowed by thousands of travois poles that it resembled a plowed field.” [
Son of the Morning Star, p. 267]
This is just a brief sampling of the data I have put together to arrive at my opinion. If you like I can provide census data and surrender ledgers as well. There are some who claim none of that proves the Indians on the ledgers or in the census were at the battle and while there is some validity in this argument, my only question would be, if they weren't on the reservation and they surrendered with Sitting Bull or Crazy Horse...? Well, you get my drift.
Actually, losing credibility with
you doesn't make me all that panicked. Not since you put up that post some time ago where you doubted there were any Indians who were on foot confronting Reno. A rather sclerotic argument, wouldn't you say?
As for aiming my work at someone, I am not that pretentious. I do not aim my work at any
one or any
thing. I put up my opinions and I attempt to support them as best I can. I use reason, logic, first-hand testimony and accounts, my own military experience, a good map, an accurate ruler, and a lot of on-the-ground footwork. I also use the experiences of others-- my contemporaries-- and I ask for their opinions, judgments, and findings. I share virtually everything I do, and I have made almost everything I have public, in several articles and one book... so far. I have shared those ideas at seminars and have been invited to do so again, so if anything my "credibility" may be on the upswing. I have also been known to change my mind when the evidence warrants such change. Try it sometime; you will find it refreshing. On this side of the Atlantic, we call it an open mind. I do not know what
you call it... are you familiar with the concept?
Furthermore, should you chose to reject my findings, my reasoning, and my theories, that's fine with me. If you choose to challenge me-- publicly or privately-- just be prepared to offer plenty of "proof," such as we may label it,
for I shall. I do not say or post a thing without being able to support it.
You have hardly shown the same veracity.
Oh, I think the brow furrowed some time on Cemetery Ridge or Last Stand Hill. He was after all, German, not British.
Oh, please, spare me! Such altruism, such dedication and loyalty, such self-sacrifice! Bunkum!
Stay in touch... it's been a pleasure.
Best wishes,
Fred.